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Abstract
This thesis examines how policy practitioners negotiate difficult subjects, specifically 
the difficult subjects entailed in negotiations around community cohesion policy. The 
research applies a governmentality perspective to consider how people working within 
government (using techniques of governmentality to govern populations) are subject 
to regimes of governmentality themselves. A substantial body of the research is based 
on  detailed  ethnographic  work  (both  participant  observation  and  extensive  semi-
structured,  reflexive  qualitative  interviews  with  policy  practitioners)  in  Hackney,  an 
inner London borough with a very diverse population (in terms of ethnicity, economic 
status,  migration  histories,  beliefs  and  experiences).  Hackney  rarely  appears  in 
narratives of community cohesion policy, and local practitioners have framed it as a 
place  that  is  comfortable  with  diversity  –  a  success  story  of  twenty-first  century 
multiculturalism. Often this story is told (in everyday talk and in official documents) by 
reference to places which have come to epitomise 'community cohesion problems', 
specifically Oldham (representing segregation between white and Asian communities, 
the potential for explosive violence),  Barking and Dagenham (standing for problems 
with  a  disenfranchised  'white  working  class'  turning  to  racist  extremism)  and 
Peterborough (as a place coping with sudden large-scale new immigration). The thesis 
follows these narratives, interviewing policy practitioners in each of these places to 
understand how they negotiate community cohesion policy from within the narrative, 
as well as policy practitioners working with local government at the national level who 
shed light on how places, communities and the practice of policy are understood from 
this  location.  The  thesis  raises  questions  of  how  to  understand  practices  of 
government, and the uncomfortable and ambiguous ethical negotiations such practices 
sometimes  entail;  the  importance  of  place  and  place-branding  in  governing;  the 
relationship  of  narrative,  place  and  governing  to  questions  of  material  power 
inequalities; and the potential for understanding government through a 'sociological 
imagination'.
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Introduction: to a sociologist’s imagination
Hannah:  Do you think your background or identity affects how you think about 
cohesion?
Rachel:  God it must do. It must do! I suppose I think that it's not really about me,  
you know that it's something other… we talk about communities... I probably 
think about ethnic minority communities, and people who are poor... And it's 
something  other,  to  me...  something  that  I  watch  rather  than  partake. 
Although actually, that's just so not true, I mean for me personally.1
This extract from an interview with Rachel, a policy practitioner in Hackney, illustrates 
some, if not all, of the themes at the heart of the thesis. Though she begins with a 
separation between herself and 'something other' out there, 'the community' to be 
governed, when I asked Rachel about community cohesion policy in particular, with its 
connotations at least of having a broader remit relevant to 'everyone', Rachel's instinct 
was to say that her suggestion that she lives apart from diversity was 'so not true' (and 
she went on to describe aspects of her home life that supported this assertion). My 
question about whether her 'background or identity' affected how she thought about 
cohesion was deliberately worded openly (see Chapter Two) and based on trends I had 
seen through initial research; and at this prompting, Rachel exclaims that 'It must do!'. 
That is, she has imbibed a type of reflexivity-as-reflex-action when meeting a question 
framed in these terms, even though she adds that her everyday manner is to think of  
'the community' as separate from her (white, professional, middle-class) self. So the 
space between her work of 'doing things to' the community as a local  government 
employee, and being part of a shared community herself (and promoting such a 'whole 
community' vision as part of a local authority) is evident in Rachel's brief comments 
here, as is the suggestion that these two models exist simultaneously. Not only this, but 
Rachel recognises some of these contradictions as she describes them to me (between 
living together with 'others' while seeing them as different to herself, between local 
1 Names  of  interviewees  have  been  changed  to  preserve  anonymity  (see  Chapter  Two).  Within 
interview  excerpts,  an  ellipsis  indicates  that  some speech  has  been  omitted.  Occasionally  short 
affirmations or parts of speech have been omitted without notation, for the sake of clarity.
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government being  for  'everybody'  or  being  about  doing  things  to  others,  between 
being part of the community and part of its government, between recognising (her 
own) power and treating it as an invisible given), but also says that she would usually 
treat them as unseen and unacknowledged. 
Finally,  this  exchange  is  an  emotional  or  affective  one;  it  is  between  two  specific 
people,  Rachel  and myself,  in  the situation  of  a  research  interview where we had 
known each other slightly as colleagues in previous years, where she was senior to me,  
but  where  I  was  interviewing  her  about  subjects  she  may  not  have  previously 
articulated in this way, to analyse later in my own terms, and where we both had some 
idea  (or  assumptions)  about  a  shared  position  as  white  middle  class  female 
professional local authority policy workers in inner London. Thus her anxiety about her 
reading  of  community  is  openly  presented  ('God  it  must  do'),  while  my  only 
intervention following my question is a series of encouraging affirmations ('yeah' and 
'mm', which have been edited out of the extract above for clarity). Rachel, like many 
others, repeatedly said 'you know' as she explored difficult subjects, implicitly drawing 
me  into  a  complicity  or  assumed  understanding  of  how  she  was  exploring  the 
discussion. This apparent empathy in the interview situation allows a certain level of 
vulnerability which is evident in much of the interview data in the thesis, where policy 
practitioners discuss subjects in terms that might be surprising for those unfamiliar 
with these worlds, who might expect them to be experts and to speak fluently and 
cogently about what they mean by 'community' and interventions in it. That kind of 
polished response can of course be found in documents, speeches, and action plans 
produced by many of those I interviewed. But the ability to explore these questions in 
a more open manner, one that stretched boundaries to consider how decisions are 
made  over time,  and how government is practised, was dependent on relationships 
built  around  a  certain  level  of  shared  affect  –  trust,  understanding,  anxiety, 
expectation, obligation – even community.
Affect, emotion2 and relationships are central to this thesis because they are central to 
2 Though I recognise that a distinction is sometimes made between affect (as an embodied feeling)  
and emotion (as  the articulation of  that  feeling)  (Gould,  2010:27),  in  this  thesis  I  follow Ahmed  
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how  organisations,  and  specifically  governing  organisations,  work.  Organisations 
depend on people persuading one another to follow particular courses of action, by 
drawing  on  resources  which  sometimes  include  coercive  or  disciplinary  power;  or 
allusion  to  this  power  through  status  differentials  and  self-regulation  based  on 
acceptance of differences in power and status; or using elements of desire as tools of  
persuasion. All of these resources operate at the level of people doing the persuading, 
choosing,  and  self-regulation  –  within  structural  constraints.  The  workings  of 
organisations are thus mediated through embodied and affective relationships,  and 
experienced in emotional terms. But recognising this does not mean that governing 
and  organisations  are  being  reduced  to  the  irrational,  inexplicable,  or  ineffable. 
Emotions are powerful, and power operates through emotions.
The operation of power through persuasive, emotive means is often enacted through 
the sense-making of narrative techniques. In this sense, policy and government can be 
understood  to  be  about  creating  and  disseminating  compelling  narratives  –  what 
makes a narrative 'compelling' is its affective power. The thesis treats such narratives as 
important,  following  stories  around  both  as  a  strategy  for  analysis  and  for  data 
collection.  Through  the  thesis,  I  follow  multiple  narratives  of  community  cohesion 
policy, of place, of how people understand and explain their own encounters within 
government. This thesis does not attempt to present a narrative of what community 
cohesion policy (or community cohesion) 'is', or even of what government 'is'. Rather, I 
discuss how such concepts are understood and used; and these understandings and 
uses are usually presented in the form of narrative, and thus through appeals to affect 
and intuition.
This is quite a different approach to understanding emotion and well-being in policy-
making  to  that  which  has  recently  gained  a  spike  in  publicity  in  Britain  and 
internationally  (e.g.  Theodoropolou and Zuleeg,  2009;  Wilkinson and Pickett,  2009) 
which  is  characterised  (sometimes  unfairly)  as  'measuring  happiness'.  Within  that 
movement  there  are  differences,  not  least  between  those  interested  in  a  more 
(2004:6) and Sayer (2005:36) in understanding emotions as both embodied and cognitive; as such, I 
tend to use the terms 'affect' and 'emotion' interchangeably.
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developed  sense  of  how  to  understand  'well-being'  beyond  economic  aggregates 
(Stiglitz  et  al,  2009),  and  those  more  interested  in  quantifying  'happiness'  whilst 
ignoring power relations (Mulgan and Davies, 2011). But both of these approaches are 
quite different to a consideration of how power relations and structural inequalities of 
power operate through affective relationships, which is one of my aims in this thesis.
So 'relationships' have more than one resonance here. Because community cohesion is, 
in one simplified version, about 'living together with difference' (a phrase which raises 
a number of questions in itself), it is centrally about (affective) relationships between 
people – which when simplified too far  can become simple 'common sense'  about 
'getting on' which obscures the power relations that might determine why and how 
people are 'different' and why and how they may or may not 'get on' with each other 
(see  Chapter  Three  for  a  detailed  examination  of  the  resonances  of  community 
cohesion policy in its various guises). Discourses which resort to affect and feeling as 
measurable goals of government (and the responsibility of governed individuals) can 
bypass structural causes of problems, and are discussed in relation to theorisation of 
governmentality in Chapter One. 
In Chapter One, Difficult Subjects, I consider the literature on public sociology and on 
governmentality. I argue that existing literature on governmentality (the processes of 
governing that require individuals to take responsibility for making (the right) decisions 
about their lives, in line with societal norms) can be developed to take account of the 
processes  of  governing  through  norms  within structures  of  government.  That  is,  I 
suggest that this thesis will make an original contribution by examining the practices of 
governing, rather than the more usual material of texts and documents used in studies 
of  governmentality.  Further,  I  argue  that  while  attention  to  emotion  in  studies  of 
community cohesion policy have viewed emotionalism as a way of obscuring attention 
to power, we should pay attention to emotive registers as a way in which power is 
exercised. In particular, the potential discomforts of being made aware of inequalities 
of  power,  particularly  those in  which one is  implicated,  are  often experienced and 
articulated emotionally, and this also informs how people respond to such inequalities 
as  agents  within  government.  As  I  argue  in  the  chapter,  policy  practitioners  often 
12
articulate and use sociological analyses to understand and develop their work. In this 
sense,  they  could perhaps  be considered public  sociologists;  and I  consider  recent 
debates about the meanings of public sociology and how these might be articulated 
differently if we allowed sociology, or the academy more widely, to enter and engage 
with the messiness of doing as well as thinking; to intervene as well as to critique. The 
blurred boundaries that are revealed are one of the subjects of this thesis, as I explore 
what it means when sociological analysis is used in the practice of governing, not only 
as  a  technocratic  tool,  but  as  a  way  of  understanding  the  less  visible,  day-to-day 
negotiations of power and their personal consequences.
In Chapter Two, I explore how I put this position into practice through my research 
methodology. I look at how previous research has approached questions of policy and 
particularly community cohesion policy and related subjects. I  argue that there has 
been a lack of attention to the practice of policy and to taking seriously the narratives, 
understandings and compromises made by those involved in practices of governing. 
The chapter shows how I have used an inductive methodology, following narratives 
from within the data, using a variety of methods. The ethnographic element of my 
research  draws  on  my  experiences  from  before  the  research  project  was  officially 
‘underway’,  though my engagement  with  policy  worlds  as  a  practitioner  continued 
throughout. This engagement means I am able to draw on my own experience, though 
I do not assume that this is representative of others'. I had access as an ‘insider’ and, 
later in the thesis, explore some of these situations. Being engaged in the world I was  
researching also provided me with access to,  and relationships of  trust  with,  other 
practitioners.  Through  in-depth,  semi-structured  qualitative  interviews  I  spent  time 
reflecting on and interpreting these practitioners' experiences with them. All  of this 
was informed by use of documentary sources, understanding these not simply as texts 
to be interpreted, but as artefacts-in-use. The rest of that chapter explains some of the 
techniques of analysis I used on the data, and how the inductive, interpretative design 
of the study led me to follow narratives of community cohesion policy that were rooted 
in or anchored against place. As a result, I developed a research design that led from 
local  practitioners  in  Hackney  (and  national  practitioners  engaged  with  local 
government)  to places  which,  as  I  will  show,  often act  as  markers  in  narratives  of 
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community  cohesion  policy,  namely  Oldham,  Barking  and  Dagenham,  and 
Peterborough.
Chapter  Three  explores  these  narratives  in  more  detail,  though  not  in  a  typical 
chronological  form.  To  understand  the  ways  that  community  cohesion  policy  is 
understood, I look at how meanings and ideas are grouped into sets of intertwining 
narratives which support but also contradict one another, but are all easily identified in 
accounts of 'what community cohesion means'. This chapter provides context for the 
rest of the empirical material in the thesis by following four narratives, each of which 
provides a set of coordinates with which policy practitioners navigate their accounts of 
community  cohesion  policy's  development.  Each  draws  on  a  history  of  parallel 
moments  and  understandings  which  resonate  with  contemporary  events;  each 
combines  a  moment  or  series  of  moments  seen  as  turning  points  in  the  policy's 
development; and for each, a particular place or group of places have become symbolic 
of  the  narrative  and  its  associations.  Firstly,  the  'origin'  of  community  cohesion  is 
explained as a response to inner city deprivation and ethnic segregation, resulting in a 
history of 'parallel lives' lived by 'Asian' and 'white' communities in towns in northern 
England; the turning point of violent disturbances in those towns in 2001 resonates 
with  histories  of  inner  city  riots  in  earlier  decades  but  in  this  case  resulted  in 
government-sponsored  reports  naming  'community  cohesion'  –  interaction  across 
bounded communities – as a cause of tension (because of its lack) and a prescription 
for avoiding future problems. Though early responses described isolated communities 
as 'Asian', subsequent developments related to the international 'war on terror' shifted 
the conception of the problem to be one of Muslim segregation from 'wider society'. 
This  also  resulted  in  a  controversial  off-shoot  of  community  cohesion  policy,  the 
Preventing  Violent  Extremism  (PVE)  programme,  which  focused  exclusively  on 
preventing Muslims from becoming terrorists,  and is  explored at  length in  Chapter 
Four. Because of the linking of community cohesion policy's origins to reports into the 
2001 disturbances, these narratives of segregation and violence are often called up 
simply by reference to Oldham, Bradford or Burnley, or 'the northern towns'. 
The second narrative of community cohesion that I discuss in Chapter Three describes 
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community cohesion problems associated with another problem group, this time 'the 
white working class'.  I  explore how the idea of a 'white backlash',  here rhetorically  
linked  to  classed  exclusion,  is  linked  to  mainstream  liberal  discourses  about  'the 
problems with multiculturalism'. I suggest that these debates, like many of those linked 
to community cohesion policy, slip between meanings, as 'multiculturalism' comes to 
symbolise quite different things even among those who oppose it;  and that  clarity 
about the difference between multiculture (as a lived experience) and multiculturalism 
(as a name used to denote a number of ideologies) is often lacking. More recently, this  
discourse has become associated with electoral successes of the far right racist British 
National Party (BNP), and this success has largely been attributed to a dissatisfied and 
neglected 'white working class'. I argue that  'white working class' is problematic as an 
analytic category because it undermines the solidarity of 'working class' by suggesting 
that only white people are working class; it confuses understandings of the reasons for 
exclusion as being associated with ethnicity or race, rather than class; the way the term 
is used taints those who do identify as white and working class as being innately racist 
or misguided; and importantly, it allows 'the white middle class' to suggest that virulent 
racism is not their responsibility. In discussions of community cohesion policy, this set 
of ideas is often signified simply by reference to Barking and Dagenham, the outer  
London local authority which notoriously elected 12 BNP councillors between 2006 and 
2010.
The third narrative in Chapter Three draws on ideas of the British (English) countryside 
as an innately white and normative symbol of nation, now threatened by immigration. 
Such  images  are  long-standing,  but  migration  to  rural  areas  increased through the 
2000s as a result firstly of the national asylum seeker dispersal programme, and later 
due to the expansion of the EU and associated arrival of labour migrants. In community 
cohesion policy narratives, this new migration is seen as quite different to older models 
of  migration  from  Commonwealth  countries,  and  its  scale  and  speed  is  seen  as 
challenging local communities and infrastructure which may be unable to cope. Though 
less associated with a specific place than the earlier two narratives, there are repeated 
examples  of  Peterborough  being  used  as  an  example  of  a  place  experiencing  this 
change,  and in  Chapter  Six  I  explore  this  association further.  The final  narrative  of 
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community cohesion policy in this chapter is that of 'super-diversity', that is, the idea 
of the inner city transformed from a fearful  place to a place of opportunity,  where 
ongoing migration and other forms of diversity enhance life rather than harm it, not 
least in providing opportunities for consumption. In this context, community cohesion 
policy appears to have less relevance because the sheer complexity of diversity means 
that  groups simply  'rub  along'  without  forming large  enough factions  to  segregate 
themselves or create tensions. I suggest that Hackney in inner London is often used as 
an axiomatic example of this ideal of a super-diverse future, but remains haunted by 
less  optimistic  histories  and  their  legacies,  particularly  in  terms  of  economic 
inequalities. Hackney may be an awkward fit for community cohesion policy, but this in 
turn makes it a productive site from which to study the negotiations made by policy  
practitioners in adapting national priorities to local contexts.
In Chapter Four, I enter directly into the world of the policy practitioner in Hackney, 
drawing on ethnographic data from my experiences as a policy practitioner negotiating 
the  Preventing  Violent  Extremism  programme  and  its  relationship  to  community 
cohesion policy. The difficult subjects this negotiation entailed were many: not just the 
difficulty of the assumption embedded in the PVE programme that all Muslims (and 
only  Muslims)  were  at  risk  of  becoming  terrorists  and  therefore  required  special 
attention but also, importantly, the relationship between central and local government; 
the ability of local practitioners to determine local problems and solutions; and the role 
of  local  government  in  relation  to  the  police  and  security  services.  This  chapter 
demonstrates the work done by practitioners to manage their unease with some policy 
narratives, by working around and through some of the silences and assumptions of  
'official', written presentations of policy documents. My attention to the practices of 
policy differs from other analyses of PVE and community cohesion policy which have 
remained at the level of documentary analysis, thereby missing some of the  uses of 
policy narratives in practice.  
Chapter Five broadens out to consider the governance of place, as experienced and 
negotiated in Hackney. Place is important to the negotiation of community cohesion 
policy  because it  is  largely  imagined as  articulated through local  places  and place-
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identity.  The  treatment  of  community  cohesion  policy  as  a  local  solution  to  local 
problems  can  be  imagined  as  a  way  of  evading  attention  to  national  and  global 
determinants of inequality which structure relationships at the local level. I consider 
how policy practitioners in Hackney negotiate the resonant histories and narratives 
associated with their  place,  to  establish  narratives  of  belonging  which try  to  make 
sense of  local  needs,  change and futures within the possibilities allowed by power 
settlements  between  local  and  central  government  and  global  flows  of  capital.  I 
explore how efforts to create a sense of place are challenged by local activists who 
attempt to reveal some of the inequalities of power and control which operate in the 
making  of  local  place,  but  who,  outside  of  government,  are  not  subject  to  the 
commitments  and obligations  of  policy  practitioners.  I  use  theories  of  branding  to 
demonstrate how the debates about place in Hackney draw on resonant and affective 
narratives; but I  suggest that my case differs from more usual  treatments of place-
branding, as the struggles I discuss are over the rights to claim an authentic voice of  
place, rather than simply attempts to sell the place to outsiders.
Chapter Six broadens the consideration of place and brand to engage with three other 
localities that have become associated with community cohesion policy in the way I 
suggested in Chapter Three. By engaging with policy practitioners in those three places, 
I  consider  how local  places are constructed in narrative  in  opposition to simplified 
'elsewheres'. I show how practitioners are aware of how their local areas are treated in 
this way, and protest about such simplifying frameworks – while they in turn use other 
places as a similar shorthand. Further, I examine how policy practitioners react to the 
treatment of  their  local  area as a marker for community cohesion narratives – not 
necessarily by disputing the narrative outright, but by trying to subvert it. The power of 
these narratives is such that practitioners do not dismiss them, but use them as an 
opportunity for rebranding, reworking the attention they gain from a bad community 
cohesion reputation to showcase their  achievements in that  field or  others.  In this 
case,  narrative  and  brand  are  being  used  as  a  tool  within  the  worlds  of  local 
government  competition,  where  places  vie  for  reputational  credit  as  a  means  of 
gaining  central  government  approval,  funding  and  recognition  as  sites  of  'good 
practice'. This competition in the quasi-market of public sector reputation and league 
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tables  is  an  example  of  the translation  into practice  of  Third Way governmentality 
outlined in Chapter One, and as a result the priorities of local authorities are shaped as 
much by the need to present a positive image in policy worlds (to attract funds and  
support for initiatives to meet local people's needs) as by locally instigated priorities.
In  Chapter  Seven,  I  draw on findings  across  the thesis  which bring us  back  to the 
‘governors’  themselves. I consider how the difficult subjects of power inequalities and 
the recognition of the power of simplifying narratives make many policy practitioners 
uncomfortable, particularly when reflecting on these issues in the research interview. 
The strategies interviewees used to negotiate these uncomfortable positions varied. I 
argue that the recognition of systematic discrimination and disadvantage of particular 
gendered, classed or racialised groups has become embedded in policy worlds to the 
extent that practitioners often note it almost as a reflex action (as we saw in Rachel's  
comments  above).  But  the  result  is  not  always  emancipating.  Indeed  some 
interviewees  used  this  starting  point  to  re-establish  themselves  as  privileged  (for 
example, as a middle class heterosexual white man) and therefore 'neutral'. Others, 
though, reflected on the impossibility of neutrality and what this means for the role of 
the  bureaucrat.  Some  found  community  cohesion  policy,  or  associated  subjects, 
difficult to talk about because of the risk of exposure of their own privileged position in 
society,  and  many  sought  to  find  a  more  comfortable  speaking  position  by 
demonstrating how they, too, had somehow been marginalised and therefore could 
speak authentically about oppression. I close this chapter by suggesting that perhaps 
the  most  powerful  techniques  for  speaking  about  the  inequalities  and consequent 
tensions which community cohesion policy (sometimes) tries to address came from 
those practitioners  who recognised their  own uncomfortable  position but  spoke in 
solidarity with (rather than on behalf of) groups they saw as oppressed.
Finally, Chapter Eight draws the empirical evidence together around four main themes 
of  the thesis,  showing how my research presents an original  contribution,  firstly to 
understandings of governmentality as process, by examining the negotiations of policy 
in practice (the conduct of the conduct of conduct) and how governors themselves are 
also subject to processes of governmentality and self-regulation. Secondly,  I  discuss 
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how the construction of narratives, what they allow to be said and what is silenced, 
can have the effect of masking power relations. In the case of community cohesion 
policy, I discuss how my research demonstrates that attempts to expose and address 
inequality  can  be  reincorporated  into  narratives,  silencing  attempts  at  more 
progressive imaginings of society. Thirdly, I demonstrate how the role and functioning 
of local government is a difficult subject in itself, an often unspoken subject of struggle 
in the negotiations I have mapped, and that this constant questioning of what local 
government should  be,  or  is,  able  to do – a  mixture  of  promise  and frustration –  
creates  uncomfortable  positions  for  policy  practitioners  working  within  it.  Finally,  I 
argue  that  the  thesis  has  shown  how  the  linking  of  individual  moments  and 
relationships (often experienced through emotion) and societal power structures is not 
limited  to  the  imaginations  of  sociologists  or  academics.  I  argue  that  many  policy 
practitioners encountered in this research made such links, but that their role was not 
simply to develop such understandings, but to attempt to use them in the negotiation 
and exercise of power. As my research shows, doing so is not easy or comfortable. It is 
often navigated through the use of narratives that draw on unspoken resonances and 
affective reactions. Developing, interpreting and using such narratives is a skill in itself. 
The importance of understanding the power of emotion in policy is not so much about 
emotion as an output of policy,  or  an abdication of attention to material  relations.  
Rather,  it  is  about  understanding  how  material  relations  of  power  are  mediated 
through personal relationships and emotional reactions, and that to influence power 
inequalities it is necessary to understand such emotional resonances.
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Chapter One: Difficult Subjects
Introduction
There  are  contradictions  within  community  cohesion  policy,  but  how  are  these 
negotiated? They are not instigated by a monolithic state, but developed, argued over, 
manipulated, translated and refracted through multiple exchanges between individuals 
and organisations. Thinking about how these contradictions are negotiated and used 
opens up aspects of  knowledge about processes of government, and provides new 
ways to understand or challenge such policies, how they come to be and what their  
consequences might be.
In  this  thesis  I  do not  set out  to address the efficacy or  application of  community  
cohesion policy (for which see e.g. Cheshire, 2007; Hudson et al, 2007; Muir, 2008); to 
provide  a  theoretical  basis  for  ideals  of  community  cohesion,  justifications  for 
developing it as a programme of government, or the evaluation of its application (for 
which see e.g. Cantle, 2005; Ratcliffe and Newman, 2011; Wetherell et al, 2007). Nor 
do I intend the thesis as a normative critique of community cohesion policy discourse;  
a  literature on this  already exists  where the assumptions,  methods and findings of 
community  cohesion  policy  and  its  supporting  research  have  been  systematically 
critiqued (e.g.  Ben-Tovim, 2002; McGhee, 2003, 2005; Burnett,  2004, 2007; Worley,  
2005).
My research is a study not of community cohesion policy, but of the processes through 
which it is shaped and enacted. There are three aspects to this: 1) understanding that 
government or the state is not monolithic, and is itself made up of people, institutions 
and practices (Foucault, 1991 [1978]:103); 2) understanding how people act as agents 
of change in producing, negotiating and translating policies of governmentality; and 3) 
recognising that such people are themselves subject to governing processes (both as 
everyday citizens and within the professional context).
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I use community cohesion policy as the example for this research because this focus 1) 
relates  to  questions  such  as  community  and  responsibility  which  are  central  to 
'governmentality';  2) highlights the importance of the practice and use of discourse 
through community cohesion's shifting and unstable meaning, and the questions that 
relevant  policy  statements  leave  unresolved;  and  3)  creates  space  for  attempts  to 
engage with the changing context of  larger themes including the nature of  society,  
identity,  inequality,  migration and belonging.  Community cohesion policy,  like many 
other policy ideas, is overdetermined – in the sense that it is determined many times 
over,  by  different  readings  at  different  times  by  different  individuals  in  different 
contexts; 'by memory, by meaning, by social relations' (Pile, 2005:12). 
The emergence of the concept of 'community cohesion' is not a single, straightforward 
path  to  trace.  Ideas  merge  and  filter  through  numerous  lineages,  unions  and 
resonances (Osborne and Rose, 1999: 384). In this chapter I will explore the rationale 
for  looking  at  the  ways  these resonances  are  expressed and used within  everyday 
contexts of governing. By engaging with policy practitioners and their reflections on the 
processes  of  governing,  I  uncover  how sociological  imaginations  are  used in  public 
spheres; and perhaps the potential for this to be developed. In doing so, I try to both 
demystify the practice of government and understand how complex its operation, at 
the micro-level, can be.
This approach builds on what  Rose describes as 'analytics of government', seeking to 
'diagnose an array of lines of thought, of will, of invention, of programmes and failures, 
of acts and counter-acts' (1999b:21). Rose describes this type of study as concerned 
with  'regimes  of  truth'  or  'regimes  of  enunciation';  not  interested  in  identifying 
essential authorial intentions, but in examining what is said, by whom, how it is said, 
and with what authority. This is a field of struggle, change and flux:
It is not so much a question of what a word or a text 'means'... but of analysing  
the way a word or a book functions in connection with other things, what it makes 
possible, the surfaces, networks and circuits around which it flows, the affects and 
passions that it mobilizes and through which it mobilizes (1999b:29).
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While  Rose's  work  examines  not  just  texts  but  these  relationships  between  texts, 
actions and contexts, his approach is historical, and therefore much of the empirical 
data he investigates are printed or physical documents or secondary literature, much as 
in the work of Michel Foucault. My research aims to get closer to the living, usually 
unrecorded elements of government, by engaging with the reflections of individuals 
working with and producing the kind of documentation that historians might later find 
to analyse.  In the process, of course, I make these reflections into texts; I will discuss 
further the status I give to this data in Chapter Two. At this point I want to establish  
that my approach is an understanding of processes of governmentality in action and in 
production,  which  builds  on  existing  governmentality  theory  but  takes  a  more 
immediate approach – and engages with individuals at once governed and governing.
In this chapter I will first explain my object of study (how government is conducted) 
and  the  thinking  behind  this  theoretical  approach,  building  on  understandings  of 
governmentality first articulated by Michel Foucault, and particularly as elaborated on 
by Nikolas Rose. I will consider existing sociological work on community cohesion policy 
in the context of New Labour government in Britain,  and explain how my attention to 
the negotiation of  policy by practitioners adds to this literature.  I  will  suggest how 
considering affect in processes of government will help to develop an understanding of 
ethico-politics  in  practice.  Finally,  I  will  reflect  on  how  emotion  and  affect  are 
instrumentalised through narratives attached to place, and the organisation of these 
emotions  into  competitive  performance  measures  within  the  logic  of  governing 
through governmentality.
The sociological imagination and ethico-politics
Community  cohesion  policy  is  formed  by  multiple  resonances,  not  least  the 
relationship between two sometimes apparently separate, but usually interpenetrating 
worlds – on the one hand academic theory and research, on the other policy makers 
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and practitioners. Of course these 'two worlds' are not internally homogeneous and 
they do not operate separately from one another. In this chapter I trace some of the 
influences and confluences in and between them, and in doing so explore the context 
for the emergence of community cohesion policy to consider how those echoes and 
influences work in action.
This  research  is  an  exploration  of  the  sociological  imagination  (Mills,  1999  [1959]) 
outside the academy. More recent debates about the reach of sociology beyond the 
university were given impetus by a speech to the American Sociological Association 
(ASA)'s annual conference in 2004 by its President, Michael Burawoy (2004). Burawoy's 
gist was that sociological insights should be made available to the public and that this 
may involve political and ethical (or in his term, 'moral') engagement. I share Burawoy's 
desire to promote engaged sociological thinking in the world. What I find problematic  
is  his  characterisation  of  the  practice  of  sociological  research,  and  his 
compartmentalisation  of  public  engagement  within  his  vision  of  the  discipline's 
interactions with the rest of the world (reservations also noted by others e.g. Brady,  
2004; Calhoun, 2005; Tittle, 2004). In particular, the move to a discussion of 'public 
sociology' loses some of the power that thinking with a 'sociological imagination' can 
offer (see also Back, 2007b).
Burawoy  describes  four  types  of  sociology:  professional  sociology,  policy  sociology, 
critical  sociology and public sociology (2004:1607). Policy and public sociology both 
have  audiences  outside the academy,  but  while  policy  sociology  is  concerned with 
instrumental knowledge, public sociology is concerned with reflexive knowledge. Policy 
sociology is accountable to clients or patrons (such as the state, businesses or NGOs), 
while public sociology is accountable only to 'designated publics'.  The risk of policy 
sociology is 'servility',  while the pathology of public sociology is 'faddishness'. Policy 
sociology is about doing, whereas public sociology is about thinking. What government 
(in the sense of 'the state') uses is policy sociology; public sociology (and therefore 
reflexive use of  sociological  ideas) is  reserved for civil  society.  Alongside policy and 
public  sociologies  sit  professional  and  critical  sociology,  which  reproduce  the 
instrumental/reflexive knowledge distinction within the academy.
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Burawoy  concedes  that  there  is  not  a  watertight  distinction  between  his  types  of 
sociology,  and that  each  is  internally  complex,  and may be practised  by  the  same 
sociologist over time (or at once). He acknowledges too that there are variations in 
how the disciplinary field is constructed in different national contexts, whereas he is 
speaking specifically to a US audience. Even accepting this qualification for the sake of 
argument,  there  are  problems.  The  key  concern  for  my  current  discussion  is  the 
assumption that the use of sociology by the state will  be necessarily unreflexive or 
even malign (Brady, 2004:1634-5).
In my view, an important goal  of public sociology should be making the means for 
discussions that question power relations and their workings available in all realms of 
society (see also Back, 2007b:114). Dialogue and questioning are envisaged as central 
to sociology in Mills' conception of the sociological imagination as:
a quality of mind that will help [people] to use information and to develop reason 
in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what  
may be happening within themselves. (1999 [1959]:5)
and 
the capacity to shift from one perspective to another... to range from the most 
impersonal  and  remote  transformation  to  the  most  intimate  features  of  the 
human self – and to see the relations between the two. (1999 [1959]:7)
In  this  thesis  I  want  to  think  about  how  this  public  sociology,  or  sociological 
imagination,  works  within  the  structures  of  government  and  policy-making.  It  is 
important to recognise not only that non-sociologists sometimes think in similar ways 
to  sociologists,  but  also that  in  some cases  it  is  not  so easy to draw a distinction 
between who is  'a  sociologist'  and  who is  not  (Farrar,  2008),  and that  sociological  
theories and ideas can be translated and re-inflected outside the academy with or 
without the academy's 'consent'. There is potential to intervene in different ways if we 
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feel that sociology is being misunderstood or misapplied; but in doing so we should 
recognise that non-professional sociologists have their own insights and expertise – for 
example, thinking about how other, perhaps more radical, forms of sociology could be 
transformed into practical  tools  for  use  within governing and policy,  or  challenging 
government and policy.
Quite different approaches to understanding policy and government have been taken 
by many working in political science, public administration or state theory. My work is  
distinct from much of the traditional study of government and governing in three main 
ways: 1) political science traditions tend to focus on national rather than local scales, 
and on institutions rather than people; 2) their approaches to knowledge production 
are largely descriptive and/or prescriptive of institutional models and abstraction; and 
3)  they  tend  to  have  an  opacity  about  research  methods,  allied  to  these 
understandings  of  government  as  institutional,  abstract,  and  perfectible.  In  this 
institutional focus, local government studies can appear to operate without people or 
places – the stuff of social interaction. Following others (Back, 2007b:160-163; Burnett 
and  Duncan,  2008;  Keith,  2008b),  I  begin  from  an  understanding  of  government, 
governing and policy-making as messy,  unruly and contingent,  involving  people  and 
happening in places. 
There is a preoccupation with macro-scales in the work on British government, with 
much more interest in national than local government (Jessop, 2003:108-9; Rhodes, 
1988). This is replicated in the study of local government, where a substantial body of 
literature  focuses  on  the  relationships  between  institutions,  while  neglecting  the 
people who make up those institutions  (e.g.  Jones,  1995;  Rhodes,  1988:46;  Stoker, 
2004;  Wolman,  1995) –  despite  occasional  case  studies  of  specific  individuals  in 
leadership  positions  (e.g.  Gains,  1995:92).  This  treatment  of  government  as  best 
understood  at  large  scales  can  also  be  seen  in  Jessop's  reading  of  Foucault  to 
understand  'micro-power'  as  a  'perspective'  which  can  be  applied  to  'the  global 
strategies of the state' (Jessop, 2007:39), without necessarily requiring an engagement 
with interactions  on a micro level.  Even where attempting to discuss relationships, 
negotiations and partnerships, there remains a tendency to treat institutions (or parts 
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of institutions, or professions, or even 'the public') as if they think and act as one (e.g.  
Rhodes, 1988:46-7; Stoker, 2004:79). 
Perhaps  as  a  result,  such  studies  describe  institutional  relations  and  functions  in 
abstract  terms,  and/or  prescribe  alternative  models.  Questions  of  whether  central 
control  of  local  government is  too hierarchical,  of  whether local  government is  run 
efficiently,  and  of  the  distinction  between  government  and  governance  tend  to 
dominate this literature  (Hood, 1991, 1998; Pyper and Robins, 2000;  Stewart, 2003; 
Stoker, 2004:168; Wolman, 1995). Some writers in this school have recognised that 
such  abstractions  can  be  far  removed  from  real  interactions  between  people  in 
government – yet their subsequent attempts to 'put people back in' to such models 
within political science frameworks tend to start from the model, attempting to amend 
it  to  fit  observations,  rather  than  beginning  with  empirical  experiences  (Dunleavy,  
1991:259; Hood, 1998; Rhodes, 1997, 2002).
These  epistemological  starting  points  lead  to  tendency  towards  research  methods 
connected  to  historical  and  legal  approaches,  that  is,  largely  using  archival  and 
documentary sources – perhaps with interviews and observations – but with a general 
lack of  attention to the provenance of  data (e.g.  Stoker, 2004:78; Stone,  1995).  An 
apparent cultural  turn has provoked some attention to ethnographic methods from 
previously more traditional researchers (e.g. Rhodes, 2002); but the debates between 
Bevir  and  Rhodes  (2008)  and  Marsh  (2008a,  2008b)  over  epistemology  and 
methodology suggest that political  scientists may gain from a more interdisciplinary 
approach and a greater familiarity with the type of sociological perspective explored in 
this thesis. More recent interest in citizen engagement (e.g. Brannan et al, 2007) may 
have broadened understandings of the object of study to consider individual actors, 
but most studies continue to favour a focus on individuals interacting with, rather than 
constituting government or the state (Hunter, 2003). Similarly, recognition that there 
may be messiness or reflexivity within processes of policy and governing tend to be 
limited to asking whether policy practitioners understand that policies may 'fail', rather 
than questioning whether or how practitioners negotiate and constitute the meanings 
and  practices  of  policy  (and  its  success  or  failure)  (e.g.  Jessop,  2003:110;  Stoker, 
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2004:1).
These criticisms of political economy approaches to the study of government should 
not suggest that there have not been other studies of local government practice which 
engage with policy practitioners, and contextualise their practice. There is a a literature 
which uses  a  less  embedded ethnographic  methodology but  still  accounts  for  local 
government  practice  without  the  political  economist  tendency  to  attempt  to  build 
predictive models from the findings (e.g. Boddy and Fudge, 1984; Lansley et al, 1989).  
Likewise,  a  body  of  work  applying  a  more  ethnographic  lens  to  local  government 
through  interviewing  and  observation  of  policy  practitioners  exists,  largely  focused 
around particular issues such as race relations (e.g. Ben-Tovim et al, 1986; Solomos and 
Back,  1995;  Young  and  Connelly,  1981).  More  recently,  critical  sociologists  have 
extended this work to engage with government practitioners' negotiations of their own 
identities  within  practices  of  governance,  though  largely  focusing  on  specific 
professions such as social workers or politicians (Hunter, 2003, 2004; Mayo et al, 2007; 
Puwar,  1997,  2001,  2004;  Lewis,  2000).  My  work  adds  to  this  literature  by 
understanding  the  relationship  between  individual  negotiations  and  wider  power 
structures through the experiences and reflections of practitioners who are at once 
responsible for governing, but often feel their power is limited; by both understanding 
this relationship through a sociological imagination and reflecting on how practitioners 
themselves negotiate policy with an understanding of the connections between the 
personal and the structural.
In the process of my research, the understandings of social problems that participants 
expressed were rarely described with explicit reference to social theorists or theories 
(though sometimes they were). They were very often inflected by them though, either 
by 'folk sociologies' (Sayer, 2005:20) or by half-remembered insights from books, radio, 
television  or  newspapers  –  or  policy  documents  and  conferences.  Occasionally, 
participants would express frustration at the limits of the models at their disposal for 
understanding  the  complex  social  problems we were  discussing.  They  would  often 
describe  the  workings  of government  in  pragmatic,  ethnographic  terms  that 
emphasised the everyday and contingent, alongside their presentation of the formal 
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model  of  how  governing  is  supposed  to  work.  They  would  provide  their  own 
theorisations about these forms of cognitive dissonance. 
If  the  policy  practitioners  I  interviewed  could  see  a  lack  in  the  means  that  were  
available  for  describing  social  problems;  if  they  were  very  articulate  in  noting  the 
language games of policy process and policy discourses; if they came to very similar 
conclusions to many (albeit more rigorously argued and evidenced) academic papers 
on  the  subject;  were  they  not  using  sociological  imaginations,  practising  public 
sociology? And more pressingly, if they could see these dissonances, how did they deal 
with them? How did these policy practitioners practice, to varying extents, a form of  
public sociology?
It is useful to think about the practice of policy through the lens of governmentality 
and ethico-politics. Rose (1999b) uses the term 'ethico-politics' to consider government 
in the context of re-thinking the world beyond previous schematics of easily divisible 
and  mechanical  workings  of  discrete  nation  states,  to  take  account  of  new  flows, 
challenges and undercurrents (p2). In this less certain world, a
new ethical politics... refuses the idea that politics is a matter of state, parliament,  
election  and  party  programme...  demanding  that  individuals,  families, 
communities, employers take back to themselves the powers and responsibilities 
that... have been acquired by states, politicians and legislators (pp.2-3).
The  communitarian  turn  Rose  characterises  as  dominating  ethico-political  trends 
attempts to counter this uncertainty by referring to a common core of shared values.
This  core  can  thus  form  the  basis  of  an  ethico-politics  which  overcomes  the 
contradiction between the need to respect autonomy and diversity on the one 
hand, and the need for some basis for authoritative judgements of good and bad, 
right and wrong, on the other (p.170).
This  is  a  politics  with rising demands  from all  points  on the political  spectrum for 
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control  to  be  removed  from  the  state  to  the  level  of  the  individual,  family  or 
community, who take responsibility for making (the right) decisions about their lives. 
Whereas  bio-politics  used  disciplinary  power  to  maximise  the  physical  health  and 
welfare  of  populations  of  docile  individuals,  ethico-politics  uses  culture  and 
consumption  to  encourage  moral  self-government  by  individuals.  This  depends  on 
autonomy of the individual, while reinforcing norms (the 'shared core' of values) that 
strongly  encourage  individuals  to  behave  in  a  certain  way,  to  produce  beneficial 
outcomes.  Ethico-politics  'individualizes  and  normalizes',  by  developing  the  'self-
techniques  necessary  for  responsible  self-government'  (p.  188).  But  the  sharing  of  
norms and responsibilities, couched in an appeal to a morality of 'community', does 
not eliminate the possibility for tension, or the need to negotiate the diversity and 
difference of individuals in a population (p. 170).
This  central  appeal  to  'community'  is  one  obvious  reason  for  treating  community 
cohesion as an exemplar of ethico-political interventions. The ethico-politics described 
by Rose attempts to treat individual choices about one's life as technical decisions, for 
which there are measurable pros and cons; and where ethical and moral judgements 
about the costs and benefits to oneself and to others are based on these measurable 
criteria.  By  looking  at  the  way  community  cohesion  policy  is  negotiated,  we  can 
consider how the cross-over between private and public  ethical  responsibilities are 
played out by individuals working within the traditional forms of the state. To devise 
and  to  practice  ethico-political  interventions  involves  some  level  of  sociological 
imagination,  some analytical  consideration  of  the  relations  between individual  and 
society.
The pattern of individualisation and normalisation is replicated in professional as well 
as  personal  life.  In institutions of  government,  professional  expertise is  increasingly 
subject to the managerial  techniques of  audit  (Power,  1999),  while  the doctrine of 
'double  devolution'  (Miliband,  2006)  professes  an  increased  freedom  for  local 
government from central  government  control  (and for  residents'  groups  from local 
government)  –  so  long  as  contractual  and  audit  requirements  are  met.3 These 
3 What will become of this agenda under the rubric of 'The Big Society' promoted by the coalition 
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phenomena  are  exemplified  in  the  development  of  community  cohesion  policy:  a 
formula intended to produce measurable and accountable results, while having moral 
force; which is spoken of as needing to fit local circumstances, and to be nationally 
comparable; and where the relationship between individuals and society is mediated 
by an appeal to community (e.g. COIC, 2007:4-5). 
If community cohesion is achieved through individual and group behaviours, then the 
task of organisations and policies of government is simply to enable individuals and 
groups to make the proper ethical decisions which will enable cohesion. Trevor Phillips,  
as Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, suggested that 'integration is a learned 
competence  –  like  maths  or  driving  a  car'  (Phillips,  2005).  If  integration (closely 
associated with the language of cohesion) is simply a skill or craft to be learned, then 
the task of government is to provide the means to learn; the responsibility of citizens is 
to learn and apply this skill. The following extract from a Home Office cohesion strategy 
exemplifies this approach:
This strategy is  also about looking beyond opportunities for individuals,  to the 
importance of strengthening society.  This is not something that the Government  
can do alone, but it is an issue on which we can give a lead: helping people come  
together from different backgrounds;  supporting people to contribute to society; 
and taking  a stand against  racism and extremists  who promote hatred (Home 
Office, 2005b:5, my emphasis).
Here, the role of government is to 'help' and 'support' people to make the right choices 
and to behave in an appropriate way. People are expected to do this not (only) for their  
individual benefit, but for the good of society; but their responsibility for doing so is an 
individual  responsibility.  The  normative  behaviours  are  specified  by  the  state,  but 
ensuring they are followed is an individual ethical responsibility. This ethico-politics is a 
form  of  thinking  that  has  come to  be  associated  in  Britain  with  the  'New  Labour 
government  from 2010 remains  to  be seen  at  the time  of  writing.  The ethico-political  trend of  
responsibilisation seems likely to continue or increase, but it is unclear how the element of audit,  
management and measurement by experts will develop as the government's ambition to shrink the  
state proceeds (see Chapter Eight for more reflections on this).
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project'.
Governmentality and New Labour
Community  cohesion  has  been  very  much  a  New  Labour  concept  (Burnett,  2007; 
Thompson, 2002; Szreter, 1999; Schofield, 2002). The Third Way approach championed 
by  Anthony  Giddens  ('Blair's  favourite  intellectual'  (Richards,  2005))  favours  social 
democracy over socialism or liberalism; pragmatism over ideology; and populism over 
redistribution (Temple, 2000; Lister, 2001). It is a project which situated itself at the 
supposed 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992), where the end of the Cold War apparently 
signalled  a  future  without  enemies  of  liberal  democracy.  As  a  consequence,  the 
political  project  associated  with  Tony  Blair  in  the  UK  and  Bill  Clinton  in  the  USA 
declared the failure of state socialism and the need to regulate capitalism. This could, 
and  has  been,  represented as  'post-Thatcherite'  politics  (Giddens,  2000:8),  yet  the 
defining element of New Labour politics seems to be that there is not an unambiguous 
core,  but  an  ambivalence  in  policy  and  rhetoric;  an  approach  that  was  key  to  its 
electoral  success,  but  has  also  provoked  criticism  (Back  et  al,  2002;  Beynon  and 
Kushnick,  2003;  Gilroy,  2001;  Hall,  1998;  Lister,  2001;  Solomos,  2003:89).  This 
ambiguity relates directly to the ethico-political contradiction of the obligation to be 
free within a market-led framework (Rose, 1999b:83); the opportunity to make one's 
own choices but to be punished if these choices are not in line with political and policy 
aspirations.
In  bringing  together  these  forms  of  managerialism,  measurement  of  performance 
intended to value equality, and empowerment of local people and communities, the 
New  Labour  government  presented  itself  as  enabling  a  populist  and  progressive 
consensus (Blair, 2002). It is unsurprising that this concern for consensus emerged in a 
context where the 'end of history' thesis suggested that there was no longer room for 
ideological  conflict.  This approach discounted the complexity of  politics as struggle, 
despite the new social  movements and persistence of ideological  conflict that have 
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become much more difficult to ignore in the light of international global protest, the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 'war on terror' more generally (Mayo, 2005). The 
challenges  that  this  still  tumultuous  world  presents  provoke  new  attempts  at 
communitarian solutions, such as those of community cohesion policy or social capital 
theory. 
This form of government has called on sociological expertise, but perhaps more the 
form of  policy sociology described in Burawoy's  typology than the public  sociology 
dialogue  or  sociological  imagination  that  might  leave  room  for  questioning  or 
uncertainty. There are limitations to this literature in terms of theoretical coherence 
and practical application or efficacy. Why, then, has it been so influential? There are 
three explanations for this. Firstly, it has gained prominence and respectability at least 
in part from its over-citation in the academic literature which criticises its shortcomings 
(Fine, 2001:191). Secondly, its scientistic nature and use of numbers make it appear 
credible, reliable and tested. Finally, its apparently broad scope and claim to explain all 
manner of problems and prescribe their solution make it accessible and practical for 
policy practitioners to use.
The last of these claims is the most relevant here. Anthony Giddens famously produced 
a number of texts proposing to lay the intellectual foundations of Third Way politics. 
Key elements of this philosophy are a belief in market mechanisms not as counter to 
social  and  economic  equality,  but  necessary  to  it  (when  tempered  by  regulation) 
(Giddens, 2000:164).  The regulation of  markets in the name of  social  responsibility 
goes  alongside a  similar  restraint  required from individuals  –  Giddens suggests  'no 
rights  without  responsibilities'  should  be  a  central  motto  for  this  form  of  politics 
(Giddens, 1998:65). This link between the rights and responsibilities of individuals and 
government, the right to increased autonomy in return for conducting oneself within 
limits of behaviour, has been characterised as 'responsibilisation', a central element to 
governmentality or the conduct of conduct (Burchell, 1996:29). It is exemplified in the 
Third Way emphasis on investment in human capital, coupled with the expectation that 
this will be re-invested in the economy either through the labour market or through 
(specific  forms  of)  domestic  labour  (Giddens,  2000:165-6).  Finally,  a  preoccupation 
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with 'common sense' concerns of populations, namely crime and family life, are seen 
not only as electorally important but as the core of the 'shared values' that underpin 
national 'community'. The Third Way philosophy insists that these preoccupations can 
form  a  progressive  political  project  when  tied  into  the  rights-responsibility  link 
described above (Giddens, 2000:166).
  
The increasing use of concepts such as 'community' as both a rhetorical technique and 
a way of shaping processes of governing has been a particular focus of sociological 
attention, and one that is of course important to a study of community cohesion policy. 
As Schofield puts it, 'the very attractiveness of community to policymakers lies in its 
ambiguous potential' (2002:679-80). Inherent in these policies is an understanding of 
community as a seemingly fundamental  social  and historical  concept,  which can be 
'allowed too easily to become an explanation rather than something to be explained' 
(Alleyne,  2002).  Levitas  points  out  that  the  concept's  popularity  has  increased  in 
academia as well as in government, with a similar lack of conceptual clarity (2005:89).
For Rose, 'community' has become a central lever in the Third Way of governing, as a 
point linking
the powers of a territory between the authority of the state, the free and amoral  
exchange  of  the  market  and  the  liberty  of  the  autonomous,  'rights-bearing' 
individual subject (1999b:167).
For  example,  Levitas  observes  that  'community  involvement'  is  often  used  as  a 
condition  of  state  support  for  poorer  areas,  so  that  the  requirement  to  create 
'community' becomes a form of government at a distance (2005:199).
The development of community as an object of policy has been parallel to, and in part 
reliant on, the rise of  social  capital  as theoretical  concept and policy tool  (see e.g. 
Cantle, 2005: 186). A number of theorists have taken up the idea of social capital, in 
various forms (e.g. Coleman, 1988), but many have shed the sense of capital with an 
exchange value.  In Robert Putnam's (2000) consideration of social  capital,  issues of 
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trust and well-being are central; issues of power and economic relations largely absent. 
Putnam's thesis is that 'social capital' consists of reciprocal, informal relationships such 
as  participation  in  civil  society  organisations.  He  suggests  that  more  time  spent 
watching television and using computers, changing patterns of residence and work and 
family life (particularly women's increased involvement in paid employment), and the 
increasing diversity in society have led to a reduction in these ties, but that health,  
wealth and happiness can be increased by participation in  voluntary groups.4 Putnam 
elaborates on this to describe two types of social capital – 'bonding' capital is the ties 
within  a  distinct  community;  'bridging'  capital  makes  links  between  distinct 
communities; too much bonding capital without bridging capital, it is suggested, can 
lead to fragmentation and a lack of cohesion (Putnam, 2000:362).
Ben Fine (1999; 2001)  describes  social  capital  as  a  'conceptual  fad'  (2001:195).  He 
argues that  the social  component of  all  capital  has been traditionally neglected by 
mainstream economics, only to attempt to 'put the social back in' through a rational  
choice model which ignores real social complexity and tensions, or which attempts to 
explain such complexities through tidy mathematical equations. DeFillipis, meanwhile, 
suggests that Putnam's version of social capital neglects the role of the  economic in 
social  relationships,  with  Bourdieu’s  version  more  useful  in  this  regard  (2001:783).  
Some accounts of social capital have emphasised the importance of networks without 
recognising that some networks will give access to more economic capital than others. 
To address this power differential  would require confrontation,  but this  is  elided in 
Putnam’s simplistic conception, which suggests that the supply of social capital could 
potentially be increased indefinitely so that everyone has more. DeFillipis concludes 
that, if social capital is to have an exchange value like other forms of capital, this can 
only be realised by virtue of the fact that some people have it while others do not  
(2001:801). 
Bourdieu  describes  the  relationship  between economic  capital,  cultural  capital  and 
4 See, for example, Putnam's website  www.bowlingalone.com which includes a number of 'factoids' 
including the following: 'Joining and participating in one group cuts in half your odds of dying next  
year'.
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social capital and argues that capital 'amounts to the same thing'  as power (Bourdieu, 
1986:243). Cultural capital can be embodied as a disposition for learning, behaviour or 
values;  objectified in the form of  cultural  goods;  or  institutionalised in the form of 
educational  qualifications.  Social  capital  'is  the aggregate of  the actual  or  potential 
resources which are linked to… membership in a group – which provides each of its  
members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital' (1986:248-9). Both social 
capital and cultural capital are created through labour and are exchangeable for each 
other or for economic capital and, Bourdieu argues, should be considered in order to 
form a  full  understanding  of  the  reproduction of  capital  and power relations.  This 
notion of social capital as embedded in power relations tends to become lost in the 
interpretations of the model more often used in policy development. 
The early critiques of community cohesion policy began with a similar critique to the 
arguments  over  social  capital  laid  out  above:  describing  and  participating  in  the 
struggle  for  meaning,  pointing  out  the  neglect  of  power  relations  in  the  way  that 
theories of community cohesion were being developed, and identifying inconsistencies 
in the policy, its practice and its identified subject matter. These critiques show that the 
ideal of 'shared values' with which it appears easy to agree, can actually stand for a 
multitude of  shifting  meanings.  These variances  include the disjuncture  between a 
focus  on cohesion and a repressive criminal  justice response,  particularly  to young 
Muslim  men  (Bagguley  and  Hussain,  2003a;  McGhee,  2005);  the  association  of 
cohesion  policy  with  migration,  and  latterly  with  terrorism  (Cheong  et  al,  2007; 
Husband and Alam, 2011); inconsistent attention to the social and economic factors 
underpinning  unrest  (Burnett,  2007;  McGhee,  2003);  the  de-racialising  and  re-
racialising effects of 'community' discourse and the implications of cohesion discourse 
for  the construction of gender and family (Worley,  2005);  and the assumption that 
consensus will always be a positive goal, that communities or identities are static and 
bounded, and that any of these questions can be separated from struggles over power 
and disadvantage (Alexander, 2004; Cheong et al, 2007). 
Derek McGhee, for example, notes the essentially sociological nature of problematising 
and managing relations between individuals, communities and society that community 
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cohesion projects entail  (2003:376).  Jonathan Burnett  suggests that the creation of 
problems  and  specification  of  their  solutions  in  the  development  of  community 
cohesion policy relies heavily on 
emotive  sentiment  or  emotionalism  [which]  legitimises  an  extension  of  state 
governance, the practice of which both alienates and stigmatises those against 
whom it is targeted (Burnett, 2004:1).
The focus of both Burnett's and McGhee's research is the alienation and stigmatisation 
they see arising from these practices of governing. While these political outcomes are 
important, at the risk of repeating myself, I  want to emphasise that my research is  
about the functioning of the practices that can reproduce these forms of government 
(or not). It is about the power and practice of sociological imagination. It is also about 
ambiguity  – again,  not  just  enumerating the ambiguities that exist  in discourses of  
community cohesion, but how they function in practice. The importance of ambiguities 
of  language  in  community  cohesion  policy  in  particular  have  also  been  covered 
elsewhere:
whilst  the  concept  of  ‘community’  is  highly  ambiguous,  it  has  continuing  
resonance  in  New  Labour  policymaking.  The  concept  of  ‘community’  has 
particular  implications  for  processes  of  race  and  gender.  Talking  about 
‘communities’ enables language to become deracialized, whilst at the same time 
the language of community cohesion draws upon earlier discourses of assimilation 
through notions of ‘integration’ (Worley, 2005:483).
Worley  points  out  how  the  power  of  ambiguity  at  once  dismisses  and  recreates 
divisions  of  race  and  gender,  again  noting  how  sociological  categories  are  part  of 
constructing as well as understanding community cohesion policy. Worley's reference 
to  'integration'  here  is  also  telling.  She  treats  the  term  as  over-determined  by 
homogenising discourses of assimilation, but others prefer it to cohesion as a better 
way of recognising the two-way (at least) process of bringing together different groups 
(Spencer, 2011).
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The use and power of language in re-imagining and reinforcing social categories has 
also  been explored  in  relation  to  Third  Way politics  more  generally.  Bourdieu  and 
Wacquant  point  out  that  the  terms  in  which  the  politics  of  governmentality  are 
couched are such that clarity of thinking is obscured. Such language 
tends to mask the historical roots of a whole set of questions and notions: the 
efficiency of the (free) market, the need for recognition of (cultural) 'identities' or 
the  celebratory  reassertion  of  (individual)  'responsibility'  (Bourdieu  and 
Wacquant, 2001).
That essay provided a critique of the internationally significant emergence of neoliberal 
moralism over the last decades of the twentieth century. Similar analyses have also 
been made specifically of the 'New Labour Project' in Britain by a range of authors (e.g. 
Fairclough,  2000;  Levitas  2005;  Wetherell,  2008;  Kalra,  2002;  Back  et  al,  2002), 
including Stuart Hall:
One of the core reasons for the 'Third Way's semantic inexactitude - measured by 
the promiscuous proliferation of such troubling adverbs as 'between', 'above' and 
'beyond' - is its efforts to be all-inclusive. It has no enemies. Everyone can belong.  
(1998:10)
Such  analyses  demonstrate  the  importance  of  language  to  the  framing  of 
understandings of society within government; to the problematisation of aspects of life 
as questions requiring solutions; and to the creation and use of particular tools and 
technologies to effect these solutions.
The practicality of the (policy) sociology used to support Third Way political projects 
and forms of government is in large part related to language. The language of social 
capital and of community, the projects it makes possible and impossible, the concepts 
it releases and silences are parallel with what is thinkable within and for government 
(Bourdieu,  1977  [1972]:164).  Despite  its  tendency  to  confuse  description  and 
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explanation and to consider a concept like 'community' to be both a goal in itself and a 
solution to most other ills (Rose, 1999b:179-80), the strand of sociology which provides 
the basis for community cohesion and related policies has been extremely influential.
In  response  to  this  tendency,  Newman  and  Clarke  (2009:185-6)  call  for  the  re-
articulation of concepts like 'public', 'equality', 'bureaucracy' and 'welfare' as a way of 
nourishing counter-discourses towards an egalitarian form of publicness. They argue 
that such counter-discourses take on the undertones and genealogies that undercut 
many of these terms, in a more effective way than simply rejecting a term such as 
'diversity' because it has become discredited by some politically problematic usage. In 
my data, I will explore the extent to which such counter-discourses co-exist, refract and 
re-interpret  existing  meanings  and  echoes,  in  the  everyday  negotiations  of  policy 
practitioners.
Simply identifying the contradictions and ambiguities of language in policy seems to 
limit the possibilities for sociological imagination to have influence in the public sphere. 
The  existing  literature  on  community  cohesion  policy  which  provides  this  kind  of 
analysis does not tell us very much about how alternative worlds might be imagined 
(or  brought  into  being).  It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  space  for  an  analysis  which 
considers  how and why such ambiguous and problematic  policies  and theories  are 
influential,  which  considers  the  functioning  of  power  and  agency  at  a  micro-level, 
recognising that government is not a single and coherently functioning entity, but a set 
of processes, interactions, factions and individuals (Keith, 2008b; Mayo et al, 2007).
This thesis will  explore these elements of ethical struggle where they appear in the 
formation  of  community  cohesion  policy,  not  only  in  textual  artefacts  but  in  the 
translation and negotiation of discourse and practice. While existing academic critiques 
do acknowledge these tensions, in the main they neglect the process of negotiating 
them. This is where my thesis explores new territory.
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The conduct of the conduct of conduct
Having set out my understanding of governmentality as a technique of power, I want to 
consider the specific practices it involves. Most writing in this area focuses on ways 
that citizens are subject to state power, and how they conduct themselves in response 
to  regimes  of  governmentality.  There  is  less  existing  research  on  the  ways  that 
individuals are implicated in creating regimes of governmentality to govern others.
Rose recognises that the rise of ethical discourse in politics could be an opportunity to 
challenge the supposed objectivity of what are deemed scientific or rational choices, 
but there are points where 'the vocabulary of ethics actually operates to impose a 
different but no less motivated and directive politics of conduct' (1999b:192). A more 
radical form of ethico-politics would recognise a constant struggle and re-evaluation of 
norms and values; an 'agonistic politics of ethics' (1999b:194; see also Mouffe's call for 
an 'ethics of the political'  (2005:113)).  This  is  particularly significant as conflict  and 
pluralism  are  inherent  in  both  the  objects  of  community  cohesion  policy  –  the 
problems it is supposed to work on – and in the formation and perpetuation of policy. 
The developing field of psycho-social welfare studies attempts to introduce feminist 
perspectives on the importance of affect and attachment to questions of power and 
knowledge (Barnes, 2008; Scanlon and Adlam, 2008; Stenner et al, 2008). This goes 
beyond the treatment of 'happiness' as a quantifiable social good (e.g. Layard, 2005) to 
consider  the  interdependence  of  materiality  and  affect,  in  some  cases  directly 
challenging the assumptions of more influential studies. For example, Hoggett (2001) 
challenges Giddens' celebration of the possibilities of rational choice by highlighting 
how choices can be made in 'urgent and contingent encounters' (p40), in which 'our 
capacity to be a reflexive agent is often constrained by the difficulties we have in facing 
our  own fears  and  anxieties'  (p42).  Hoggett's  description  of  constrained  reflexivity 
seems  to  imply  that  the  reflexive  agent  would  be  a  rational  one;  the  emotional 
decisions we make because of fear and anxiety are not what would be in our best  
rational interests. He goes on to consider 
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whether the notion of  the 'reflexive  self'  is  not itself  gendered,  expressing an 
essentially  masculine  experience  of  autonomy  in  contrast  to  a  concept  of  a 
'relational self' in which self cannot be understood except in its relation to other  
(p45).
By considering the importance of emotion in decision-making, we may therefore be 
better  able  to  consider  the  ethical  dimension  of  relations  to  others  that  more 
scientistic accounts seem to remove. This is an articulation of social theory which has 
not penetrated the practice of governing anywhere near as effectively as the work of, 
for example, Putnam or Giddens. 
There is of course a risk that the psycho-social welfare literature could obscure the 
relationships of dependence and commitment between the self and others through a 
focus on a sovereign, autonomous, self-realising subject of 'the psy disciplines' (Rose, 
1999a). But there is room for nuance, whereby this literature opens up a space for  
considering affect as a relationship between the individual and the other. This does not 
necessarily lead to the pursuit of the (measurable and always improvable) happiness of 
the sovereign subject. It can lead instead to an understanding of an ongoing interaction 
in which multiple echoes, meanings and re-inflections are possible, including multiple 
reactions within the self as well as between selves (e.g. see Hoggett, 2001:45). The 
impetus of writers defining the field of psycho-social welfare is to rethink welfare and 
well-being together, rather than drifting into the pop-psychology of well-being (Stenner 
et al, 2008).
My empirical approach is similar to that described retrospectively by Miller and Rose's 
reflections  on  their  own  engagements  with  social  research  through  the  lens  of 
governmentality:
Instead of writing the history of the self or of subjectivity, we would study the 
history of  individuals'  relations  with themselves and with others,  the practices 
which both were their correlate and condition of possibility, and enabled these 
relations to be acted upon. Not who they were, but who they thought they were,  
what they wanted to be, the languages and norms according to which they judged 
themselves and were judged by others, the actions they took upon themselves 
and that others might take, in the light of those understandings (Rose and Miller,  
2008:7, original emphasis).
By  concentrating  on  the  'how'  not  the  'why'  of  governing  (Foucault,  1982:217),  I  
consider the people who work within and make up institutions of government, rather 
than the institutions themselves.  I  consider the practices by which such individuals 
make sense of  their decisions,  activities and responsibilities and the frameworks of 
thought and practice that they use to do so.   I  do this  by considering discourse in 
practice,  that  is,  the use,  modification,  negotiation,  acceptance and re-inflection of 
discourses in everyday talk (albeit largely in interview situations). 
If governmentality is concerned with the conduct of conduct – guiding others as to how 
to conduct themselves (Foucault, 1982:221) – then what this thesis confronts is  the 
conduct of the conduct of conduct – how people practice guiding others as to how to 
conduct themselves. The majority of the empirical  data I  will  discuss relates to the 
negotiations that policy practitioners make when explaining and exploring how they 
interpret, recreate or subvert programmes of governmentality; how they construct and 
consider their roles in doing so across their 'private' and 'public' identities; and how in 
so doing they negotiate, develop and question that boundary. This is done, of course, 
in the context of a series of active discourses about governing, ways to govern, ideals of 
government, and the purposes of governing. 
Through the thesis  I  will  develop this understanding of the importance of  affective 
elements of governing, to consider its implications for the conduct of the conduct of 
conduct.  The  body  of  work  on  emotion  in  the  workplace  (e.g.  Fineman,  2000; 
Hochschild,  1983;  Greco  and  Stenner,  2008)  looks  at  the  relationship  between 
individual and organisation, but not at how senior individuals in organisations relate 
emotionally to their powers to change that organisation or its effects. In contrast, the 
existing literature on psycho-social approaches to welfare focus largely on the welfare 
recipient; on how 'the “weight” of welfare provision becomes a matter of individual 
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responsibility, choice and desire' (Stenner et al, 2008:421). There is less attention to 
the affective dimension of governing from within the governing organisation (Barnes, 
2008:477; though see Hunter, 2003 and 2005; Lewis, 2000; Lipsky, 1980; Mayo et al, 
2007). The existing literature on the 'public sector ethos' (du Gay, 2000; Hoggett et al, 
2006;  Le Grand, 2003) considers one element of this, an element traditionally thought 
of as about impartiality of service delivery and equality of citizenship rights. 
How  far  then  has  the  growing  emphasis  on  responsibilisation  altered  this  service 
provider role? If the subject of welfare or government is constructed as an self-creating 
individual, how do those governing them conceive of their own role? Not forgetting 
that they are, at the same time as governing, subject to governance themselves – or do 
they forget this? I want to consider how the government of individuals' emotional and 
affective responses as individuals, as political subjects and citizens, as simultaneously 
clients  of  the state,  employees  of  the  state,  and decision-makers  within  the  state, 
shape and are shaped by their practices of government. In doing so, I want to make 
visible the ethical and political choices that sit within and alongside the bureaucratic 
(Mayo et al, 2007; see also Lewis, 2000).
Imagining places
As well as working on themselves, policy practitioners seek to find comfortable, or at 
least authoritative, positions from which to speak. Unsurprisingly, much of the claim to 
authenticity within practices of local government concerned connections to, narratives 
about, and knowledge of local places. At a general level, narratives are built around 
(and create) reputations of places, and these reputations become metaphors for more 
general policy design, markers of what problems exist and how they might be solved 
(see Chapter Three; Keith, 2005:157). Policy practitioners can at once recognise and 
use such metaphors, and dispute their accuracy when talking about their own local  
area, claiming more detailed knowledge of neighbourhoods and towns than 'outsiders' 
might have.  Thus, in policy practice as elsewhere, multiple understandings of a place 
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(for example, as a metaphor for racialised segregation and as a place of everyday lived 
multiculturalism) can be invoked, without necessarily begging the question of which is 
more 'real' (Edelman, 1977:15). The shifting meanings of places and the techniques 
used to negotiate  them are  central  to  the way that  community  cohesion  policy  is  
practised and to the role of local government. There are strong parallels with practices 
of branding, and for that reason I have developed existing theoretical work on branding 
and on place-marketing to consider what these processes (more often thought of as 
promoting private financial  investment) can tell  us when expanded to consider the 
emotional power of meanings of place and their relevance to community, belonging, 
and governing.
David  Harvey's  (1989)  discussion  of  a  generalised  move  from  managerial  to 
entrepreneurial  urban governance is worth re-visiting in this context. Writing in the 
late  1980s,  Harvey  examined  (with  cautious  approval)  how  some  Labour  local 
authorities  in  Britain  were  seeking  ways  to  work  a  prioritisation  of  equalities  and 
elements  of  socialist  principles  into  the  dominant  entrepreneurial  logics  of  local 
government  at  that  time.  This  required  competition  between  municipalities  for 
investment, residents and central government support (an early Third Way logic). The 
difference now is that this proto-Third Way has become the framework which local 
practitioners must negotiate. Alongside the traditionally business-minded imperatives 
of  efficiency  and  productivity,  New  Labour's  league  tables  and  development  of 
performance  measures  (already  established  under  the  previous  Conservative 
administrations)  were  designed  to  make  various  measurements  of  well-being  and 
public good the 'outcomes' which organisations would compete to deliver.5
Municipal boosterism comes in waves, and most recent sociological and geographical 
critiques  have  considered it  in  light  of  neoliberal  frameworks  that  emphasise  self-
reliance and the requirement of places to compete for private investment (e.g. Evans, 
2006; Harvey, 1989 Hitchcock, 1999; Shaw et al, 2004; Urry, 1995; Ward, 1998), though 
5 It remains to be seen whether this focus will remain under the coalition government, whose major  
focus  has  been  on  'efficiency'  rather  than  the  detailed  performance  measures  of  the  previous  
administration (see e.g. Pickles, 2010).
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examples of place-marketing can be found long before the twentieth century (Ward, 
1998). 'Place shaping' became an explicit focus of local government work in the early 
twenty-first century,6 as part of the  more general trend towards promoting well-being 
and  affective  goods,  within  a  framework  of  targets  and  quantification.  Much  local 
place-marketing by local authorities now marries the imperative of attracting private 
investment with an imperative of appealing to  local residents. This is  typical  of the 
ways that New Labour administrations, building on their Conservative predecessors, 
have built social well-being concerns into adaptations of market and entrepreneurial 
principles for (local) government.
The Thatcherite era in Britain saw a wave of re-branding of previously abject cities as  
'vibrant' and attractive, a much-cited campaign being 'Glasgow's Miles Better' (Ward, 
1998).  Interestingly,  Ward  contrasts  the positivity  of  the  Glasgow campaign  with  a 
contemporary publicity campaign by the London Borough of Hackney which described 
itself as 'Britain's Poorest Borough' (Ward, 1998:220). While Glasgow's campaign was 
primarily outward-facing and entrepreneurial,  this more 'pessimistic'  campaign from 
Hackney was intended to attract central government support. Ward notes that there 
were slim prospects for success of such an approach at that time, citing Prime Minister  
Margaret Thatcher's 'general distaste for “moaning minnies” who complained about 
problems such as unemployment and poverty' (Ward, 1998:221). He suggests that such 
an approach might have been more successful in another period ('the 1960s, perhaps') 
but  in  the  Thatcher  period  'optimism  was  essential'  (however  misplaced).  Written 
before the New Labour government's ascendancy, this assessment does not foresee 
how the two drives  of  the 'optimism'  of  competition,  and concern with inequality 
would become married through Third Way quasi-marketisation of governance (Lister, 
2001; Schofield, 2002; Shaw et al, 2004). 
With government programmes in the 2000s which measured poverty and deprivation 
and  targeted  national  resources  to  areas  most  in  need,  a  different  kind  of 
entrepreneurial  drive  emerged.  Local  authorities attracting private  capital  were still  
favoured by  central  government,  but  drawing  attention  to  local  poverty  no longer 
6 See, for example, DCLG (2006) and Lyons (2007).
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necessarily resulted in dismissal as a 'moaning minnie'. Demonstrating need was an 
important  tool  in  attracting  financial  and other  support,  thus  the  measurement  of 
poverty reduction was a question to be negotiated carefully. If a borough attracted a 
growing wealthy population, the resulting increase in overall or average wealth in the 
borough might mean that central government support would be reduced – though the 
lot of the poorest residents may not have changed at all. Thus describing a place's 
status  as  one of  the poorest  areas  in  the  country  became a  matter  not  simply  of  
highlighting an area of challenge – but also of staking a claim to a share of national 
resources. 
Such pressures have grown exponentially with the growth in inspections and publicly 
available league tables on local authority performance, as a whole and for individual 
services, and also in respect of reputation promoted through devices and techniques 
such as 'beacon status' and being regarded as a site of good practice. An important 
measure of 'success' at a national level includes 'customer satisfaction' measures of 
approval of the council, and more general questions such as the community cohesion 
indicator  ('do  you  agree  that  people  from  different  backgrounds  get  along  well 
together  in  this  area?' (CLG,  2007c:5))  which  translate  affective  judgements  into 
quantitative measures. As Harvey (1989) seems to foresee, local authorities are judged 
not just on the prosperity of their area, but on the satisfaction of residents both with 
where they live and with the local authority as arbiter of this. This would of course 
have  always  been the  case  at  some level;  elected  members  being  accountable  for 
resident satisfaction at local elections, and officers' careers benefiting or suffering from 
association with a council seen as successful or otherwise. 
The emphasis on shared sense of place is also related to political concerns that global  
flows of  people  and capital  have  removed some of  the certainties  of  life,  thereby 
risking fractures between different sections of society (whether along lines of class, 
'race',  ethnicity,  religion  or  some  other  factor).  The  attention  to  shared  belonging 
which community cohesion policy prioritises is thus tied up directly with attempts to 
develop a shared, geographically-based sense of 'belonging' at a neighbourhood level, 
which of course relate to somehow presenting a sense of place that appeals to, and 
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rings true for, the variety of existing residents. This belonging also becomes something 
to be quantified and audited.
The importance of narrative has become explicitly recognised within the local-central  
government relationship, albeit in a peculiarly measurement-oriented sense. The Local 
Area Agreement process now requires all  local  authorities to provide an 'evidence-
based story of place' which 'should present how groups of outcomes and performance 
indicators  connect  with  each  other...  so  that  in  telling  the  story  of  place  GOs 
[Government  Offices]  and  central  government  can  understand  the  relationship 
(cause/effect) between indicators and targets' (CLG, 2007a:17). The brand of place is 
thus seen within these frameworks of governance as at least as important as (and tied 
up intimately with) the experience of place (or product) as lived materially through 
health, housing, education, etc. An attachment to, and positive impression of, a place 
may rely in part on these material services and amenities – but they could also be 
thought  of  as  entirely  separate  to  the  feeling  of  the  locality,  or  the  emotional 
attachment to the place (and, in theory, the local authority). A guide to branding for  
local  authorities,  produced  by  the  Improvement  and  Development  Agency  (IDeA), 
states:
The LGA’s7 analysis in 2007 of best value performance indicators (BVPI) data found 
that  resident  satisfaction  with  council  services  had  no  impact  on  public 
perceptions  of  the  council  improving  lives  and  local  areas.  It  also  found  that  
residents  who  feel  informed  by  their  council  are  far  more  likely  to  feel  their 
council is making their local area a better place to live (IDeA, 2009).
Here, the advice to local authorities is that beyond simply improving the lives of their 
residents or the services they provide, they must publicise this success, and ensure that 
residents associate positive changes with interventions by the local authority. If  this 
association is not made, satisfaction with the local authority (as measured by surveys) 
will be low, and this will count against the organisation in national league tables of the 
'best performing' authorities. It is also likely to adversely affect the prospects of the 
7 Local Government Association.
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council's leadership in terms of career advancement or voting patterns.
Conclusions
This thesis engages with the everyday negotiations of officials,  bureaucrats,  elected 
politicians  and policy  experts  in  the act  of  government.  But  I  am not  examining a 
simple one-way process of the production of laws, policies, discourses or interventions 
that  govern,  and  produce  a  distinct  impact  on  or  control  populations.  Nor  am  I 
investigating what these products or their impacts are, or whether they are effective. 
Rather, I am interested in looking beyond the opaque conception of the 'state' which 
does things to people, to consider the processes, practices and discourses that make 
up  the  state  through  their  enactment,  flows,  revisions  and  sticking  points.  I  am 
interested  in  this  because  it  makes  a  difference  to  populations,  and  because 
understanding how this operates is at  least as necessary as understanding what its 
effects might be, if one is to change things (in whatever way). The object of study is the 
practice of governing, and how those engaged in governing are themselves subject to 
processes of government. 
I  have  suggested  that  acts  of  governing,  particularly  through  techniques  of 
governmentality, require some form of sociological imagination – that is, the ability to 
make  links  between 'the  most  impersonal  and remote  transformation  to  the most 
intimate features of the human self' (Mills, 1999 [1959]:7). My question is how this is  
enacted and what we might gain from thinking of policy as a process of negotiating 
meaning  through  contradictory  positions.  In  Chapter  Two  I  will  expand  on  how  I 
approach this research as embedded within practices of policy, and a reflective and 
analytical study rather than an outcome-focused intervention. As I have suggested in 
this chapter, in negotiating policy, practitioners can be seen to be conducting a form of 
public  sociology.  I  aim to apply  my own sociological  analysis  to these negotiations, 
recognising  that  the  people  I  am  studying  are  (in  varying  ways)  self-aware, 
knowledgeable, perceptive agents.
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This  chapter  has  begun  to  demonstrate  how  ambiguity,  affect  and  narrative  are 
important in the governing of identity, belonging and community, particularly in the 
context  of  the  modes  of  government  which  have  developed  in  early  twenty-first 
century Britain. This ethico-politics, in which control is exercised through shared values, 
culture  and  consumption,  can  be  used  to  obscure  difference  and  conflict  (and 
uncomfortable  positions),  as  we  have  seen  (Rose,  1999b:170).  Unresolved  (and 
perhaps  unresolvable)  ambiguities  are  inherent  in  the  issues  encompassed  in 
community cohesion policy. Techniques of governing which incorporate ambiguity and 
narrative as ways of talking about and intervening in difficult subjects may be essential, 
with the caveat that irresolution and (ethical) discomfort is likely to remain within an 
agonistic politics of ethics (Mouffe, 2005:113; Rose, 1999b:194). This thesis explores 
whether  (and  if  so,  how)  techniques  of  governing  through  affect  and  ambiguity, 
through  brand  and  myth,  can  be  effected  without  ignoring  the  power  inequalities 
which they may leave unspoken.
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Chapter Two: Getting Uncomfortable
Introduction
Studies which focus on a discourse analysis of official policy texts (e.g. Burnett, 2007; 
McGhee, 2003) can only tell us so much. The deconstruction of particular effects of 
language can demonstrate the ways that specific political frameworks are implemented 
through  a  text,  and  can  unpack  philosophical  perspectives  or  taken-for-granted 
assumptions that are relied upon to confer meaning. However, this approach does not 
take into account the possibility for active interpretation of such texts by those who 
use them; in fact it risks attributing agency to the documents themselves, rather than 
to  people  who produce  and use  them.  It  neglects  that  such  documents  are  often 
knowingly produced as potentially ambiguous tools, and disregards the possibility that 
policy  practitioners  might  be  as  perceptive  or  reflexive  as  the  sociologist  (Sayer, 
2005:7).
This is not to dismiss the importance of the written document as an anchor for policy 
debates. A number of key texts form such anchors for the organisation of my research, 
and they do so because such texts are used by policy practitioners to root and route 
their navigation of policy 'agendas'. This does not mean that such texts are static, or 
that they are treated as static by policy practitioners (except when this is strategically 
useful).  The 'event' of a major policy report can be treated as marking a particular 
turning point in debate or action; the central meanings that individual users of that 
document  take  away  are  not  necessarily  consistent  or  pre-determined  by  the 
producers  of  the  document.  This  cannot  be  taken into  account  by  a  documentary 
discourse analysis,  though such an analysis can provide a starting point,  a menu of 
potential meanings, resonances and undertones that such documents represent. An 
engagement  with the practices  –  negotiations  –  that  surround these documents  is 
necessary to more fully understand the effects they have in the social world.
For this reason, my research methodology includes attention to key policy documents, 
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but links this analysis to the interpretations and uses made by policy practitioners of 
those documents, and the work that goes into their production. These negotiations 
and understandings are accessed through extensive qualitative interviews, and through 
ethnographic analysis of my own experiences and observations as a policy practitioner.
This chapter takes apart the research question (how do policy practitioners negotiate  
difficult subjects?) piece by piece, discussing what I mean by each term and how it 
relates to the broader themes of research and analysis that run through the thesis. As I  
do so, I  explain how the research question and research strategy were formed and 
shaped over time. I then elaborate on the types of uncomfortable positions that policy 
practitioners  might  take  in  these  negotiations,  and  how my methodology  provides 
access  to  ways  of  understanding  these  positions.  The  questions  of  authority  and 
reflexivity this opens up have direct parallels with academic debates about ethics and 
positioning of the critical researcher. Following this, I consider specific instances of my 
own  uncomfortable  positioning  during  this  research,  particularly  relating  to  the 
ambiguities of  researching a familiar  environment,  of  my funding arrangements,  of 
proximity, bias and authority. I briefly explain the empirical attention I have given to 
'elsewheres'  which appear to form the constitutive outside of  community  cohesion 
policy and ideas of place. Finally, I take each of my three sources of data – documents,  
ethnography and interviews – and explain why they are important for this project and 
the  status  I  have  given  to  the  data  I  produced through  each.  I  also  spell  out  the 
practical steps involved in producing and analysing that data. 
How do policy practitioners negotiate difficult subjects?
This was never intended as a prescriptive study, an analysis of how to 'do' policy or  
government  better,  or  a  vision  of  'what  should  be'.  Rather,  I  aim  to  understand 
ambiguities  and  difficulties  in  these  processes.  Informally,  the  importance  of 
marshalling language as well as understanding differences in political power seemed to 
me  to  be  widely  acknowledged  within  (and  outside)  governing  institutions.  Yet 
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bureaucratic government depends on the persistent belief in, fantasy of, or aspiration 
towards  an  ideal  of  transparent,  technical  and  objective  decision-making  (du  Gay, 
2000:141).
The  research  question  was  formed  from  my  own  experience  of  some  of  these 
uncomfortable positions, though initially it was not articulated in that way. It moved 
from a framing about 'how community cohesion policy is developed', to be re-focused 
on  the  actual  negotiations  of  government  practitioners  to  develop  community 
cohesion policy, in response to my emerging empirical data. The focus is on the work 
policy practitioners do to create, maintain, obstruct, manipulate or change policies and 
institutions  –  including,  often,  work  on  themselves.  These  negotiations  that  policy 
practitioners  undertake  are  the  focus  of  the  study.  They  include  negotiations  with 
others, and with their own understandings of the world, in order to carry out their 
professional roles and to reconcile these roles with their personal, political and ethical  
commitments.
How do policy practitioners negotiate difficult subjects?
This brings me to the question of  difficult subjects. There are three sets of 'subjects' 
which could be implied here,  and perhaps the most obvious is  the one I  am least  
concerned with. Studies of government or governmentality are concerned with the 
construction and management of (somehow problematic) populations of subjects (in 
the  sense  of  selves)  (Miller  and  Rose,  2008:14).  'Difficult  subjects'  might  refer  to 
members  of  the  population  who are  difficult  to  govern,  and  the  ways  that  policy 
practitioners negotiate (with, or around) them. This type of 'difficult subject' is relevant 
to the thesis, in the sense that the production and negotiation of community cohesion 
policy  is  ostensibly  aimed  at  governing  just  such  'difficult  subjects'.  However,  as 
demonstrated in Chapter One, this is not the primary concern of the thesis, and little 
time  will  be  spent  on  addressing  the  actual  construction  or  management  of 
populations.
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Secondly,  policy  practitioners  themselves  are  'difficult  subjects'  because  they  are 
subjects (selves) who at once govern and are governed; they are subject to the policies 
they develop as  well  as  explicitly  active  in the development of  policies as  tools  of 
government  (Bell  and  Binnie,  2000:18;  Brown,  1997:87;   Hunter,  2003).  Their 
awareness  of  this  double  positioning,  as  well  as  their  sometime awareness  of  the 
ambiguities of  processes,  practices  and policies  of  governmentality,  can make their 
experience  of  subject-hood difficult;  their  negotiation  of  their  professional  roles  in 
research  encounters  with  me  were  to  a  great  extent  concerned  also  with  their 
negotiation of their own sense of self. Policy practitioners can be 'difficult subjects' for 
analysts of policy and political processes, insofar as such analysts focus on government 
as  a  process  of  institutions,  the  individuals  who  work  within  and  make  up  such 
institutions are understood only in their professional roles, and their motivations are 
thus reduced to their professional commitments (McKee, 2009:478-9; see also Chapter 
One).  Understanding  their  occupation  of  a  space  beyond  the  professional  thus 
becomes difficult, and they can only be understood by such theoretical frameworks 
within one delineated realm of subjectivity at a time (Gordon, 1991:4; Miller and Rose,  
2008:8; see also Chapter One).
The third meaning of 'difficult subjects', and the most central to the research question, 
is not concerned with subjectivity or selfhood, at least not directly. This is 'subjects' 
understood in the more colloquial sense of topics or issues. The question here engages 
directly with discourse and language and how they are manipulated. Difficult subjects 
are difficult because there is a lack of (acceptable) language to talk about them; or 
because these subjects risk provoking disagreement or discord; or because individuals 
or  groups  are  unsure  about  how  to  understand  them;  or  because  they  relate  to 
underlying  issues  which  are  simply  not  up  for  negotiation.  They  are  also  difficult 
because, partly as cause and partly as effect of these uncertainties, they are slippery; 
they can call on multiple narratives, resonances and ideas. 
The  difficult  subject  I  concentrate  on  is  community  cohesion  policy.  Community 
cohesion policy is a collection of ideas, practices and texts, rather than a discretely  
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defined subject. It touches on a whole host of other subjects – difference, inequality 
and  discrimination  along  lines  of  class,  race,  gender,  religion,  age  and  geography, 
conflicting values, questions of nationhood, community, belonging, trust, power and 
governance. Many of these subjects (many of which might be considered 'difficult' in 
their own right) are central to how interviewees defined community cohesion policy, 
and indeed to how its development is understood in policy and academic literatures 
(see Chapter Three). The negotiations of community cohesion policy's meanings and 
resonances provide many opportunities to take up or avoid uncomfortable positions. 
Meanwhile, its proponents' insistence that it should be considered in all areas of public 
services (if not life) allows us to consider how far it morphs and changes in different 
contexts. Using a difficult subject as a lens through which to examine the more general 
functioning of government is not unique; Cooper and Monro (2003), for example, use 
lesbian and gay equality work as a lens through which to examine the organisational 
functioning of  local  government,  and its  'state identities'  (see also Bell  and Binnie, 
2000:13-16;  Cooper,  1995).  However,  my  use  of  this  lens  is  innovative  in  that 
community cohesion policy is intended to influence all areas of local government work 
(CLG, 2009), and my examination of its dynamic engages directly with policy practice. 
While community cohesion policy discourse is central to the tale that will be told, it is 
of interest as a way of examining negotiations and practices, rather than a term to be 
defined in itself by this thesis.
Thus the research question – how do policy practitioners negotiate difficult subjects? –  
concentrates on how difficult subjects (questions or topics that are hard to grasp, can 
be ambiguously interpreted, are inherently conflictual, and are perhaps unresolvable) 
are  negotiated by  policy  practitioners.  These are  subjects  which,  even while  being 
viewed as technocratic problems to be solved through processes of government or 
policy  implementation,  can  connect  with  deeply  held  political  beliefs  and personal 
experiences. The subjectivity of the policy practitioners emerges as an important force 
in  these  negotiations,  in  which  practitioners  often  take,  or  find  themselves  in, 
uncomfortable positions – but their subjectivity emerges as  part of the negotiations, 
rather than itself being the difficult subject with which I begin my investigation.
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How do policy practitioners negotiate difficult subjects?
The negotiation of difficult subjects can be thought of in two senses: as trying to reach 
agreement  or  compromise  (usually  in  dialogue  with  others);  and  as  finding  a  way 
through difficult terrain. Both of these are active processes, and suggest work as well 
as  a  journey.  These  processes  also  depend  on  the  construction  of  narrative.  The 
negotiations I  will  discuss are constructed as  narrative in  several  different ways  by 
policy  practitioners  themselves  –  as  well  as  being  re-assembled  in  my  analysis  in 
narrative form. 
Narratives can be conceived of as accounts of a series of causally connected events, 
usually  involving  a  main  protagonist.  While  there  are  continuing  debates  over 
competing definitions of 'narrative' and 'story' (Paley, 2009:18-21), semantic wrangling 
doesn't really concern me here. What I want to emphasise is that narratives/stories are 
accounts which are constructed, and that their telling is intended to have, and has, 
effects  on  social  relationships  (Gunaratnam,  2009:55;  Paley,  2009:30;  Samuel  and 
Thompson,  1990:8).  Through  narratives,  people  make  sense  of  the  world,  make 
arguments  about  the  world,  and  re-make  the  world  (Trouillot,  1995:23).  To  reach 
agreement  or  compromise,  people  construct  narratives  which  demonstrate 
connections  between different  points  of  view or  priorities,  and mask  or  overcome 
continuing differences (Bonnett, 1993:79; Christie, 2006; Revill, 1993:121; Valentine et 
al, 2010:927).  To find a way through difficult terrain, people try to imagine how the 
path they are constructing will lead to their eventual goal. As part of the process of 
negotiating  difficult  subjects,  policy  practitioners  produce  textual  narratives  in 
documents which attempt to provide these anchoring narratives and connections. They 
also (often in a different register) construct narratives about how these documents are 
produced and used. I take the content of both of these types of narratives seriously – 
and  also  to  pay  attention  to  their  construction  (in  the  latter  case  –  how  people 
construct  their  narratives  about how  they  construct  narratives).  While  the 
predominant  focus  is  the  practice  of  negotiation,  the  content  of  narratives  which 
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enable and constitute this negotiation is also important as 'a means to understand our 
subjects8 better' (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000:32).
I have conceptualised narrative in policy practice in four connected ways. Firstly, there 
is  the narrative  that  appears  in textual  documents,  providing a coherent  and fully-
formed  presentation  of  institutional  or  political  standpoints,  plans  or  options 
(Llewellyn, 2001).9 These narratives can be studied in themselves and their internal 
contradictions,  assumptions  and  exclusions  demonstrated.  Their  production  and 
publication is used (by practitioners and by analytical  observers)  to structure policy 
narratives  of  what  happened,  when,  and why.  The narratives  in  the document are 
important in that they are (part of) the product of negotiations, and they are also texts 
on which further negotiations work (Foucault,  2002 [1969]:6-7; Hunter,  2008; Riles, 
2006;  Strathern,  2006;  Swan,  2010).  But  this  does  not  in  itself  address  the  work 
involved  in  constructing  and  using  these  documents,  or  how  that  work  entails 
negotiations  with  a  range  of  'stakeholders',  with  existing  policies,  discourses  and 
institutions,  and  with  resonances  of  language  and  form  which  determine  what  is 
possible. 
Though less obviously taking narrative form, the second sense of narrative which I use 
is to consider the process of negotiating (difficult subjects through) policy. It involves 
writing,  reading  and  translating;  talking,  remembering  and  revising;  meeting,  not 
meeting  and  excluding.  It  is  conducted  by  policy  practitioners  embedded  in 
organisations and institutional practices. There are narratives of how it is supposed to 
work and occasional analyses of why it does not work; but the fragmentary, variable 
and intangible is difficult to capture. This is not unique to policy processes, but is true 
of many aspects of 'real life' (Law, 2003:3). For the purposes of understanding these 
negotiations,  I  draw  on  my  own  ethnographic  experiences  embedded  in  the 
negotiations of difficult subjects through policy. Inevitably, I present these experiences 
8 Subjects here in the sense of the selves doing the negotiating.
9 While Strathern (2006) disputes that 'bullet-point' documents constitute narratives, Llewellyn (2001)  
makes a strong case for understanding policy documents and strategies as narratives, where they 
envision a journey with a destination or desired outcome.
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in a narrative form in order to communicate more-or-less coherent understanding and 
analysis by connecting events, interactions and observations. In this sense my research 
translates  these  negotiations  into  narrative  –  re-framing  memories  which  are 
themselves assembled through technologies of notes, documents and artefacts (Rose, 
1998:180).  In  doing  so,  I  recognise  that  my  narratives  are  partial,  embodied  and 
embedded, and variable with time and context. They are in themselves a technology 
(Paley, 2009:17),  in this case for understanding the processes of policy practice and 
governing in the context of the research account (Gunaratnam, 2009:58).
Thirdly, a great deal of my data is drawn from interviews with policy practitioners in  
which they present their understandings of the development of community cohesion 
policy in the form of narratives which draw on (shifting meanings of) specific places,  
times,  events,  documents and myths (Keith and Pile,  1993:37),  with many,  notably, 
connecting these understandings  to  narratives  of  self.  A  central  tool  in  negotiating 
difficult subjects, this time in the sense of negotiating around difficult terrain, was to 
anchor subjects (issues) in an understanding of the self. Interviewees used biographical  
narratives, or elements of them, to claim a space from which to speak about issues 
where questions of power and situated knowledge were near the surface. This is  not 
intended to suggest that this direct attention to identity reveals some more complete 
or  authentic  truth about  the processes  and negotiations  of  policy,  or  practitioners' 
understandings of them, than would be found through other means of observation or 
research (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997:314). Rather, the interviews present one form 
of data on the ways that policy practitioners negotiate these difficult subjects (Hollway 
and Jefferson, 2000:32). This data is  itself a negotiation, and it is a data set which is 
produced  by  and  dependent  on  the  interview  methodology  which  I  used  (Paley, 
2009:23; Skeggs, 2002). 
The fourth type of narrative is spatial, a shared 'folk knowledge' which explains the 
concept of community cohesion evolving over time and space. As this spatial narrative 
was so strong in discourses of cohesion, I decided to adapt my research strategy to 
embrace this reflective myth-making, by following the threads of narrative to places 
that appeared as symbols. The intention was not to prove or disprove the 'truth' about 
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local experiences of community cohesion represented in this narrative. As I have noted, 
the content of the narrative is of interest precisely because it sheds light on the process 
of negotiation. By focusing on negotiation, I examine how policy practitioners who are 
constructed  within the narrative,  negotiate their  way  through these narratives,  and 
narrate  their  own  place  in  relation  to  cohesion.  I  will  discuss  this  element  of  
methodological innovation further in the section on research sites and 'elsewheres'.  
Developing the literature on place-branding introduced in Chapter One, I consider the 
role of place in the construction of narratives in detail in Chapters Three, Five and Six.
How do policy practitioners negotiate difficult subjects?
As  outlined  in  Chapter  One,  I  am  interested  in  the  practice of  governing,  and  my 
methodology  stays  close  to  this  practice by  using  participant  observation  and 
interviews in  which policy  practitioners  reflect  on their  own conduct.  The research 
focus on local government (and its relationship to central government) to some extent 
blurs the lines between bureaucrat  and politician.  New Public  Management theory 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), but also longer histories of municipal governance (e.g.  
see Lansley et al, 1989:1) and the funding settlement between levels of government, 
have often positioned local actors as simply implementing nationally decided policies. 
This is not to suggest that there is no distinction between local elected politicians and 
the officers employed by local  authorities (or  other local  institutions).  Indeed, their 
concerns and motivations, as well  as their formal statutory obligations, powers and 
restrictions, can vary greatly. However, they have both been included in my research to 
consider  the  'small-p'  political  negotiations  that  non-politicians  do,  and  the 
technocratic elements that form part of the workings of elected politicians. As such, 
this  research  does  not  focus  solely  on  the  bureaucrat,  but  notes  the  distinction 
between bureaucratic and political ethos made by du Gay  (2000; 2007) and others, 
and considers to what extent this is evident – or contested – in practice.
The  question  of  identity  and  subjectivity  in  relation  to  government  has  received 
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attention  in  social  policy  and  sociology,  whether  this  is  bracketed  as  psychosocial, 
feminist, queer, post-colonial or governmentality research (e.g. Ahmed, 2007b; Cooper, 
1995; Hoggett, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Rose, 1999b; Stenner et al, 2008). However, there 
has been less research into how processes of identity and subjectivity are invoked by 
those acting within governing roles, in terms of how those roles actually work (Hunter, 
2003:324; Keith, 2008b:332). Exceptions to this do exist, largely based on qualitative 
interview  work  with  bureaucrats  which  takes  seriously  their  self-presentation  and 
relationship to their work. This engagement with self-presentation is not treated as a 
'true' or 'untrue' description of power relationships, but as a technique which allows 
practitioners  to  undertake  and  make  sense  of  their  work,  whether  protecting  or 
attempting to disrupt the prevailing power dynamic (e.g. Cooper, 2006; Hoggett et al, 
2006; Hunter, 2005; Lipsky, 1980; Puwar, 2001). My study takes this further by engaging 
with these practices as both participant and observer.
Uncomfortable positions
When negotiating  difficult  subjects,  policy  practitioners  often  find  themselves,  and 
present  themselves,  as  occupying  uncomfortable  positions.  By  uncomfortable 
positions,  I  mean discourses and practices which are contradictory and unresolved. 
Discomfort often seems to arise from irresolution between what should be and what 
is; between one's privileged position and one's political commitments to equality. It is 
experienced as affective, embodied, emotional discomfort. Here I want to explain my 
understanding  of  uncomfortable  positions  as  a  subject  of  research,  and  how  the 
discomfited positions of researcher and research subject are related. 
My first concern is with the status of knowledge of a critical researcher, in relation to 
that of the policy practitioner as research participant. Policy practitioners are in the 
business of producing knowledge and analysis. Often, they use research produced by 
social  scientists  in  their  work.  This  cross-over  can  be  difficult  to  negotiate  for 
researchers concerned about maintaining critical distance from their subject matter. 
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Strathern  (2000),  for  example,  notes  that  cultures  of  audit,  in  the  sense  of  self-
examination  and  representation  to  others,  have  become  embedded  in  academic 
institutions. But she seems adamant that these should be maintained as two separate 
roles. Even when positions of both critical researcher and auditor are occupied by the 
same person, Strathern argues, it is 'absurd' to consider these selves as able to interact 
and reflect 'face-to-face' on the same knowledges (2006:193). She suggests that policy 
documents are a form of shield used in negotiation between institutions (universities in 
her  case)  and government,  with  which the institution  attempts  to demonstrate  its 
capability to govern itself by affirming that it will behave as the government wishes it 
to. Yet Strathern does not appear to be objecting to the manner in which universities 
agree to behave in return for a lack of direct interference from government. What she 
objects to is that these agreements (e.g. to pursue research 'of the highest quality') 
appear to her to be meaningless, and so the process of issuing a written commitment 
to that effect is a waste of time. If Strathern's point is that policy documents which 
contain bullet-points are a ritual practice, it seems odd for an anthropologist to thereby 
dismiss them. When she says that instead of engaging in the processes of audit and 
governance,  'we  ought  to  be  making  knowledge  useful'  (Strathern,  2006:200),  she 
seems to be neglecting that what is 'of use' might not be the contents of a text or 
artefact, but the use and practices to which it is put (Rose, 1999b:29). By suggesting 
that the roles of administration and critical thought must be separated completely, she 
implies that trying to cross these boundaries would pollute the pure act of intellectual 
endeavour. 
Riles (2006) gives more of a sense of how such cross-overs can be confounding in her  
analysis of her experience of being an anthropologist at a United Nations meeting on 
gender. She found that  shared subject matter and vocabularies somehow prevented 
social scientists from intervening in bureaucratic or political debate with the insights 
they would have provided in an academic forum (p.79). Because the same terms were 
being used to denote different things – or more importantly, to achieve different goals 
– the anthropologists in this case found that their expertise was silenced as they were 
left without their own language. Yet Riles concludes by arguing that the silences these 
convergences  create  should  be  paid  greater  attention,  rather  than  simply  avoided 
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through separation of the two roles (p.89). There can be, then, a useful knowledge 
created by crossing these boundaries. As Bonnett puts it: 'contradiction needs to be 
understood at the level of lived experience' (1993:177), which might also invoke the 
idea of affective, embodied experience.
The  idea  of  emotion  as  a  motivating  force  is  anathema  to  some  theorists  of 
bureaucracy (in particular du Gay, 2000; 2007). Du Gay argues that the personae of 
bureaucrat and individual should be kept separate. He suggests that attempts of New 
Public  Management and psychological  theories of  management to integrate  feeling 
into public services have undermined the commitment to impartiality which is a central  
tenet of the public service ethos. This has parallels with Strathern's (2006) insistence 
noted above, that the roles of bureaucrat and analyst cannot be lived at the same 
moment. The difference is that du Gay has a much more positive view of the ideal of an 
impartial bureaucrat,  implementing rules without personal reflection. That is not to 
suggest that he does not recognise the political  aspects of bureaucratic work – the 
negotiation and interpretation that is necessary for, in his main case, the civil service to 
develop politicians' ideas into workable policies (du Gay, 2000:141). But du Gay's chief  
point is that for these negotiations to be successful, bureaucrats  must conform to an 
impartiality  which  allows  them  to  work  with  governments  of  changing  political  
persuasion (du Gay, 2000:139-40). My argument is that this is an ideal type, or a useful  
fiction,  rather than what actually  happens,  or  can happen,  in practice (Mayo et al, 
2007). I must stress that this study is not intended to 'expose' how bureaucracy does 
not function according to norms of impartiality,  but to consider how people within 
organisations negotiate these norms, given their inevitable embeddedness as persons 
with commitments (which they may or may not put to one side at times) as well as  
functionaries.
It is worth noting that these debates about discomfort and impartiality are as relevant 
to  the  academy  as  to  the  bureau.  That  is,  they  are  part  of  my  discussion  of  
methodology and how I negotiate it, as much as they are part of what my research 
participants are doing. In this I address both the status I give to the accounts of my 
research  participants,  and  the  status  that  should  be  given  to  my own  words.  The 
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auditing or self-assessment required of the policy practitioner is also required by the 
sociologist through processes of reflexivity and accounting for methodologies (as in the 
production  of  a  PhD  methodology  chapter).  There  are  risks  of  slipping  into  the 
performance of reflexivity as a way of absolving one's mistakes and performing Good 
Practice (Strathern, 2006:200) for the researcher, as there are for the bureaucrat. The 
hope, though, is that the accounting of and for methodology and method is more than 
a simple exercise in audit, and that it produces analytically productive insights. 
Such struggles to find ways to critique social inequalities whilst also being embedded in 
them (indeed in some ways able to critique inequalities because of the privilege those 
inequalities provide) have concerned researchers in traditions of feminism, anti-racism, 
and post-colonialism (Ahmed, 2000; Skeggs, 2002:362; Spivak, 1988). Bell hooks invites 
the  privileged subject  –  in  stronger  words,  'the  oppressor'  (hooks,  1990:146)  –  to 
'choose the margin', as a 'site of radical possibility' (p.149); to 'enter that space' (p152) 
of constant change, struggle and resistance. She suggests that selves who have been 
marginalised by others – because of their gendered or racialised identities, for example 
– can make a virtue of their ability to see the world from an outsider's perspective, able 
to disrupt dominant categorisations. This echoes Du Bois's conception of the 'double 
consciousness' of those whom racism has subjected to a  'sense of always looking at 
one's self through the eyes of others' (Du Bois, 1994 [1903]:2), as a resource, a source 
of knowledge of ambiguity and power struggles. Hooks wrestles with the necessities of  
using language which 'carries the scent of oppression' (hooks, 1990:146) to reveal and 
resist that oppression. Her essay is hopeful in that by  choosing – rather than being 
relegated to – a marginal position outside of the dominating centre, one might be able 
to recreate and reinvent the language and its interpretation, and through this, relations 
of domination. One might find in the shared margin a 'radical creative space which 
affirms and sustains  our  subjectivity,  which gives  us  a  new location from which  to 
articulate our sense of the world' (p.153). Her call to the reader – both 'oppressed and 
oppressor' – suggests that this marginal space could be an opportunity to re-imagine 
and reinvent relationships by constantly unsettling and transforming perspectives on 
non-marginal space. 
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Following hooks,  my argument is that attempting to maintain consciousness of  the 
ambiguity afforded by a marginal position is difficult, perhaps sometimes impossible – 
but  that  attempting  it  can  provide  a  productive  tension.  The  production  of  public  
sociology, as I envisaged it in Chapter One, means entering these precarious positions 
and opening oneself up to possibilities (which might include the possibility of being 
wrong).  Gunaratnam  outlines  how  such  an  approach  to  research  can  create 
vulnerabilities for the researcher as well as the researched:
The  fundamental  problematic  of  interpretation...  is  that  it  is  always  a  risky, 
emotion-laden and ethical business... [to] practise our... crafts in ways that aspire 
to  the  honing  of  technique  and  skill  and  that  give  recognition  to  our  being 
touched... while all the time remaining faithful and vulnerable to the unknown 
(Gunaratnam, 2009:59).
This  point  about  the  role  of  emotion  in  uncomfortable  positions  is  important.  As 
Gunaratnam  suggests,  one  can  be  at  once  skilled  and  technical,  and  aware  and 
responsive  to  emotion  and  vulnerability.  Emotions  are  embodied  responses  to 
situations (Sayer, 2005:37), attached to commitments which  mean something to the 
individual, and which are part of the self – not just a preference. As such, they should 
be taken seriously. If commitments come into conflict (for instance, professional and 
political commitments) then we might expect this to produce an emotional response as 
much as a rational or articulated one. Hence we should not be surprised if difficult 
subjects create situations in which individuals  feel  uncomfortable; and we should not 
necessarily dismiss this discomfort as self-indulgent or self-protecting. We should take 
into account what provokes such emotional reactions, and how these reactions can 
motivate action, including within the policy process. 
Such a position can all too easily be dismissed as simply a performative attempt at self-
exculpation and the re-enforcement of privilege without action towards greater social 
justice  (Ahmed,  2004b:118;  Berlant,  2004:11;  Skeggs,  2004:131).  But  indulging  the 
narration of privileged selves is not the point. Rather, it is to seek out whether, and 
where,  there  are  possibilities  for  such  privileged  selves  to  take  a  position  which 
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recognises their (our) privilege, and uses it to improve the equity of social relations, 
without simply reinforcing a colonising relationship. Whether such a position might be 
possible is as relevant to debates about the role of the sociologist and academic as to 
debates about that of the policy practitioner (Skeggs, 1997:15). There is also a risk that 
such  attention  can  turn  into  an  over-reliance  on  the  explanatory  power  of 
psychoanalytic  theory  to  account  for  social  processes,  at  the  expense  of  an 
understanding of political and power relations (as seems to be the case in Hollway and 
Jefferson (2000:19-20) for example). However, avoiding those pitfalls should not mean 
abandoning an attention to the ways that affect and emotion inform social action and 
interaction and refract political behaviours. This attention is important not to produce 
empathy for the subjects whose emotional and emotive negotiations are at stake, but 
to concentrate on how this emotional filter comes to dominate discourse, process and 
action because of a particular moment of political and social formations, and how such 
a filter (as a result of these formations) then informs and inflects the types of political 
and social action that is possible (Ahmed, 2004b:10; Sayer, 2005:3). Nor are emotions, 
commitments,  morals  or  ethics  necessarily  conservative.  They  can  be,  where  a 
settlement is reached to cope with an oppressive situation – but they can also provoke 
resistance to dominant norms (Sayer, 2005:100). As Berlant, writing about compassion, 
notes,  emotional  complexes  have  'powerfully  material  and  personal  consequences' 
(2004:11),  whether  these  are  progressive  or  conservative.  Emotions,  and  the 
emotionally uncomfortable positions of policy practitioners, are worthy of study not 
simply  as  an  experiences  within  the  self,  but  for  their  impact  on  social  relations 
(Skeggs, 2002:350). 
My uncomfortable positions
There are two concrete ways in which my relationship to this research project and its  
subjects require particular consideration. Firstly, having worked as a policy practitioner 
in  Hackney,  I  had  existing  relationships  with  many  research  participants,  and 
perceptions about how policy negotiations work. This experience informs and enriches 
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my data and provides opportunities for ethnographic description based on participant 
observation. These histories also provided credentials that undoubtedly helped me to 
achieve access to interviewees both within and outside Hackney that would otherwise 
have been much more difficult. But there is a risk that these connections could blur my 
analytic lens through over-familiarity or lack of questioning of norms and practices. 
In fact, the doctoral project emerged precisely because of such a questioning. I do not 
think that I can reveal a moment of realisation (Denzin, 1989:10) in which I noticed the 
negotiations of policy practice, the knowing compromises that are involved and the 
steps people take to manage their own commitments and those of others. However, an 
illustrative example was an incident when I was involved in developing new governance 
arrangements for children's services. This emerged after sitting with a group of the 
most senior managers from health, education and social services and trying to agree 
on a shared definition of 'commissioning', a term each of the three professions used to 
describe slightly different relationships to designing and delivering services. There were 
many meetings on this subject, covering similar ground and objections, after which I or 
other colleagues would draft another version of a policy paper attempting to reconcile 
different definitions and practices, only for it to be discussed and revised again. Finally,  
in one meeting it seemed all three heads of service had reached agreement about the 
word 'commissioning' and how it could be used in joint planning. But as we left the 
room, I realised that what had actually been agreed was that colleagues would not 
dispute the others' use of the word 'commissioning', yet would continue to operate 
within each service with the existing practices. This wasn't necessarily a problem in 
itself (though it had taken a long time to reach this situation). The point is that all those 
involved were aware of the different uses of language and meaning which they were 
negotiating individually  and together,  and reconciled that  while  they may not have 
reached agreement, they had reached something which they could treat as agreement 
(Young, 1990:33).
It  is  clear  that  when  operating  in  this  environment,  the  ability  to  hold  several 
contradictory  opinions  at  once  is  necessary.  But  this  is  different  to  Orwell's 
'doublethink' (Orwell, 1949) in the dystopian  Nineteen Eighty-Four.  There is a sort of 
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self-policing involved, but there is also a recognition among (many) policy practitioners 
that sometimes these manoeuvres can be contradictory. I certainly felt (but was also 
able to operate within) the cognitive dissonance of this necessary discomfort. So did 
many of  my colleagues who could reflect  on the sometime absurdity of  the policy 
process, but also see it as a form of negotiation necessary to develop shared meanings 
or cope with competing prerogatives. As I have said, this was not a realisation that 
came upon me suddenly,  but a  habitus formed by and forming the policy process. 
Thinking about the importance of this way of being, how it functions and what work it  
enables seemed like an important area for exploration in a research project.
A more unusual aspect of my relationship to the research was that my studentship 
became funded, after its initial stages, through a collaborative (CASE) studentship, by 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) with an annual contribution from the 
London Borough of  Hackney (LBH).  CASE studentships are  an initiative of  the ESRC 
meant to encourage PhD research to be connected to arenas beyond academia. To set 
one up, a university department and a non-academic partner organisation (in this case, 
LBH), agree a research proposal for a PhD thesis which will also provide work that is of 
use to the non-academic organisation,  and alongside this  a  programme of  support 
from, and involvement in the work of, the organisation for the research student. In this 
case,  I  worked up the  research and support  proposals  with  both  partners  and we 
received approval and funding from the ESRC, who provided the majority of the funds 
for my tuition fees and living costs, with a smaller contribution from LBH. Prior to the 
CASE studentship, I had begun the PhD on a part-time basis, while working for LBH 
part-time and with an agreement that they would pay my part-time tuition fees. That 
prior agreement, however, did not include any formal discussions of the subject of my 
studies, or of arrangements for cooperation with fieldwork.
At the outset of the CASE arrangement, all partners signed an agreement about ethics 
and intellectual property which stated that my research for the PhD would be guided 
ultimately by my academic supervisors.  While I  would share findings with the non-
academic supervisors from LBH throughout the research and discuss any matters of 
contention,  they  would  not  have  a  right  of  veto  over  writing  or  publications.  A 
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studentship panel was held quarterly involving LBH, Goldsmiths and me, at which we 
reviewed  progress  on  fieldwork  and  writing,  and  work  I  was  doing  for  the  local 
authority. This work, which also formed part of the studentship arrangement, involved 
sharing my expertise as an academic researcher with the local authority in practical 
ways.  For  example,  I  produced  a  position  paper  which  was  used  as  a  basis  for 
discussion of how Hackney might approach the concept of community cohesion in a 
locally-relevant way. I also gave advice and comments on research design and research 
reports that were commissioned by the council from outside organisations as part of 
their  consultation  on  a  community  cohesion  strategy.  This  model  of  research 
collaboration suggests some expectations about research that will be practical, applied 
or technocratic, producing measurable, quantifiable or obviously 'useful' outputs. As a 
CASE student, I was constantly thinking about the 'usefulness' of my research, even as I  
tried to ensure this  did not  limit  my methodology or  analysis.  The example of  our 
specific  project  shows  that  such  collaborations  do  not  have  to  close  down 
opportunities for freedom of intellectual inquiry. To a large extent, this freedom was 
dependent on a partnership between individuals within organisations who saw value in 
finding time and space for reflection without predetermined utilitarian applications. Its  
success  also  depended on  my ability  to  participate  in  more  instrumental  activities 
linked to the research while developing critical theoretical underpinnings for the thesis.
This  type of  work  does  not  easily  fit  into the methodological  discussions  either  of 
researching  'up'  or  'down'.  The  research  participants  are powerful,  and  could  be 
considered 'elite',  in  that  they  are  opinion  formers  and being  researched precisely 
because they are powerful. However, their powerful or elite status is in many cases 
directly comparable to that of the academic.  Indeed, in many cases they may have 
been colleagues; or the same person may cross 'between worlds' at different points. To 
some extent this was true in my case. Although many of the interviewees with whom I 
spoke had been senior to me, they were also colleagues I had worked with and advised 
directly.  Thus the  usual  methodological  concerns  about  accessing  and  being 
manipulated by elite research subjects (e.g. Phillips, 1998), while relevant, do not fit 
neatly  here.  Feminist  methodological  concerns  with  listening  and  engaging  with 
research participants, with not exploiting one's power as researcher (e.g. Oakley, 2005 
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[1981]), similarly do not quite fit. It is about finding a space between the assumption 
that power needs to be shared with the research participants, and that the researcher 
is manipulated by the participants. This is  another precarious position:  one which I  
attempted  to  negotiate  as  a  researcher  by  paying  close  attention  to  research 
participants' accounts, being clear about the contexts of these accounts, and explaining 
the grounds for my analysis and findings within the thesis, so that they can remain 
open to challenge from the reader.
My  proximity  to  many  of  the  research  participants  not  just  in  terms  of  shared 
professional and personal biographies, but in terms of social positioning and political or 
analytical outlook and skills emerged most strikingly in interviews when the analysis an 
interviewee put forward was almost exactly my own. This is a different experience from 
an  interviewee  saying  something  which  one  knows  will  illustrate  perfectly,  when 
quoted,  a  point  that  is  becoming  clear  from  the  research.  Rather,  she  produced 
statements  that  I  would have been happy to include in my own authored analysis 
section. If  I  had been using interviews as sources of information about 'what really 
happened', I might have been encouraged by this, seeing it as definite confirmation 
that my analysis was correct, because participants agreed with it. But my approach to 
the interview and other data was to treat them as performances and tools intended to 
produce particular effects in particular circumstances. As such, maybe the convergence 
or our analysis was a warning that I was too close to the material and the participants'  
own observations?
On reflection, I took it to be evidence that researchers are  not that special.  I do not 
mean to undermine myself too much at this point. My research for this project reached 
much more broadly than a single interviewee's experience, and my analysis draws on 
more  (and  different)  theoretical  frameworks.  I  have  spent  more  time  and  given 
attention to different things than my interviewees might in their experience, or than I 
would have in other circumstances (i.e. outside of my researcher role). So I believe I 
can claim additional value for this study and its conclusions beyond simply reflecting 
and repeating  the lay-person's  views;  but  I  want  to emphasise  that  this  privileged 
position comes from the particular purpose and context of conducting the research. It  
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also comes from a particular intellectual training, which in large part is shared with 
many of  the participants in my research.10 In this  sense I  am in the uncomfortable 
position of an expert whose expertise remains open to challenge from others who have 
different, but perhaps equally valid, grounds for expertise.
Relationships with participants, research sites and research projects shift, and involve 
emotional investment as well as time and professional energies (Coffey, 1999:46). For 
me, these shifts involved negotiating a position which created, at times, perceptions 
that I might be moving between roles of friend, colleague, adviser, 'spy',  auditor or 
competitor. In the role of researcher, I could (be seen to) occupy all of these roles, and 
none of them.
Research sites, and elsewheres
The  majority  of  my  fieldwork  was  carried  out  with  local  government  officers  and 
politicians and their colleagues in other governance agencies in Hackney. Looking at 
how community cohesion policy, questions of difference, belonging and equality are 
negotiated within local government in Hackney specifically is important firstly because 
it  is  a  place  full  of  diversity  (in  many  senses)  where  there  is  a  widespread  self-
consciousness  about  the  presence  of  difference  and  how  it  is  lived.  Indeed, 
competition for the interpretation and ownership of difference in Hackney and how it  
changes or is preserved is evident both in processes of governing and in public debate 
(see Chapter Five).
Secondly, Hackney is an important place to explore these issues precisely because it 
does not fit in the usual narrative mappings of community cohesion policy. Community 
10  It is more than likely that my participants will take an interest, or may indeed just 'come across' this  
research (see also Puwar, 1997); indeed, many were interested in reading the final version. Even if I  
should choose to, I would never be able to get away with assuming that I could treat data however I 
might wish because 'it  is unlikely' that a named participant might 'come across' the research (as  
Hollway and Jefferson (2000:91) decide is the case with their working class participants).
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cohesion policy is an area in which the borough is seen as – and presents itself as – an 
example of good practice and achievement, or where community cohesion is seen as 
unproblematic,  making  consideration  of  the  policy  irrelevant.  In  this  context,  the 
negotiation of multiple interpretations of both community cohesion (policy) and of the 
geographical  and historical place are open to exploration in the narratives of policy 
practitioners. Chapter Four explores another example where Hackney explicitly did not  
fit  into the national  policy frameworks I  was studying – the case of  the Preventing 
Violent Extremism (PVE) programme. Because I have used Hackney as a case study for 
understanding PVE, my findings are a story of how policy  does not fit  with the local, 
when that  locality  is  a  place for  which the policy  was not necessarily  designed (as 
indeed, many places – specifically London – are largely neglected especially in early 
formulations  of  community  cohesion  policy  –  see  Chapter  Three).  This  limits  the 
generalisability  of  my findings,  of  course,  but it  also provides  an opportunity  for  a 
different type of knowledge from that generated by studies of these policies which 
more usually focus on the locations in which they are seen to 'fit' (e.g. Husband and 
Alam, 2011).
Of course there is a third set of reasons why Hackney was an ideal site for this research  
project: the practicalities of my own situation. I began the project here because of my 
own interest in,  familiarity with,  and access to the geographical  area and the local 
authority.  From there,  I  established the  CASE  studentship,  described  above,  which 
helped  to  secure  formal  support  from  the  local  authority.  But  these  practical 
advantages  to  using  Hackney  as  a  research  site  also  stemmed  from  its  inherent 
analytical  interest.  Starting  from  a  general  interest  in  Hackney  presents  research 
questions about cohesion, diversity and belonging, and the relations between central 
and local government, as much as starting from those questions can lead one back to 
Hackney.
By  starting  to unravel  my research  question (how do policy  practitioners  negotiate 
difficult  subjects?) in Hackney,  I  was led to additional  research sites.  The power of 
narrative in Hackney, particularly when exploring its apparent success in living with 
difference, was evident from my earliest research interventions. It quickly became clear 
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that  these  narratives  were  constantly  being  told  in  relation  to  other  places,  that 
contrast with elsewhere made sense of the local Hackney experience. At the same time 
as  criticising  'outsiders'  for  inaccurately  stereotyping  Hackney,  'insiders'  would  use 
similarly  simplified  views  of  other  places  as  they  made  sense  of  the  world.  This 
prompted me to widen the research field beyond Hackney in two ways. 
Firstly, this meant exploring the negotiation of community cohesion policy and related 
narratives of policy practitioners working at a national level, at the interface with local 
government. Hackney policy practitioners presented their understanding of community 
cohesion  and  of  Hackney  in  reaction  to  an  outside,  and  to  outsiders'  (faulty) 
perceptions  of  Hackney.  Community  cohesion was seen as  an area where Hackney 
could be a national leader, whereas in many areas of public service and quality of life it 
might not be. More generally, the experience of local government is very much tied to 
national government priorities and actions. Though community cohesion policy can be 
interpreted as tying in with a push toward locally determined identities, it  is  also a 
nationally-created term and a set of policy ideas that have only become discussed in 
these terms in Hackney because of national discourse. Therefore, it seemed that one of 
the  difficult  subjects  being  negotiated  locally  was  how  to  reconcile  national 
requirements  with  local  needs.  Thus  the  negotiations  being  made  at  the  interface 
between national and local government, in central government departments, national 
lobbying and membership bodies, think tanks and professional  organisations, was a 
second  field  of  study.  Largely  I  accessed  this  through  interviews,  but  again  I  had 
opportunities to make ethnographic observations through attendance at public and 
private events (such as consultation meetings, policy round tables, and conferences) 
and through the data available in documents published by these organisations.
Secondly, I took the narrative thread used by my interviewees, and followed it to three 
locations  (Oldham, Barking and Dagenham, and Peterborough)  which were used in 
their accounts of community cohesion policy to represent a typology of times, places 
and  constellations  of  difference  and  conflict.  This  innovation  was  not  intended  to 
provide  direct  comparators  to  the  main  research  site,  and  the  research  in  those 
locations is by no means extensive enough to do so. Rather, it engages with the status  
of the three other localities as marker points within narratives of community cohesion, 
and explores how policy practitioners within those sites work with and against  this 
status. This is  in contrast to the work in Hackney which extended across the broad 
range  of  governance  institutions  and  areas  of  policy  and  service,  to  consider  how 
community  cohesion  policy  was  understood  across  the  range  of  practices  of  local 
government and its partners.
I will expand on the effects of place and event in narrative more fully in Chapter Three,  
and the resonances of each of the three 'elsewheres' (Oldham, Barking and Dagenham, 
and Peterborough).  Here I  want to emphasise that they were used to explore how 
negotiations  of  policy  and  place  are  made  by  practitioners  who  have  become 
enmeshed in a web of meanings associated with a particular form of policy discourse.  
By entering those places and considering the view from within that web, I explored 
how the renegotiation of apparently fixed meanings of places allows those meanings to 
become unsettled or reinterpreted.
Documents
My study begins with documents because policy documents are tangible tools around 
which  policy  processes  are  organised.  Policy  practitioners  treat  and  create  policy 
documents as tools  to shape debate,  as starting points to be worked with,  and as 
sources  of  meaning.  There have been a  number  of  attempts  to define community 
cohesion  in  landmark  policy  documents,  which  have  become  embedded  in  wider 
narratives,  as  I  will  discuss  in  Chapter  Three.  These  definitions  are  used by  policy 
practitioners, not as demonstrations of the 'truth' of what community cohesion is, but 
as artefacts around which to base their constructions of what community cohesion 
means.  Similarly,  I  will  analyse policy documents not as records of what happened, 
what is, or what should be; but rather as tools whose production, consumption and use 
is part of the negotiation of difficult subjects. Thus when I analyse these texts, I do not 
assume  that  they  present  a  definition  of  what  the  institutional  authors  believed 
71
community cohesion to be. I  suggest instead that they represent  an outcome  (at a 
particular point in time) of negotiations around what can and cannot be said about the 
project of community cohesion, presented in a particular form which is intended to 
push debate in one direction or another – and which may or may not manage to do so. 
This treatment of documents follows Foucault's re-conceptualisation of documentary 
sources  as  a  resource for  history which allow scholars  to treat  the text  as  part of 
history, rather than simply a (perhaps unreliable, perhaps partial) representation of it 
(Foucault, 2002 [1969]:6-7).
Much existing work on community cohesion policy analyses policy documents (and 
press coverage) in similar ways, considering the discourses they use not as records of 
decisions, but as active attempts to shape understandings, and as embedded in wider 
discourses  and meanings  (e.g.  Cheong et  al,  2007;  Fortier,  2007;  Yuval-Davis  et  al, 
2005).  My  work  builds  on  these  studies  and  extends  this  method,  by  linking  the 
understanding of documents as tools  and subjects of analysis, to a consideration of 
how  those tools are both constructed and used. Hunter (2008) discusses how  policy 
documents constitute 
a meeting point for... multiple perspectives... Their power is not in an ability to 
communicate  a  definitive  normative  truth  about  the  world,  but  as  fictions 
between what 'is' and what 'might be' (p518).
Likewise, Ahmed (2007) argues that that we should 'follow documents around' (p591) 
to consider how they are used in practice, as well as considering critically what they 
say. The space between what organisations do, what they say they do, and how they 
appear is not just something critical social research can expose, but also something 
which practitioners may recognise, and which they may use documents to demonstrate 
(p607).  This  links  back  to  my  discussion  of  the  role  of  narrative  in  negotiation  – 
documents present arguments or narratives about how things are or should be; these 
accounts are produced in order to have a specific effect (Paley,  2009:17).  They are 
tools, but like any tool, they can misfire or be used for other than their intended use. 
We need to begin with looking at the document to consider its potential uses, but by  
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stepping  outside  of  the  study  of  documents  we  can  start  to  consider  the  other 
elements of negotiating difficult subjects in practice.
This  is  why I  linked the study of  policy  documents to ethnography and interviews. 
However,  these  other  methods  themselves  produce  documents  –  field  notes  and 
interview transcripts – which not only make an account of 'what happened' but also do 
work on 'what happened', turning it into text, noting some elements and leaving out 
others  (Clifford,  1986;  Trouillot,  1995:26).  For  simplicity's  sake,  I  will  discuss  these 
forms of data separately in the following sections, having concentrated here on 'found 
documents',  i.e. policy texts and media coverage, and the way I  have gathered and 
analysed them as data.
Securing the documentary data (policy documents and media sources) to work with 
was relatively straightforward. General web searches using important key words, the 
use of  online alert  services for  key words ('Hackney'  and 'community cohesion')  to 
identify new web postings, and manual searches of relevant government departments 
and policy organisations supplemented my existing archive of key documents built up 
through working in the field. In addition, I secured local policy documents through my 
existing and continuing work for and collaboration with Hackney Council, while a large 
amount of other documentation is publicly available for all local authorities and policy 
organisations via their websites. Appendix One provides an indication of the size of the 
archive  I  consulted  and  analysed;  listing  only  those  documents  which  are  directly 
referenced in the thesis text, it includes 57 separate government reports, speeches or 
letters; 52 separate media or news items; and 12 additional policy documents (such as 
those  produced by  think  tanks).  In  addition,  I  refer  to  a  number  of  documents  in 
Chapter Four which are referenced simply as 'internal documents' because they are not 
publicly available. Analysis of documentary artefacts was useful not only in itself, but 
also for understanding some of the shared meanings and constructions developed by 
research participants as observed through interview and ethnographic data. For more 
details on how I analysed these documents using interpretive methods and coding to 
organise  themes  through  NVivo  (a  qualitative  data  analysis  programme),  see  the 
Interviews section later in this chapter.
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Ethnography
'Ethnography is an act of memory' says Coffey (1999:127), and emphasises that even 
detailed fieldnotes, or physical mementoes, are tools that enable memory, rather than 
'pure' sources themselves. Though my work in Hackney prior to embarking on 'official'  
PhD research was not framed as an ethnography, it serves as a source of data both for 
understanding the esoteric knowledges of how local government policy works, and the 
specific research setting and occupational  priorities,  behaviours and languages. This 
experience  is  supplemented  by  observations  made  in  and  around  the  process  of 
conducting  interviews,  including  participation  in  the  policy  process,  attendance  at 
conferences,  events  and  meetings,  and  informal  conversations.  These  data  and 
experiences helped to produce relationships I would later rely on in fieldwork.
This experience provided me with a 'feel for the game' (Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]:103) of 
policy practice and institutional life within the organisations of local government and 
their  interactions  with  other  organisational  forms.  Taking  a  step  outside  of  this 
common-sense framework by choosing to study these processes with an element of 
ethnographic distance was an ongoing process. But it was a constantly iterative one; as 
I discussed above, the capacity to step outside of the doxa is not one only reserved for 
the  self-styled  researcher.  Thus  part  of  managing  the  ethnographic  work  was 
understanding when research participants were able to suspend the rules of the game 
(in  a  way  that  I  understood  myself  to  be  doing)  to  consider  its  workings  and 
assumptions; and considering to what extent this 'suspension' might itself also be part 
of 'the game'.  
A study with interesting parallels to my approach is the research conducted by Sara 
Ahmed  and  her  colleagues  in  the  Integrating  Diversity  Project  at  the  Centre  for 
Excellence in Learning (Ahmed et al,  2006). This involved researchers participating in 
the production of education diversity policies, and reflecting on their involvement and 
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the wider field of education diversity policy. Their subsequently published reflections 
on the experience demonstrate  the tensions  and frustrations  that  such 'cross-over' 
work can entail, particularly in experiencing institutional blockages to change 'from the 
inside'. But the existence of these reflections demonstrates that new knowledges can 
be produced through such engagement (Ahmed, 2007a; Hunter, 2008; Swan, 2010). 
Ahmed and her colleagues were engaged in a research project on the concept and 
practice of diversity in the learning and skills sector (2006:6). Their approach to the 
work done by diversity as a concept, rather than 'what diversity is' (p26), mirrors my 
own approach  to  the  study  of  community  cohesion  policy.  They  also  used  textual 
analysis of documents, ethnographic study of the work done through documents (as 
participant observers), and interviews with diversity practitioners.
The research team engaged in the production of diversity policies, their evaluation and 
promotion, while trying to maintain their identities as critical social researchers, and 
also understanding their own positioning within the 'diversity' being governed. They 
found that their attempts to integrate critical analytical findings into the process of 
policy and governing met with obstructive responses from the institutions within which 
they were working (Swan, 2010:494). Though in many ways their project conformed to 
neoliberal  management norms in higher education – high publication outputs,  links 
between  research  and  'real  world'  impact  –  their  questioning  of  the  assumptions 
underlying diversity work seemed too disruptive to be welcomed. Indeed, publication 
of the report they were initially commissioned to write was apparently blocked for this 
reason (Hunter, 2008:517). The research team proceeded nonetheless to produce the 
report in the terms they chose, and indeed to publish a number of academic articles in 
prestigious journals, reflecting on their positions as insider/outsiders, and the power 
dynamics they negotiated as researchers and (quasi-)bureaucrats. Notes they wrote to 
one another through the research process later became ethnographic data with which 
to analyse the dynamics of government and feeling within which they had become 
embroiled.
I began my research unaware of these predecessors, and my experience of institutional  
power-broking  has  (so  far)  been  different.  However,  the  value  of  being  a  critical  
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researcher also engaged in policy practice is evident from their publications. Part of my 
subject  matter  for  this  research  has to  be  my ethnographic,  embodied  experience 
simply  because  the  research  process  itself  has  formed  part  of  the  negotiation  of 
difficult subjects. My position, like these previous researchers, is deeply embedded in 
participant observation and an action research, as both projects use critical sociology 
in the production of policy work – while studying the policy work itself  in order to 
produce new knowledge. My ethnography does this at several levels. Access primarily 
as  a  practitioner  allowed me to  account  for  my own direct  experiences  (including 
affective ones) in Chapter Four. This involvement enabled both privileged access to the 
research site and an embodied understanding of policy processes, which became data 
for  research  as  I  reflected  on  the  notes,  records  and  memories  I  had  of  those 
experiences, and considered what they could tell us about policy practice. 
Participation as a practitioner also allowed me access to privileged materials which 
might otherwise have been held as confidential, some of which I refer to in Chapter 
Four  as  'internal  documents'.  I  have tried to  strike  a  balance between using  these 
materials as integral to demonstrating the practices I am researching, and maintaining 
some  level  of  confidentiality  with  respect  to  the  trust  placed  in  me  by  research 
participants, by referring to these documents and events with some level of discretion. 
As  the  research  was  produced  in  cooperation  with  colleagues  at  LBH  through  my 
studentship, some of these documents were passed to me specifically because they 
might be of use to me in my research, and as such I have respected this relationship by 
using the documents in this way. I have contextualised these documents where I use 
them  as  far  as  is  necessary  to  make  sense  within  the  analysis,  without  adding 
extraneous  details  which  would  only  serve  to  identify  individuals.  Since  the 
ethnographic  work  I  conducted was,  in  part,  done before  I  knew it  would become 
research, and because of its nature, I was unable to obtain 'consent' from others who 
formed  part  of  my  experience.  For  that  reason,  I  have  tried  to  ensure  that  the 
discussions which are based on participant observation do not identify any specific 
people who had not agreed to be included in the study at some point. 
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Interviews
Uncomfortable positions emerge when reflexive subjects are faced by contradictions 
between  their  taken-for-granted  understandings  of  the  world  and  their  empirical 
experiences. The interview encounters I engineered often enabled policy practitioners 
to occupy such uncomfortable positions, whereas in day-to-day life (as studied through 
the ethnographic component of this research), they might have less time to dwell on 
these positions, because of the demands of fulfilling professional duties. This is not to 
say that such discomforts were not present in daily interactions, just that a space to  
examine and elaborate on them was created in the interview encounter.
Interviews gave participants an opportunity to reflect on, as well as to engage in, these 
negotiations.  I  treat  the interview encounters as  constructed space in  which I  take 
seriously what the interviewees say. I do not dismiss their arguments as simple self-
justifications ('they would say that,  wouldn't they').  But nor do I take the interview 
transcript as a straightforward explanation of 'how it really is'. Rather, taking seriously 
the  interview  encounter  means  understanding  it  as  a  negotiation,  in  which  both 
interviewer and interviewee reflect on and reproduce elements of the policy- and self-
making process. Interviews thus provide concentrated access to such negotiations in 
process, rather than an unquestioned explanation of the situation 'from the horse's 
mouth'. 
The  creation  of  framed  research  encounters  is  partly  related  to  an  attempt  to 
systematise research.  Paying attention to these frames and how they are breached 
(rather than leaving this out of, or unspoken in, the analysis) can help to highlight some 
of  their  analytical  implications.  For  example,   Coffey  describes  how  bumping  into 
participants outside her research site made clear to her the contrast with how she 
presented herself when 'on duty' as researcher, and the way she had constructed this,  
bodily  and  emotionally.  It  also  drew  attention  to  the  constructed  nature  of 
professional/personal  relationships  within  the  research  site  and  the  limits  of  them 
beyond  the  research  –  and  hence  her  role  as  a  specific  kind  of  outsider  (Coffey, 
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1999:53).  For  me,  the  interview encounter  produced a  particular  kind  of  frame in 
which personal narratives of self were produced by participants,  and perhaps more 
emphasised than in their daily work. It was a separate space from daily ethnography, 
set aside to consider the construction of policy practice from a different angle. This is  
not to say that the accounts I was given were more authentic because personal. Rather, 
they demonstrate how participants found a mode of talking about policy issues when 
one-to-one, and that they used personal narratives both to remake themselves and to 
claim a form of authenticity often associated with the confessional account.
It is not my intention to privilege an 'authentic self' or to use the interview method as a  
confessional tool through which this self is revealed. Rather, if we accept Atkinson and 
Silverman's (1997) critique of the 'interview society',  then we might also note their  
contention that the treasuring of self-presentation in popular culture and social science 
is a 'social fact'. That is, it is a phenomenon that can be studied. As they note, there is a  
difference  between  'biographical  sociology  and  the  sociology  of  biographical  work' 
(Atkinson and Silverman, 1997:322), in which they esteem the latter but accuse the 
former of lacking analytical rigour. In my interview data, it is the biographical work that 
I am interested in. The negotiations that policy practitioners make to comprehend and 
to  re-present  difficult  subjects  in  terms they find manageable  and acceptable  very 
often  involve  work  on  their  own  biography  and  its  re-presentation  as  narrative, 
connected to and orienting narratives of policy. In Rose's terms, this is a 'focus not on 
what language means but on what it does' (1998:178).
The  main  body  of  data  in  the  thesis  is  formed  of  85  interviews  with  'policy 
practitioners' (see Appendix Two for the range of policy practitioners I interviewed,; 
Appendix Three provides a quick reference to the roles of those quoted within the 
text). Though the choice of interview participants was my own, I sought guidance and 
cooperation from 'gate-keepers' whose endorsement helped me to identify myself as a 
legitimate  researcher,  as  well  as  triangulating  my  own  views  on  who  the  relevant 
people  within  an  organisation  or  locality  might  be. Within  Hackney,  my  CASE 
studentship status, as well as my previous work history there, meant that I was already 
aware of institutional structures and key organisations and departments. I had worked 
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with many of the people I  interviewed there in the past,  though not necessarily  in 
relation to community cohesion. For those who I did not know, my endorsement by the 
Assistant Chief Executive involved in my research studentship provided an institutional 
imprimatur,  as  did  my  use  of  a  Hackney  Council  email  address  to  arrange  the 
interviews. Only one person I approached for an interview in Hackney declined to be 
involved.
When approaching national organisations and other local authorities, I also used my 
association with Hackney and my local government email address (provided as part of 
my CASE studentship arrangements) as a way of reassuring potential participants of the 
validity of my project. With each of the three additional case study areas, I found that 
the most effective way to gain access was again through an initial gatekeeper. These 
were each identified in different ways, again capitalising on my existing relationships, 
career and biography. The first contact with Oldham was made by meeting an Assistant 
Director  at  a  local  government  conference  in  London  where  he  was  making  a 
presentation  on  their  developing  local  approach  to  community  cohesion,  with  a 
community organiser from Oldham who I also later interviewed. I was able to attend 
this event as a result of my existing local government connections, and to speak to the 
Assistant Director in the tea break and follow this up with email and phone contact 
which led to seven interviews with policy practitioners in Oldham. 
In Barking and Dagenham and Peterborough, I was less reliant on a single gatekeeper 
for  each,  but  again  would  have  found  access  much  harder  without  my  existing 
background,  knowledge  and  resources.  The  first  contact  I  made  in  Barking  and 
Dagenham was through a research participant from a think tank (who incidentally I 
knew  personally  before  interviewing).  He  had  conducted  research  on  community 
cohesion there and gave me details of policy practitioners he had met within the local 
authority. Through this information, I did manage to meet with the local authority lead 
on community cohesion, but this did not result in the same level of cooperation in  
securing  further  interviews  as  elsewhere.  Instead,  using  my  knowledge  of  the 
functioning of local authorities and local strategic partnerships, I identified a number of 
people holding key positions locally and arranged to meet with them, also asking each 
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of them if there were other people they thought it would be useful for me to interview.  
Finally, in Peterborough I was able to contact a member of the (by then concluded) 
national Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC), who worked locally, through 
my academic supervisor who had also participated in the COIC. I also identified the 
local lead on community cohesion through the LSP's website, and obtained his help in 
securing six  interviews in total  with policy  practitioners  in  Peterborough who were 
involved in community cohesion.
The majority of those working at the national level were in organisations that had a 
specific remit to work with or on behalf of local government or on community cohesion 
policy, or organisations that were in the process of developing their own research and 
positions on community cohesion policy (I am thinking here particularly of some of the 
think tanks I visited). Many were as interested in understanding my research project as 
a source of knowledge for themselves, as in providing data for me. With most of these 
organisations, my local government and university credentials, my association with two 
leading  academics  in  the  field  as  my  doctoral  supervisors,  and  in  some  cases  my 
previous work or personal acquaintance with them, seemed to identify me as a friendly 
researcher and my project as one they were interested in participating in and hearing 
more from. For other organisations though (I  am thinking here particularly of more 
'right-leaning'  think  tanks)  these  connections  did  not  work  so  well,  and  may  have 
served as a barrier to access. 
Often,  research  participants  seemed  nervous  in  interviews,  some  telling  me  so 
explicitly. Part-way through an interview, even the most senior executives might ask 'Is 
this  alright?  Is  this  what  you  wanted?',  or  apologise  for  'rambling  on'.  At  these 
moments  I  sought  to  reassure  them  that  I  did  not  have  a  model  answer  which  I 
'wanted' them to give, and that I was glad that they were leading the conversation in 
the directions that were most relevant to them. The other reason for nervousness from 
participants  might  have  been  a  suspicion  that  I  could  have  had  'ulterior  motives'.  
Through my initial written requests for interviews and my introduction to the interview 
when we met I  sought to reassure interviewees that my recordings and transcripts 
would not be shared with anyone in the organisation, that extracts used in my research 
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would  be  anonymised  and  that  if  interviewees  wished  any  specific  comments  to 
remain  completely  confidential  they  had  only  to  say  so.  I  also  explained  that  the 
research was to understand policy practitioners' varying understandings of community 
cohesion policy, and not an exercise to find 'right answers' or 'best practice' – or bad 
practice. Nevertheless, the 'audit culture' of local authorities is strong, and though no 
one said so directly, I did feel that in some cases my presence was seen as potentially a  
'checking up' or auditing exercise. That said, the questions I asked would have been 
unusual for an exercise in management auditing. 
The interviews were semi-structured and based around four broad questions:
• How  would  you  describe  community  cohesion  policy?  /  What  is  your 
understanding of community cohesion policy?
• (How) has community cohesion policy and its development affected the work 
that you do?
• How do you think community cohesion policy will develop in the future?
• People  often  describe  community  cohesion  policy  as  being  about  identity, 
background and experiences; do you think your own identity,  background or 
experience affect how you think about cohesion policy?
For each of these areas of questioning I had a number of related prompts in case the 
thrust of the questions were unclear to interviewees or they were hesitant to expand. 
In  most  cases,  however,  these broad questions  prompted initial  responses  which  I  
could follow up with more reactive questions. I tried, as far as possible, to follow the 
directions of discussion which seemed most relevant to the interviewee, while keeping 
in mind the structure and focus of the interview. For instance, if an interviewee began 
talking  about  what  might  seem a relatively  unrelated issue of  policy,  or  their  own 
experiences in a previous job,  I  would follow their line of thought but if  necessary 
provide  prompts  or  questions  relating  this  back  to  the  main  line  of  questioning. 
Because of this reactive style of interviewing, in different interviews the amount of 
time spent on each area of interest would differ. 
The final question listed (how one's own identity, background or experiences informed 
thinking  about  community  cohesion)  was  added  after  six  pilot  interviews,  where 
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participants had talked unprompted about their own experiences in relation to their 
understanding of cohesion policy. Reviewing the pilot interviews, I saw that this was an 
important area of investigation, and decided to incorporate a specific question to tease 
out more reflections on it. I spent some time considering the wording of this question, 
and while I did not always stick exactly with the script for all  of the questions (e.g. 
perhaps adapting some of the vocabulary to that which had already been used by an 
interviewee,  or  elaborating  on  aspects  of  the  question  if  they  were  unclear),  the 
language of 'identity, background or experience' was an important combination. The 
broad  interpretations  this  made  possible  are  common  to  the  language  of  much 
community  cohesion  policy  documentation,  which  tends  to  avoid  the  language  of 
'equality categories' (such as gender, race or sexuality), instead using terms with which 
'everyone' can identify (e.g. COIC, 2007:4). I did not want to subscribe to the idea that  
those identified with 'unmarked' categories such as male or white are unaffected by 
questions  of  gender  or  race,  and  wanted  interviewees  to  feel  as  comfortable  as 
possible to relate their own viewpoints whatever these might be, whilst allowing them 
to  choose  whether  this  was  expressed  by  drawing  on  identity  politics,  ethical 
commitments,  material  events,  some  other  formation,  or  a  combination  of  these. 
While some interviewees expressed surprise or embarrassment at this question initially 
(one reason why I  couched it  with the preface that  this  was especially  relevant  to 
cohesion policy), most had already begun to answer it with comments throughout the 
interview,  to  which  I  would  sometimes  refer  back  as  prompts  if  they  struggled. 
However, I also gave interviewees the opportunity to say that they did not see how any 
of these issues affected their understandings of cohesion policy, and some did say this. 
As I  have discussed, the transcripts became documents, and I  paid attention to the 
process that went into creating them. I  understood the conversations I recorded as 
encounters  in a  specific,  created research encounter.  When analysing the language 
used by both me and the people I was interviewing, I tried to view it in this context, 
and  to  consider  hesitations,  intonation  and  laughter,  for  example,  as  part  of  the 
process  of  performance  and  conveying  of  meaning.  In  this  sense  my  analysis  was 
influenced  by  traditions  of  conversation  analysis  (Silverman,  1998).  This  was  an 
influence or epistemological starting point, rather than a strict prescriptive method. I 
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used inductive understandings and communicative strategies to develop my analysis, 
and demonstrate the reasons for my analysis and conclusions with close reference to 
the transcript texts, as you will see throughout the thesis.
I have contextualised the data to the extent that it makes sense within my analysis (for 
instance, describing the professional role or other characteristics of an interviewee), 
while  not  providing  additional  unnecessary  information  which would  only  serve to 
identify individual research participants. All of the names of interviewees have been 
changed (except for two who were expressly interviewed as public figures and who 
gave consent to be named – see Chapter Five). Where an interviewee asked me not to 
attribute specific comments to them, I either took further measures to obscure their 
identity, or avoided using the material altogether. I obtained consent (written or verbal) 
from every  participant  I  interviewed;  I  anonymised the  interviews;  I  explained the 
purpose of the research both in writing before the interview and verbally when we 
met. 
The majority of the interviews I conducted were with one research participant, though 
five were with two people at once, and I also recorded one focus group-style meeting 
with a  larger  number  of  participants.  The  typical  interview lasted  around an  hour, 
though they ranged between half an hour and almost two hours. I recorded all of these 
events with a digital  voice recorder, except for one interview where the participant 
preferred  not  to  be  recorded  and  where  I  took  detailed  notes  as  we  talked. 
Immediately  after  every  interview  I  made  detailed  notes  on  the  context,  body 
language,  and  any  elements  of  the  interaction  that  had  struck  me  as  particularly 
important at the time. I later transcribed all of the interviews myself, taking account of 
all pauses, stutters and exclamations. The process of transcribing enabled me to think  
back over the interviews and become intimate with the large amount of data I had 
collected. This way, I avoided the fragmentation of data that can be a risk of relying on 
qualitative data analysis programmes, retaining my overview of themes and my ability 
to recognise subtle resonances and use intuitive and inductive strategies for analysis 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2000:68).
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As a way of organising my data, I created 'codes' for the themes that emerged from the 
data,  both from interview transcripts and other documentary sources.  These codes 
were created and administered within the qualitative data analysis programme NVivo,  
which made it possible to systematically apply these codes to the transcripts as I re-
read each one in turn. In the process of coding, further themes emerged inductively 
and I created new codes for them to help to organise the data. In all, I had 93 different 
codes by the end of this process. For an idea of how I handled these codes, the first 
five in my NVivo file when organised alphabetically were '2001 riots, Oldham, Bradford, 
Burnley'; 'age as diversity'; 'barking [and dagenham]'; 'beneath the surface'; 'bnp, far 
right'. 
Reviewing these five codes gives a reasonable idea of the complexities of this coding 
strategy. Firstly, the codes were created inductively and were shorthand for my own 
use,  thus  they  did  not  necessarily  form  fully  fleshed-out  analytic  categories  that  I  
would use in my final write-up.  Secondly, they are a mixture of types of ideas, based 
on the formations that emerged from the data. For example the first code listed here 
('2001  riots,  Oldham,  Bradford,  Burnley')  is  a  cluster  around  narratives  of  the 
emergence of community cohesion policy which comes out consistently in the data and 
is located in time and space. The second (age as diversity) is a way of talking about 
diversity  by  reference  to  age,  which  emerged  as  a  tactic  in  some  data  for 
demonstrating that community cohesion policy was not simply based in race and faith 
– yet in the end this was not a strong enough theme to be discussed at length in the 
thesis.  The  third  (barking)  is  a  place  which  came  up  frequently  in  narratives  of 
community  cohesion  policy  and  which  I  subsequently  pursued  as  a  theme  of  the 
research by developing the methodology to investigate perspectives from within that 
place; the fact that in my own shorthand I left off 'Dagenham' may be revealing of my 
own  lack  of  attention  to  the  specificities  of  place,  but  also  to  the  ways  that  
interviewees in particular might talk more about one than the other part of the local 
authority  in  Barking  and  Dagenham.  The  fourth  code  (beneath  the  surface),  is  a 
category I created to group together narratives that seemed to form around themes of 
unspoken tensions, when practitioners or documents alluded to cohesion as potentially 
just 'on the surface', with more sinister or difficult subjects concealed or silenced. This 
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code included a variety of  different  subjects,  constructed within resonant  narrative 
forms. The final code listed here (bnp, far right) refers to narratives and allusions to the 
British National Party and other far right groups which were identified in some sources 
as specific, or primary, threats to cohesion. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that as I went through this coding process, much of my 
data  was  given  several  different  codes.  A  different  methodology  might  have 
investigated  systematic  correlations  between  codes  (Fielding,  2002:165)  –  but  my 
coding  system was  not  a  tool  to  scientise  or  quantify  this  data  on  narratives  and 
meaning. I coded the data as a way of sorting and thinking about it, of organising my 
thoughts  and  interpretations,  and  so  where  codes  overlap  I  have  discussed  these 
associations in my analysis, but I do not pretend this shows some independent variable 
at work, because of course all of the codes themselves and their application emerge 
from my own inductive decisions.
The  processes  of  transcribing,  reading  and  coding  the  around  1,000,000  words  of 
transcript material made me extremely familiar both with the detail of the material, 
and  its  broader  themes.  When  thinking  about  emerging  themes  throughout  the 
analysis  process, I  was able to refer back to the coded archive to locate material  I  
remembered as significant. Having the archive organised in this way also enabled me to 
re-read  juxtaposed  sets  of  interview  material  from  different  participants,  thereby 
creating  a  different  context  for  pieces  of  data  than when embedded in  their  own 
individual interview transcripts.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have highlighted how uncomfortable positions and difficult subjects 
arise  throughout  the thesis.  Sometimes this  is  related to the use of  language,  the 
differences  between  what  is  said,  implied  and  understood.  I  have  suggested  that 
ambiguity itself should be understood as a tool or technique of governmentality (as 
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discussed in Chapter One). As such, my research strategy takes the study of policy off 
the page, and into the practices, negotiations and uses of policy documents and their 
ambiguities  by  using  participant  observation  and  semi-structured  interviews  with 
policy practitioners where they are given the space to reflect on their policy practice by 
stepping slightly outside of their everyday negotiations.
As I have argued, the interviews and other forms of data I have gathered and analysed 
in the thesis are in themselves negotiations, as is my own work as both researcher and 
practitioner. This should not be seen wholly cynically, as if participants are simply trying 
to show themselves in the 'best' light. As I will discuss later in the thesis (see especially  
Chapter Seven),  many practitioners demonstrated deep commitments to their work 
even as they suggested they might fall short of their own ideals. This presentation itself 
is a strategy of negotiation of identity and narrative, but while throughout the thesis I 
have considered participants' presentation of themselves as fundamentally related to 
power structures and their own positioning within them, I have also  sought to take 
their narratives seriously. In particular, I have refused the (perhaps more comfortable) 
option of drawing a firm line between 'policy' and 'sociology' which would suggest that  
the two worlds have access to fundamentally different knowledges or perspectives. 
Rather  I  have  emphasised  that  these  worlds  are  connected,  but  that  operating 
primarily within one or the other influences what  purposes  knowledge or techniques 
might be put to at a particular moment.
The  connections  between these  two  imagined  worlds  are  emphasised  by  my own 
position as both practitioner and sociologist. I have discussed the negotiations that this 
entailed in conducting my research, the benefits it had in terms of access, analysis and 
insights,  and  the  potential  difficulties  in  maintaining  analytical  distance  and 
independence. To a great extent, the conduct of the research had many parallels with 
the subject of  analysis.  That  is,  the  very action of  developing this  research project 
draws into question the roles and identities of both researcher and participant, while it 
is the actual  practices  of these actors, and their meanings, that are of interest. This 
parallels one of the main threads of the research question, about what it means  to  
govern, and how this is best understood by attention to the actions of those engaged in 
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governing.  As  I  will  discuss  at  greater  length  in  the  empirical  chapters,  building 
relationships  of  trust  (in  order  to  influence  action)  appears  to  be  at  the  heart  of 
governing,  and  doing  so  requires  both  technical  and  emotional  skill.  Very  similar 
processes are at work in building research relationships.
These  relationships  between  individuals  are  of  course  always  experienced  within 
structures  of  differential  power.  As  I  have  emphasised,  the  attention  my  research 
strategy  gives  to  emotions  as  part  of  the  process  of  governing  is  not  intended to 
obscure or mask power relations. Rather, it is a recognition that  power relations and  
structures  are  lived  through  emotional  reactions.  Emotional  labour  is  used  in  the 
processes of governing, and expected in the responses of those being governed. This is 
also true of the process of research. And emotional effects are often found within, and 
exercised through, narratives which make sense of society or are used to persuade in 
one way or  another.  The power of  narrative  (and how narratives shape as  well  as 
embody what is said and what remains silent) is central to the thesis, both its analysis  
and its subject matter. By following narratives, I have developed a research design that 
follows the meanings of places and in relation to one another and to the practice of  
governing.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  begin  to  explore  where  this  narrative-based 
research strategy and the concentration on how narratives are used has taken me.
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Chapter Three: Contradictory narratives of cohesion
Introduction
In this chapter I explore narratives of community cohesion policy. The term community 
cohesion  (policy)  can  be,  and  is,  used  in  various  ways.  Sometimes  'community 
cohesion' is used to describe an existing condition, or a condition that is being aspired 
to.  At other times 'community cohesion'  (or its lack) is  treated as a cause of other 
conditions (such as educational achievement or poverty). Thirdly, building on both or 
either of these meanings, a set of actions to engender community cohesion can be 
prescribed by commentators as required in a particular situation. Finally, 'community 
cohesion' can be treated as a political construct, and it is largely in that sense that I use 
it here and throughout the thesis. This is the reason that I mostly refer to 'community 
cohesion  policy',  because  this  emphasises  a  whole  set  of  ideas  (including  the 
descriptive,  causal,  and prescriptive  listed  above)  which are  collected together  and 
given the label 'community cohesion' as part of constructing a legible policy narrative 
(or, as we shall see, multiple narratives). Part of the power (and the difficulty) of using 
(or analysing) this sort of concept is that the phrase 'community cohesion (policy)' so 
easily slips between these types of meaning.
Prescriptive, technocratic policy documents treat community cohesion as an object or 
condition which can be measured, as in the first two senses outlined here (e.g. DCLG,  
2007b). Attempts to map community cohesion policy as a policy prescription (the third 
sense outlined above) sometimes present a chronology of  important moments and 
documents in its development, which illustrate that approaches have changed over 
time (e.g. Cantle, 2005; see also the Institute of Community Cohesion's archive at
http://www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Resources/AboutCommunityCohesion). There is a 
developing  literature  critiquing  such  unproblematised  chronologies,  and  policy 
definitions of community cohesion (e.g. Burnett, 2004, 2007; Kalra, 2002; Khan, 2007; 
McGhee,  2003,  2005;  Robinson,  2005,  2008).  This  literature  begins  to  consider 
community  cohesion  policy  as  a  political  construct.  However,  in  the  main  it  has 
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depended on archival  discourse analysis  of  policy  documents,  which stops  short  of 
attention to my particular interest in the resonances and contradictions of how policy 
is understood, practised and lived (see also Bonnett,  1993:180; Husband and Alam, 
2011:13; Solomos and Back, 1995:xi). 
In an attempt to do justice to the overlaps, ambiguities, resonances and silences of 
how people  –  especially  policy  practitioners  –  make  sense  of  community  cohesion 
policy, I have framed this chapter around narratives. That is, the data I have gathered 
suggests  four  groupings  of  ideas  through  which  different  aspects  of  community 
cohesion policy are imagined. These four sets of ideas are not separate – indeed to 
some  extent  they  depend  on  each  other.  But  they  are  best  understood  as  four 
connected stories about existing or past problems with community, future solutions, 
the  places  where  these  occur,  the  relationships  to  power  and  difference  of  the 
populations  and  places  involved,  and  how  to  manage  them.  What  is  included  or 
excluded  from  each  of  these  narratives  is  important,  as  is  who  constructs  the 
narratives, how and why; and how the narratives (with their silences) are used (Keith 
and Pile, 1993:37; Trouillot, 1995:26).
In detailed work on British political and media constructions of 'young black men', John 
Solomos has shown how policies 'construct definitions of the problems to be tackled 
which  exclude  certain  issues  from serious  consideration'  (1988:142),  where  'coded 
terms'  such  as  'urban  problems  and  'pressure  on  services'  are  used to  talk  about 
violence and disorder, and about race (p105; see also Hall et al, 1978). But it is also 
important to note how these coded terms shift over time and context (Solomos and 
Back, 1995:xi). For instance,  Bagguley and Hussain (2003b:3) read official reports on 
community  cohesion  as  'an  “index”  of  changing  racialised  discourses'  that  reflect 
shifting government attitudes to community. And my research is most of all concerned 
with  how  awareness of  these  codings  is  practised.  Once  we recognise  that  policy 
practitioners, journalists and citizens may be aware, to various extents, of the coding or 
silencing they are doing or receiving,  matters take on another order of  complexity. 
Community cohesion policy is a particularly good example of this because (at least in 
some of its formulations) the difficulties of communication about 'sensitive issues' are 
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at its heart (Cantle, 2001:18; Lewis, 2005:555).
This  chapter  narrates  the  landscape  of  cohesion  with  geographically  anchored 
reference  points.  This  is  a  figurative  landscape;  it  is  imagined  from  material 
geographies, but only partly related to their lived experience (Keith and Pile, 1993:6).  
Each of the four overlapping policy narratives demonstrates a relationship between 
community  cohesion  (the  problem,  description,  cause  or  prescription)  imagined 
through place ('they' experience community cohesion problems 'over there', but 'we' 
do not have problems 'here'); and imagined through time (problems of the past which 
have now been solved, or problems of the present which never used to exist). Barnor 
Hesse has written about how imagining such problems as 'elsewhere' and of a different 
(past) era is typical of a colonising, Eurocentric approach which imagines the position 
of the speaker/viewer/analyst/governor to be superior, modern, and central (and those 
they view to be inferior, primitive and marginal) (Hesse, 1993:175). The narratives I 
discuss here are partial. I am not claiming to tell the whole story, but to provide some 
context for how community cohesion policy is thought and performed in national and 
local policy practice. 
The  first  narrative  centres  on  the (familiar)  idea of  the  unfamiliar  Other,  and how 
community cohesion policy has become closely associated with ideas of 'parallel lives', 
much discussed following the reports of inquiries into violent disturbances in northern 
English  towns  and  cities  in  the  summer  of  2001.  In  more  recent  developments, 
associations of  the 'alien other' have shifted to focus on a newer 'folk devil': the young  
Muslim (Asian) man (Alexander, 2000, 2004). Religious labelling of the outsider was 
less central to the initial stages of community cohesion policy, but following attacks on 
New York and Washington later in 2001, and the ensuing 'war on terror', Islam has 
become increasingly problematised in community cohesion policy and its associated 
programmes (Husband and Alam, 2011:2). 
The second set of coordinates locates a different folk devil – the 'white working class'. 
This  term  has  become  associated  with  nationalistic  racism  and  particularly  with 
electoral successes of the British National Party (BNP) in the 2000s. This framing of  
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debate allows racism to be situated with the white working class, outside or on the 
outskirts  of  London,  and  not  in  the  capital  city's  middle-class,  multicultural,  
metropolitan centre (Skeggs, 2005a:972). It also demonises and homogenises a section 
of  society as backward and violently racist  outsiders from the body politic and the 
national 'shared value' of 'tolerance' (Haylett, 2001:357; Hewitt, 2005:53).
Thirdly, nostalgic ideals of national identity in Britain and specifically in England have 
long been associated with ideas of the countryside and rural landscapes and their links 
to idealised 'whiteness'  (Chakraborti,  2010; Chakraborti  and Garland,  2004; Garland 
and  Chakraborti,  2006;  Keith,  2005:33;  Neal,  2002:443;  Stedman  Jones,  1989:311; 
Williams,  1973:7).  Consequently,  'problems'  for  community  cohesion  were  framed 
around how existing  resident  populations  would 'cope'  with  increases  in  migration 
following  the  accession  of  new  countries  to  the  EU  in  2004,  particularly  in  areas 
previously  unused to migrant  or  ethnic  minority  presence.  Such areas  become the 
focus for narratives of both a nostalgically imagined 'authentic' English identity, and 
debates  about  what  multiculture  could  and  should  mean,  particularly  in  changing 
contexts of power and difference.
Finally,  I  turn  to  a  narrative  of  celebratory  urban multiculture.  The  previous  three 
narratives created racialised others, and situated the discrimination to which they were 
subjected within particular bodies and places (non-cosmopolitan,  rural  or provincial 
white working class – or self-segregating ethnic minorities). They imagined places and 
populations  lacking  in  community  cohesion  (in  different  ways).  The  final  set  of 
coordinates imagines a Britain that is cosmopolitan and multicultural, an image which 
does  not  overtake  but  sits  alongside  the  other  shifting  referents  of 
Britishness/Englishness. In this context, the inner city, previously imagined as a place of 
danger associated with poverty, crime, deviance and migration becomes celebrated for 
its association with difference and change (Bonnett, 2010:129; Keith, 2005:121). The 
narrative of long-standing histories of welcoming newcomers becomes celebrated as 
part of the national story, representing 'British values of tolerance'. 
These four narratives do not tell a straightforward story of community cohesion policy 
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and  its  development.  They  converge,  diverge,  contradict  and  intertwine  at  various 
points. In the remainder of this chapter, I will elaborate on each – beginning with their  
historical resonances, the more contemporary moments that connect these narratives 
to community cohesion,  the policy developments that intersect with each, and the 
explanation for their associations with an imagined geographic location.
Parallel lives and 'the other'
History
Sociology's exploration of 'race' – and how this social category is constructed and lived 
– moves between assumptions of fundamental  difference and their translation into 
assumptions  of  cultural  differences  (see  Gilroy,  2000);  understanding  'race'  as  a 
construction but racism as real (Miles, 1993); understanding racist structural practices 
as embedded in hegemonic struggle within capitalist society (Hall et al, 1978); the risk 
that  such  approaches  can  reduce  understandings  of  black  experience  and  political 
mobilisation  to  victimhood  in  reaction  to  racism  (Gilroy,  1990);  and  attempts  to 
integrate understandings of race with other dimensions of difference and oppression 
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983; Brah, 2007). All of these strands of thought enter the 
policy and popular discourse, to different extents, and in more or less precise forms. 
Their  incommensurabilities  do  not  prevent  their  coexistence  and  reappearance. 
Residues of all of them can be identified in both the policy development literature on 
community cohesion and in the everyday talk of policy makers discussed later in the 
thesis. 
The history of 'race relations' studies in Britain, the US and Europe has been concerned 
largely  with  urban  populations,  where  cities  have  been  places  of  settlement  for 
international migrants. Classic studies of ghettoisation, spatial segregation, integration 
and  assimilation  applied  ecological  models  to  measure  dispersal  and  residential 
separation  of  racially  defined  population  groups  throughout  the  twentieth  century 
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(Waters and Jiménez, 2005). In some forms, the idea of community cohesion policy as 
concerned with residential segregation on ethnic lines owes much to the histories of  
social geography and its development of measures such as the Index of Dissimilarity 
(Burgess et al, 2005; Finney and Simpson, 2009).
Community cohesion policy was a response to ethnically/racially marked 'riots'. This 
echoed the urban programmes of  the 1980s,  and their  focus  on ethnic  residential  
segregation. But a new inflection of these debates in Britain in the 2000s was that the 
previous characterisation of 'good' and 'bad' migrant populations was reversed. Instead 
of  African  heritage  groups  being  seen  as  the  perpetrators  of  violence  ('having 
problems')  while  South  Asian  groups  were  caricatured  as  responsible,  quiet,  and 
dedicated to business and family ('having culture') (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003a; Hall  
et al, 1978; Lewis, 2005:550-2; Solomos, 1988), the 'problem' group or folk devil of the 
2000s is the South Asian heritage Muslim, perhaps second or third generation migrant 
(Alexander, 2000:xiii; MPA, 2007:51), though the 'problems with' Black Britons have by 
no means disappeared from policy discourse (e.g. see Blair, 2007).
A significant turning point both for government policy on race equality and academic 
engagement with these issues was the 'moment' of urban riots in the 1980s (Keith, 
1993; Solomos, 2003:36). That this 'moment' relates to events over several years is an 
illustration of how the complex yet mundane realities that led to those uprisings, the 
events themselves, and their aftermath can become distilled through narrative into 
'the 1980s riots'. This phrase then draws in all the resonances and implications of black 
urban poor, state and casual racism, explosive reactions, and government attempts at 
post-hoc amelioration – while eluding the specificities of precisely who, how, why and 
what  took  place  (nor  is  there  room to  discuss  'what  happened'  here;  for  detailed 
discussions  see Benyon and Solomos,  1987;  Keith,  1993;  Kettle  and Hodges,  1982; 
Solomos, 1986).
Rhetoric  linking  public  disorder  to  failed  immigration  and  integration  policies 
contributed  to  immigration  acts  limiting  the  rights  of  people  from  former  British 
colonies to enter Britain, alongside race relations and race equalities acts intended to 
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improve the treatment of  those already resident in Britain (Solomos, 2003:80).  But 
racialisation is not only a project applied to those with darker skins (Bonnett, 1998; 
Miles, 1993) and folk devils are not always imagined through this lens. Though less 
centrally located in the race relations literature (Mac an Ghaill, 2001), an alternative 
'folk  devil'  of  late  twentieth  century  Britain  was the 'Irish  terrorist',  a  trope  which 
resonates with early twenty-first  century narratives of the 'Muslim suicide bomber' 
(Nickels et al., 2009). This was a community identified as outsiders by their religion and 
migrant heritage, and then associated as a whole with the dangers of the Provisional 
IRA's  attacks  on  mainland  Britain  and  separatist  ideology.  Longer  histories  of 
international  domination led to systematic demonisation of the Irish in Britain as a 
specific danger to 'the nation' throughout the late twentieth century through counter-
terrorist legislation, police harassment and popular racisms (Fekete, 2001; Hickman, 
1998).
The emergence of Muslim populations as alternative folk devils had its own 'moments' 
or  turning  points.  These  images  had  already  become  established  before  the 
appearance  of  community  cohesion  policy  as  a  government  agenda.  One  of  these 
turning  points  was  the  reaction  to  the  publication  of  Salman  Rushdie's  novel  The 
Satanic Verses, which was seen as offensive by some Muslim leaders, with copies burnt 
in protests in Bradford and elsewhere, and a  fatwa  declared on Rushdie in February 
1989  (Solomos,  2003:212-3).  These  events  re-energised  political  debate  about 
multiculturalism,  with a  greater  focus  on  ethnoreligious  difference,  integration  and 
gender,  problematising  (South  Asian)  Muslims in  particular,  and prompting political 
mobilisations  within  Muslim  communities  as  a  specific  political  force  (Solomos, 
2003:213-5;  Solomos  and  Back,  1995:150).  These  were  not  new  issues  in  British 
political debate. For example, controversy spilled over in the mid-1980s in reaction to 
Bradford headteacher Ray Honeyford's outspoken views against anti-racist education 
relating to the South Asian heritage children attending his school (Ball and Solomos, 
1990:13). The first Gulf War, in 1990-1, also helped to congeal 'the idea that there was 
some kind of unitary Muslim community in Britain that could pose a threat to national 
identity' (Solomos, 2003:215). Thus the 'quiet and dutiful migrant' caricature attributed 
to South Asians in Britain had already begun to fade when community cohesion policy 
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emerged (Fortier, 2007:109; MPA, 2007:51).
Contemporary moments
In 2001, violence broke out on the streets of northern English towns, most notoriously 
in  Oldham  (in  May),  Burnley  (in  June)  and Bradford  (in  July).  The  news  coverage 
produced strikingly similar images of burning cars and riot police that instantly drew 
parallels with 1980s disturbances. Links between the two periods were drawn by policy 
practitioners (e.g. Cantle, 2005:8), journalists (BBC News, 2001; Darbyshire, 2001) and 
academics (e.g. Bagguley and Hussain, 2003a; Kalra, 2002). The parallels were not just 
in  the  widespread  and  riotous  nature  of  the  disorders  but  in  the  involvement  of 
racialised urban populations – this time Asian rather than black – though both sets of 
disturbances involved white participants too, and in more complex relationships than a 
simple 'white-against-black' scenario (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003a; Keith, 1993).
The  government  reports  that  emerged  following  the  2001  disorders  identified  a 
number  of  contributory  factors  for  the  violence,  including  economic  deprivation, 
provocation from far right groups, crime and political  disenfranchisement (Denham, 
2001:8) But their greatest emphasis was on a diagnosis of 'parallel lives', that is, that 
'Asian'  and 'white'  communities  were living separate existences and rarely  meeting 
(Cantle,  2001:9;  Denham,  2001:13).  This  again  was  assigned  a  number  of  causes, 
including  systematic  discrimination  in  both  public  and  private  housing,  and  'white 
flight'  from schools and neighbourhoods,  and to the choice of Asian people to live 
together  for  safety  from  discrimination  and  access  to  cultural  resources  (Cantle, 
2001:28).  The  prescription  was  that  'parallel  lives'  needed  to  be  addressed  by 
developing greater  'community  cohesion'.  As the definition of  community  cohesion 
and how to achieve it  has continued to be debated, there remains a reverberation 
around  this  central  idea  that  established  migrant  communities  have  remained 
separated  from  longer-standing  (white)  communities  in  many  towns,  and  that 
intervention is required to bring these two groups together.
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There were four key reports into the 2001 disturbances (Cantle, 2001; Clarke, 2001; 
Denham, 2001; Ritchie, 2001), and an additional report in Bradford which  had been 
commissioned prior to the events there in July (Ouseley, 2001). A key document which 
has dominated narratives of community cohesion is that produced by the Independent 
Review Team chaired by Ted Cantle (Cantle, 2001). This report refers to 'Asians' and 
'the Asian community' (alongside the 'white community'), but places less emphasis on 
the  designation  'Muslim'  and  only  refers  to  'the  Muslim  community'  within  the 
biographies of some of the review team members. The disturbances occurred weeks 
before  the  attacks  on  the  World  Trade  Centre  in  New  York  and  the  Pentagon  in 
Washington  on  11th September  2001,  and  the  subsequent  declaration  of  an 
international  'war  on terror'.  The riot  reports  were being written at  that  time and 
published soon after, but it seems that the idea of Muslims as a focus of folk devilry, 
fear or discrimination was not yet fully  crystallized as a concern in policy discourse 
(though see Ritchie,  2001:10)  in  the way it  became over  the following  years,  with 
Britain engaging in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the aftermath of bombings on 
the  London  transport  system  in  July  2005.  Despite  official  insistence  that  the 
Preventing Violent Extremism programme (later Prevent) which emerged following July 
2005  was  separate  to  community  cohesion  initiatives,  in  practice  the  two  were 
inextricably  linked  (see  Chapter  Four).  The  explicit  targeting  of  Muslims  as  having 
responsibility to 'isolate violent extremist activity', 'identify themselves as a welcome 
part  of  British  society'  and  'actively  condemn  violent  extremism'  seems  expressly 
designed to produce an outsider group in opposition to the 'wider British society' (CLG, 
2007b:3).  These  public  and  policy  developments  occurred  alongside  widespread 
expressions of concern about 'parallel lives' of 'Asians' (now equated with 'Muslims') as 
too different and separate to cohere with 'the wider population'.
In contrast to responses to civil disturbances in the 1980s which were initially led by 
the  central  government  department  responsible  for  local  government11 before  this 
leading role shifted by 1985 to the Home Office and consequent associations with law 
and order (Solomos, 2003:247),  the early responses to the 2001 disturbances were 
produced from the Home Office before moving back alongside community and local 
11 At that time, the Department of Environment.
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government  matters.12 Whereas  law  and  order  concerns  apparently  became  more 
dominant  in  the 1980s policy  responses,  in  the 2000s the change in  departmental 
responsibility  suggests  an  increasing  emphasis  on  regimes  of  governmentality  and 
behaviour-shaping activities rather than imposition of control.  Increasingly,  counter-
terrorism measures were also split between these two departments, with Communities 
and Local Government responsible for 'winning hearts and minds' of British Muslims 
(DCLG,  2007a),  while  information-gathering  and  intervention  remained  with  the 
security services (HM Government, 2006; 2009a; see also Chapter Four).
As  community  cohesion  policy  was  shaped  by  events  and  policy  reactions,  the 
messages about how precisely its relationship to race, racism and ethnicity should be 
understood  also  shifted.  Despite  being  discussed  as  if  its  main  focus  was  on 
segregation and separation, the Cantle Report initially positioned community cohesion 
policy as specifically addressing racialised inequality.  It  aligned community cohesion 
work with race equality  work,  suggesting that  local  authority  Community  Cohesion 
Strategies might be seen as part of meeting the duty to promote equality under the 
Race  Relations  (Amendment)  Act  2000 (Cantle,  2001:21).  The  team made the  first 
theme of their investigation 'the extent to which race issues are visibly and positively 
addressed  by  political/civic/community  leadership  and  diversity  is  valued'  (Cantle, 
2001:56). Further, the later Community Cohesion Review Panel which was appointed 
by the Home Office to provide guidance on the development of community cohesion 
policy and strategies13 stated in its final  report the 'hope that the statutory duty to 
“promote good race relations”... will be effectively discharged through the community 
cohesion agenda and will be regarded... as synonymous' (Community Cohesion Review 
Panel,  2004:57,  my  emphasis).  While  these  recognitions  of  the  links  between 
community  cohesion  work  and  race  equality  reflect  the  (implicit  and  explicit) 
understandings of many practitioners, most of the other documentation produced by 
national  bodies  attempts  to  separate  the  two  or  at  least  remove  the  tensions  of 
discussing race issues from community cohesion forums. An early example of this was 
12 From 2006, the Department of Communities and Local Government.
13  With some of  the same members as the Community Cohesion Review Team that  authored the  
Cantle Report, and again chaired by Ted Cantle.
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in  the  first  national  guidance  on  community  cohesion  programmes:  'Community 
cohesion  incorporates  and  goes  beyond  the  concept  of  race  equality  and  social 
cohesion' (LGA, 2002:6). Precisely how it might do so is not made clear.
Place
As described above, the rise of community cohesion policy as an agenda is connected 
to those places remembered as experiencing disorder in the summer of 2001. Disorder 
occurred in other places too around this  time, and yet other localities with similar 
characteristics  of  population,  geography and employment patterns  escaped serious 
disturbances.  But  the three towns which experienced the most  significant  disorder 
were the ones that commissioned local investigations into their causes, and received 
the most national  attention.  This  could be thought of  as the process by which the 
moment of  fact creation  (the making of sources) gives way to the moment of  fact  
assembly (the making of archives) (Trouillot, 1995:26; see also Wemyss, 2008). At each 
of these stages, some elements of history are remembered or privileged as facts, whilst  
others  are  silenced.  Oldham, Burnley and Bradford  in  this  process  are  recorded as 
places of parallel lives where attempts to find community cohesion are tested. They 
take an anchoring role from which the community cohesion policy narrative starts,14 as 
community cohesion is retold (the moment of fact retrieval). Silences and fact creation 
can manifest at any of these overlapping moments, or at the fourth, the moment of 
retrospective significance, the making of history 'in the final instance'.
Whether or not history is ever fixed 'in the final instance', the retrospective significance 
of  community  cohesion  policy  is  not  (yet).  However,  its  association  with  this 
constellation of northern English towns remains, in their  presentation at  a national 
level  through,  for  example,  policy documents,  conferences and media coverage (by 
both  locals  and  outside  commentators).  Their  names  have,  to  different  extents, 
become shorthand for ideas of segregated communities of South Asian Muslims and 
'the white working class'. The transformation of cohesion agendas by connection with 
14 See, for example http://www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Resources/AboutCommunityCohesion
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anti-terrorism re-inflects these resonances, as do the broad West Yorkshire accents of 
the bombers of July 2005, who grew up as British Asian Muslims in nearby towns (Back, 
2007a). The broader narrative this is used to construct is of northern England as a place 
where  multiculturalism has  failed  –  where  migration  of  the  mid-twentieth  century 
stalled in its normative progress towards integration. This fits with the post-industrial 
landscape of popular films (for example, This is England (2006), East is East (1999), My 
Son the Fanatic (1997)) which imagine a quasi-nostalgic, generalised provincial England 
stuck in the past of post-industrial hopelessness and depressed racism – in contrast to 
the superdiverse cosmopolitan harmony of Tony Blair's  Cool Britannia (read London) 
(Bonnett, 2010:130). Thus 'that' England of parallel lives is imagined as both spatially 
and temporally outside of the heart of government and power – and therefore simply 
unable to keep up, rather than left behind (as a consequence of others racing ahead). 
But this is not the only narrative which links places, events and times to a model of 
failed community cohesion.
'The white working class': locating racism with the other Other
History
The second set of coordinates from which to trace narratives of community cohesion 
policy similarly locates problems outside, and in the past of, the centres from which 
such histories are told. The twist this time is that this is not a trope of an invading  
other, but a relic of the past, the 'white working class' unable to adjust to a globalised  
world  and  therefore  threatening  national  cohesion  by  a  racist  rejection  of 
contemporary values.
The simple narrative is that Britain as a whole has become more at ease with itself as a  
post-imperial  nation  now  able  to  celebrate  its  internal  diversity.  Racism  and 
discrimination which were previously everyday have become unacceptable, indeed in 
many forms illegal. The exception to this is the 'white working class', who are portrayed 
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as  either ignorantly racist  or  as articulating what  others are too afraid to say:  that 
'multiculturalism has gone too far'. Either way, this figure enables a narrative in which 
racism  has  been  eliminated  from  the  nation  but  is  still  allowed  to  be  spoken  in 
response to concerns associated with this both marginalised and demonised figure.
Significant  moments  removing  the  acceptability  of  racist  speech  from  the  national 
discourse include the outrageous racism of Conservative slogans in the 1964 general  
election  campaign  in  Smethwick15 and  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher's  1978 
comments about her fear of Britain becoming 'swamped by people with a different 
culture' (quoted in Solomos, 2003:177). These moments were significant not just in 
demonstrating xenophobia and racism at the heart of mainstream politics, but also in 
mobilising a critique of it (Solomos, 2003:69). Similarly, that extreme far right views 
were both present as a force in electoral politics, and a threat that could be defeated, 
was  demonstrated  by  the  election  of  the  first  British  National  Party  (BNP)  racist 
councillor in the UK in Tower Hamlets in 1993 and subsequent refusal of officers and 
elected  members  to  cooperate  with  him,  which  with  concerted  efforts  from  local 
activists led to his removal (Wemyss, 2009:95).
Another significant element in this narrative is the idea of a 'backlash' from poor white 
communities already marginalised within  capitalism and then threatened by labour 
competition from immigration; or, more recently, framed as neglected by the state in 
the  privileging  of  ethnic  minorities  through  equalities  policies  and  'state 
multiculturalism'. This framing of concerns about immigration as spoken on behalf of 
the already economically excluded is most graphically remembered with reference to 
Enoch Powell's  infamous speeches (Solomos, 2003:61),  but was also present in the 
vociferous attacks on anti-racist education throughout the 1980s (see various essays in 
Ball  and  Solomos,  1990;  Hewitt,  2005:119).  These  historic  resonances  are  not 
necessarily place-based, except in that they call on images of both industrial and inner 
city working populations struggling within competitive labour markets, and  (less often) 
of agricultural or pastoral England/Britain.
15 Most notoriously, 'if you want a nigger neighbour vote Labour', a slogan the candidate refused to  
condemn (Solomos and Back, 1995:54).
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Contemporary moments
If racism is now seen as unspeakable in public life, it is in large part due to outraged  
reactions – not just to the speech acts of politicians described above or institutional or 
banal  racisms,  but  to  specific  incidents  which  have  captured  public  and  political 
imaginations. Perhaps the most significant of these events was the racist murder of a 
black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, in Eltham, south east London in 1993. The murder 
investigation was repeatedly compromised and, following an independent inquiry, this 
was found to be the result of institutional racism of the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MacPherson, 1999). A direct result of this was the Race Relations (Amendment) Act  
2000, which created a positive duty for public bodies to promote race equality. The 
strongly-worded outrage in the popular media at the racist nature of the murder and 
the collapse of criminal trials against the perpetrators was significant in demonstrating 
the unspeakability of racism (Hewitt, 2005:52).
Yet  this  condemnation  was  explicitly  narrated  through  class.  'White  working  class' 
housing estates become, in this narrative, the site of racist violence, condemnation of 
which enables the rest of society to claim its anti-racist credentials. As Roger Hewitt 
puts it, the 'message was that in looking for racism in the UK there was no need to look 
further'  (2005:53).  This  enabled  the  statutory  requirements  of  the  2000  Act  and 
analyses  of  institutional  racism  to  be  called  into  question  from  a  position  of 
condemning racism – by locating it outside of institutions.  Alongside this, there is a 
discourse which suggests (repeatedly) that 'political correctness' is now hegemonic – 
an  argument  now made on  the  left  of  the  political  spectrum as  well  as  the  right 
(Ahmed, 2005). This counter-narrative is tiringly familiar in its echoes of the attacks on 
multiculturalism  and  anti-racism  through  the  1980s,  mentioned  above,  and  now 
apparently given a spur by the incorporation of greater race equality measures in law. 
But  political  and  media  attention  to  the  'white  working  class'  is  not  simply  about 
characterising an incorrigibly and violently racist group. It is about designating them as 
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a victimised and marginalised group whose racism is a reaction to their situation; about 
positing a resentment of attention they are said to feel is given to every disadvantaged 
group  but  them (Bottero,  2009:7;  Gillborn,  2008:22;  Hewitt,  2005:57;  Ware,  2008; 
Wells  and  Watson,  2005).  The  category  of  'white  working  class'  is  problematic 
particularly because the conjunction of  race and class silences a  proper analysis  of 
inequality  in  either  form.  Indeed,  the  lack  of  clear  specification  of  what  actually 
constitutes being 'white working class' clouds the debate, particularly when statistics 
claiming to demonstrate disadvantage are invoked (Gillborn, 2008). The 'working class'  
label enables a claim to victimhood in economic terms, while the 'white' label enables 
the blame to be placed with government policies which are seen to champion only the  
ethnic 'other' (Hewitt, 2005:126-7). Conversely, using the term 'white working class' to 
designate 'others' presumes a racialised and probably racist element to (white) working 
class resentment, and hence to some extent discredits it. The 'working class' element 
serves to distance the (middle class) commentator from such presumed racism and to 
create a constitutive outside for their own blameless (race and) class privilege (Garner, 
2008:47;  Haylett,  2001:365;  Reay,  2008:1081).  In  terms  of  community  cohesion 
discourse,  having  been coded as  resentful,  racist  and backward-looking,  the  'white 
working class' are constituted as outside the national community of shared norms and 
values:
[W]hat we all have in common is a desire to build a strong society where civility 
and  courtesy  are  the  norm,  where  people  are  at  ease  with  change,  and  are  
committed to being good neighbours and active citizens. (COIC, 2007:3)
Government  policy  on  anti-social  behaviour,  at  one  point  framed  as  'the  Respect 
Agenda', extends this class-based racialisation of the perpetrators of un-cohesive acts 
as  abject and outside the national  community (Haylett,  2001:357).  In this  case the 
creation  of  an  'other'  from  the  urban  poor  does  not  restrict  itself  to  a  visibly  
identifiable ethnic group. Rather, 'troublemakers' can come from any racial or ethnic 
group in this discourse, indeed, theoretically, from any class background (Respect Task 
Force, 2006). But the popular image is that they are more likely to be white, poor, 
young and male (Burney, 2005; though see Isal, 2006 on the lack of data on this). The 
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enforcement of sanctions for anti-social behaviour through the Respect Agenda was 
largely  related  to  social  housing  rights,  and  controls  over  freedom  of  movement, 
making it most relevant to those living in social  housing. 'Respect' was an initiative 
largely  developed and analysed separately  from community  cohesion policy,  yet  its 
associated rhetoric of a 'majority of law-abiding, decent people' threatened by 'the few 
individuals and families that think they do not have to show respect to others' (Respect 
Task  Force,  2006:1)  mirrors  the  narrative  of  a  cohesive  community  of  consensus 
threatened only by those who stray from the norm. The rise in electoral support for the 
far right serves a similar purpose for the political 'mainstream', allowing opposition to 
racism to be focused on these 'others', rather than confronting ways that inequalities 
are embedded in the bigger political parties.
In 2002, the BNP won two council seats in Burnley, and over successive years increased 
the number of local council seats they held to a peak in 2008 of 37 across England and 
Wales (as well as gaining two seats in the European Parliament and one on the Greater  
London Authority in 2009). Though a very small number of the around 20,000 local 
council seats across the country, the significance of the BNP's electoral success was not 
just that they had become sufficiently respectable to secure a viable voting base in 
some areas. The transformation was also visible in their increasing acceptance as a 
respectable political party by other major parties and the national media. Though still  
treated as more exceptional than fascist parties elsewhere in Europe, the appearance 
of the party's leader on BBC Question Time alongside leading politicians from all main 
political parties,16 and the cooperation of authorities to which they have been elected 
contrasts with the dismay at the first elected BNP official in Tower Hamlets in 1993.
Following  this  electoral  resurgence  of  the  BNP,  the  calls  that  'multiculturalism', 
equalities work and community cohesion policy were 'playing into the hands of the 
BNP' were reinforced, not least by the BNP's own positioning of itself as standing up for 
a marginalised section of society (Back, 2002:36; Copsey, 2008; Keith, 2008a; Williams 
and Keith, 2006). Explicitly in reaction to this tendency, Communities Secretary John 
Denham announced the Connecting Communities fund at an event at the Institute for 
16 Question Time, BBC1, 22nd October 2009.
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Community Cohesion in October 2009. Like the Preventing Violent Extremism Fund, 
the  justifications  and  purpose  given  for  this  initiative  appeared  to  contradict 
themselves,  and  broader  government  strategy  on  community  cohesion.  Like  PVE, 
Connecting Communities was aimed at a specific group –  in this case 'hard working 
families' in 'predominantly white areas' who 'say “it's not my community any more”. 
And feel helpless to do anything about it.' (Denham, 2009) (rather than 'Muslims in our 
communities' who should 'identify themselves as a welcome part of a wider British 
society'  (CLG,  2007b:3)).  Connecting  Communities  was  aimed  at  'addressing  the 
legitimate  fears  and  concerns  which,  neglected,  can  prove  fertile  territory  for 
extremism'  (Denham, 2009)  (rather than 'isolat[ing]  violent  extremist  activity'  (CLG, 
2007b:3)).  Both  the  Connecting  Communities  and  PVE  funds  aimed  to  encourage 
specified  groups  to  feel  more  enfranchised  by  state  investment,  while  in  doing  so 
attaching a stigma to them as a therefore problematic group (Kundnani, 2009; Turley, 
2009).  This  also  seemed  at  odds  with  the  broader  recommendations  of  the 
Commission on Cohesion and Integration that '“Single Group Funding” should be the 
exception rather than the rule'  (COIC,  2007:160,  see also later  in this  chapter,  and 
Chapter Four).
The difficult subject that proponents of the Connecting Communities fund and other 
politicians and policy practitioners are trying to negotiate is to find a balance between 
understanding the existence of, and reasons for, discontent among particular sectors of 
the population, without appearing to pander to racism (or extremism). The problem is 
that many communities (identified as 'white working class' or otherwise) have found 
themselves  without  satisfactory  employment,  education,  or  (significantly)  housing 
(Williams and Keith, 2006). That for many it has become easier to blame immigration 
and ethnic minorities for one's own misfortune than to seek solidarity with others who 
are similarly disadvantaged makes this negotiation all the more difficult. Entering this 
difficult  space  means  entering  the  'gray  zone'  of  attempts  at  understanding 
discrimination without condoning it, as described by Les Back (2002). 
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Place
Though  Burnley  was  the  first  place  to  elect  BNP  councillors  in  this  wave  of  their 
electoral success, it is Barking and Dagenham that has become most associated with 
this narrative of disgruntled 'white working class' communities turning to the far right.  
Barking and Dagenham had the largest BNP group on its Council, with 12 councillors 
between 2006 and 2010.17 Though it remained an overwhelmingly Labour Council, the 
BNP was the most successful electoral opposition the local party had seen for some 
time.  The  borough  came  to  symbolise,  for  both  the  national  press  and  policy 
practitioners across the country, the problem of far right mobilisation among the 'white 
working class'.
As an outer London borough once reliant on social housing and dependent historically 
on manufacturing jobs (particularly at the Ford car plant)  which have now severely 
declined,  Barking  and  Dagenham  has  many  similarities  to  northern  towns  which 
experienced disturbances in 2001. Within the borough, there is a marked difference 
between Barking, closer to inner London and capitalising on that proximity to some 
extent through developing retail,  housing and transport links as part of the London 
Thames  Gateway;  and  Dagenham,  to  the  east  and  more  firmly  part  of  Essex,  and 
suffering more markedly from a lack of alternative forms of employment. An important 
difference between the post-industrial experience of Barking and Dagenham and that 
of  ex-manufacturing  towns  in  northern  England  is  that  Barking  and  Dagenham's 
population  continues  to  grow.  Much  of  the  new population  is  made  up  of  ethnic 
minority families moving outwards from inner London boroughs, particularly to family-
sized former social housing (Williams and Keith, 2006:3-4).
Proximity to the more established multiculturalism of inner London makes Barking and 
Dagenham a ready comparator to it, and a place against which national and local policy 
practitioners  have  tended  to  measure  their  relative  success  in  managing  ethnic 
diversity (e.g. Muir, 2008). Employment and housing pressures are usually described 
within  this  narrative  as  at  the  root  of  racialised  tensions  in  the  borough.  Yet  this 
materialist  framing has  a  nostalgic  tendency  which  celebrates  an  imagined past  of 
17 In the May 2010 local elections, all of the BNP councillors in Barking and Dagenham lost their seats.
105
certainties of employment, housing and nuclear family values; a past of 'British culture' 
without immigration (see the debates between Dench et al, 2006 and Farrar, 2008; and 
Blond and Pabst,  2007 and Keith,  2007b).  In  this,  it  can mirror the nostalgic  racist 
tendencies attributed to the 'white working class' (elided with BNP voters) who have 
become  associated  with  Barking  and  Dagenham.  The  nostalgia  of  these  narratives 
provides  an  easy-to-follow  storyline  which  also  silences  alternative  materialist 
framings.  Shortage  of  housing  supply  is  taken  as  a  given,  as  is  the  consequent 
competition for resources, whereas alternative models of house building, distribution, 
or ownership are not part of the debate – silencing any questioning of the models of 
power and resource distribution which create this competition. 
Thus Barking and Dagenham can be made to represent the condition of post-colonial  
melancholia,  in  which  Britain's  white  populations  are  stuck  with  an  unrealised 
expectation of a promised white supremacy which has not materialised (Gilroy, 2004; 
Hewitt, 2005:131). Barking and Dagenham is thus the past which has only just met with 
the future,  in the form of  migration,  and been found wanting.  Such narratives can 
either mourn the past (as those populations are thought to), or construct 'the white 
working class' as necessarily backwards (and racist) because of their nostalgia (Bonnett, 
2010:123). Either way, the narrative of 'white working class' populations, subject to 
economic  and social  deprivation as  a  result  of  wider global  forces,  and as  a  result 
turning  to  far  right  racism,  is  represented  through  references  to  Barking  and 
Dagenham; and this narrative situates its population as in the 'past' of a multicultural,  
convivial  cosmopolitan  future.  Imagining  the  place  (or  any  place)  as  somewhere 
populated by some violent racists but simultaneously by those deserving of sympathy 
does not provide so easy a narrative; it necessitates uncomfortable positions (Keith and 
Pile, 1993:224).
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New arrivals: reimagining multiculture
History
A third narrative which intertwines with community cohesion debates is that of British 
identity, and its relationship to lived multiculture and prescribed multiculturalisms. The 
debate about national identity is of course ancient, but the narrative I will concentrate 
on  here  is  one  which  persistently  imagines  British  identity  as  white  and somehow 
unchanging,  in  defence  against  a  reality  of  changing  and  emergent  forms  of 
'Britishness'. Such a nationalist narrative is not unique to Britain of course. Nor, indeed, 
are the 'values'  which are often claimed as particularly British.  Part  of the work of 
nation-building  is  defining  an  imagined  community  in  opposition  to  outsiders 
(Anderson, 1991), and re-imagining this shared community or solidarity is an ongoing 
process (Calhoun, 2007:166). The pastoral and agricultural have long been associated 
with an idealised nostalgia of Britain and Britishness (and more specifically, England 
and Englishness) and mobilised to promote this nationalism (Chakraborti and Garland, 
2004:384;  Keith,  2005:33;  Neal,  2002:443;  Stedman  Jones,  1989:311;  Williams, 
1973:7). While notions of national culture (and public services) being 'swamped' by 
immigrants are often invoked in relation to Britain as a whole (Solomos, 2003:66), this  
becomes much more potent when used in relation to the countryside which remains 
imagined, and often lived, as an implicitly white place (Bonnett, 1993:182; Chakraborti, 
2010:509;  Garland  and  Chakraborti,  2006:160;  Knowles,  2008)  –  where  'white'  is 
imagined as also Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and heterosexual.
Attempts to reimagine Britishness as diverse and changing have been hampered by the 
necessity of confronting histories of nation-building which rest on racialised inequality 
and discrimination. A significant attempt at such re-imagining pre-dates the community 
cohesion narratives by just a year. The Runnymede Trust18 established an independent 
Commission for the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain in 1998, a launch initially endorsed 
by  the  then  Home  Secretary  Jack  Straw.  The  Commission  published  its  report  in 
October  2000,  recommending  that  a  new  form  of  inclusive  British  identity  be 
developed,  incorporating  flux  and  heterogeneity.  It  suggested  this  would  involve 
18 A race equality think tank.
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negotiating  the  'systematic,  largely  unspoken  racial  connotations'  of  Britishness 
(Parekh, 2002:38). The ensuing media coverage took this as a slur on British identity, 
replacing  'racial'  with  'racist';  and  using  this  to  suggest  that  the  multiculturalist 
approach advocated by the Commission was one which would 'rewrite Britain's history' 
(quoted  in  McLaughlin  and  Neal,  2004:160).  The  response  of  the  press  was  a 
nationalist and conservative version of multiculturalism, one which proclaimed a pride 
in  Britain  (and  its  professed  tolerance  and  inclusiveness)  before  all  else  (Fortier,  
2005:564).
This  furore  illustrates  the  difficulty  of  addressing  issues  of  'unspoken  racial 
connotations'  –  when  these  connotations  are  unspoken  precisely  because they 
threaten underlying narratives of identity  and location. The risk of examining these 
connotations  is  two-sided:  both  of  being  seen  as  straightforwardly  reifying  racial 
difference,  and of  being accused of  reifying racism by pointing out  its  existence or 
potential. The apparent silencing of 'race' while still talking about it in coded terms was 
notable throughout previous attempts to engage with discrimination and with new 
forms of common identity, particularly through education (Gilroy, 1990:196; Gordon, 
1990:184).  The narrative of  a  countryside invaded by immigrants  invokes unspoken 
connotations of both race and nation, and creates risks for those who would attempt 
to  negotiate  these  silences  openly.  Likewise,  'the  rural'  has  classed  connotations. 
Picturesque rurality might include 'salt of the earth' farmers alongside landed gentry 
and  city  dwellers  fleeing  urban  bustle,  but  rarely  do  these  images  reflect  a 
consideration of  rural  poverty,  homelessness,  or  exclusion (or  the effects that rural 
isolation might have on making such struggles less visible).
Contemporary moments
There have been several  significant  moments on which the narrative  of  arguments 
about the meaning of Britishness, Englishness and multiculturalism have turned during 
the 2000s. These include the arguments of 'progressive patriots' such as musician Billy  
Bragg that the St George's flag and English identity should be reclaimed by anti-racists; 
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suggestions by Gordon Brown when in government that a new bank holiday be created 
as  a  celebration  of  British  identity;  and  the  establishment  under  the  Labour 
government of citizenship tests and citizenship ceremonies for new Britons. Even as – 
or  perhaps  because  –  the  borders  of  national  identity  and  freedom  of  movement 
shifted, the debate about what it means to be British (or English) intensified.19
That these debates are entangled in a confusion about what 'multiculturalism' means 
only intensifies these silences – and the discomforts that emerge when they are made 
to  speak.  Multiculturalism  has  been  a  popular  target  within  community  cohesion 
debates,  blamed  for  encouraging  separation  (Cantle,  2005:10-1),  though  some 
formations  of  multiculturalism  appear  to  share  the  emphasis  on  the  need  for  a 
'common core'  of  values  that  is  at  the centre of  government-endorsed community 
cohesion definitions (Hickman 2007; Modood 2007).  There are numerous summaries 
and taxonomies of the various understandings of multiculturalism and related terms, in 
both academic and policy-making arenas (see, for example, Hall, 2000; Morrell, 2008; 
Modood and Ahmad, 2007; Parekh, 2000). There are also many developed statements 
of  position  within  the  debate  about  what  multiculture does  or  should  mean  (e.g. 
Modood,  2007;  Kymlicka,  1995;  Kundnani,  2002;  Goodhart,  2004;  Cantle,  2005). 
Unhelpfully, arguments centred on different philosophical models for understanding or 
living with difference or diversity, and the extent to which this is a desirable goal, are 
often  confused  with  (much  less  frequent)  considerations  of  'actually  existing 
multiculturalism' (Grillo, 2007:993). Stuart Hall points out these tangles of the debate 
and suggests that a useful starting point is to distinguish between 'multi-cultural' as a 
description  of  societies  where  different  cultural  communities  live  together;  and 
'multiculturalism' as a type of strategy adopted to manage such societies (Hall, 2000:  
209). 
The definitions of multiculturalism (as a philosophy, rather than as a lived reality) range 
from equal access to rights and services based on assimilation with majority customs; 
19 Though under  the coalition  government  there  appears  to  have  been a  renewed focus on older 
models  of  nationhood  drawing  heavily  on  celebration  of  the  royal  family,  with  all  the  obvious  
connotations of class and race that that entails.
109
through cultural particularism in private coupled with universal public citizenship; to 
the allocation of  group rights  to different  segments of  society  living alongside one 
another.  Each  of  these  rest  on  different  beliefs  about  the  relationships  between 
solidarity  and  difference  (Keith,  2005:53-4);  the  risk  of  either  neglecting  the 
particularities  of  individuals  and  groups  by  requiring  too  much  similarity,  or  of 
emphasising  difference  to  the  extent  that  members  of  a  society  no  longer  see 
themselves as part of a shared whole. These arguments are not necessarily restricted 
to questions of migration, ethnicity, race or culture but can expand to other forms of 
difference  such  as  gender,  sexuality  or  disability  and  identity  politics  (Abraham, 
2010:978; Cantle, 2005:159; Fraser, 2000). 
Suggestions  that  multiculturalism  has  (or  should  have)  ended  (Kundnani,  2002; 
Goodhart,  2004;  Phillips,  2005)  are  also  entangled  in  the  confusion  about  these 
differing  meanings,  and  perhaps  each  attacks  a  different  target.  David  Goodhart's 
intervention  in  the  national  press  has  been identified  as  a  landmark  controversy20 
(Khan, 2007:49; Alexander, 2007:116), asserting a need to turn back from recognition 
of difference to a more assimilationist stance, describing a British identity as an ethno-
historical  one,  to  be  learnt,  earned,  or  born  into (Goodhart,  2004:para  13).  Here, 
multiculturalism  is  attacked  as  a  position  'which  rejects  a  common  culture',  and 
thereby puts at risk the social solidarity required to maintain a welfare state, and basic 
social cohesion. This suggests that in Goodhart's view, ethnicity remains central to an 
idea of Britishness; that too much change to Britishness risks its disintegration; and 
therefore that those who do not fit  the current state of Britishness (whatever that 
might be) should adapt to it, rather than vice versa; and that the numbers of 'different' 
people entering the country should be limited. 
Goodhart comments that a changing population may provoke a changing relationship 
with history, suggesting that he fears this remaking of (national) narratives. There is no 
particular reason to think that the present's relationship to the past will ever be static,  
or indeed that it should. That the past and present are constantly used to make sense 
20 And one he seemed to remain keen to repeat through the magazine he edited, see for example Mirza 
et al (2010).
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of  one  another  is  a  truism,  and  one  invoked  elsewhere  as  a  resource  for  both 
multiculture and nationhood (e.g. Parekh, 2010).
Trevor  Phillips  (as  newly  appointed  Chair  of  the  Commission  for  Racial  Equality) 
denounced Goodhart's  views as  'genteel  xenophobia',  indicating that  'some liberals 
have given up on the idea of a multi-ethnic Britain' (Phillips, 2004:para 1). A year later, 
however, he was launching his own high-profile  attack on multiculturalism (Phillips, 
2005). This speech did seem to recognise multiple versions of the concept:
there has to be a balance struck between an 'anything goes' multiculturalism on 
the one hand, which leads to deeper division and inequality; and on the other, an 
intolerant, repressive uniformity (Phillips, 2005:para 38).
However, the message most widely taken from this speech was a warning that Britain 
was 'sleepwalking to segregation' (see e.g. Wetherell et al, 2007:47, 120), and that a 
model of multiculturalism which emphasised group difference was a cause of this. The 
prescription  was  instead  to  pursue  the  goal  of  integration,  based  on  equality, 
participation and interaction. Conversely, Kundnani (2002) opposes multiculturalism as 
masking underlying power relations and discrimination – he welcomes its 'death' as 
providing an opportunity for a renewed left-wing critique.
The struggle to deal with these contradictions continues through community cohesion 
policy – as Claire Alexander puts it:
One of the biggest ironies of the 'community cohesion' agenda is that it creates 
the idea of minority ethnic communities at the same time as it  demands their  
disappearance,  and  that  it  fixes  ethnic  identity  within  these  community 
boundaries while demanding it move outside of them (Alexander, 2007:124-5).
The ambiguities of both cohesion and multiculturalism debates make it possible for 
community  cohesion  to  be  seen  as  both  a  'retreat  to  multiculturalism'  (Brighton, 
2007:3) and an indictment of it (Alexander, 2007:116). The argument about where and 
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how boundaries of community should be drawn shifts between the local, national and 
global  –  while  questions  of  whether  boundaries  should  be  drawn at  all  is  seldom 
broached (though see Calhoun, 2002).
Debates  about  the  meaning  of  nationhood  have  been  tied  to  discourses  about 
immigration throughout history, but narratives of migration to Britain which had for the 
second half  of  the twentieth century been linked to former  colonies (Gilroy,  1987; 
Mercer, 1994:7) were challenged in the early twenty-first century by different patterns 
of  movement  (Vertovec,  2007:1025).  Aside  from  the  expansion  of  freedom  of 
movement  within  the  growing  EU,  the  inequities  of  global  labour  flows  on  which 
society depends were brought into focus through national attention at moments such 
as  the  deaths  of  21  Chinese  migrant  workers  employed  to  collect  cockles  in 
Morecambe Bay in 2004 (Back, 2007b:32). This is notwithstanding the daily tragedies 
of  those fleeing persecution or  risking life and family to come to Britain, within or 
outside the official migration channels (see Back, 2007b:40-1). Migration is most often 
made  visible  through  its  demonisation,  for  example  by  association  with  'foreign 
prisoners' who 'escape deportation after release' (The Independent, 2006). Changes to 
policy on those seeking political asylum in the UK meant that from 2000 applicants 
were dispersed to locations across the country to reduce concentration in areas of 
typical  settlement,  in  turn  creating  new  diversity  in  other  areas  (Home  Office, 
2005c:22). The biggest impact in terms of numbers of immigrants, however, was linked 
to  the  expansion  of  the  EU  to  include  ten  new  member  states  in  2004.  These 
developments  plotted  quite  different  patterns  of  migration  to  those  used  to 
understand migration through British colonial histories (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003a; 
Vertovec, 2007), and brought migration to areas of Britain previously unused to the 
settlement of 'new arrivals' (COIC, 2007:31-3; Robinson and Reeve, 2007:19-20).
The  timing  of  the  Communities  Secretary's  establishment  of  a  Commission  on 
Integration  and  Cohesion  appeared  to  coincide  with  increased  concern  about 
community cohesion linked to the terrorist attacks on London in July 2005. However, 
when the report of the Commission was released in 2007 it focused much less on those 
events  than  on  the  challenges  and  opportunities  of  new  migration  (COIC,  2007). 
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Providing a typology of five 'groups' with which local authority areas were encouraged 
to identify in order to consider their  likely local  cohesion challenges (p149-54),  the 
report identified both changing and stable areas that are less affluent as being most 
likely to face cohesion challenges. The thrust of the whole report was reflected in its 
title,  Our  Shared  Future, which  emphasised  that  both  new  migrants  and  existing 
communities had responsibility for mutual respect and civility, as well as being entitled 
to a sense of trust in public institutions which demonstrate visible social justice. The 
name of the commission – using 'integration' as well as 'cohesion' – seemed to be an 
attempt to draw attention to the specific measures that might be needed to enable 
new migrants to integrate into Britain (requiring government efforts, not simply efforts 
of migrants themselves) alongside cohesion as a more long-term process involving all 
residents or citizens. Perhaps because of the connotations of the term 'integration', 
which  suggest  homogenising  assimilation  to  some people,  this  term has  not  been 
frequently used in policy debates (Spencer, 2011).
Like the Commission for the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain before it, what the report 
became best known for  was not what its  authors necessarily intended as a central 
message (Keith, 2007a). The most headline-grabbing element of the COIC's report was 
the  proposal  to  move  away  from  funding  third  sector  groups  and  services  which 
operated purely on the basis of group identity:
funding to community groups should be rebalanced towards those that promote 
integration and cohesion, and... ‘Single Group Funding’ should be the exception 
rather than the rule for both Government and external funders (COIC, 2007:160).
This recommendation reflected older concerns that competitive structures for bidding 
for community grants could not only create bounded identity communities in order to 
present funding applications, but that the ensuing competition between ethnic groups 
could further reinforce divisiveness (Ouseley, 1990:141). But it became swept up within 
an 'end of multiculturalism' debate and interpreted as insistence on an assimilatory 
approach toward nationhood.
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Place
As I have argued, one narrative of nationhood in Britain relies on the countryside as an 
implicitly white symbol of history and identity. The image of this countryside being 
'swamped'  by  immigrants  is  thus  potent.  Narratives  of  invasion  were  mobilised  in 
response to the increasing presence of asylum seekers and refugees outside the main 
metropolitan conurbations (as a result of government dispersal policies) from 2000. 
The  population  of  new asylum seekers  was,  however,  tiny  in  comparison  with  the 
arrival  of  migrants  from  new  EU  member  states  between  2004  and  2006.  While 
427,000  migrants  from  the  new  EU  accession  states  had  registered  under  the  UK 
Worker Registration Scheme by 2006 (Vertovec, 2007:1036),  at  its peak the asylum 
dispersal  scheme had  spread  54,000  migrants  from London  and  the  south-east  of 
England to other areas of Britain (Vertovec, 2007:1042). Together, these new patterns 
of migration were a significant disruption to the narrative of an ever-stable rurality, as  
many migrants took up low-paid agricultural work in rural areas (Robinson and Reeve, 
2006:6).
The narratives of areas previously relatively untouched by migration, now struggling 
with sudden diversity and increases in population size, are less directly tied to a specific 
place than the narratives associated with Oldham and with Barking and Dagenham 
which I described above. However, Peterborough is used repeatedly as an example of 
this narrative. Though a city, Peterborough sits at the centre of a subregion of market 
towns, and the local authority covers rural as well as urban areas. Aiming to compete 
as a growing city with a planned expansion of higher education and environmental 
enterprises, the city is attempting to project its image as a growing regional centre. The 
city itself has had established ethnic minority communities for decades, was a national 
reception  centre  for  asylum  seekers  and  attracted  new  EU  migrants  to  work  in 
agricultural  and  food  processing  industries.  The  pace  of  inward  migration  from 
international as well as national sources has increased greatly over recent years, with 
an  expectation  that  there  will  be  a  21%  increase  in  the  population  aged  0  to  14 
between  2008  and  2021,  and  a  57%  increase  in  those  aged  over  65  (Greater 
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Peterborough Partnership, 2008:7-8). The local authority is thus not only seeking to 
improve the quality of life of existing residents, but to understand the changing needs 
of a population that is growing rapidly in size as well as diversity, and in the rural as 
well as urban areas.
Peterborough was a Community Cohesion Pathfinder authority, a programme intended 
to develop early lessons from community cohesion initiatives. Subsequently, the city's 
experience has been used as an example of good practice from which other localities 
can  learn  (e.g.  COIC,  2007:96,  166;  Home  Office,  2005a;  Home  Office,  2005c:50).  
Positioned as a place which has overcome difficulties,  Peterborough represents the 
narrative of new forms of migration reaching parts of the UK previously equated with 
tranquil whiteness. Having experienced early difficulties associated with the arrival of 
asylum seekers, the town can now present itself  as having learnt how to overcome 
these  challenges  and  establish  new  models  of  integration  and  multiculturalism, 
entering the present/future of mobile multiculturalism in a way to which others should 
aspire.
Superdiversity: where old problems become new solutions?
History
Throughout  the  previous  narratives  I  have  suggested  that  places  with  'community 
cohesion problems' have been imagined as outside an idealised multicultural nation, 
and  that  these  narratives  allow  those  who  use  them  to  indulge  in  continued 
scaremongering  about  threats  to  national  identity  which  are  positioned  at  a  safe 
distance. It may seem counter-intuitive to imagine the ideal of community cohesion 
within the inner city, given the histories of demonising this as a place of crime, violence 
and  deviance.  The  change  from  seeing  the  inner  city  as  a  place  of  poverty,  to  a  
potential engine of growth, is relatively recent (Keith and Rogers, 1991:7-11). The flows 
of global capital which also require global labour flows have of course always passed 
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through cities,  but now the presence of  populations  with recent origins across the 
world provide cultural  capital  to be consumed, as well  being as a source of  labour 
(Jacobs, 1996:99-100).
The move from demonisation to celebration was not without struggle. In the 1980s, for  
example,  political  mobilisations  by  ethnic  communities  subject  to  harassment, 
discrimination and violence coincided with a movement of  left-wing radicals  in the 
inner cities, largely in response to the punitive policies of the Thatcher governments 
(Lansley et al, 1989). Among the most potent struggles of this time was the attempt by 
many local  authorities  in inner  London (as  well  as  urban areas  outside of  London, 
significantly Manchester),  to develop anti-racist and multicultural  policies.  This gave 
way to the narrative of 'loony left'  councils and many, largely spurious, tales of the 
excesses of 'politically correct' policies, such as attempts to ban the singing of Baa Baa 
Black Sheep in schools (Gordon, 1990:179-80) because it was allegedly seen as 'racist'.
Early local policies designed to address racism within institutions received criticism not 
only from those opposed to their aims, but also from anti-racists and progressives who 
saw many of them as being counter-productive in practice. Race Awareness Training 
(RAT) became the epitome of this problem. Local authority officers who were regarded 
as racist would be sent on training at which they were encouraged to recognise their 
attitudes and overcome them. In practice, this was a punishment for those considered 
racist.  But  it  also  enabled them to  become 'even more  sophisticated  at  projecting 
themselves  and  covering  up  deficiencies  and  prejudices'  (Ouseley,  1990:147). 
Meanwhile, RAT's focus on individual attitudes 'left the institution with all its power 
structures relatively untouched' (Ouseley, 1990:146). The reliance on 'guilt complexes' 
to regulate behaviour and 'the determinism of seeing all white people as inherently 
racist'  provoked  criticism  of  RAT  from  anti-racists  as  well  as  from  the  New  Right 
(Solomos and Ball, 1990:218).
The 'loony left' characterisation belies the fact that many inner city local authorities 
had  systematically  discriminatory  policies  at  this  time.  Housing  in  particular  was  a 
service in which severe discrimination on race grounds was found to exist in a number 
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of inner city authorities (Ben-Tovim et al, 1986; Jeffers and Hoggett, 1995; Lansley et al,  
1989; Solomos and Singh, 1990). Hackney was one authority which became infamous, 
after  action  by  the  Commission  for  Racial  Equality  and  pressure  from  local  black 
communities engendered a review of housing allocations and management practices 
(CRE,  1984;  Solomos  and  Singh,  1990:98).  Indeed,  this,  like  many  other  policy 
narratives I have highlighted (and see especially Chapter Six), was reincorporated by 
the  local  authority  as  an  attempt  to  demonstrate  good  practice  in  overcoming 
institutional  racism (Solomos and Singh,  1990:103).  To some extent,  the authority's 
eventual successes in improving practices and outcomes were recognised as such by 
others (Ouseley, 1990:151).
In the aftermath of these bruising struggles, there has been progress in addressing 
some of the more discriminatory policies and practices of local authorities and other 
agencies. Overt racism is no longer acceptable in most aspects of public life, but there 
remains  a  legacy  of  awkwardness  about  how  to  talk  about  discrimination  and 
difference, and  what precisely might be considered offensive or unjust. This leads to 
silences  about  these  subjects  and  their  histories,  which  can  make  negotiating  this 
terrain both difficult and discomfiting.
The power of  these associations  and the way they were promoted in  the national 
media are such that many councils, including Hackney, have found it hard to shake an 
image of radicalism/incompetence/corruption in the ensuing years (Ball et al 1990:86;  
Solomos, 1986:29). It has encouraged councillors to adopt policies intended to distance 
themselves from loony left labels, particularly by emphasising diversity and inclusion 
rather than the more overtly oppositional  anti-racism (Ball  et  all,  1990:90;  Gordon, 
1990:176; for more on the shift from 'anti-racism' to 'diversity',  see Ahmed, 2007b;  
Faist, 2009).
Contemporary moments
The reinvention of the Labour Party as New Labour was partly about distancing itself 
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from the 'Old Left' label, from the idea that the party could not be trusted with the 
national economy, and from concerns such as racism and policing, which were 'seen as 
vote losers distracting public attention from Labour's “traditional” political heartland' 
(Keith and Murji, 1990:130). The shift towards neoliberalism, communitarianism and 
pragmatism  all  contributed  to  a  massive  increase  in  culture-based  regeneration  of 
inner cities. Reconceptualising diversity as a virtue has been part of reimagining it as a 
capitalist asset, and a governed and managed activity (Jacobs, 1996:87). In this process, 
the 'success story' is both 'neoliberal and multicultural', firmly in the present (if not the 
future) and 'aggressively forward-looking'. The 'brash multiculture of consumption' has 
a London focus, particularly in relation to its draw on competitive, young, highly skilled 
migrants; but this sheen is also to some extent lent to the rest of the United Kingdom 
(Bonnett,  2010:130),  and  treated  as  a  model  or  laboratory  for  the  future  of 
multiculturalism (as in Butler and Hamnett, 2011:20). This narrative of forward-looking 
dynamic  diversity  centred  in  London (but  enveloping  the  rest  of  the  country)  was 
central  to  London's  successful  bid  for  the  2012  Olympics  (Vertovec  2007:1025; 
Wetherell, 2008:306-7).
One narrative of community cohesion, then, is that it is an attempt to roll out a post-
racial settlement from London to the rest of the UK. The proclamation that chicken 
tikka masala was now 'Britain's national dish' by then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook 
(Cook, 2001) was based on an understanding that cultural mixing had become banal 
and ordinary, but it was also about promoting an image of Britain as slightly exoticised 
and no longer  stodgily  reliant  on 'meat  and two veg'.  In  2006,  David Miliband (as 
Cabinet  Minister  for  Communities  and  Local  Government),  gave  a  speech  to  the 
Scarman  Trust  in  which  he  stated  that  'diversity  is  a  fact  across  all  societies.  All 
countries are multicultural and there is no going back' (Miliband, 2006). In the context 
of an argument to 'meet the challenges of a multi-ethnic society' by 'strengthening 
community' this was a moderate progressive speech, and more strongly empirical than 
Cook's. These comments are particularly interesting however for their resonance with 
the often-quoted (but difficult to source)21 mantra of New Labour that 'we're all middle 
21 Though see, for example, Blue, 2008; Hatherley, 2011; Pickard, 2010; Webb, 2011; Woods, 2010 –  
and for commentary on this as a New Labour agenda, see Skeggs, 2004:54.
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class now'. The assumption is that if  'we' are all  middle class and multicultural, the 
struggles with poverty and racism are over. Persisting power inequalities are silenced, 
as are struggles over ideology in a post-political age (Mouffe, 2005:35;  Swyngedouw, 
2010:214).
The associated technocratic approach to multiculture and diversity is exemplified in the 
operationalisation  of  community  cohesion  policy  within  government.  In  2007,  new 
national indicators were introduced which local authorities across England and Wales 
could choose to incorporate in their Local Area Agreement with national government, 
as a way of measuring their impact on the local area. The set of indicators included 
three separate measures to monitor community cohesion. These were:
NI1: Percentage of people who believe people from different backgrounds get on 
well together in their local area
NI2: Percentage of people who feel that they belong to their neighbourhood
NI4: Percentage of people who feel they can influence decisions in their locality 
(CLG, 2007c:5).
These  measures  are  given  similar  status  and expectations  for  improvement  to  (for 
example) measures of the efficiency of refuse collections or the quality of public play 
areas.  Yet  they  continue  to  rely  on the collection  of  large-scale  survey  data  about 
subjective measures, whose causes are much harder to isolate or manage. They are a 
'technology  of  community',  a  device  to  make  community  or  the  experience  of 
community  real,  and  thereby  something  on  which  it  is  possible  to  operate  (Rose, 
1999b:189; see Chapter One). The indicators were widely taken up by local authorities 
across  the country,  suggesting either that  they were widely accepted as  measuring 
local priorities or (more cynically) as easy-to-meet targets.
These relatively anodyne measurements of what it means to live well and safely within 
diverse  communities  emerged  at  the  same  time  as  diversity  itself  was  increasing 
exponentially in its complexity (Keith, 2005:177-8). 'Super-diversity' has been coined as 
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a term to not only recognise the increasing number of locations across the globe from 
which  migrants  are  now  arriving  in  significant  numbers  in  the  UK,  but  also  to 
emphasise  that  the  word  'migrant'  gives  very  little  sense  of  the  diversity  of  their  
experiences as it varies across different social positionings of class, gender, length of 
settlement,  legal  status,  sexuality,  family  connections,  and  so  on  (Vertovec,  2007). 
Developments in extending non-discrimination law to a growing number of 'protected 
groups' through the Equality Act 2010 and the merging of existing equalities bodies 
into a single organisation is  one of the few ways in which policy or legal instruments 
explicitly attempt to address cross-cutting elements of diversity and their relationship 
to  power. New  legal  protection  from  discrimination,  and  recognition  that 
discrimination, disadvantage and inequalities of power can come in many forms and 
operate  with different  dynamics  have  not  been translated further  into  a  discourse 
about commonalities of oppression, however (Gavrielides, 2011). It remains to be seen 
how the law will be interpreted and to what extent it will address specific inequalities, 
or mask them.22 The Equalities and Human Rights Commission began work in 2009 on 
mapping  experiences  of  groups  who  might  be  affected  by  several  types  of 
discrimination at once. The Act also includes a duty for public bodies to promote 'good 
relations'.23 Yet there is a lack of  connection made in policy debates and academic 
literatures between new equalities and good relations duties, and community cohesion 
policy.
Place
As noted above, Hackney is associated with the narratives of the inner city not just 
because of its histories of migration and poverty (see e.g. Harrison, 1983), but also in 
relation to its histories of governance and engagement with racism and anti-racism. It  
is one of the local authorities whose names still act metonymically for the idea of the 
22 This remains in question as the coalition government raised the question of whether the Equality Act  
2010 should be 'scrapped altogether' as part of its 'Red Tape Challenge' consultation which seeks to 
'reduce  the  overall  burden  of  regulation'  (see  www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalities 
[last accessed 8th June 2011]).
23 Which builds on the terminology of previous Race Relations Acts and Local Government Acts.
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'loony left'. It is also a place whose metonymic associations are strongly tied to the 
danger  of  the  inner  city  (see,  for  example,  Bonnett,  1993:171;  Oakeshott,  2008; 
Sinclair, 2009:9). Yet these connotations are also, in part, what has attracted growing 
creative industries and artists to the area, which have in turn contributed to its wider 
desirability. The marketing of London as an Olympic city on the basis of its multicultural  
associations is matched by the re-marketing of its resonances of urban edginess, as in  
the  pirating  of  Hackney  Council's  municipal  logo  by  Nike,  to  sell  sports  clothing 
worldwide (LBH, 2006c; Tran, 2006; for more on how Hackney's diversity has been used 
as a source of meaning and brand see Chapter Five).
In  the  era  of  community  cohesion  policy,  Hackney  did  not  seem to  fit  any  of  the  
narratives  of  'community  cohesion  problems'  previously  outlined.  In  part,  this  was 
because  each  of  them has  focused on  challenges  posed by  new immigration  (and 
reactions  to  it),  or  on  the  nature  of  'parallel  lives'  defined  by  two  separated 
communities. In this light, Hackney can be imagined as happily cohesive – in that the 
superdiversity of its residents might avoid large factional identity groups which could 
congeal  into  the  rivalries  of  competitive  identity  politics.  Ideas  of  multiculturalism 
could also, in some inflections, be broadened beyond migration and race to embrace 
other forms of diversity. In this formation, the 'folk devil' is less the migrant (or queer); 
instead it is the racist (or homophobe) who becomes the constitutive outside of the 
imagined national community. The past of far right activism in inner London, political 
in-fighting, and struggles against institutional discrimination are forgotten, or at least 
less visible (Watson and Wells, 2005; Wemyss, 2009:94). And multiculture is frozen as 
an achieved goal, a cohesive community, rather than an ongoing, lived process. The 
inner city, and in particular inner London (with its proximity to national politicians and 
press) becomes a repository of hope rather than despair, for instance as a symbolic 
figurehead for New Labour's attempts to tackle some of Britain's 'most deprived and 
crime-ridden estates' when Prime Minister Tony Blair launched his programme of inner 
city investment, the New Deal for Communities, on the Holly Street estate in 1998 (BBC 
News, 1998).
But this narrative of happily 'rubbing along' does not necessarily take account of power 
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inequalities.  Hackney,  or  the  inner  city,  could  come to  symbolise  the  inequities  of 
neoliberal forms of multiculturalism which allow 'difference' to be cultural capital for 
some, but to remain the source of exclusion for others  (Ahmed, 2000:125; Bell and 
Binnie, 2000:86).  In celebrating local diversity, it can become too easy to forget not 
only  local  histories  of  violent  racism  (Keith,  1993)  but  also  the  internal  tensions,  
dynamics and injuries that a happy multicultural  sheen might hide. These wrangles 
over the symbolism and processes of silencing and branding in Hackney's histories are 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
Conclusions
In  this  chapter  I  have  outlined  four  narratives  of  community  cohesion  which  are 
actively used and re-interpreted in both policy and academic worlds. I have suggested 
that these narratives are connected and feed off one another, and that each of them 
are simplified versions of more nuanced and contradictory events and interpretations. 
The chapter has also introduced the key events in policy and beyond it which inform 
some of these narratives, and the context in which community cohesion policy has 
been developed and negotiated over  a  decade.  I  have tried to suggest that,  when 
looked at through a variety of lenses, connections can be made which suggest both 
continuities and dislocations from policy interventions in previous decades. In the rest 
of the thesis, I engage directly with the narratives of policy negotiation provided by 
practitioners in the course of my research. This chapter should provide both a factual 
background to the events and interventions to which they allude, and a guide to some 
of the ways these moments have been and can be fitted together to make sense of 
policy worlds, or deconstructed to examine their silences and assumptions. 
As  I  have shown, understanding community cohesion policy  as  bound to particular 
events, times and places conjures a set of easily digestible stories which can be readily 
referred to in conversation and negotiations (riots in Oldham in 2001; election of the 
BNP in Barking and Dagenham in 2006; new migration into Peterborough throughout 
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the 2000s;  long-standing diversity in Hackney).  As,  throughout  the thesis,  I  provide 
further evidence of how policy practitioners imagine and use such narratives in their 
negotiations,  I  will  suggest  that  in  doing  so  they  employ  a  form  of  sociological 
imagination  that  makes  links  between  local,  personal  experiences  and  societal 
structures of power distribution. Within these narratives there is much to be learned 
from observing what is silenced, as well as what is spoken. The lack of discussion of  
class inequality  in these narratives (except  with respect to the racially  marked and 
analytically confused category of 'white working class') is the most obvious silence.
In Chapters Five and (especially) Six, I will explore what the narratives outlined here 
mean for policy practitioners when working within a place that has been branded with 
such easily regurgitated narratives. The meanings attached to a place might be based 
on empirical  events,  but these meanings also help to determine future events and 
policies. Much energy can be spent on trying to produce  alternative  narratives and 
associations.  As  I  will  demonstrate  further  throughout  the  thesis,  many  policy 
practitioners I spoke to recognised the power of these narratives and used them to 
illustrate their understandings of community cohesion policy. But many also described 
how they attempted to disrupt or reinterpret the associations that their locality had 
within  the community  cohesion  policy  narrative.  Chapter  Four,  which  now follows, 
explores an instance of these negotiations in practice, in Hackney.
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Chapter Four: 'Is there anything the council did that distracted you from extremism?'
Introduction
This chapter discusses how policy practitioners negotiated difficult subjects around the 
establishment of the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) fund. That is,  this chapter 
looks at how a policy problem is constructed and negotiated within a local authority, in 
response  to  and  in  negotiation  with  national  policies,  local  circumstances  and 
individual  understandings.  It  raises  questions  about  the  role  and  purpose  of  local 
government and its relation to power, agency and control. The focus on PVE draws 
attention to how far community cohesion policy, in one articulation, has been tied to 
the  targeting  of  Muslims  as  a  'problem  group',  and  refracted  through  the  lens  of 
religious  and  ethnic  representation,  privilege  and  stigma.  As  discussed  in  Chapter 
Three, some constructions of community cohesion position it as separate from PVE. 
This separation does not necessarily translate into the common-sense understandings 
of  practitioners.  In  my  experiences  and  interviews  with  local  and  national  policy 
practitioners  they  suggest,  based on  the  timing,  presentation,  implementation  and 
funding of projects and their own professional and personal experience, that there are 
more complicated agendas at play than those laid out openly in official documentation. 
This chimes with much sociological comment on the subject (e.g. Husband and Alam, 
2011; McGhee, 2008). Yet the articulation of what community cohesion policy or PVE 
policy is 'really about' varies with circumstance as well as time and place – that is, in 
negotiations between local and central government, power relations determine what 
can be said, and how. Through this chapter, it becomes clear that different levels of 
reality, information and argument become important at different levels and in different 
parts of governing organisations. These shifting terms of debate determine the most 
effective (or possible) forms for local policy practitioners to negotiate difficult subjects.
I  explore  these  themes  through  a  consideration  of  how  the  Preventing  Violent 
Extremism  Fund  (PVE)  was  introduced  as  a  national  programme,  drawing  on 
documentary sources and ethnographic data from my experience of working as a local 
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government officer in Hackney at the time. The data here includes my own personal 
account of dealing with the fund as a local policy practitioner, and the reflections of 
colleagues in interviews. These were of course situated experiences, and the data I use 
consists of narratives reconstructed retrospectively. As such I do not claim to reflect the 
experiences  of  practitioners  elsewhere  in  the  country  (although I  do  discuss  some 
evidence of parallels). Instead, by first presenting these narratives and then considering 
the work that each of them (including my own) is doing in positioning the speaker in 
relation to governing, I reflect on what it means to practice policy, to be at once part of  
an organisation with its own rules and to have one's own agency. I consider ways in 
which practitioners negotiate uncomfortable positions that might arise in this process 
when they give an account of themselves.
The  chapter  opens  with  a  descriptive  account  of  the  negotiations  over  the 
establishment of  the PVE programme in Hackney.  This  account offers a perspective 
which  differentiates  between central  and local  government,  and between different 
parts  of  the  local  state  (especially  the  local  authority  and  the  police),  in  terms  of 
understandings,  goals,  and  ways  of  working.  It  also  suggests  that  within  those 
organisations there are varying perspectives. 
In subsequent parts of the chapter I consider how practitioners in local and national 
government, and in the different cultures of local  government and the police, hold 
different understandings and prioritisations of information, measurement, impacts and 
presentation  of  policy.  As  well  as  taking  seriously  practitioners'  accounts  of  what 
happened  (including  my  own  account),  I  analyse  the  ways  practitioners  present 
themselves within these narratives, and what this can tell us about policy practice and 
the negotiation of power and personal commitments that entails.
Preventing Violent Extremism lands on my desk
In early February 2007, the Chief Executive of the London Borough of Hackney received 
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a request to attend a meeting of London local authority Chief Executives, called by the 
Government  Office  for  London  (GOL),  to  discuss  the  Preventing  Violent  Extremism 
(PVE)  Pathfinder  Fund.  At  that  time,  I  was  working as  a  policy  adviser  in  Hackney, 
responsible  for  maintaining  awareness  of  policy,  political  and  community 
developments,  forming  strategic  alliances  within  and  outside  the  local  authority, 
advocating policy responses and ensuring the implementation of strategy agreed by 
the political and managerial leadership.  Because I had a broad remit for 'inclusion'  
issues, I was asked to prepare a one-page briefing on the background to the PVE fund, 
its significance for Hackney, and a recommended response. The Fund was new, and the 
guidance note stated that Government Offices had been working with local authorities 
since the previous October to develop programmes. Having checked with colleagues in 
the community  safety  team that  we had not  been involved in  those discussions,  I  
suggested in the briefing that it seemed 'unlikely they expect us to take part'. 
Nevertheless, I advised on the headlines of the funding programme: it was intended to 
'encourage local approaches to preventing violent extremism'; 'this is to be separate 
from community cohesion activity'; and £2million of the £5million one-year fund would 
be 'available for bids from London boroughs with more than 5% Muslim population – 
this includes Hackney'. I also pointed out in the briefing that Hackney's 'large Muslim 
population  (14%  -  compared  to  8%  in  London)'  was  'ethnically  diverse,  including 
Turkish and Somali communities' while 'only 1% of Hackney's population is Pakistani 
(2% in London), 3% Bangladeshi (2% in London) – the ethnic groups of Muslims the 
government appears to be most concerned about'; and stated that 'we have not noted 
any  problems  related  to  Islamic  extremism  in  the  borough'  despite  proximity  to 
Finsbury Park Mosque (in Haringey) which had been associated with extremists. Finally, 
I suggested that:
It seems unlikely that we would be involved at this stage as we do not have a 
history  of  problems  with  extremism  and  we  would  not  want  to  highlight  a 
particular community or group of communities as 'a problem'.24
24 Internal document; as discussed in Chapter Two, I gained access to many documents discussed in this 
chapter as a result  of my participant-observer status, and therefore will  not give full  referencing  
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I advised that we should attend the meeting to stay updated and see whether funds 
could be incorporated into existing community engagement programmes. I suggested 
we use the opportunity to highlight diversity within Muslim communities and to ask 
about the relevance of the fund to extremism beyond that claiming connections to 
Islam.
The Chief Executive sent an Assistant Director to the meeting as her representative, as 
did  many  of  her  peers.25 After  the  meeting,  I  was  briefed  that  it  had  been  an 
uncomfortable affair. Representatives of the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (CLG) and Government Office for London (GOL) were not pleased with the 
level  of  seniority  of  attendance  from  local  authorities;  and  local  authority 
representatives expressed a number of concerns about the scheme (this account is also 
supported by documentary sources including Kelcher (2007) and House of Commons 
Communities and Local Government Committee (2010:226)). 
One  concern  local  authorities  expressed  was  very  practical:  the  extremely  short 
amount  of  time  in  which  we  were  expected  to  produce  bids  that  fitted  the  PVE 
priorities. Guidance for the fund was published on 7th February; the meeting with GOL 
was on 13th February; and expressions of interest were due by noon on 2nd March. 
Though local government bureaucracy is often criticised for the time it takes to reach 
agreement and take action, this tempo does not simply stem from a disinclination to 
progress.  Rather,  the  typical  bureaucratic  requirements  for  due  process  and 
consideration of financial, legal, political and managerial implications exist to ensure 
fairness and avoid corruption or mistakes. The importance given to these checks and 
balances limits flexibility, but may be particularly pronounced in those authorities that 
still suffer from a reputation of incompetence or corruption from past decades (see 
Chapter Three).
details for them in the bibliography.
25  26 of the 33 local authorities in London were eligible to bid for PVE on the basis of the size of their  
Muslim populations. A total of 52 local authorities were eligible nationally (see Kelcher, 2007).
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Nor can these practical considerations be separated entirely from the more politically 
sensitive issues which concerned local authorities (including Hackney) about the way 
PVE  had  been  constructed.  The  framing  of  the  fund  as  exclusively  targeted  at 
extremism in the name of Islam without reference to other forms of violent extremism, 
the focus on Muslim populations only, and the lack of any apparent basis for selecting 
eligible authorities aside from the proportion of  their  population that  was Muslim, 
were raised not just in my briefing, but also by colleagues from other authorities. These 
were presented as not just problematic bases for the policy in themselves, but also 
likely to be counter-productive in that they might undermine relationships with local 
community groups (Muslim and non-Muslim), as a result of how the programme was 
being presented, and the way that funds were to be distributed. Thus these were not 
just questions of language but of implementation and process, which local authority 
officers suggested would be difficult to address, especially in the short time available. 
However,  it  was  made  clear  by  civil  servants  from  GOL  and  CLG  at  the  February 
meeting and in subsequent correspondence that all 'eligible' authorities were expected 
to submit proposals to the fund, and that non-participation would be seen as a sign of  
not taking seriously the threat of future terrorist action (see also McLean, 2008). It was 
hard for any local  authority to refuse additional investment in services. In Hackney, 
being one of Britain's poorest areas made such a bold and apparently uncooperative 
move even harder, as did its still haunting history of municipal failures (see Chapters 
Three and Five).
 
Though  their  concerns  about  the  fund  had  not  been  addressed,  the  senior 
management and politicians in Hackney decided to submit an 'expression of interest' 
without  necessarily  committing  to  the  programme.  After  all,  this  was  still  being 
described by  CLG and GOL  as  a  bidding  process  in  which  we may or  may  not  be  
'successful'. This decision was made after contact with peers in other local authorities, 
and indeed most  authorities did present  initial  expressions of  interest.  In  Hackney, 
officers in community safety, youth services and community engagement were asked 
to develop a proposal. At this point I had a coordinating role, acting as a contact point 
for politicians and senior management. 
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In the course of this process, I was contacted by a representative from a local Muslim 
community  organisation.  She  had  been  in  contact  with  the  youth  service  about 
delivering a programme of activities for Muslim young people, and she was concerned 
to hear that the local authority was only lukewarm about whether it would pursue the 
PVE programme that could potentially fund it. I tried to explain the concerns about the 
programme, that these were largely motivated by a feeling within the local authority 
that the design of the programme would stigmatise, and be resented by, Muslims. She 
told me she did not see things this way at all; and that on the contrary, if the funding 
opportunity were rejected, it would constitute neglect on behalf of the local authority 
of the needs of Muslim residents (needs she had identified, not necessarily the goals of  
PVE).
After our conversation, she forwarded me a proposal her organisation had written the 
previous October, to address problems they had identified with risky behaviour among 
some local Muslim young people, including drug-taking and drug-dealing, an increase 
in involvement in violent crime, and 'misguided influence on young Muslims regarding 
Islamic teachings' leading in some cases to 'isolation from the main Muslim community 
due to zealous behaviour not in accordance to teachings of traditional Islamic practice'.  
They proposed to address these issues by researching involvement in drugs with a view 
to developing peer support among Muslim young people; through self-managed youth 
activity including sports and skill  development;  and by establishing a committee of 
local Islamic scholars to provide better access to their teachings for young people.26 
This  seemed  like  the  kind  of  project  we  might  have  been  looking  for:  an  already 
identified need which fitted reasonably  well  with the aims of  the national  funding 
scheme. But there did not seem to be an awareness of the proposal among those local 
authority  officers  dealing  with  the  PVE  bid.  The  proposal  had  been  addressed  to 
councillors  but  it  was  unclear  whether  they  or  officers  had  either  received  it  or 
responded, and if so, what the response had been.
I was concerned about how these developments were being perceived. It seemed to 
26 Internal document.
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me that as an organisation, we needed to be clear about what projects we might put 
forward for funding, and why we would support some and not others. In particular, 
when acting as a spokesperson for the authority, I wanted to know as much as I could 
about what decisions had been made (or not made) and why. It seemed to me that 
there could be a number of perfectly valid reasons why the months-old proposal I had 
been sent had not been taken forward, but I  needed to be able to know what had 
happened in order to maintain an amicable relationship with the external organisation 
in question. So I followed up the query with colleagues who were developing the PVE 
bid, specifically in the youth service. Though I didn't find out whether the document 
had reached anyone in October (before we had heard of the PVE fund), it seemed that 
colleagues  were  in  discussions  with  someone  else  in  the  organisation  about  the 
possibility of a joint bid. Much as the local authority was a variegated structure where 
contact  with  one  officer  may  not  equate  to  wider  awareness,  the  community 
organisation  was  also  made  up  of  several  people  who  may  not  all  have  been  in 
constant communication. 
Eventually, an expression of interest was developed with a different local organisation, 
for a project to 'undertake research with Muslim communities to identify experience 
and perceptions  of  Islamophobia'  with subsequent  work  'exploring the reasons for 
conflict and alternatives to conflict'.27 Two weeks after this was submitted, the local 
authority Chief Executive received a letter from GOL saying that the borough would be 
'offered'  £90,000  to  support  that  project.  Despite  the  initial  reticence  of  London 
boroughs reported in February, the letter stated that there had been high demand for 
funds; the £90,000 allocated to Hackney was thus 'not subject to further negotiation'. 
The first payment, the letter said, was to be made through the Local Area Agreement 
(LAA)28 grant in April 2007 (two weeks from the date of the letter), and the programme 
27 Internal document.
28  Local Area Agreements (LAAs) were introduced in 2004/5. An LAA is an agreement between a local 
area and central government, including a set of improvement targets which local partners commit to  
achieving, and the funding allocations from central government that will underpin them. While the 
local LAA signatory is the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) which consists of major statutory sector  
and other organisations in a local area, the local authority is the accountable body. The coalition 
government announced in 2010 that they would abolish LAAs.
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was to be formally launched by the Secretary of State following an event at the end of 
March.29
The local authority was thus instructed that it would be 'offered' funding for a specific 
project, which it had 'expressed interest' in providing. Officers and elected members in 
Hackney  had  (perhaps  naïvely)  understood  these  tentative  terms  at  face  value, 
assuming that an expression of interest would be submitted in order to preserve our 
options, but only as a literal initial expression of interest, a way of deferring a decision 
about  whether  or  not  to eventually  participate.  But  the expression of  interest was 
taken by central government to be a firm commitment to develop a local programme, 
to which many senior local practitioners still felt ambivalent (if not hostile).
The  local  political  leadership  repeatedly  stated that  they did  not  want  to  take the 
money if it would oblige them to run a programme ostensibly targeting Muslims – all  
local Muslims, Muslims in particular, and Muslims only – as potential terrorists. Yet  
there  was  clear  pressure  from  CLG  to  show  that  the  local  authority  was  'taking 
seriously' the potential threat of extremism. This was coupled with local pressure from 
Muslim organisations  who saw PVE as a  potential  funding stream to develop their 
work.  The  senior  management  team  and  Cabinet  developed  an  alternative  local 
solution to this impasse. It was the end of the financial year and an underspend had 
been identified within the voluntary sector grants budget.  Cabinet agreed that  this 
would be used to develop an alternative fund to the PVE programme in Hackney. They 
asked me to write a scoping document setting out its terms.
The  proposed fund was 'to  support  vcs  [voluntary  and community  sector]  projects 
aimed at improving community cohesion... in a Hackney-focused way, sensitive to our 
local population'.  It  was intended to prepare the borough to bid for future funding 
'from  other  sources,  including  the  Preventing  Violent  Extremism  fund  where 
appropriate'  by  developing  'a  strong  base  of  projects  demonstrating  success'.  We 
proposed to  support  projects  addressing  known areas  of  tensions  between groups 
(socio-economic  divisions  and  regeneration;  intergenerational  issues;  high  levels  of 
29 Internal document.
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mobility  and  hidden  communities;  gang  violence  and  area-based  rivalries;  links 
between 'single community' infrastructures) and 'identifying new or unacknowledged 
sources of conflict'.30 The underlying issue was that the local authority had no evidence 
of emerging extremism in the borough,  but officers and politicians  were concerned 
about sources of tension or potential tension. The administrators of the Local Strategic 
Partnership  advised  their  central  government  contacts  of  this,  and  that  the  local 
authority had therefore chosen not to accept the offer of PVE funding for 2007/8.
While it felt exceptional to refuse a funding stream from central government, I also felt, 
as an officer, quite proud of the compromise we had developed. Local politicians had 
taken a decision which they believed reflected the needs and wishes of local residents, 
and as officers we had found a way to deliver that. Between us we had done this in a 
way  which  did  not  reject  outright  the  national  policy,  but  questioned some  of  its 
premises and suggested constructive ways in which a local approach might differ. In 
theory, this also fitted with national agendas on localism, where authorities use their 
local knowledge to develop site-appropriate services. This didn't address, of course, 
what  expectations  might  have  been  raised  with  organisations  involved  in  the 
expression of interest for the PVE fund; but there remained the opportunity for them 
to be part of the alternative community cohesion fund. 
However, this compromise did not satisfy those managing the PVE fund nationally and 
regionally. In fact it did not appear to register with them at all. This became clear when 
the local authority received an email informing us of new indicators which would be 
included in our Local Area Agreement (LAA) to measure the delivery of PVE. The initial  
proposal for these indicators read directly off the aims of the scheme that were given 
in national guidance, and suggested that local authorities measure the impact of their 
activities by reporting publicly on the number of Muslims who had been diverted from 
extremist beliefs, among other things.31 On receiving an email communicating this, I 
30 Internal document.
31 This version of the indicators was not made public, and I no longer have a copy of the document.  
Measurement  of  the scheme's  success  was subsequently  dramatically  altered –  see later  in  this  
chapter.
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immediately went to talk to colleagues who were in regular contact with GOL about  
the LAA, sure that there must have been some misunderstanding. There were three 
immediate problems: we had not agreed to participate in PVE,  yet were still  being 
included in its measurement; the indicators were being inserted into the LAA without 
discussion;  and  the  indicators  themselves  appeared  impractical  and  offensive.  As 
Emma, a senior officer in Hackney who I interviewed later, put it:
Emma: I don't know if they ever came up with a... definition for that indicator 
about cohesion, and I think when it first came out I was thinking well what 
are you gonna do, you just going to go out and knock on... people's door and 
go, ooh are you a Muslim, is there anything the council did that distracted 
you from extremism?
Although Emma does not distinguish cohesion and extremism, which have different 
indicators on which local government performance is measured, her point is a general 
one.  Though Emma's comment is humorous, her suggestion does seem like a logical 
way to find out whether a project has helped 'Muslims in our communities' to 'reject 
violent  extremist  ideology  and  actively  condemn  violent  extremism'.  But  it  is  also 
absurd  in  that  the question,  much like  the original  design  of  the PVE  programme, 
makes an implicit assumption that Muslims need to be dissuaded from extremism, and 
the question does not seem like one that a person who either remained an extremist 
or had never been one would be likely to answer happily. This is a central example of 
how  the  language  and  premises  of  the  PVE  programme  expose  fundamental 
differences in conceptualisation of communities, measurement, information and the 
role of government within and between policy practitioners, local and national – which 
I consider further later in this chapter.
It  was  quite  clear  to me that  the  Mayor  and Cabinet  would  have  a  problem with 
including these proposed measurements in local plans for the borough, and this turned 
out to be the case. This made little difference, however. GOL asked local performance 
managers for Hackney's figures on performance against NI35 (the PVE performance 
indicator).  When they explained that Hackney had chosen not to participate in the 
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scheme, officials at GOL replied that the money had been passed onto the borough as 
part of the LAA block grant; which it had, despite the local authority's protestations. 
The  introduction  of  LAAs  as  a  contract  between  local  authorities  and  central 
government had been promoted as a way of devolving power to local areas, reducing 
the number of targets and separate funding streams for which they are accountable to 
central government, with one contact point through the regional government office 
(CLG, 2007a). Yet NI35 was inserted into the 198 measures on which all LAAs across the 
country must report, after local negotiations for that year were completed.  The only 
remaining element of choice for local authorities as to how to report was whether to 
make NI35 one of the 35 headline indicators, for which improved outcomes in their 
local area would result in additional 'reward' funding from central government.
This precise question – whether to include PVE as one of the most important measures 
of success in Hackney – arose a year later when renewing the LAA. At this point, the 
Borough  Commander  of  Police  presented  a  briefing  for  Hackney's  Local  Strategic 
Partnership  steering  group  arguing  that  NI35  should  be  included  in  local  reward 
indicators because Hackney was a high risk area for violent extremist activity.32 The 
police  briefing  poses  the  question  'why  does  Hackney  need  to  build  resilience  to 
violent extremism?' and in response quotes 2001 Census data on the size of the black 
and minority ethnic (BME) population in general. This appears to equate Muslims in 
general  with the risk  of  violent extremism without  any explanation,  and to equate 
Muslims  with  BME  populations  in  general,  and  BME  populations  with  violent 
extremism.  Though  the  report  goes  on  to  observe  that  'Muslims  are  not  a 
homogeneous group', it then states that 'Many Muslims may categorise themselves as 
having an Asian ethnicity,  but this  is  not  the case for  all  Muslims.  Even within the 
category of Asian, there are huge cultural differences between Muslims from Pakistan, 
Africa and the Far East' [sic].33 This suggests a lack of 'intelligence' within the police 
service not just about community relations and local threats, but also confusion about 
ethnic,  'racial',  national  and  religious  categories  as  well  as  basic  questions  of 
geography. The potential implications of such a lack of knowledge or understanding for 
32  Internal document.
33  Internal document.
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relationships  with  and  between  local  communities  and  identity  groups  will  be 
discussed further below. I will also discuss what this approach to populations and data 
suggests about the perspectives and priorities within the police force.
What is particularly interesting about the police briefing is that it follows the national 
line pushed by both CLG and Home Office guidance on PVE that refers to past crimes, 
the size of the resident Muslim population, and nebulous 'intelligence' which cannot be 
revealed, as evidence of threats of future violence. It then suggests that this should be 
prevented by actions to be carried out  by the local  authority  at  the behest of  the 
police, security services and central government. The overall argument of the report 
was that local intelligence pointed to a terrorist threat in Hackney which should be 
tackled through PVE schemes  led by the local authority,  thereby turning the 'softer' 
tools  of  persuasion  and  self-government  directly  into  the  service  of  agencies  of 
disciplinary control.
These aspects of the relationship between local government and the police to some 
extent mirror the relationship between CLG and the Home Office on the national level. 
Within national government, it appeared that any debate about the balance between 
promoting  good community  relations  and gathering  intelligence  on  criminal  terror-
related activity had been won by the security services and the Home Office. Though 
PVE was administered by CLG through local government, it emerged from the national 
cross-government counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST. This was published 
in  2006,  and  revised  in  2009  (HM  Government,  2009a).  CONTEST  consists  of  four 
strands –  Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. At the time the PVE programme was 
launched, the stated aims of the Prevent strand were threefold: to tackle disadvantage, 
inequalities  and  discrimination  that  could  'contribute  to  radicalisation'  (HM 
Government, 2006:1); to deter facilitation of terrorism by 'changing the environment in 
which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate' (p12); and challenging 
ideologies which are used to justify violence 'primarily by helping Muslims who wish to  
dispute these ideas to do so' (p2).
The  PVE  programme  was  the  community-based  part  of  the  Prevent  workstream, 
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implemented through local government, alongside policing and counter-terrorism work 
led  by  the  police  (HM  Government,  2009a:14-15).  Though  the  overall  counter-
terrorism strategy draws attention to 'structural  problems...  that  may contribute to 
radicalisation' there are no specific efforts to address inequality or discrimination in the 
UK as part of the Prevent strategy. The PVE guidance even states explicitly that tackling 
disadvantage is to be considered elsewhere and that PVE work is not to be directed to 
this end (DCLG, 2008:11). The original PVE guidance stated its aims:
to develop a community in which Muslims in our communities:
• identify  themselves  as  a  welcome part  of  a  wider  British  society  and  are 
accepted as such by the wider community;
• reject violent extremist ideology and actively condemn violent extremism;
• isolate violent extremist activity, and support and co-operate with the police 
and security services; and,
• develop  their  own  capacity  to  deal  with  problems  where  they  arise  and 
support diversionary activity for those at risk (CLG, 2007b:3).
This  guidance,  published,  promoted  and  managed  by  CLG,  directly  translates  an 
'intelligence',  criminalising and securitising discourse  into the official  policy of  local 
government.
***
I have outlined my own experience of negotiating the Preventing Violent Extremism 
fund,  and of  attempting to  do this  in  a  way  that  met national  requirements,  local 
political  priorities  and  alliances,  and  the  practicalities  of  working  in  complex 
organisations and partnerships. While my account may read somewhat impersonally as 
a  whole,  there  are  moments  where  my personal  investment  in  these  negotiations 
becomes particularly  clear.  One example is  where I  describe a wish to ensure that  
proper processes of communication and decision-making have taken place in order to 
present a professional  response to community organisations making inquiries about 
136
the fund. Another is when I  describe feeling 'proud' of the attempt at  compromise 
which the local authority presented as a way of negotiating more difficult aspects of 
the project. 
In the following parts of the chapter, I consider these moments and my reactions to 
them  more  analytically.  I  also  draw  on  evidence  from  narratives  of  colleagues  in 
Hackney and elsewhere, gathered in interviews some time later. I have organised the 
rest of the chapter around four elements of the 'difficult subjects' which appeared as 
most salient in the problems local government practitioners expressed with the PVE 
fund, and which have already begun to emerge in the narrative above. These were the 
relationship between local government and the police or the perceived 'securitisation' 
of  local  public  services  via  PVE;  the  different  understandings  of  measuring  policy 
impacts held by different parts of government; the likely impact on local relationships 
between community organisations and the local authority; and the presentation and 
communication of the fund. The chapter examines what the narratives I have collected 
tell us about crisis points in the negotiation of policy related to cohesion, belonging, 
identity and inequality, and the means available for individual practitioners embedded 
within organisations to deal with them.
'Intelligence'
Brian: And the police, because of their pragmatic approach, get there faster than 
the local authority. Hence the Prevent...  We're aware this needs to be done,  
it needs to be done, and therefore we will drive it through. Because it needs  
to be done. We know it's gonna come, and I think the council know it needs 
to be done. But where they'd like to have a few more meetings and discuss it 
a bit further and go – and convince [pause] you don't always get that time, 
so. 
I had asked Brian, a senior local police officer involved in community cohesion work in 
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Hackney,  about the inclusion of the PVE indicator in the Local Area Agreement, as I 
knew the police had pushed for this to be one of the 'reward indicators' for Hackney.34 
Brian’s first response was to tell me that Hackney 'hits all the boxes that [this is] where  
is your next radicalised extremist [is] gonna come from' because it has 'huge levels of 
deprivation' and when people who have been in prison for extremism-related offences 
are  released  'they  all  seem  to  come  to  Hackney'.  He  saw  the  reasoning  as  quite 
straightforward 'it needs to be done, and therefore we will drive it through'. Brian’s 
view is that the local authority is simply dragging its feet, and will eventually cede to 
the inevitability of the police’s more quickly-adopted approach.
While Brian frames the police’s speed of adopting the PVE scheme as 'pragmatic', many 
of the objections to the scheme that I heard from local authority officials (and which I  
put  forward  myself  when  working  as  one)  could  also  be  framed  that  way.  These 
objections were that the scheme simply would not address the problem it set out to 
solve, that even if extremism in the name of Islam was seen as an imminent threat, the 
focus on Muslims in general did not follow. While the parameters of their pragmatism 
differed, both local authority and police practitioners talked in terms of effectiveness, 
and of techniques that they saw as the most efficient to achieve desired outcomes.
In Chapter One, I described the importance of governmentality, the promotion of self-
governing behaviours, to the development of community cohesion policy. A simplifying 
theoretical  framework  might  suggest  that  local  government  has  promoted  self-
government,  while  the police  focus  on disciplinary  government.  Until  well  into  the 
1980s, local government and the police in England operated as quite separate entities, 
particularly in London. While some local authorities had police committees, in London 
the first such relationship was established by the Greater London Council in the 1980s, 
where the police had previously reported only to the Home Secretary (Lansley et al, 
1989:68). From that period, work between local authorities and the police developed, 
albeit  often  in  a  situation  of  mutual  distrust  or  misunderstanding  (Lansley  et  al, 
1989:51). Pushes towards  partnership across government agencies, especially in the 
34  While the local authority is the lead organisation for the LAA, Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), a  
partnership of key statutory bodies including the police, health and local authority as well as the 
voluntary and private sectors, sign off the LAA.
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2000s,  have brought  developments  in  working  relationships  which  mean that  local 
authority Chief Executives and their local police commanding officers sit together on 
Local  Strategic  Partnerships,  and  the  two  agencies  are  held  jointly  responsible  by 
central government for community safety targets (though more recent proposals for 
directly elected police commissioners may alter this relationship again). Though there 
is  consequent  blurring at  the edges with exchanges of  responsibilities,  staffing and 
resources,  the  two  remain  quite  distinct  institutions  with  distinct  purposes  and 
cultures. These distinctions become clearer when a controversy or crisis, such as the 
instigation of PVE, occurs. I suggest that the police and security services (and largely 
the national government policy guidelines) present their viewpoint as 'pragmatic' and 
'no-nonsense' as it aims to root out terrorists without worrying about causing offence. 
Conversely,  the  local  government  perspectives  I  consider  position  themselves  as 
pragmatic,  in that  to achieve their  goals  of  building trust  with local  residents they 
cannot be seen to form part of the police and security services' intelligence apparatus.
An  increasing  focus  on  counter-terrorism work  with  Muslim communities  followed 
bombings in London on 7th July 2005.35 National government established a number of 
working groups involving individual Muslims invited as private citizens, intended to find 
'concrete proposals about how Muslim communities and the Government can further 
work in partnership to prevent extremism, and to reduce disaffection and radicalisation 
within Muslim communities across Britain' (Preventing Extremism Together Working 
Groups, 2005:97). This community relations focus did to some extent influence the PVE 
guidelines. The working groups proposed actions for engaging with Muslim women and 
young people, and support for community development and leadership, which appear 
as  PVE priorities.  But  the working groups’  ambition to promote understanding and 
dialogue about Muslim lives and religion – not just between Muslims but across society 
– were not developed further within PVE guidance (Preventing Extremism Together 
Working  Groups,  2005;  CLG,  2007b).  There are  also elements  of  the PVE priorities 
which do not relate directly to any recommendations of the working groups, around 
resilience  and  early  intervention  with  communities  (see  also  Bright,  2006:12).  This  
35  Though government  thinking in  this  area had already begun by 2004 (see FCO,  2004;  Thomas, 
2010:443).
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demonstrates a move from treatment of Muslim communities as potentially vulnerable 
in the working groups, to a treatment of 'Muslims in our communities' primarily as a 
potential threat within PVE; that is, from a 'community relations' focus to a 'security' 
focus.
This  contrast  can  also  be  seen  between  the  briefing  which  I  produced  as  a  local 
government policy practitioner responding to the PVE programme for Hackney, and 
that produced by the local police a year later (described earlier in this chapter). The 
most pressing argument of the police briefing was the risk of terrorist activity occurring 
in  the  borough,  illustrated  with  information  on  previous  arrests.  The  briefing  also 
provided population data as a way of illustrating potential for violent extremism. But 
the way they used the data on ethnic and religious identity in the borough betrayed a  
lack  of  understanding  of  the  information  quoted.  They  confused  ethnic,  religious, 
national and 'racial' categories. The briefing stated the size of local Muslim (and ethnic 
minority in general) populations but the author did not apparently feel any need to 
provide further explanation of why this was considered a risk factor. 
This approach was not limited to the police, however.  The simple assumption of the 
national  PVE  guidance  seemed to  be  that  'the  main  terrorist  threat  facing  the  UK 
currently  comes  from  Islamist  extremists'  (CLG,  2007b);  that  'Islamist  extremists' 
formed a subset within the larger population group 'Muslim'; that therefore reaching 
more Muslims would result in reaching more extremists as a percentage of that group; 
and that the most efficient way to reach more Muslims would be to work in areas 
where the most Muslims live. In short, the assumption seemed to be that Muslims are 
a single group, and a set percentage of Muslims could be expected to be extremists or 
terrorists,  distributed  evenly  across  the  population.  There  was  no  consideration  of 
whether, for example, extremism might thrive outside of the larger concentrations of 
Muslim populations, rather than simply where the biggest numbers live (see Finney 
and  Simpson  2009:109).  This  amounts  to  a  question  of  how  measurement  is 
conceptualised at different levels and in different branches of government. 
Conversely,  a  neglect  of  understanding  the  security  intelligence  on  actual  criminal 
140
activity could be attributed to my briefing, where I dismissed the suggestion that there 
was evidence of terrorist activity in the borough. Indeed, the local authority did not 
have any information to suggest this, but there may have been information available. 
For instance, the police briefing provides information on three individuals who had 
been convicted of terrorist offences, with residences or family connections in Hackney. 
The contrast between these two briefings is not just in the arguments each made, but 
in the types of knowledge that are available and valued in the two cultures of the local  
authority  and  of  the  police,  and  what  information  each  frames  as  essential  (or 
unnecessary) to make sense of the situation (Trouillot, 1995:51). 
When the two organisations work together, they each ask the other to take seriously 
their own form of knowledge and understanding of priorities – yet each retain their 
own over-riding concerns. To caricature this difference: police officers appear to see as 
self-evident  that  the  most  important  ambition  is  finding  and  arresting  (potential) 
bombers. Conversely, for local government officers, persuasion, trust and relationship-
building seems the self-evident priority. Like the slippages that occur when discussing 
meanings  of  'community  cohesion'  (between  thinking  of  it  as  a  state  of  affairs,  a 
problem to be solved, a cause of problems or a possible solution), the emphasis on 
community  relationships  which  local  government  practitioners  made  slip  between 
connected, but different, relationships to the problem of extremism or terrorism. For 
the police, similar slippages occurred when talking about the quality of 'intelligence'. It 
is also worth noting that, to some extent, techniques of persuasion and relationship-
building are perhaps the only ones available to local government in this context; while 
the police's more coercive powers were also limited by what information they had.
The lack of clarity about what 'intelligence' was available was important in blurring the 
roles  between local  government  and the  police  or  security  services.  This  nebulous 
concept was used both as an existing resource that justified the form and development 
of PVE, and as an output of PVE. Local authorities and individual service providers were 
expected  to  develop  knowledge  of  local  communities  not  just  in  terms  of  needs, 
priorities or tensions, but as information on risks which could be passed on to the 
security  services.  It  is  understandable  that  information  on  significant  criminal 
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investigations may not be made widely available. However, there was a feeling among 
local government practitioners in Hackney that those with access to this information 
(largely  the  police  locally)  were  using  this  knowledge  to  exert  pressure  on  those 
without access. These fears were not confined to Hackney; for example, the Leader of 
Bradford Council appeared on Newsnight in September 2008, stating:
What they said was, that if we were willing to go out and monitor the Muslim 
community and use the resources of the local council to do that, then they would  
release an amount of money to us. The local council should be there to promote 
education, caring for elderly people, making sure we live in a safe place, and not 
become a  wing of  the security  services...  We've had an enormous amount  of 
pressure...  I  think they are also trying to suggest that we're soft on terrorism, 
which is completely wrong (Newsnight, 2008).
This comment demonstrates that struggles over the appropriate response to the threat 
of  terrorism  reached  beyond  Hackney  or  London.  It  is  also  worth  noting  the 
assumptions made in these comments about the self-evidence of local government's 
role  being  to  provid  amenities  for  residents  –  and  not  to  be  part  of  the  security 
services.
Throughout the life of the PVE programme occasional media coverage suggested that it 
encouraged local authorities to 'spy' on residents (see for example Dodd, 2009a), and 
other research reports based on interviews with local government practitioners have 
found them to be uneasy about working on a programme so closely associated with 
intelligence gathering for the security services (Husband and Alam, 2011; Kundnani, 
2009;  Turley,  2009).  One  element  of  PVE  was  clearly  an  intention  to  use  trusted 
networks  developed  by  local  authorities  to  inform  security  intelligence,  as  I  will 
illustrate further below. Yet, conversely, the police and security services only appeared 
willing or able to share a very limited amount of their own knowledge. 
An example of this argument is extracted from my interview with Craig, another police 
officer who had worked with community cohesion and PVE issues:
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Craig:  We've  seen  that  there  is  a  counter  terrorist  [sic]  threat,  we  know that 
because we've had attacks...  we know that on account of  the intelligence 
that's come in, I appreciate fully that most people can't – and I use the word 
can't  with consideration,  can't  understand the intelligence picture...  that's 
not because they're thick, it's because they can't be allowed access to it, if 
you see what I mean... but I think it's right to say that there is a tangible  
threat, and I... have not yet found anybody of any note or significance or who 
has the ability  to have an impact,  who would disagree with the fact  that  
there is a counter terrorist [sic] threat. 
Craig notes first the history of violent attacks, which is not in dispute. He continues by 
alluding to 'intelligence' which 'most people can’t be allowed access to' which suggests 
that  there  is  an  ongoing  threat.  He  is  aware  that  there  is  some  feeling  that  this 
intelligence may not be substantial, and counters this by suggesting that anyone made 
privy to this information is convinced by it. Such secrecy makes the intelligence difficult 
to work with, but the seriousness imputed to it makes it hard to ignore.
Later in the interview, I asked Craig what his views were about the specific focus on 
extremism in the name of Islam, rather than (for example) violent extremism linked to 
far right organisations. His first response was that  a far right terrorist attack was 'not 
gonna happen' because 'we’ve never seen that'.  When I  reminded him of  a recent 
conviction of a far-right activist for bomb-making (Dodd, 2009b) and the bombings in 
1999 by David Copeland targeting ethnic minority and gay communities in London, and 
of recent police statements about a growing threat of far right violence (Dodd, 2009c),  
Craig agreed that such acts of violence 'need to be dealt with', but still insisted they 
were not 'the real threat'. He suggested that addressing far-right extremism might be 
helpful in developing acceptance of PVE by demonstrating it was not a programme of 
victimisation of 'people that happen to be Muslim', because 'when we talk about the 
far right we're not talking about white people'. Yet he then went on to argue that 'it 
follows'  that  'the  preventing  violent  extremism  agenda  focuses  on  Muslim 
communities' because 'the greatest threat comes from Al-Qaeda'. The contradiction in 
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this argument – that all white people are clearly not white supremacists, but that all  
Muslims might  be linked to Al-Qaeda – is a straightforward reflection of the way the 
PVE  programme  was  presented  in  national  policy  guidance.  More  broadly,  these 
comments make clear how far 'whiteness' is being taken by Craig as an invisible and 
normative way of being (Frankenberg, 1993:240; Ware, 2002:92-3).
Craig  also  suggested  that  far-right  extremists  were  less  of  a  threat,  and harder  to 
target, because they 'are acting alone, it’s really difficult to target their infrastructure'. 
This  implies  that  the  infrastructure  of  extremists  acting  in  the  name  of  Islam  is  
accessible,  though the only way this is  targeted through the PVE scheme is by the 
broad focus on all  Muslim communities.  This  is  not to suggest that the rest  of the 
government's  counter-terrorism  strategy  does  not  have  a  more  developed  idea  of 
infrastructure. However, the suggestion that the local government, community-focused 
part of the strategy should target extremism in the name of Islam because it has a 
more  developed  infrastructure  while  remaining  at  the  level  of  a  religious  identity 
seems incongruous.
Whatever  'intelligence'  does  exist,  access  to  it  is  restricted  and  local  government 
practitioners are expected to take on trust that what they are told by the police and 
security services is substantiated. They are then asked to promote this view among 
local residents. In addition,  local authorities are expected to pass information to the 
police to supplement intelligence gathering with very little reassurance about the need 
for this, or how information might be being used. David was one of the most senior 
local government officers in Hackney (if anyone within the local authority were to be 
made aware of security issues, it would be him) and he expressed his frustration at the 
way that 'intelligence' was being used:
David:   The  police  saying...  you're  ranked  6th  [in  terms  of  threat  of  violent 
extremism] in the country, but, can't get any evidence to prove why we are.
Hannah:  [laughs] They won't tell you why, or?
David:  No, they won't share the intelligence... It seems to be based on [pause] 
numbers of people and numbers of educational establishments in the – so 
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there's a completely flawed model about why.
Hannah:  Yeah. It's because lots of Muslims live... in Hackney. 
David:  Yeah. But then I get told by the police, oh there are real threats out there 
but they won't tell me what they are.
David  describes  the  impression  he  has  been  given  that  the  police  model  of 
'intelligence' about extremism is flawed. The only explicit detail that has been given,  
even to a senior officer who is being asked to cooperate with the scheme, is that the 
threat  level  is  based  on  the  size  of  the  Muslim  population  and  'educational 
establishments' (it is unclear here if David is referring to mainstream establishments or  
specifically Muslim education). Still, the spectre of 'intelligence' remains powerful, and 
David does not want to neglect, or be seen to neglect 'real threats' – but it is unclear  
how threats can be addressed when they 'won’t tell [him] what they are'. Part of the 
power of this nebulous intelligence is that those who are privy to it are confident that  
anyone who knew about it would agree with them about the threat. Here, 'intelligence' 
is  another  of  those  terms  that  slips  between  discussion  as  a  cause  of  problems 
(because intelligence was lacking), a source of knowledge of problems (when there is 
intelligence  about  a  threat),  a  problem  in  itself  (when  the  quest  for  intelligence 
threatens relationships with communities) and a solution to problems (if we have more 
intelligence, we can prevent threats). This only adds to the difficulty of discussing this  
subject, particularly for those without access to 'intelligence'.
Those who invoke 'intelligence' are clear about their arguments in favour of PVE, even 
if their reasoning might sometimes be contradictory. They see PVE as justified beyond 
question, by the (undisclosable) 'intelligence'. This clarity can shut down consideration 
of  why threats  have developed,  or  what  alternative approaches might  be possible. 
Again, there are implicit assumptions about causes and prescriptions in both the police 
insistence on the power of intelligence, and local government scepticism. There are 
differences too in the constituencies which the two organisations have to convince in 
order to maintain the authority of their actions (where local authorities are much more 
directly  accountable  to  'the  community'  via  the  electoral  system).  But  while  local 
government practitioners expressed concern that the way 'intelligence' was being used 
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could cast unfounded suspicions on Muslim communities at large (see also House of 
Commons Communities and Local  Government Committee,  2010:226; Husband and 
Alam, 2011; Kelcher, 2007; Kundnani, 2009; McLean, 2008; Reading Muslim PVE Crisis 
Group,  2008; Turley,  2009),  national  debates critiqued these practices from a quite 
different perspective.  
Some media coverage of PVE derided both national and local government participation 
in the scheme for either excessive paranoia, requiring refuse collectors to 'snoop in 
residents' rubbish bins' (McGee, 2008; see also Dodd, 2009a) or of wasting money on 
projects such as 'thousands on producing T-shirts  proclaiming “I  love Islam”' (Reid, 
2008;  see  also  Newsnight,  2008).  These  stories  are  reminiscent  of  the  critique  of  
'political correctness gone mad'  in the public sector which is familiar from attacks on 
local government in the 1980s (see Dunant, 1994; Gordon, 1990; Lansley et al, 1989; 
and my discussion in Chapter Three). Like the mythologies that developed at that time, 
they are potent because they are grounded in some elements of fact, coupled with 
exaggeration  and  ridicule.  Some  of  these  criticisms  of  supposed  local  government 
incompetence even echoed the portrayals of the nationally mandated PVE scheme by 
local policy practitioners.
A criticism which I did not hear from local practitioners, however, was a more serious 
allegation that PVE funding itself was being directed at groups with their own links to 
extremism (e.g. Bright, 2006). This question draws on issues that go way beyond local 
connections or  funding measures and back to international  politics  and the role of 
national and foreign policy in creating the context in which extremism erupts (Brighton, 
2007; Thomas, 2010), and the lack of a viable framework at any level for understanding 
new  forms  of  networks  of  ideology  and  violence  (Bhatt,  2007  and  2010).  The 
suggestion that funding meant to prevent violent extremism could actually be used to 
support  it  is  ostensibly  quite  separate  from  the  problems  of  alienating  Muslim 
residents.  The  knee-jerk  reaction  is  to  assume  advocates  of  these  critiques  hold 
respectively right- and left-wing political viewpoints. However, both of these potential 
problems could be assigned to a shared cause: a lack of detailed knowledge about 
actual functioning of extremist movements, and a push to be seen to take firm action, 
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resulting in hasty and perhaps counter-productive policy. This connects to questions 
about  how  the  PVE  fund  conceptualised  violent  extremism,  and  potential 
interventions. These questions are not just about what interventions might be most 
effective in combating violence, but also about what it is practically (and politically) 
possible within existing frameworks of government, and ethical and social norms.
Measurement
Emma: As officers in local government, you're often from a sort of left wing liberal  
type  background...  and  the  idea  of  enforcing  anything,  it  is  tough...  so 
community cohesion has a bit of a re-branding almost to do, because of its 
negative connotations, because government pushes can seem like spying... it 
also stinks of a  sort  of white British versus Muslim...   And it's  to do with  
extremism... rather than in its wider sense about how communities generally, 
into race issues, into age issues, all sorts of issues...  need to be under the 
umbrella of cohesion... it seems to be used and interpreted as, we need to 
guard against Muslim extremism. And if we don't, if we don't do community 
cohesion, [clicks tongue] my god, what will happen.
This comment from Emma relates to her discussion of the performance indicators for 
PVE which I  quoted earlier, in which she ridiculed the practicality of measuring the 
scheme's success through traditional means available to local government ('you just 
going to knock on people's doors and go, ooh are you a Muslim, is there anything the 
council  did  that distracted you from extremism?').  In this  second interview extract, 
Emma  reinforces  the  sense  that  community  cohesion  and  PVE  policies  are 
interchangeable, which is how she sees them and how she believes local  residents 
perceive them. She describes some potential for community cohesion to be about a 
broader  range  of  questions  ('into  race  issues,  age  issues,  all  sorts  of  issues'),  but 
understands this potential  to have been shut down by a focus on 'guarding against 
Muslim extremism'. Again she lampoons the power of the opaque intelligence used to 
justify this approach ('if we don't, my god, what will happen'). What is of particular 
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interest here though is the opening comment in this extract, where she attributes her 
uneasiness  with  the  scheme  to  a  feeling  that  it  'seems  like  spying',  that  local 
government is unused to 'enforcing' things in this way. 
Emma here draws on personal political and ethical commitments, which she believes to 
be common among local government officers, and which she describes as 'a sort of left  
wing liberal type background'. This is not a party political alignment, but what might be 
described elsewhere as a 'public service ethos' – a commitment to public service, social 
justice or some other general formulation of the importance of the public good, and 
perhaps to the championing of the vulnerable or those in need of support. The way 
that  PVE  had  been  presented  to  her,  particularly  in  terms  of  its  elements  of 
information-gathering,  had  made  Emma  wary  that  these  commitments  might  be 
subverted by the scheme.  As discussed earlier,  these were suspicions  shared more 
widely among local authority officers about the extent to which the PVE programme 
might lead to them becoming informants  for  the security  services,  or  perceived as 
such. 
Yet both of Emma's comments illustrate the fleeting nature of managerial engagement 
with  these  issues.  Despite  her  apparently  strong  feelings  on  the  absurdity  of  the 
project, she doesn't 'know if they ever came up with a definition for that indicator'. The 
PVE programme does not form part of her day-to-day work and so her outrage does 
not necessarily translate into a practical intervention. Rather, she demonstrates a level 
of knowledge of the issue and her political relationship to it (to me, in the interview) 
but in doing so also abdicates responsibility and distances herself from those elements 
of organisations she works with and within which are implementing it.
Despite  Emma's  suggestion  that  she  and  her  colleagues  were  instinctively 
uncomfortable  with  what  she  construed  as  'spying',  the  local  state  has  a  long-
established  role  in  collecting  and  modelling  population  data  as  part  of  planning 
services and predicting behaviours of, and risks to, the local population (Foucault, 1991 
[1978]:99).  As  Husband  and  Alam  (2011:175)  observe,  many  local  government 
practitioners  are  fluent  at  integrating  such  statistical  data  with  local  experiential 
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knowledge about what it might mean. These interpretive techniques were not always 
shared by the police service, as indicated by the police briefing discussed above. Nor 
were nuances of local knowledge always compatible with data considered as national 
aggregates, as in the CLG guidance on PVE being aimed at those areas with the largest 
Muslim populations. Perhaps partly for this reason, the blunt ways in which the PVE 
programme  was  presented  created  difficulties  at  the  level  of  definition  and 
measurement of impact, as well as design of implementation. These challenges were 
expressed to government in various forms (e.g. Kelcher, 2007; McLean, 2008; House of 
Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, 2010) and eventually the 
initially proposed indicators (which mirrored very closely Emma's facetious suggestion) 
were replaced by more process-focused formulations (Rimmer, 2008).  By 2008 NI35 
success criteria for PVE had been developed into a framework which focused on the 
achievement of internal goals by the local authority (HM Goverment, 2009b), judging 
levels of:
• Understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities 
• Knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent extremism 
and the Prevent objectives
• Development  of  a  risk-based  preventing  violent  extremism  action  plan,  in 
support of the delivery of the Prevent objectives 
• Effective  oversight,  delivery  and  evaluation  of  projects  and  action  (HM 
Government, 2008:55-58).
Alison, who worked for an organisation that represents local government interests to 
national  government and vice versa,  suggested that these changes to the scheme's 
measurement  and  presentation  were  the  result  of  dialogue  between  parts  of 
government. She saw the process of negotiating the compromise itself as productive:
Alison: The feedback from some local authorities have been, we really hated this 
at  the  outset,  we  really  felt  that  this  was  gonna  do  all  sorts  of  untold 
damage...  and almost in the process of  making that point  back to central 
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government, they actually did what they needed to do... Because they had...  
to go out into their communities... and have a proper dialogue with them 
about, this is actually an issue, do we have a role in doing anything about it?  
And it started to draw out some of the more unpleasant and difficult debates 
and tensions that you would have at a local level... Whether that's what CLG 
intended...  not  a  robust,  you've  gotta  go  out  and  stop  the  terrorists,  is 
debatable but doesn't really matter cos I think the position they've arrived at 
now... has got them to quite a sensible place I think.
Alison suggests that while the CLG approach may have initially been 'you've gotta go 
out and stop the terrorists',  the resistance of local authorities to this approach and 
their insistence on sharing these problems with local  residents in itself  produced a 
positive  result.  She  argues  that  by  voicing  concerns  to  local  residents,  some  local 
authorities began to confront difficult issues about the presence of extremism with – 
rather than in opposition to – their residents.
What Alison's  discussion does not address is  that the changes to the scheme have 
framed it in terms which make local authorities more comfortable, a familiar move of 
'polish[ing] the rough edges that do not fit neatly either side of the controversy' so that 
'[e]veryone seems to gain' (Trouillot, 1995:115). Producing evidence of 'knowledge and 
understanding',  an  'action  plan',  'oversight'  and  'evaluation'  relies  on  internal 
processes, and not on trying to measure levels of extremism or how they might have 
changed. What was viewed as inflammatory language in the earlier presentation of the 
scheme had been removed or was easier to keep to internal documents, while the 
premise of the scheme remained unchanged – that there was an unspecified threat 
from extremism in the name of Islam that should be tackled by activities focused on 
Muslims in areas with large Muslim populations. The existence of a government fund 
directed exclusively at Muslims persisted, and it did not only have the potential to risk 
relationships  with  Muslim  communities  who  may  feel  victimised  (whether  this 
potential was only in the anticipation of local policy practitioners, as discussed here, or 
voiced by Muslim community groups, for example  Reading Muslim PVE Crisis Group, 
2008). It also created potential problems for other groups who were not eligible for the 
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fund to feel that Muslim populations were being unfairly privileged.
Impacts on local relationships
Marie: Obviously there was counter terrorism activity but there was also concern 
about  a  backlash...  against  Muslim  communities,  but  also  potentially  a 
situation where people might feel that they'd have to keep their heads down 
because they were scared of coming anywhere near the police about issues 
because [pause] the hunt was on for the bombers. And so... we as a borough 
wanted to reassure people, that you could still contact us, you could still feed 
in those issues of harassment or incidents... What we discovered was there 
had been an escalation [in harassment]… and the cumulative effect of those 
low level  incidents  meant  that  some of  the  services  and  people  were  in  
genuine feelings of fear... But some of the feedback we got from mothers was 
that their sons were saying look we can see what's happening in Abu Ghraib,
Hannah: yeah
Marie: and we can we can see that what's happening in terms of their perception 
of an attack on civil liberties, and being really really reluctant to talk about 
people that they were suspicious of, cos... they didn't have sufficient faith in 
the establishment to deal with suspicion,
Hannah: yeah
Marie: without, from their perception, fitting people up. And putting them in a 
prison with suspended  habeas corpus under the Terrorism Act.  And never 
knowing if that person would get out again.
Hannah: [overlapping] yeah, yeah 
Marie: [overlapping] And if they did, their life destroyed.
Hannah: yeah
Marie: ... And then... after the [pause] killing of Jean Charles de Menezes we were 
asked as a borough to use the networks that we'd developed through that for 
community reassurance, to pass out information from the Met Police, which 
reassured the community about – the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes.36
36  Jean Charles de Menezes was an innocent Brazilian man who was shot in the head by police in  
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Hannah: mm
Marie: And I  as an officer got in touch with my Cabinet Member and said I'm 
recommending we don't do this, because to put it bluntly I felt  that what 
we'd got from the police was a – pack of lies, [both laugh] and... it was a very 
very blatant [pause] the police version of the story, which by that time was 
beginning to unravel. We had to take the conscious decision at that point... to 
decide that our relationships... with our BME communities in terms of the 
reassurance  and  trust  could  have  been  massively  undermined  if  we'd 
forwarded the whole set of stories about – what had happened in Stockwell.
In  this  account,  Marie  described  some  of  the  tension  which  emerged  from  the 
attempts  at  partnership  working  between  police  and  local  authorities  when  roles 
become blurred, as they seemed to around the purpose and implementation of PVE 
and  related  counter  terrorism  work.  Marie  worked  in  equality  policy,  and  in  this 
interview extract she described her experience of working in a previous job for a local  
authority outside of my case studies, during the summer of 2005.
Marie describes firstly her concern that some local residents might feel 'scared' as a 
result of counter-terrorism operations. While not dismissing the need for police action 
on  countering  violence,  she  points  out  that  violent  backlash  against  Muslims  (and 
those assumed to be Muslim) also required intervention. Marie suggests that the local 
authority's work should focus on supporting residents experiencing harassment, and 
preventing further conflict, rather than searching for criminals. The importance of local 
authority  services  being  seen  as  separate  from  security  and  police  services  is 
emphasised in Marie's account; people were 'harassed' and 'in fear', and some of this 
stemmed from feeling that 'the hunt was on',  and anyone could be a suspect.  She 
reports how women in the local community reported finding it very difficult to talk to 
their children about whether they knew anyone who might be involved in extremist 
activity,  in  the  context  of  political  and  legal  developments  which  made  them  feel 
increasingly that civil and political rights, particularly of Muslims, were under attack. It 
Stockwell  tube station on 22nd July 2005. They had mistaken him for a terrorist suspect during a 
flawed surveillance operation. This occurred two weeks after four terrorist bombs on the London  
transport system killed 56 people and injured around 700 people.
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seems apparent from this account that Marie was quite sympathetic with that feeling, 
and indeed at other points in the interview she described feeling parallels to the way 
that she had experienced victimisation under anti-terror laws related to Irish people in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when she was married to an Irish man who was unjustly arrested  
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
Where the first part of Marie's account refers to the feelings within the community and 
how she as an officer tried to find ways to understand them, the second part relates  
even more directly to the relationship between local government and the police. Marie 
describes receiving a request from the local police to pass out information on their 
behalf about the fatal shooting of a man at a tube station by counter-terrorism police. 
Given the local authority's role in community reassurance and the networks they had 
built,  the  police  service  were  presumably  hoping  to  increase  the  spread  of  their 
information, and to use what trust people might have in the local authority. Yet Marie 
was immediately wary of being asked to work in this way, for exactly that reason – 
because  unquestioningly  disseminating  the  police  briefings  would  ally  the  two 
organisations even more closely for local people, and any trust (or lack of it) would be 
shared between the two organisations. This was not simply a disinclination to be allied 
with the police service, but a suspicion Marie had that the police information was 'a 
pack of lies'. She was quite clear that if her suspicion should turn out to be justified 
(which it did – see Knight, 2005), the relationships of trust between the local authority 
and residents would be severely damaged.
It  is  worth  highlighting  two  other  elements  of  Marie's  account  in  contrast  to  the 
national and police understandings of PVE and related work. Firstly, towards the end of 
the interview extract here, Marie refers to 'relationships with our BME communities'.  
Earlier in the chapter, I criticised the police briefing for appearing to equate the black 
and minority ethnic population with the Muslim population, thereby ignoring diversity 
within  the  category  of  'BME'  and  also  that  some  Muslim  residents  may  not  be 
categorised as 'BME'. Marie also moves from talking about Muslim communities to 
BME  communities.  However,  the  context  of  Marie's  comment  is  a  long  history  of 
difficult, distrustful and sometimes violent relationships between the police force and 
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racialised minorities. Her argument is that an incident like the shooting of Menenzes 
draws on these wider histories and is likely to increase mistrust and fear of the police 
among  a  broader  population  of  minority  communities,37 not  just  among  Muslims. 
Menenzes,  after  all,  was  not  Muslim but  targeted  because  he  was  mistaken for  a 
terrorist suspect. Secondly, Marie's account suggests that she herself also shares some 
suspicion  of  the  police  force  and  their  workings,  based  in  part  on  her  personal 
experiences.  This  construction  of  her  argument  actually  mirrors  the  'intelligence' 
discourse of the police and national government, in that both are based on empirical 
events in the past which are attributed predictive power about future behaviours.
The tensions that become visible are a result of the different perspectives of national 
and  local  government.  Yet  another  perspective  exists  among  many  voluntary  and 
community  sector  organisations  (as  well  as  individual  residents)  who  might  be 
potential recipients of the fund, as Saida, who was directly engaged with implementing 
PVE in Hackney, described:
Saida: Engaging Muslim communities... sometimes can be seen as quite sensitive 
and  quite  controversial...  simply  because  it's  actually  singl[ing]  out  a 
community,  and if  you're looking at trying to build community cohesion... 
then the last thing you want is to say oh hang on, we need to do some work 
with this community around counter terrorism stuff... and that is unsettling...  
anyone that belongs to a community and outside the community... plus when 
you've got things like funding that can be an issue as well cos other people 
from other  communities  may  feel,  non-Muslim  communities...  oh  they're 
getting all this money and why is that, when we might need money for this 
and  that,  so  -  it's  about  striking  the balance  so,  in  the  sense  of  Prevent  
strategy it was quite sort of controversial and quite sensitive for some Muslim 
communities. 
Saida clearly  had some commitment to PVE as  she was working directly  within  its 
remit.  However,  her  comments  here  express  a  degree  of  ambivalence,  which  she 
37 Whether or not these relationships may have improved more recently, for example in the aftermath of  
the MacPherson Report (see Chapter Three).
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attributes to local residents (PVE 'sometimes can be seen as quite sensitive'). Though 
she does describe the programme as 'sort of controversial and quite sensitive for some 
Muslim communities',  this is only after discussing the effects of the programme on 
other groups. Firstly, she describes how the focus on Muslims could be 'unsettling' for 
'anyone  that  belongs  to  a  community  and  outside  the  [Muslim]  community' 
presumably  because  they  would  be  led  to  believe  that  Muslims  in  general  are 
associated with terrorism. She then raises the issue of competition for funds. As my 
own experience of developing PVE indicated, in practice complaints also came from 
groups not eligible for the money, who simply wanted the additional funding available 
through PVE. 
Saida was one of the few Muslim practitioners I interviewed, and this could also have 
played some part  in her relationship to the programme. While many of  the white, 
middle class professionals I interviewed were, to some extent, asserting their 'left wing 
liberal type' credentials by expressing their solidarity with Muslims targeted by PVE, 
perhaps Saida was performing a similar move in a different direction,  asserting her 
understanding  of  the  views  of  'other  communities,  non Muslim communities'.  The 
difference between the positions available to different practitioners may also relate to 
their levels of involvement in the scheme, and to a need to justify one's own alignment  
with  a  particular  policy  (see  Chapter  Seven  for  a  more  detailed  explanation;  and 
Husband and Alam, 2011:168-73).
As noted above, one organisation contacted me in Hackney about concerns that funds 
might be rejected by the local authority, and that this would constitute neglect of local 
Muslim communities'  needs.  This  might  be  understood  in  the  context  of  a  super-
diverse local area in which policy practitioners perceived there to be multiple ethnic,  
religious and other identity groups with specific needs and different forms of access to 
power. For example, it is well-established that the charedi Jewish population is both 
relatively  large38 and vocal,  with well-developed lobbying techniques for  presenting 
38 The charedi community is estimated to be 7% of Hackney's population (London Borough of Hackney,  
2011:2) and the largest such community in the world outside New York and Israel (Mayhew and 
Harper, 2008:5).
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their social, cultural and economic needs to local statutory organisations.39 There is a 
risk that aligning need with identity groups in this way within a competitive culture of  
bidding for public funds can create community cohesion problems in itself.
This was a question raised in relation to community cohesion by both Cantle's original 
report (2001:24), and later in a different form by the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion (2007:160-4). Where Cantle argued that area-based allocation of funds had 
created inter-ethnic tensions because different identity groups saw each other as being 
favoured by the local  state, the COIC focused specifically on funds allocated on the 
basis of group identity, which they argued had a similar effect.   Both suggested that 
resentment can be inspired by targeted funding perceived to be privileging one or 
other group. Yet there is rarely a shortage of organisations wishing to receive these 
funds, however potentially divisive. In the economy of the voluntary and community 
sector in Britain, which through the 2000s received an increasing amount of public 
funds for provision of services (Flood,  2010),  the imperative to maintain income to 
deliver organisational goals in a context of scarce resources means that funding, from 
whatever source, is highly sought after.
In both the systems critiqued by Cantle and by the COIC, the majority of such funds are 
allocated  on  the  basis  of  economic  or  social  need,  where  the  data  that  identifies 
inequality  suggests  it  is  associated  with  disadvantage  of  a  particular  geographical 
neighbourhood or identity group. They are not usually allocated  simply on the basis 
that an area or identity group, in itself, should receive more funds. Yet this appeared to 
be exactly what the PVE fund proposed. The documents that set out the rationale for 
the funding to local government and communities provided no evidence, qualitative or 
quantitative, that where it was targeted would prevent violent extremism; it just had to 
be spent on Muslims. It was not just a basic political or practical opposition to this 
39  The  charedi  community  was  cited  frequently  in  interviews  as  the  most  obvious  example  of  a 
bounded (or 'cohesive') community in Hackney. The charedi community has strict rules about diet,  
schooling, gender roles and use of communal services, and in Hackney the community has a number  
of strong advocates who articulate its specific needs and lobby the council in this regard. However,  
for reasons of space I have not been able to provide a detailed discussion of these relationships in my 
thesis. For more information about Hackney's charedi community see Holman and Holman, 2002.
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aspect of the project that troubled many policy practitioners. As I described, there was 
potential to incorporate funding directed at Muslims with other streams of funding for 
the  general  population  which  could  have  potentially  overcome  some  of  these 
difficulties. In some sense, it was the central government insistence that agencies be 
seen to be doing PVE, and that it be promoted in these terms, that caused the most 
difficulty for policy practitioners attempting to negotiate local sensitivities.
Communication and presentation
Sam: We had quite a big fight with DCLG about the Preventing Violent Extremism 
Fund... just the name made a number of boroughs say that they didn't want 
the money if that's what it had to be called and I think we were the one, the  
last one that held out, and said, well okay we'll take it only if we don't have to 
flag up locally  that that's  what it's  called and as long as we don't have a 
Minister rocking up and saying, if there was a particularly successful project, 
oh this is great and it's all part – to do with this.
The interviews I conducted with policy practitioners took place about a year after the 
initial negotiations over the Pathfinder fund, in which I had been directly involved. The 
memory  of  those  wrangles  still  rankled,  as  in  this  interview  with  Sam,  a  senior 
politician in Hackney. The importance Sam places on the language and presentation of 
the scheme is clear. This could be easy to dismiss as a superficial question of branding 
or public relations, but issues of communication were particularly important to how 
practitioners perceived their role. Relationships with real people in local communities 
were at stake for officers and politicians, and I and many of those I spoke with felt  
strongly that the name of this scheme and some of its central tenets would not only 
undermine  the  potential  to  prevent  extremism,  but  could  also  threaten  broader 
relationships  of  trust  within  communities  and  between  local  government  and 
residents.
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Sam's account constructs this negotiation as a tussle between the local authority and 
central government ('we had quite a big fight'). In this, the local authority is portrayed 
as heroic ('we were the last one that held out') and victorious (accepting the fund but 
only on certain conditions). This is the same chain of events which I described in my 
own account earlier in this chapter. Sam seems to be demonstrating a similar pride to 
that I described personally, at having at least tried to resist the problematic aspects of  
this  scheme.  And  he  also  positions  himself  in  a  way  which  echoes  my  account, 
describing  a  distinction  between  local  and  national  parts  of  government  and 
demonstrating a personal distance from the PVE scheme.
Communication and presentation are important in policy negotiations on a number of 
different levels. As already discussed, the political tasks of managing relations with and 
between different communities and groups are understood by policy practitioners to 
rely on a sensitive understanding and use of language and the way this language leads 
to the construction of services and distribution of funding. Such narratives also allow 
policy  practitioners  to  demonstrate  a  personal  connection  to  (or  distancing  from) 
responsibility for interventions and imputed political positions. Thus in recounting my 
experience of negotiating the PVE fund I have made it clear that I had several concerns 
about the premises of the fund and the likely impacts it would have; and I have tried to  
provide  a  convincing  narrative  of  how  I  (with  colleagues)  tried  to  address  these 
concerns and the reasons for our actions. This can also be said of Sam's narrative. Sam 
and I  were positioned differently  in relation to these negotiations:  he  as  politically 
responsible to (and reliant on) a local electorate and his national political party; I as 
interpreting  national  policy  and  local  needs  and  framing  possible  responses  as  a 
functionary of the bureaucratic structures of the local authority. But we were both well  
aware  that  local  residents  and  national  organisations  would  make  little  distinction 
either between the differences in (for example) our two positions, or more importantly 
between us as individuals acting within local government, and the local authority as a 
whole. Hence my 'pride' in seeming to have found a compromise solution, my worries 
about representing the authority to organisations who claimed to have been neglected 
in former service planning decisions, and Sam's insistence that 'we held out'. These are 
negotiations  in  which  we (as  policy  practitioners)  have both  an  institutional  and a 
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personal  stake.  The  importance  of  presenting  this  as  a  struggle  between  parts  of 
government is partly about demonstrating that the institution of which we form a part 
is capable of taking an ethical stance similar to that we might wish to have taken as  
individuals (see Chapter Seven). By 'ethical stance', I  do not mean to imply taking a 
moral high ground; rather, I am treating ethical practice as a weighing up of choices, 
reflecting on and making – perhaps impossible – decisions between finite goods (Mayo 
et al, 2007; Mouffe, 2000; Sayer, 2005).
While my assessment of Sam's narrative may have sounded somewhat cynical, in that 
the 'victory' over national policy in this case was rather limited, the negotiations over 
the importance of language, communication and conception of the PVE scheme did 
appear  to  have  some  effects.  This  was  the  result  of  concerns  expressed  by  local 
authorities across the country, not just in Hackney (House of Commons Communities 
and Local Government Committee, 2010). Alison, from her position between national 
and local government, reflected on these negotiations:
Alison: Somebody in CLG did actually say to me at one point, well if we let them 
call it community cohesion they'll hide behind [it] and they won't do anything 
about preventing violent extremism and I just think that's bollocks, I  don't  
think that's the case at all, I don't [think] the reason that authorities call it  
community cohesion locally is because they don't want to deal with PVE, I  
think it's because they're uncomfortable with the language, they know that it 
won't play well with local communities etc etc, so CLG have shifted and said 
you can call it what you like locally but you're still doing PVE.
Alison  was  of  the  opinion  that  PVE  work  did  need  to  be  tackled  separately  to 
community  cohesion,  to  deal  with  specific  issues  around  involvement  in  violent 
extremism.  But  here  she  expresses  some  sympathy  for  the  way  that  some  local 
authorities attempted to re-brand (or de-brand) PVE 'because they’re uncomfortable 
with the language,  they know it won’t play well with local communities'. She tries to 
promote  a  more  sophisticated  view  than  the  initial  CLG  official  she  quotes,  who 
thought  that  local  authorities  were simply  'hiding behind'  the community  cohesion 
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label. The solution that CLG eventually came to was that local authorities could tailor 
language as they wished, but must still take specific actions to counter extremism in 
the  name of  Islam.  Thus  Alison  presents  herself  as  between the  central  and  local 
government  sides  of  the  argument  (as  indeed  is  her  role)  and  as  even-handedly 
understanding their different perspectives. Yet she also emphasises the power of the 
centre: 'you're still doing PVE'.
There were some signs, towards the end of the period covered by this research, that 
the approach of national government to PVE shifted slightly.40 In a speech in October 
2009, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Shahid Malik indicated that Government 
had listened to local community concerns about the language of the programme, and 
that  they  would  now  refer  to  the  scheme  as  Prevent,  'removing  the  “violent 
extremism” label from funding' to help local communities contextualise the funding 
(Malik, 2009) (though what else were they 'preventing'?). Though Malik reiterated that 
the main focus of work should remain on 'the Al Qaeda influenced threat', a space was 
opened in the debate to consider other forms of terrorism and violent extremism. This 
echoed John Denham, Secretary of State for Communities’ speech a week earlier, in 
which he indicated that  right-wing racist  extremism would also become a focus of 
specific action by the CLG (Denham, 2009). How far this shift in political rhetoric was 
influenced  by  the  arguments  of  local  policy  practitioners,  or  by  other  political 
calculations, is unclear. 
Conclusions
This chapter has discussed problems in the conception, design, implementation and 
presentation of  the Preventing  Violent  Extremism programme,  by  focusing on how 
such problems were identified, described and negotiated by local policy practitioners in 
40  While these developments suggest a broadening of the approach, a significant review of the Prevent 
programme was announced by the coalition government in July 2010 (Travis, 2010). In 2011, they 
announced a greater focus on security and an end to the community development aspects of the 
Prevent programme (HM Government, 2011).
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Hackney. In doing so, I  have discussed the different perspectives and priorities that  
policy practitioners have, depending on how they are located within structures and 
cultures of government and governing institutions. While I have made clear my own 
personal  views on the PVE programme, I  have also taken seriously the accounts of 
those  with  different  perspectives  on  the  programme  and  on  the  wider  role  of 
governing institutions. The central criticism of the national programme and the way it 
was handled and promoted locally by the police, was that it lacked sensitivity to local  
populations or understanding of how people and organisations react to, interpret and 
engage  with  policy  interventions.  To  engage  with  these  weaknesses  would  have 
required a great deal more time and detailed work, and this appeared to conflict with 
an urgency to be seen to be 'stopping the terrorists'. This weakness led to criticisms  
such as those I have engaged with at length here, about the impacts on people placed 
unfairly under suspicion. It also contributed to criticisms elsewhere that PVE and the 
wider  counter-terrorist  programme  were  counter-productive  because  they  were 
wasting  money  on  pointless  exercises  or  supporting  damaging  organisations  (e.g. 
Bright, 2006). The broader criticism – about the initial premises of the PVE scheme 
which imagined a problem (terrorism) whose causes and solutions could be found by 
interventions at the level of local extremists – was raised at various moments in this 
narrative,  but  in  the  end  was  silenced  by  the  search  for  more  pragmatic  ways  to 
negotiate this difficult subject, using vaguer language, less clear about this bypassing of 
causes of terrorism or extremism which might be found in more global structures of  
power.
While  I  have  particularly  criticised  the  police  and  security  services'  conceptions  of 
communities and the ways that populations should be managed and talked about, I do 
not  want  to  suggest  that  the  approach  more  common  among  local  government 
practitioners  (with  which  I  have  aligned  myself)  is  unproblematic.  What  surprised 
practitioners about  the PVE programme was not  the aim to collect  information on 
Muslims or the assumption that all Muslims were potential terrorists. Most of those I 
spoke with through the research had varying levels of awareness of institutional racism 
and its histories in both police and local and national government policies. This has 
often  involved  actions  which  victimise,  demonise,  or  otherwise  impact  on  some 
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racialised groups more than others. What was 'new' in PVE was that all of the guidance 
and monitoring of the scheme was explicitly targeted at one religious group. There was 
no attempt to hide this focus.
The local authority approach of incremental negotiation to try to meet the different 
sensitivities  of  different  constituencies  might  be  accused  of  masking,  rather  than 
dealing with, institutional  discrimination.  However,  direct challenge may not be the 
most effective means of change from within government, given that the attempt to 
challenge national  policy  directly  by creating a  different  local  approach was simply 
ignored. The tactics of negotiation, which allow for reinterpretation and flexibility of 
meaning, may be more effective means of subverting problematic policies.
We have also seen, in this chapter, how the meaning and purpose of local government 
is both treated as self-evident, and questioned by its juxtaposition with demands that 
don't fit a 'self-evident' role. The emphasis that local government practitioners put on 
relationships and negotiations may have been related to idealism about their role (as 
'left wing liberal types'), or equally about identifying what tools were available to them 
in governing. When silent power relations became articulated as baldly as they did by 
PVE  policy's  suspicion  of  an  entire  demographic  group,  discomfort  among  policy 
practitioners was palpable. In this case, this overt language and practice was quietly 
modified back to a more ambiguous framework relating to internal processes. Muslim 
extremists were still understood to be the primary focus of PVE, but more 'polite' ways 
were found to discuss this.
In this chapter I have paid a great deal of attention to the nuances of reflection among 
local policy practitioners, and have tended to treat 'central government', and to some 
extent  'the  police'  as  monolithic,  homogeneous  entities.  They  are  also,  of  course, 
internally  variegated  organisations  with  disagreements,  internal  conflicts,  different 
objectives,  competing  priorities  and  ongoing  negotiations. The  research  I  have 
conducted,  being  situated  within  local  government  looking  outwards  at  national 
structures, provides less detail on the variegation in national government priorities and 
negotiations.  This  is  in itself  is  important;  even when recognising complexity,  more 
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distant structures or ideas need to be simplified for the sake of understanding (see also 
the reflections on ideas of place in Chapters 5 and 6). While in this chapter I  have 
concentrated on local negotiations of a specific policy that is aligned with community 
cohesion  policy,  in  the  next  chapter  I  will  go  on  to  discuss  understandings  of 
community cohesion within narratives of place and time in a single borough. In doing 
so,  I  take  a  step  away  from  my  personal  narrative  to  consider  more  fully  the 
representations of place and belonging attached to 'Hackney' in the practice of policy.
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Chapter Five: I Love Hackney/Keep It Crap
Introduction
In  this  chapter,  I  move  from  the  examination  of  how  a  specific  subject  of  policy 
(preventing  violent  extremism)  was  negotiated  in  a  particular  place  (Hackney),  to 
consider  how the  subject  of  'Hackney'  itself  is  articulated  in  policy  narratives  and 
negotiations.  A  sense  of  place  and  shared  belonging  have  been  incorporated  into 
considerations of community cohesion policy partly as a way of trying to negotiate 
more difficult  subjects of difference by imagining a neutral,  shared,  neighbourhood 
space. But this chapter demonstrates a set of competing claims about the meaning of a 
place – and about authenticity, narrative, histories, futures, power, class and identity. 
These debates suggest that far from providing a neutral ground for a simple shared 
coherence,  places  exist  as  both  shared  and  contested  meanings,  grounded  in  and 
experienced through competing narratives in emotional registers.
 
This chapter explores a set of overlapping narratives about the meaning of a place – 
Hackney – and who is included or gets to speak for its local 'community'. Each narrative 
appeals to emotive associations with symbols of authenticity including claims to be 
marginalised or to understand marginalisation through identification with Hackney. I 
consider how the resonances of the local authority's branding strategies for Hackney 
re-appropriated  meanings  and  associations,  and  how  others  re-interpreted  and 
subverted that Hackney brand. As I am looking specifically at meanings within policy 
practice, the voices of 'people on the street' are largely silent in this discussion. Though 
community  consultation  is  required  by  national  regulations  to  form  part  of  local 
authority narrative construction, this does not necessarily mean that such street-level 
voices  are  heard  directly  in  policy-making,  or  indeed that  if  they  were  heard  they 
would  be  as  progressive  as  the  people  I  interviewed  sometimes  imagined  (Keith, 
2005:153). These 'real people' are, however, frequently spoken for. Policy practitioners 
often presented their narratives of Hackney as being those of authentic residents, and 
as counter-claims against the perceptions of outsiders, or against other vocal image-
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makers. The power of 'celebrity' critics was a particular preoccupation of many of the 
policy practitioners with whom I spoke, and two names in particular kept coming up. 
Michael Rosen and Iain Sinclair are both local residents, writers and public figures, and 
have both been involved in public arguments with the local authority over regeneration 
and change in the borough. Because of the significance these two figures appeared to 
have gained in local policy negotiations and narratives of place, I chose to interview 
them both, and to use the resulting data in this chapter. Though neither Sinclair or 
Rosen are 'policy practitioners', their interventions have become part of the narrative 
of  place used by policy practitioners and I  wanted to give them an opportunity  to 
reflect  on  these  entanglements  in  the  same way as  the  others  whose  narratives  I 
consider here.41
For many of my interviewees, Rosen and Sinclair had come to symbolise a particular 
form of middle class gentrification. The relationship of middle class gentrifiers to the 
places they inhabit in the inner city (and specifically in Hackney) has been discussed at 
length elsewhere (e.g. Butler, 1997; Butler and Robson, 2003; May, 1996; Reay, 2008; 
Reay et al,  2007; Savage et al,  2005).42 Very often, there is a conclusion that many 
middle class inhabitants of poor and ethnically diverse areas enjoy living there because 
they can choose to opt in and out of the excitement of multicultural inner city life. That  
is, they are able to claim an affinity with what they perceive as 'exotic' or 'different', 
and  thereby  increase  their  cultural  capital  (knowledge  of  others,  superiority  over 
suburban 'normality')  while  remaining able  (by  virtue of  their  economic  capital)  to 
retreat into more privileged and safer environments (Bourdieu, 1986; Skeggs, 2004). 
My discussion in this chapter does not necessarily undermine that assessment, but I  
add to it in two ways. Firstly, the negotiations over the meaning of Hackney are not 
separate from sociological analysis. They might be understood as 'public sociology' as 
outlined  in  Chapter  One,  where  sociological  imaginations  are  applied  outside  the 
41 Because Rosen and Sinclair were both interviewed as public figures, it would have been absurd to 
attempt to anonymise their comments in the way I have the other interview data. They both agreed 
that their comments be attributed.
42 The policy practitioners I interviewed were, by definition, middle class themselves, and many resided 
in  inner  London  –  and  I  will  explore  in  more  detail  how  they  negotiated  their  own  personal 
implication in local processes of change in Chapter Seven.
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academic arena, and research participants are able to draw on sociological resources to 
negotiate their own place within government. For example, criticisms of the council's 
policies and place-marketing often draw on arguments about appeals to private capital 
and neglect of communities which can be found in gentrification literature; and policy 
practitioners in turn accuse their opponents of exoticising poor and ethnic 'others' for 
their own benefit. 
Secondly,  many  interviewees  refer  to  a  group  of  gentrifiers  who  are  against  (a 
particular type of) gentrification, and who are trying to protect a nostalgic past which 
maintains some of the difficulties of living in Hackney which made their own journey so 
'pioneering' – and also exclusive (and therefore provided profoundly greater cultural  
capital).  What  is  interesting  is  that,  like  'the  community',  for  the  most  part  such 
unreflexive gentrifiers are always absent. Though of course the purpose of my research 
design was not to seek them out, it is notable that such views are always  attributed, 
but never admitted. Instead, all of those participants I encountered discussed how to 
some extent they were implicated in and personally benefited from gentrification in 
the  borough,  but  also  wanted  to  highlight  their  motivations  and  why  their  own 
nuanced position was different, and superior, to that they perceived others to hold. 
This self-positioning in relation to an (imagined) outside resonates with the tendency 
(to be explored in Chapter Six) of many research participants to define their own sense 
of  place  (or  achievement  of  community  cohesion)  in  relation  to  perceived  failings 
elsewhere.
I begin the chapter by providing a flavour of the mythologies of Hackney that circulate 
in policy and public discussions, through a 'collage' of artefacts representing Hackney in 
different ways. By juxtaposing some of the competing but inter-related representations 
of  the borough,  and then discussing their  positionings,  I  do not claim to provide a 
definitive description of the place, but to provide a guide to the narratives and issues 
that constitute Hackney, and their various connections to different forms of empirical 
fact and experience. 
Having set the scene, I introduce the 'I Love Hackney' branding campaign, and consider 
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how its local resonances appear to have gone beyond a simple adaptation of the 'I Love 
X' formula copied from New York by so many localities and other brands. One much-
discussed aspect of this in my research interviews was the multiplicities of 'Hackneys' 
people might love, and the various claims to what might be the 'real' Hackney. I discuss 
this  in  relation  to  public  arguments  over  the  right  to  speak  for  Hackney,  its  past, 
present and future, and the ensuing 'Keep It Crap' publicity campaign which accused 
the 'I Love Hackney' campaign of 'gentrification' against authentic local wishes (a claim 
hotly disputed by many of my interviewees).
I  probe these  local  public  disputes  further  by  considering  the  directly  oppositional 
stances taken by local authority policy practitioners, and some of the more outspoken 
local opponents of gentrification. It seemed at times that there was no point at which 
the  two  groups  would  agree  –  particularly  about  who  was  'really'  cynically 
appropriating  the  'authentic'  cultural  capital  of  the  area.  But  greater  attention  the 
discussions on both sides reveals similar discomforts and concerns about inequalities in 
access to public space, consumption and participation in public life shared between 
members of these two differently (politically) positioned groups. My data also suggests 
that both groups are well aware of their own implication in processes of change and 
exclusion. 
I then introduce this material to an analysis which draws on sociological thinking on 
branding, and through this I consider how place-myths and narratives follow the unruly 
paths  outlined  in  the  empirical  data.  I  suggest  that  these  negotiations  should  be 
understood  through  the  lens  of  cultural  capital  exchange,  where  the  branding  of 
Hackney makes it possible for different constituencies to profit in different ways from 
their association with Hackney's various connotations. As outlined in the earlier parts 
of the chapter, such machinations are often understood and described by participants, 
many of whom discuss their own role and position within this. I suggest that very often 
the different brandings and re-brandings of Hackney draw on mythologies situated in 
time.  Through  this  they  attempt  to  establish  a  nostalgic  authenticity  based  on 
community, sometimes looking to the past (as in a golden age of community, or in  
places which have failed to embrace multiculture), and at others to the future (as in 
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traditional certainties of community threatened by migration and new forms of rights, 
or in places where difference and fluidity is the comfortable norm). But I will begin by  
setting the scene, using a collage of textual images to address the question 'what is 
Hackney?'.
What is Hackney?
(1) Hackney is an inner London borough in the north east of the city, 18.98 square kilometres of  
land,43 3.3 square kilometres of green space,44 207,000 people, 86,042 households, 97,000 jobs,  
11,000 unemployed, 44% of  the population is  White British,  37.7% of  the population aged  
under 20 are dependent on someone on income support, 32.9% of the population aged 16-74  
have a degree or equivalent qualification, 29% of the same group have no qualifications, 12.9%  
of 18 year olds enter higher education, house prices rose 176.6% between 2000 and 2005,  
Hackney was the only inner London borough without a tube line until the East London Line  
extension opened in 2010, is one of the five London boroughs to host the 2012 Olympics, had  
an average crime rate higher than London as a whole by 10.2 per thousand population in 2003-
4, has an average life  expectancy more than a year shorter  than the London and national  
averages (LBH, 2006a). Hackney is consistently ranked among the top four most deprived areas  
in  the  country  (Noble  et  al,  2009).  78%  of  residents  agree  that  people  from  different  
backgrounds get along well in the area (Ipsos-MORI, 2009:39). 
(2) Hackney has enormous strength and great opportunities. We are in the centre of London,  
one  of  the  world’s  most  thriving  cities.  The  people  who live  here  have  come from many  
different ethnic backgrounds and brought cultural diversity and vitality to the borough. The  
population is young, so has real prospects to improve its life chances. The borough itself is, in  
many respects a good place to live, with busy vibrant areas, strong communities and attractive  
open spaces.
But many of the benefits of growing prosperity in the capital have not extended to us.  
While  other  parts  of  London experience pockets  of  deprivation,  every  ward  in  Hackney  is 
among the 10 percent most deprived wards nationally.
43 http://www.hackney.gov.uk/xp-factsandfigures-geography.htm   [last accessed 4th April 2010]
44 http://www.hackney.gov.uk/cp-community-parks.htm   [last accessed 4th April 2010]
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There are many problems facing us: poor skills and attainment levels, high mobility, a 
weak transport system, high levels of crime and poor environmental conditions. 
Increasingly  Hackney  is  also  experiencing  a  polarisation  of  its  community  between 
richer and poorer groups while those with moderate incomes choose, or are forced, to live  
elsewhere.  This  polarisation  can  only  harm  the  prospects  for  our  borough.  It  makes  it  
increasingly  difficult  for  people  to see pathways out of  poverty – to become economically 
active, successful and stay in the borough. It makes it more difficult to recruit to the jobs which 
are needed to service our community (LBH, 2006b:3).
(3) In the interview, Smith, the first woman home secretary, was asked whether she would feel  
safe walking on her own around Hackney at midnight. She replied: 'Well, no, but I don’t think  
I’d ever have done. You know, I would never have done that, at any point during my life' Asked  
why not, she answered: 'Well,  I  just don’t think that’s a thing that people do, is  it,  really?'  
(Oakeshott, 2008).
(4) Hackney is well known for being one of the most diverse areas in the country. It is a place 
where you can walk past Turkish supermarkets, Jamaican takeaways, fish and chip shops or 
Nigerian restaurants on one road. It is an area where mosques, synagogues and churches lie  
within five minutes of each other. Living in Hackney means having diversity at your fingertips...  
For me, Hackney is a microcosm of multicultural Britain and there are many lessons the rest of  
the country could learn from community relations here (Abbott, 2008).
(5) 'Ms Mop heroine sees off raiders: Raiders come unstuck in jewellery heist'
'11-year-old girl raped on her way to school: Police arrest 46-year-old man after attack on Well  
Street Common'
'Hitman,  15,  moaned  about  fee,  jury  told:  Youth  complained  he  only  got  £200  for  killing  
woman, court hears' 
'Gangland arms cache hidden in  graveyard:  Knives  and skewers  found after  routine  police  
sweep' 
(Hackney Gazette front page headlines, 3rd, 10th, 24th, 31st March 2011).
(6) Hackney east of Well Street Market is where you'll find genuine bona fide artists in genuine 
bona fide crumbling warehouses. See through the dour landscape of flyovers, lock-ups and lap-
dancing clubs, and you'll discover a neighbourhood of Somalian cafes and tasty Turkish grills, 
vast, atmospheric green spaces such as Victoria Park and Hackney Marshes, and a fierce local  
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community. And prospects: the Olympics site abuts  (Dyckhoff, 2008).
(7) So if you've got the Council, Hackney, worst performing - now not! But you know, when it  
was, Hackney probably needed to hear that at one time [laughs] (interview with Rob, senior  
local government officer in Hackney).
(8) Many people say I love Hackney but... you put an image in front of them and they wouldn't  
necessarily know [that it's in Hackney] (interview with Angela, senior local government officer 
in Hackney).
As this collage illustrates, there are many ways to describe Hackney. I have presented 
this selection of representations not to cancel one another out, but to demonstrate 
how these different experiences exist alongside, and are intertwined with, one another. 
As the wider thesis is about how policy practitioners negotiate difficult subjects in the 
process  of  governing,  I  am interested in  how these different  meanings  of  place  (a 
difficult subject) are negotiated in policy practice. I am not trying to expose a difference 
between an objective reality and representations of Hackney, nor do I want to argue 
for  an  extreme  relativism  in  which  all  images  of  a  place  are  equally  valid  (Keith,  
2005:72; Keith and Pile, 1993:6). I do, however, want to give a sense of the empirical 
place for the uninitiated. I also mean to highlight that the representations of place used 
in government are themselves multiple; that they claim authenticity through scientific 
measurement  or  to  local  intimacy;  and  that  they  are  used  strategically  both  to 
negotiate  policy  at  national  and  local  levels  and  to  make  sense  of  the  personal 
positions,  commitments  and  roles  of  individual  policy  practitioners  within  the 
institutions of governance.
As such, the opening paragraph of this section  (1)  is a representation of Hackney in 
which I present, through words and numbers, administratively important data derived 
from  numerous  sources  of  empirical  enquiry.  Like  all  of  the  sources,  it  could  be 
criticised  for  its  limited  ability  to  capture  reality,  either  from the  point  of  view of  
methodology, timeliness, missing of particular populations,45 missing of the point.  This 
45 See  London  Borough  of  Hackney,  2010,  which  includes  a  discussion  of  the  difficulties  of  data  
collection and updated, but still not definitive, population estimates.
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type of description is related to and co-existent with materiality, as are the various 
more literary,  emotional  or  experiential  descriptions  I  include below it.  Just  as  the 
material realities that these descriptions attempt to represent are important in how 
individuals and populations live and experience their lives, so are the narratives and 
emotions that attach to them. As artefacts of data they are important not only in how 
government prioritises  local  and national  interventions,  but  how populations  make 
choices about where to live, how to behave, and who to vote for. And, like all of the 
elements of this collage, this representation is a snapshot in time, and made from a  
particular vantage point, to meet a particular set of interests.
The extract that follows (2) is the local authority's attempt to condense this data into a 
narrative of place that encompasses both the difficulties and the positive attributes of 
Hackney. When working as a policy practitioner within Hackney, I became accustomed 
to  producing  such  narratives.  They  are  crafted  to  negotiate  a  precarious  position, 
presenting  the  borough  to  a  variety  of  audiences.  Such  narratives  must  be  both 
acceptable and recognisable to residents (who of course are a diverse lot themselves); 
and they must present Hackney as a place that is both attractive for outsiders, and 
deserving of support. To be overwhelmingly positive would not only belie the realities 
of  local  struggles,  but  would  potentially  put  at  risk  political  capital  for  national 
government support in addressing issues of deprivation, exclusion or poverty. To be 
overwhelmingly negative would again belie realities, and would alienate those with a 
deep attachment to Hackney. It also risks opening the local authority to the accusation 
that its stewardship of the area had been seriously lacking, and could put local private 
sector investment in jeopardy. 
The  next  artefact  (3) is  an  extract  from  a  newspaper  profile  of  the  then  Home 
Secretary, Jacqui Smith, in which she suggested that she would not feel safe alone at 
night in Hackney. It does not seem, from the context of the interview, that Hackney was 
under discussion in the rest of the interview. Rather, the journalist used it as shorthand 
for the unsafe inner city. When Smith suggests that it's not 'a thing that people do', 
'people' can be assumed to be those of a similar class, gender, age and perhaps ethnic 
background to herself. The potential political consequences of such a straightforward 
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yet  casual  equation  of  Hackney  with  danger  (and  'others'  who are  more  routinely 
exposed to such danger) is reinforced by a later episode in the same newspaper article:
Later an aide calls me fretting about these comments. The home secretary might 
have given the wrong impression and meant no slight to Hackney. In fact the boss 
went and bought a kebab on the mean streets of Peckham, southeast London, 
after dark the other day (Oakeshott, 2008).
Here,  as  well  as  highlighting  the  politician's  wish  to  avoid  causing  affront  to  an 
otherwise politically friendly local authority, the exchange makes it clear that Hackney 
was simply a metonym; not a place itself, but a stand-in for all those places that are  
avoided after midnight by those able to do so. This is reinforced by the retreat – that  
the minister was out in Peckham instead recently – where Peckham is equivalent to 
Hackney in its potential for crime and danger. In my interviews with policy practitioners 
in  Hackney  they  were  very  aware  of  the  negative  discourses  which  they  felt  still  
dominated views of Hackney from outside. One way of thinking about Hackney is as a  
place of crime, deprivation and squalor, the typical sense of the abject inner city. The 
feeling that this portrayal was something to fight against was strong in my research 
interviews, but finding explicit  examples of  such depictions is  not a straightforward 
task. The place has absorbed the connotations of the abject inner city to such an extent 
that it is unnecessary to spell this out in national discourse – a reference to Hackney in 
an article on knife crime, teenage pregnancy or street gangs, it seems, is sufficient to 
set the scene of danger, neglect or immorality. 
But this characterisation is followed, in my collage, by an extract from a column in the 
local  commercial  newspaper,  the  Hackney  Gazette,  written  by  the  Member  of 
Parliament for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (and Britain's first black woman 
MP),  Diane  Abbott  (4).  Entitled  'Multicultural  Marvel',  this  account  was  a  typical 
celebration of Hackney's welcoming, exciting (ethnic and religious) diversity – as typical  
as the more negative  Times piece quoted above it. These narratives are produced in 
conversation with one another. In Abbott's account, Hackney is proposed as standing 
not for  the dangerous inner city,  but as 'a microcosm of  multicultural  Britain'  from 
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which others should learn. This is Hackney as the multicultural ideal which as I argued 
in Chapter Three is one way various actors have tried to reposition Hackney in the 
wider geographic and political imaginary.
This ideal is  disrupted by the set of headlines  (5) taken from the front page of the 
Hackney Gazette (the same paper in which Abbott's regular column appears) during 
one month in 2011. These four headlines are shocking reports of violent crime in the 
area; the missing week's headline was an attack on the local  authority's (potential) 
profligacy at a time of public spending cuts. The consistency of this type of coverage in 
the Gazette, coverage which presents Hackney as violent, dangerous and corrupt, was 
the source of much concern and anger within the local authority when I worked there.  
These headlines were all unmissable on the front pages.46 However, they were usually 
accompanied by a smaller – and much more uplifting – picture story: for example, on 
10th March, the headline about the rape of a school-child was offset by 'Cabbie Ishmail 
helps deliver Chloe's baby in the back of his taxi'. The 'gangland arms cache' story on 
31st March was  published alongside a  large picture  of  a  young child  wearing  tiger  
facepaint, with the caption 'It's fun in the sunshine', reporting on a community event 
held by a housing association. The prioritisation of shocking news to sell papers was 
offset by the need for a good picture and the appeal of heart-warming stories, which 
can also evidently be found in Hackney.47
These  reports  of  crime and danger  are  interrupted by  an  extract  from a  property 
column in The Guardian's Weekend Magazine (6), in which Hackney Wick is considered 
as  a  home  relocation  destination  and  investment  opportunity.  Though  somewhat 
tongue-in-cheek with its references to 'genuine bona fide artists in genuine bona fide 
crumbling  warehouses',  this  is  also  a  typical  estate  agent  or  property  speculator's 
assessment  of  the  area.  The  'dour  landscape'  presents  an  opportunity  for  the 
discerning home-buyer/explorer to discover exotic foods and hidden parkland; and to 
make  money  from  the  'prospects'  of  the  Olympic  site.  Thus  this  column  neatly 
46 See www.hackneygazette.co.uk/home/e-edition.
47 The  3rd March story about a cleaner chasing away would-be jewel thieves managed to combine the 
elements of crime and humour (and a picture of an attractive young woman) in one story.
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encapsulates  the  potential  for  those  with  sufficient  (and  the  right  sort)  of  both 
economic and cultural capital to profit from investing in a part of the inner city with 
just the right amount of danger and exoticism – and civilisation.
The histories of Hackney Council's reputation as an irresponsible, incompetent, corrupt 
or 'loony left' institution in the 1980s and as poorly managed (financially, politically, 
and  in  terms  of  local  services)  in  the  1990s  (see  Chapter  Three) lie  behind  Rob's 
comment (7). He suggests that Hackney (in this case, the Council as institution, rather 
than the place itself) has had troubled histories, from which it has learnt and moved on 
('worst  performing – now not!').  Not  only  is  this  improvement celebrated,  but  the 
journey from 'worst' to 'well' performing48 is considered a heroic achievement in a way 
that it would not be in an organisation that had always been well run. Like the other 
elements of this collage, Rob's comments take on specific meanings when understood 
in relation to the other narratives.
Finally, Angela suggested (8) that while it is easy to elicit claims to 'love' Hackney, what 
'Hackney' actually means to people who love it can vary widely.  Angela was a senior 
local authority officer with responsibility for community development. She discussed in 
our  interview  how  she  had  grown  up  in  Hackney,  which  was  unusual  among  my 
interviewees although a large proportion of them now lived in the borough. Angela 
only brought this up, however, when the interview turned to a discussion of school 
experiences in Hackney – she did not draw more generally on her long attachment to 
the place as a marker of authenticity (see Chapter Seven). Instead, she demonstrated 
an awareness of how, as a middle class manager, her experience of Hackney was simply 
one among many others, situated within power relations, time and space:
Angela: It's a very stable borough in many, you know, on the surface but actually, 
you just go and stand in the market! [all laugh]... You know, as policy people  
we might not always stand in the market and if you're out at particular times 
of the evening you will pick up stuff that you don't pick up ordinarily. And it's  
48 Hackney Council was judged to be a well performing local authority by the national inspection body,  
the Audit Commission in 2008.
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those things are just below the surface, I think, that [we] need to look at how 
we manage. 
Angela  talks  about  experiences  'below  the  surface'.  Though  she  sees  real 
improvements in Hackney ('it's  a  very stable  borough'),  there  are  other places  not 
normally seen by her ('in the market') where the picture may be different. In doing so, 
she not only implies that multiple experiences of the place co-exist, and that her own 
experience may be incomplete. She also reinforces a sense of authenticity of her own 
account despite this multiplicity. By recognising experiences that differ to her own, her 
narrative is made to appear more balanced and grounded; and potential criticism that 
her  view  may  be  partial  seems  to  be  neutralised.  She  incorporates  alternative 
experiences,  in  order  to  assert  a  stable  vision  of  place.  It  is  an  uncomfortable 
negotiation, but perhaps necessary to negotiate the managing and governing of place. 
This collage has provided a selection of my primary data demonstrating a set of ideas 
and imaginings of Hackney. In Butler and Robson's (2003a) research with middle class 
residents  of  Hackney,  they found that  many of  their  interviewees identified with a 
'Hackney of the mind' (p177), which they suggest is connected to ideas of authenticity 
embedded  in  oppositional  working  class  histories  (see  also  Butler  and  Robson, 
2003b:1802). My data suggests there are rather more versions of this 'Hackney of the 
mind' than given credit by Butler and Robson. As Angela says, meanings of Hackney are 
shifting,  overlapping,  sometimes  contradictory.  They  exist  in  tension  with  and  rely 
upon one another. They have similar themes at their heart, but they approach these 
themes differently. 
There  is  also  a  wealth of  more detailed writing  on  the  borough,  ranging  between 
literary, journalistic and social scientific engagements; but here I am most interested in 
how the borough is understood and the idea of it is managed in policy worlds. While 
my discussion will suggest that these various policy-oriented 'Hackneys of the mind' do 
interact with the other uses and imaginings of Hackney that circulate in popular culture 
and  social  science,  it  is  not  part  of  this  project  to  catalogue  such  reinventions 
comprehensively here, or to judge them as more or less accurate accounts. Instead, I  
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suggest  that  these  debates  are  not really  about  establishing  the  truth  of  either  a 
symbolic or empirical meaning. As Trouillot (1995) demonstrates, history is not only 
about  process  or  events,  but  also  about  the  ways  those  events  are  remembered 
through narrative. In his example, the history of the Haitian revolution has been partly 
erased, partly made banal, as 
apologists  and  detractors  alike,  abolitionists  and  avowed  racists,  liberal 
intellectuals, economists, and slave owners used the events of Saint-Domingue to 
make their case, without regard to Haitian history as such. Haiti mattered to all of  
them, but only as pretext to talk about something else (Trouillot, 1995:97). 
In a more local example, Michael Keith notes how in 1980s Brixton the term 'Front 
Line' became 'an organising theme of completely contradictory rationalisations' of local 
conflict (Keith, 2005:71). Similarly in Hackney, the idea of the place itself – its 'brand' – 
becomes an organising theme of contradictory rationalisations of urban change. This 
was demonstrated clearly through explicit conflicts about the control of meaning and 
brand related to the 'I Love Hackney' publicity campaign.
I Love Hackney/Keep it Crap
Laura: What do the people that at the end of the day have phenomenal power in 
the policy making field... really think of Hackney? Have they actually been 
here?... we won't crack all of that, but because Hackney has such a dramatic, 
burning past, particularly I'm talking about the Council now. You know, that is 
just burnt so deeply... I've never before seen a brand that'd burn flesh, and 
you can still see the steam rising.
Hannah: It's a funny brand though, isn't it, because it is a name that you hear of, 
that they don't know Haringey, or Southwark, it's a name that people know.
Laura:  No, I mean when I was moving down here I actually asked...  a really bright 
bloke  both  in  terms  of  regeneration  and  destination  marketing,  visitor 
economy kind of stuff, but also place shaping...  Hackney, he said, whoah, 
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that you can do stuff with that, that's a brand you can do stuff with.
Hannah:  Yeah.
Laura:  But you do feel that there literally is something about the absolute origin 
of  brand  and  the  cattle  stamp...  Hackney,  oh  yes,  Hackney  has  a  brand. 
People know that, people have heard of Hackney. And that's fabulous, there 
is  a  gut  reaction  and  an  instinct,  and  all  sorts  of  emotional  stuff  about 
Hackney.
Hannah:  Yeah.
Laura:  And my only quibble with it is, is it accurate? And is it about the future, or 
is it about the past? And I think it's much much much more about the future,  
now, actually. And I think the Olympics is a massive driver in that.
Laura was a senior officer whose work was partly related to a publicity campaign of 
recent years based around the slogan 'I Love Hackney'. This began with an exhibition at 
Hackney Museum drawing on locals' memories of the borough, and indeed drawing 
together multiple narratives of place. A striking aspect of the exhibition was the use of 
a logo based on the 'I Love NY' iconography,49 replacing Hackney in the motif, and later 
available on badges, mugs, sweatshirts, bags and other items. The publicity campaign 
was turned into a larger drive for civic pride, and relaunched in response to the naming 
of the borough as the UK's 'worst place to live' by a Channel Four property programme 
in 2006 (another example of the creative tension between the promotion of positive 
and negative  images of  the  borough).  This  campaign  was  very  popular,  inside  and 
outside Hackney – although perhaps with only certain people. When wearing my I Love 
Hackney badge, people asked me (elsewhere in London) if I'd ever been there. Other 
people have reported seeing them worn in Brighton and Oxford, by middle class exiles 
of Hackney. 
The  logo  was  thus  worn  as  a  fashion  item,  while  also  used as  a  more  traditional  
municipal message, on posters promoting falling crime rates and encouraging recycling, 
and as the theme for a local photography competition celebrating the borough and 
what people loved about it. The campaign's crossover appeal seemed to lie with its 
49 Which was itself an incredibly successful re-branding of associations of danger and desire (Kidd and 
Glaser, 2003), and has been copied widely across the USA and beyond.
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ironic appeal to something exclusive, edgy and a little bit dangerous, quite the opposite 
of the municipal campaign to show Hackney as an orderly and safe place to live.50
In the interview extract above, Laura is grappling with the Hackney brand as it relates 
to national policy makers, rather than residents. Her concern is largely with existing 
ideas about the place, and the Council, its 'dramatic, burning past'. The power of the 
place's reputation is described vividly ('burning', 'burn flesh', 'steam rising', 'the cattle 
stamp'). Laura explicitly ties this to an affective, embodied impact, 'a gut reaction and 
an instinct,  and all  sorts of emotional  stuff about Hackney'.  Initially concerned that 
national  policy  makers  may  have  a  negative,  out-dated  or  inaccurate  view  of  the 
borough,  Laura's  speech  quickly  turned  to  excitement  about  the  potential  for 
developing the message, the brand. When she questions whether the emotion that is 
drawn on by the Hackney brand is 'accurate', and begins to talk about turning to the 
the future rather than the past, Laura is describing the move that she and others have 
made for the local authority with the re-branding of Hackney. By taking gut reaction 
and emotional draw that Hackney has, connected with the fear and desire of the inner 
city, and harnessing it to 'the future' as symbolised by the Olympics, regeneration, and 
the  'vibrancy'  that  is  so  often invoked in  the  positive  profiles  of  the  borough,  the 
statement 'I Love Hackney' uses the edginess of Hackney's prior associations to evoke 
much stronger affective ties than might come from a simple narrative of improving 
public services. As Laura elaborates:
Laura: There's something about defiance...  I  think the 'I  Love Hackney' thing is  
about – 'I know that you think that this is a dreadful place but believe me it's 
not and I love it, so there'. 
Laura's view was that by aligning themselves with Hackney, residents and others found 
common cause and a sense of community, in opposition to those who did not know or 
love the place in the same way. In the formulation she describes, people express pride 
50 A more bizarre inflection of this, to which I referred in Chapter Three, was the unauthorised use not 
of the 'I Love Hackney' logo, but of the logo representing the London Borough of Hackney as a local 
authority, on a range of basketball shirts sold worldwide by the global sportswear company Nike – for  
which the local authority won damages (see LBH, 2006c; Tran, 2006).
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and defiance through their claims to love Hackney, which may or may not relate to a 
reformulation of what the place is like.  That is to say, loving Hackney in defiance may 
be about accepting and defending the aspects of it that others see as 'dreadful',  or  
about suggesting that these 'dreadful' traits are not the true Hackney. Which of these it 
is that Laura thinks is taking place is unclear, and indeed it is probably both. Either way, 
she sees this emotional power as an important device for the local authority.
While the local authority and other agencies of governance (the London Development 
Agency, the Olympic Delivery Authority, Visit London tourist authority) have packaged 
'edginess' as an attraction for  residents, business investment and tourists, there is a  
vocal group of residents (writers, poets, artists, political activists and others) making 
their own claims to speak for the authentic place and to champion this 'edge' in a 
different way. Part of the defensive struggle for the authentic claim to love Hackney has 
been a tendency among some elected politicians and local officers to label as the 'Keep 
Hackney Crap Brigade' those who term the Council's regeneration as gentrification (or, 
occasionally,  'gentricide'  or  'regenocide'),  as  in  this  interview  with  Joe,  a  senior 
politician in the borough:
Joe:  There's  a  great  mentality  across  all  of  Hackney by  a load of  our  political 
opponents, of actually bizarrely now, right and left, that you know, want to 
keep Hackney crap, I mean Iain Sinclair, absolutely preposterous, he actually 
lives  in  Albion Square,  sitting  in  Albion Square,  saying  Hackney had been 
ruined, it wasn't the kind of edgy place he moved to thirty years ago, look at  
all these flats springing up, it's like, alright, so you get to live in Albion Square,  
and the rest of us, and everyone else in  Hackney, we should just keep it as 
nasty as possible so you get to feel really cool about it and write some edgy 
articles for the Guardian? Absolute bollocks. And offensive as well. 
This interview extract makes clear Joe's sense that he and his colleagues have been 
striving to improve life for people in Hackney, and that their intentions, efforts and 
achievements are not recognised. His anger is perhaps born of frustration at the lack of  
recognition – that the narrative of Hackney as 'crap' persists, as well as that the fact 
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that the changes it is undergoing now might not be seen as positive. He also stakes a 
claim to authenticity ('the rest of us, everyone else in Hackney') to counter the the 
critics' attempts to speak for the spirit of the place. 
In 2009, such sentiments were expressed more publicly in comments by the elected 
Mayor of Hackney, Jules Pipe, published with his permission on the Guardian journalist 
Dave Hill's blog about the borough. Pipe's comments were in response to a newspaper 
article written by the local poet and political activist (and former children's laureate) 
Michael Rosen, who had criticised the nature of the regeneration of the Dalston area of 
the  borough,  and  the  local  authority's  role  in  it.  Rosen's  piece  was  subtitled 
'Regeneration has become a byword for New Labour’s disregard for democracy and 
slavish devotion to business' (Rosen, 2008a). Pipe countered that Rosen's 'ill-informed 
stance  against  the  Dalston  development  is  just  the  latest  example  of  the  “Keep 
Hackney Crap” mentality so beloved of the borough’s far left contingent' (quoted in 
Hill, 2008). In this exchange, the argument was much more clearly about the question 
of  political  and economic choices about 'how best to bring prosperity  to inner-city 
neighbourhoods', as Hill pointed out (Hill, 2008). Yet the rhetorical power of affective 
language, and in particular the label 'Keep Hackney Crap', was unleashed as another 
way of confronting these debates through the lens of attachment and devotion, as well 
as through the oppositional framing of nostalgia and progress.
Not long after Pipe's intervention, the iconic 'I Love Hackney' badges became parodied 
by the independent production of badges bearing the slogan 'Keep Hackney Crap'. Tony 
Collins, a spokesman for The Eel artists' collective producing them suggested that  
The Eel likes  to  celebrate  that  which is  forgotten and marginalised.  The ‘Keep 
Hackney Crap’ campaign is about retaining the things which genuinely make an 
area unique and loved (quoted in Davies, 2009). 
In the same interview, Collins accused Pipe of believing that 'what is currently there is 
not worth keeping', and countered this with his own statement that 'one person's crap 
is another person's gold'. In one sense then, this was an echo of the municipal defiance 
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inherent in the 'I  Love Hackney'  campaign,  or at  least Laura's  characterisation of  it 
recounted earlier ('I know that you think that this is a dreadful place but believe me it's 
not and I love it, so there'). It is also a struggle over what it means to 'love' Hackney – 
keeping an affection for the 'crap', or wanting to improve and change the place in some 
way.
Though the Mayor suggested the prevalence of the 'far left' in this type of nostalgia, 
Joe suggested in the earlier interview excerpt that this type of nostalgia comes from 
political  opponents of the local  Labour party on the right as well as the left of the  
political spectrum. Indeed The Eel's badge campaign was promoted on the website of 
Andrew  Boff,  then  prospective  Conservative  Mayoral  candidate  for  Hackney,  who 
ended his piece noting the campaign with the rhetorical question, 'Isn’t it time we had 
a Mayor who loved Hackney?'.51 Pipe's accusation that the 'Keep Hackney Crap Brigade' 
do not love Hackney enough to improve it is turned on him, to suggest that his desire 
for change shows a lack of love for Hackney (notwithstanding that Boff's own website is 
called changehackney.com). 
These public debates quickly become oppositional and simplifying. But in the interview 
situation, my research created a space in which policy practitioners were able to reflect 
in  more  nuanced  ways  on  how  to  negotiate  shared  (or  contested)  narratives  of 
Hackney. As these debates emerged, I expanded that space to include the two figures 
who had become emblematic of a particular aspect of these arguments, to explore 
whether there actually was any shared ground within these negotiations.
'Improving for whom?'
Two writers and Hackney residents, Michael Rosen and Iain Sinclair, were frequently 
identified by policy practitioners as totems of the campaign to 'Keep Hackney Crap' (as 
we have already seen). Though often mentioned in the same breath by local policy 
51 See http://changehackney.com/?p=148 [last accessed 2nd April 2010]
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practitioners, and both long-time residents of the borough and well-known figures, the 
two have rather  different  positions  in  the struggles  over  meaning  in  Hackney.  Iain 
Sinclair's  writing  about  Hackney  is  part  of  his  broader  body  of  literary 
psychogeographical work, much of which focuses on London. Though he often speaks 
at local cultural events which are sometimes critical of the council, the position he has 
carved out for himself is as a cultural observer, rather than a political activist. Michael 
Rosen, on the other hand, has long been active within left-wing politics. The article 
which embroiled him in the argument with Mayor Pipe outlined above was published 
in Socialist Worker, and he has produced artistic as well as journalist work on political 
themes and particularly criticising regeneration projects like the model seen in Dalston 
(e.g.  Rosen,  2008b).  Though  not  policy  practitioners  themselves,  through  their 
entanglements with local  debates about  place and community,  the two writers did 
seem  to  be  influencing  the  practices  of  governing  the  borough.  For  this  reason,  I 
decided to interview them both. This would allow them to reflect on these processes 
as I had allowed the policy practitioners within and outside the local authority to do,  
rather than relying on published artefacts for my analysis.
Those working in senior roles in the local public sector were well aware of criticisms 
that their efforts to improve conditions in the local area were aimed at, or resulted in, a 
simple displacement of poorer residents by wealthier gentrifiers. The dilemmas of how 
to improve local quality of life without thereby becoming subject to market processes 
that  produce  this  demographic  change  led  to  evident  frustration  for  many.  Local 
politician Sam argued that those against change were trying to preserve some form of 
genteel urban chaos for themselves:
Sam: But there is this body of people in the borough who say 'Oh no no! You 
should leave it as it is', the whole sodding Iain Sinclair nonsense and to my 
mind it's... deprivation fetishism...
Here  Sam  refers  to  the  elegiacal  tone  of  Iain  Sinclair's  writing  on  Hackney  and 
particularly around changes being made to the Olympic site (e.g. Sinclair, 2008b and 
2009). He might be thinking of statements like the following:
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There is no sense of regeneration here. Thank god. Not yet. Business as usual.  
Cornershop steel-shuttered like Belfast and bristling with handwritten warnings to 
schoolkids. Hooded chemical brokers start young. And finish young too, many of 
them (Sinclair, 2009:9).
The passion in the narratives of Sinclair and others who claim to be voices of otherwise 
unheard Hackneys can be taken as nostalgia for a place of dirt and poverty, expressed 
as an angry polemic against those who would regenerate and clear up the place. The 
sigh of relief at 'no sense of regeneration here' may refer to some kind of distaste for a 
cleaning-up seen as  antiseptic  and inauthentic;  but  coupling  this  with an apparent 
celebration of the 'bristling', 'steel-shuttered' scene of young drug dealers heading for 
an  early  grave  undermines  this  romanticism  (similarly  the  drawing  on  another 
mythology of place, a conflict-hardened and depressed image of Belfast). This is the 
reading of many council officers and councillors like Joe and Sam, who feel that Sinclair  
and other critics are sitting pretty in the 'nicer' parts of Hackney, wanting to preserve 
the picturesque poverty elsewhere for their own inspiration, without caring about the 
people who live in the majority of the borough.
A particular row erupted when an invitation for Iain Sinclair to give a pre-publication 
reading  of  his  2009  book  dedicated  to  Hackney  in  a  Hackney  pubic  library  was 
withdrawn. This of course resulted in an eye-catching hook for his book's publicity (see 
Sinclair, 2008a). The general tenor of the book (which the local authority had not seen 
when the invitation was withdrawn) is, like much of his other writing, a self-professed 
love  for  the  borough  in  which  he  has  lived  for  40  years.  But  this  is  an  affection  
tempered with nostalgia, and a distrust of the organisations that govern the borough 
and the changes in its life and infrastructure (particularly linked to the 2012 Olympic 
developments). When I interviewed him, I asked Iain Sinclair for his perspective on the 
way that the 'banning' of his book launch had created publicity for the book itself:
Iain: From my point of view, all of that was absolutely wonderful... what was in a 
sense a very Old Hackney event... a very small, twenty people in the library 
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kind  of  [thing]...  that  would  have  been  invisible  and  under  the  radar  is 
suddenly big and it helps to sell an enormous quantity of books, in a way I 
couldn't have invented if I'd tried to do something myself [both laugh]... It  
was an act of branding to have actually got Hackney into the title of the book  
and  a  map on  the  cover,  meant  that  it  became a  branded artefact  of  a 
particular kind of argument which it wasn't even necessarily making, because 
a  lot  of  it  was  just  to  do  with  uncovering  and  celebrating  and  testing 
mythology of the past.
Sinclair  points  out  that  the  clash  with  the  local  authority  was  unplanned;  he  had 
expected an 'Old Hackney event', of interest only to local history enthusiasts, and yet 
the local authority's clumsy attempt to avoid being associated with negative publicity 
for the Olympics had resulted in a national news story. In our conversation, as in much 
of his writing on the subject, Sinclair places his concern with 'mythology of the past' in 
opposition to the workings  of  government,  and of  the future  as  imagined through 
regeneration such as that linked to the 2012 Olympic Games. And here he draws on 
two  types  of  mythology:  that  which  he  is  most  interested  in  'uncovering  and 
celebrating', a nostalgic psychogeography based around Hackney's histories (see also 
Bonnett, 2009); and that of branding, which made his book, through its associations 
with Hackney (and its controversies) alone, an 'artefact of a particular kind of argument 
that  I  wasn't  even  necessarily  making'.  This  'particular  kind  of  argument'  is,  
presumably, the anti-regeneration and anti-gentrification position which many officers 
and members of  the local  authority  attributed to him. Here,  he is  arguing that  his 
position  is  simply  that  of  a  cultural  commentator  exploring  mythologies  and  their 
articulations in the present.
 
In  Sinclair’s  dreams  of  Hackney,  the  ‘unnoticed  and  unrequired  ruin[s]’  should  be 
cherished (Sinclair,  2008b). For him, their renovation is a tragedy, profit  conquering 
aesthetics, with Olympic legacy-building as a driving force. Though he might argue that 
he is  defending  creativity  and urban energy,  it  is  easy to respond that  this  is  self-
indulgent  in  comparison  with  meeting  pressing  needs  for  affordable  housing  and 
decent  services.  But  while  mourning  the  loss  of  'every  previously  unnoticed  and 
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unrequired ruin', he also recognises that some of the work of turning them 'to profit' 
has been done by the 'impoverished artists and free-livers' themselves:
We have waved this disaster through, we have colluded: dozens of artists roam 
the perimeter fence soliciting Arts Council funding to underwrite their protests.  
It’s so awful, such a visible horror, we can’t believe our luck (Sinclair, 2008b). 
While  Sinclair  is  nostalgic  for  the  waste  and ruin  of  a  haunted landscape,  he  also 
recognises that this nostalgia is his subject, and that as it becomes built upon and over-
written, the material for his own writing expands. Further, the artists 'protesting' this 
'horror' seek and find support for their work on it from the public sector in the form of 
Arts Council funding. The faceless state at once destroys and preserves the landscape; 
the protesting artists at once protest and profit from this change. Both are implicated 
in patterns  of  regeneration and the gains and losses it  can bring,  and capitalise  in 
different ways on its ironies.
 
As an author, Iain Sinclair's main concern is much different from that of local authority 
officers,  politicians,  or  other  policy  practitioners.  He  made  this  much  clear  in  the 
interview, when I asked 'how would you do it differently?' and he replied 'You see I 
wouldn't...  if  I  responded to that then I'm actually putting myself  up to be on the 
Council!'. He added that the local Liberal Democrats had asked him to stand as their 
candidate  at  the  2008  mayoral  election  in  Hackney  ('they  said...  would  you stand, 
because we saw you got all this publicity with this book and it doesn't really matter  
what your political beliefs are'), but he had declined ('I do see this as a real job! It's not  
just something you do because you can generate some publicity'). This suggests that 
Sinclair's view of himself is definitively not as a policy practitioner, nor would he choose 
to  be  one.  Nonetheless,  he  and  his  work  have  become  embroiled  in  political 
negotiations,  and  one  reason  for  this  is  that  brand  and  narratives  of  place  leach 
between municipal campaigns, political movements, cultural artefacts and commercial 
development; as, perhaps more deliberately, have Michael Rosen's interventions.
Some months after the 'I Love Hackney' campaign was established, the re-opening of 
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Gillett Square52 in the Dalston area of Hackney as a renovated urban space was greeted 
by the elected Mayors of London and Hackney, 200 saxophonists, and an audience for 
an afternoon of celebratory music and dance. It also attracted a group of protesters 
with  signs  declaiming  the  ‘gentricide’  or  ‘regenocide’  they  felt  the  new  space 
represented, with its re-paved square and ban on public drinking. Their view was that 
the square's renovation was a privatisation of public space and another stage in the 
transfer of wealth and power from poor to rich, and in this process a neutering of some 
form of authentic Hackney-ness (Ben, 2006).
One response to this view came from Sam, a senior elected politician in the borough, 
when I asked his views about the effect of rising property prices on Hackney's diversity:
Sam: I don't think it's a gentrification that's pushing out the local working class  
people... but some of these things with Gillett Square or whatever... push out 
the grottier element, you know. There was the street drinking that used to go 
on  there,  and...  people  that  are  there  now...  want  that  moved  on, 
understandably.
Sam’s  response  seems  to  confirm  suspicions  of  anti-regeneration(/gentrification) 
protesters that the intentions behind Gillett Square and other developments were to 
move on ‘the grottier element’, here referring to street drinkers, from public space. But 
Sam distinguishes this ‘element’ from ‘local  working class people’,  who are seen as 
regaining access to the urban environment by removing a threatening presence. The 
protest at the opening of Gillett Square was recalled by several council  officers and 
elected members as typical  of  privileged gentrifiers wanting to preserve a sense of 
urban grittiness, at the expense of those without the cultural and economic capital to 
insulate  them from its  ill-effects.  More than one council  officer  described to me a 
group of teenagers telling the protesters that they (the teenagers) were glad that the 
place was now ‘safer, more well-lit’. 
52 There is no room to go into the complicated history of this development here but see (Hart, 2003) for  
one insider's account.
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Gillett Square is in Dalston, the area of Hackney where poet Michael Rosen lives, and 
one undergoing rapid change associated in particular with the arrival of a new link to 
the Tube system, the opening of new cultural and entertainment venues and large-
scale housing developments. Michael Rosen has been outspoken about these changes, 
the subject of his public spat with Mayor Pipe outlined above, and with comments 
published in Time Out:
A demographic dream grew in the heart of the large white building: they could 
change the way Hackney is… families out, young professionals in. Migrants’ shops 
out, chain stores in. Blink and you’ll miss the rising of another block of loft-style 
apartments… Manhattan… studio… modern living etc…... A train linking Hackney 
to Croydon is on its way, reminding us that the great white building will preside 
over the Croydonisation of Dalston and no one really knows what the Olympics 
will bring (Rosen, 2007).
Here  Rosen  suggests  a  sinister  Town  Hall  dream  of  the  displacement  of  the 
authentically local ('families', 'migrants' shops') by the blank face of economic capital 
('young professionals', 'chain stores'). His reference to the 'large white building' carries 
echoes of Iain Sinclair's characterisation of Hackney Town Hall as a removed, colonial  
and quasi-fascist building (Sinclair, 2009:24). Rosen notes the opening of new London 
Overground stations  in  Hackney,  including  a  new station  in  Dalston,  fearful  of  the 
'Croydonisation'53 of what was once the Hackney spirit, ushered in by preparations for 
the 2012 Olympics,  which stand here for  an uncertain and threatening future.  The 
over-riding tone is a mistrust of the local state and of a model of regeneration which 
relies on global, homogenising capital which will 'change the way Hackney is'.
In light of such writings, many councillors I interviewed treated Michael Rosen as a 
symbol of those standing for a nostalgic, preservationist attitude, wanting to keep a 
picturesque idea of ramshackle Hackney for themselves. But when I interviewed him, 
53 For more on the treatment of the outer London suburb of Croydon as an abject elsewhere to the 
vibrant  inner  city,  see  Back  (2001).  The  use  of  Manhattan  and  Croydon as  adjacent  symbols  of 
soulless capitalism (and as contrasting symbols to 'the way Hackney is') deserves further exploration 
than is possible here.
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he criticised such views in very similar terms to them:
Michael: I think people think that they discovered Hackney in 1975 or something 
and then are really quite cross that people who look like them and sound like 
them and the same educational background or whatever, have turned up. 
But no, I don't have that attitude. I don't think that's THE problem.
Here, Rosen alludes to the 'pioneer' gentrifiers who valued Hackney for what they felt  
to  be  its  exotic  edge,  some  of  whom  are  now  characterised  as  the  most  vocal 
opposition to later stages of urban renewal. As more people 'who look like them and 
sound like them' gain access to Hackney's inner London exoticism, it undermines the 
rarity  and  value  of  the  cultural  capital  they  have  amassed  through  an  exclusive 
association  with  the  place.  Rosen  acknowledges  that  these  attitudes  exist,  but 
distances  himself  from  them  (again,  they  are  the  absent  others  who  define  the 
speaker's  position  as  an  authentic  Hackney  resident).  For  him,  such  people  are 
something  of  a  side-show;  'THE  problem'  is  the  way  in  which  urban  change  is 
progressing within a neoliberal capitalist framework.
Though Rosen has pushed for a greater attention to the preservation of older urban 
environments  in  Dalston  in  particular,  he  argued  that  this  was  not  an  outright 
opposition  to  urban  change,  but  that  he  favoured  more  community-led  and  less 
capital-intensive  development.  He  contrasted  this  to  the  local  authority  model  of 
reliance  on  the  capital  and  leverage  available  within  the  parameters  of  local 
government power and the vagaries of the property market. Rosen went on to describe 
an  altercation  with  a  council  official  in  which  their  contrasting  visions  of  Hackney 
collided:
Michael:  I  said  all  you've  done,  is  just  facilitate  very  large  private  capital  to 
bulldoze the centre of Dalston, and create something that nobody has asked 
for... of course there was immediate resentment from the woman, she said 
no, no, no, we're improving, and I said improving for whom?... And she said 
'look at Kingsland Road... it's a mess, isn't it?'... And I said, it's just people...  
that's life, it's not a mess, it's just how we live, and I could see that there was 
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absolute  incomprehension,  that  we were talking  two completely  different 
languages. 
Rosen's question – 'improving for whom?' – is at the centre of these narratives and 
counter-narratives. The local authority practitioners I spoke with saw the renovation of 
Gillett  Square as benefiting local  young people (those who were reported as being 
pleased  about  better  lighting,  paving  and  security),  albeit  relying  on  elements  of 
private investment and public-private partnership to do so. Michael Rosen (and, we 
might presume, the 'gentricide' protesters) emphasised the role of 'very large private 
capital' profiting from something which 'nobody has asked for'. What seems to Sam to 
be 'deprivation fetishism' aiming to retain poverty as an artistic backdrop, is for Rosen 
an attempt to protect 'people', 'how we live', from the homogenising and excluding 
forces of capitalism. Rosen senses that he and the local authority representative he 
encountered 'were talking two completely different languages'.  But I  would suggest 
that the mutual incomprehension is not so clear-cut. While Rosen and others are not 
championing poverty, nor are the policy practitioners I  interviewed uncomplicatedly 
championing gentrification or free market logics. And people in both 'camps' are aware 
of,  if  not comfortable with,  the ways that their own fortunes are implicated in the 
positions they take in these debates.
Sam, the local politician, elaborates on this in relation to another location of contested 
class meanings, Broadway Market:
Sam: Broadway Market, that's total gentrification, I mean the prices they charge, 
two  quid  cupcakes,  that  kind  of  thing.  But  local  people  actually  like  the 
market being there, even if you don't wanna s- can't afford to spend money...  
you can say 'oh well it's a nice area to live and it's kinda buzzy and it's good'. 
Broadway Market is well-recognised as a site of middle class gentrification, with its  
olive stalls and, as Sam notes, expensive cupcakes and other luxuries (Wright, 2009, 
p.xiv). It is close to London Fields, the site of the beginnings of Hackney gentrification 
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as mapped out in Butler  and Robson’s (2003) study at  the turn of  the millenium.54 
Broadway Market is ostensibly the result of gentrification by 'collective social action'  
rather than by ‘capital’ (a distinction made by Butler and Robson, 2003:26 following 
Warde, 1991). As such, it is alternately cherished as friendly and positive, and disliked 
as 'too middle class' and exclusive. Sam’s description of 'local  people' who 'like the 
market being there' calls on some imagined, authentically poor local  figure, able to 
enjoy the 'buzz' of the market even if unwilling – or as Sam corrects himself, unable – 
to partake of its goods. 
Note, though, that Sam does suggest (as might seem obvious) that the enjoyment he 
imagines could be surprising for those economically excluded from participating in the 
market (they ‘actually’ like it). Returning to Sam’s narrative of the last time he visited 
Broadway  Market  uncovers  another  layer  to  the  complications  and  ironies  of 
gentrification debates:
Sam: I was dragged to it because [my partner] wanted to buy some fruit and veg 
so we were ripped off £1.50 per aubergine, thought right we're never coming 
back here and actually 
Hannah: [laughs]
Sam: then, she said I wish I hadn't bought those and I said why not, and she said  
because this guy selling them had this 'Keep Hackney Crap' badge on.
The irony of Sam’s story of the aubergines has several levels. Firstly, as we saw earlier,  
he was in one context an advocate of the market as a positive development in the area 
despite the inequalities in access to consumption there. But in this extract, he makes it 
clear that he himself feels uncomfortable in the market (being 'dragged to it'), possibly 
because of the divisions it exposes through its high prices and luxury goods. Sam may 
feel  that  while  material  inequalities  disadvantage  poorer  local  people,  these 
inequalities  also  create  difficulties  for  middle  class  consumers  trying  to  manage  a 
54 Some of the underlying tensions and the gap between 'Hackneys' became more visible than usual in 
May 2010, when the park's geography as a hangout for picnicking professionals crossed over with its 
location as a fault line between 'postcode gangs', and an 'innocent bystander' was shot and injured (see  
BBC News, 2010; Budden, 2010; Lewis, 2010.
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liveable sense of self when those inequalities become visible. However, the reason that 
Sam's partner gave for rejecting the market was not the high price of vegetables, but 
that the stall-holder had been wearing the reconfigured 'Keep Hackney Crap' badge; 
the badge reclaiming the jibe against anti-gentrification protests as a form of protest in 
itself, against the policies of the local authority to which Sam is elected.
Yet the ironies do not stop there. The market trader wearing the 'Keep Hackney Crap' 
badge was making a living from the very gentrification his badge ironically protested 
against; it is hard to see in what register Broadway Market as it operates at present 
could be either dismissed or celebrated as 'crap'. Of course the badge itself celebrates 
what others deem 'crap' about the borough, but by all accounts this consists of some 
combination  of  disorganisation,  independence,  unruliness,  messiness,  poverty  or 
danger. Not many of these adjectives could be applied to the 'total gentrification' of 
Broadway Market, or the selling of aubergines for £1.50 each. Again though, the story 
is  not  quite  so  simple;  the  currently  thriving  Broadway  Market  was  built  up  by 
independent market traders, and though it is now run in conjunction with the council, 
which claims it as an official local treasure,55 the history of conflict with the Council 
remains  important  to  local  mythologies.56 An  active  figure  in  the  local  traders  and 
residents'  association  is  the  former  Conservative  mayoral  candidate,  adding  a 
dimension of party politics to the ways the 'Keep Hackney Crap' phrase set off by the 
Labour Mayor has become used.
However, my interest is not in arbitrating claims about whether the development of 
Broadway Market, Gillett Square, or any other regeneration initiative was for better or 
worse. Rather, I focus on how (and why) debates about the future of Hackney, and 
about  processes  of  regeneration  or  gentrification,  are  played out  through  emotive 
narratives which call  on ideas  of  authenticity  of  place and of  voice.  Such decisions 
centre on the question of who benefits from either changing the place or conserving it.  
55 See  for  instance  http://www.hackney.gov.uk/hackney-the-place-culture.htm last  accessed  26  July 
2010.
56 For instance see http://hackneypost.co.uk/?p=3713 and   
      http://broadwaymarket.co.uk/index.php?page=community   (both last accessed 26 July 2010).
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This is a difficult subject, because it  begins to suggest that there are limits to local 
influence over market-driven changes to the local  area.  The way these debates are 
articulated suggest it is more comfortable for all involved to talk about emotive senses 
of belonging and authenticity, than to confront these limits. Next, I will explore how 
these questions of meaning and narrative, and the power to name and control them, 
can be understood through theories of branding and cultural capital exchange.
Brand and cultural capital
Throughout these empirical encounters I have encountered the language of branding 
as a way of thinking about how place and narrative are mobilised by different groups. 
While many of the participants I encountered might have used this language casually, 
theories of branding are apt for understanding the dynamics of Hackney's meanings; 
and particularly for understanding them as a source of cultural capital, and therefore a 
site of power and struggle.
The  marketing  literature  distinguishes  branding as  a  distinct  approach  to  selling  a 
'product' which is not about a fundamental change in the product or an association 
with a simple abstract  emotion,  but attachment to a  narrative (Holt  and Cameron, 
2010). Lury suggests that not only have brands become used as a way of organising the 
role of emotion in brand relations (between consumer and product), but that the use 
of brands relies on a shift in which '[i]nstead of a desire to keep up with the Joneses,  
consumers  are  believed to be more concerned with finding  meaning in  their  lives' 
(Lury,  2004:38).  Authors  vary  in  the  extent  to  which  they  acknowledge  that  such 
narratives rely on the re-incorporation of existing mythologies. Aronczyk, for example, 
suggests that re-branding nations (as business products for tourism and investment) 
relies on creative destruction, 'in which old myths and memories are swept away and 
new  ones  instituted  in  their  place'  (2007:118).  However,  evidence  from  more 
traditional corporate branding exercises, such as those of the Starbucks coffee store 
chain or Nike sportswear, suggest that myth and counter-myth depend on and play 
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against one another for effective communication, notoriety and relevance (Holt and 
Cameron, 2010; Lury, 2004; Thompson et al, 2006). 
The re-appropriation of brand myths can be thought of as a form of trading in cultural  
capital  (Bourdieu,  1986),  where  identities  or  meanings  that  are  otherwise  seen as 
abject become a source of cultural capital for others who are able to adopt appealing 
aspects  of  the  identity,  while  avoiding  abject  connotations  (Skeggs,  2005b).  Skeggs 
suggests that  the logics and techniques of  branding are used in popular  culture to 
commodify  the  culture  and  experiences  of  working  class  British  people,  making 
identification with these 'products' an asset for middle class people, which they can 
trade on as cultural capital (see also Skeggs, 2004). In the case of Hackney (and other 
places like it), the power of 'edgy' branding allows a place that is seen as dangerous 
and uncomfortable to be appropriated by those whose existing economic, cultural and 
social capital enable them to escape any actual danger, while profiting from association 
with local myths.
In the data discussed in this chapter, such re-appropriation happens at various levels, in 
an iterative way. The presentation of Hackney as an exemplar of successful multiculture 
under the slogan 'I Love Hackney' was powerful because of Hackney's prior negative 
connotations  (its  'dramatic,  burning  past'),  and  the  campaign  was  reinvigorated  in 
response to being dubbed Britain's 'worst place to live' on national television. Here, the 
first-order claims to 'Love Hackney' were being made in defiance; claiming an authentic 
knowledge of Hackney as not as bad as had been perceived, and therefore claiming a 
knowledge of the place which exceeded that of outsiders.
But some residents took exception to this as a potentially disingenuous 'sanitising' of  
local difference, packaged to appeal to 'the middle class'. Their response, in the form of 
various  re-branded  cultural  artefacts,  was  to  declare  their  allegiance  to  another 
imagined version of  the borough under  a  defiant  slogan 'Keep Hackney Crap'.  This 
second type of claim to 'Love Hackney' (as 'Crap') could be a similar claim to authentic 
knowledge to that outlined above – it's not crap, or 'one person's crap is another's 
gold'. But another, more ironic version of this re-appropriation of the Hackney brand is 
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that by identifying with a place seen by others as dangerous, 'dour' or down-at-heel, 
people gain a sense of excitement and edginess without actually being exposed to any 
danger.57 As Iain Sinclair suggested, simply having 'Hackney' in the title of a book and a 
map of Hackney on its cover was 'an act of branding' which appealed to a group (or  
groups) of people who were keen to buy into (one version or another of) Hackney 
mythology. So the nature of the brand is that it is not straightforwardly controlled. Its  
draw on associations and emotion make it inherently unstable; 'it retains the margins 
of  indeterminacy,  and the activities  of  consumers  can  extend these margins'  (Lury, 
2004:162).  In  branding Hackney,  the 'consumers'  are  residents,  activists  and others 
with claims to the place. While other studies of place-branding have demonstrated the 
risk of a homogenising effect of place-branding in a global market where every place 
vies to be 'unique' and 'vibrant'  (for  discussions of  which see  Aronczyk, 2007:119; 
Evans,  2006:203;  Philo  and  Kearns,  1993:3),  the questions  raised  in  my  empirical 
material have focused more on the competing claims to local authenticity made by a 
range of voices for a range of purposes.
Philo and Kearns pose a confrontation between accounts of place and history produced 
'in the name of  an urban-based bourgeoisie', and those 'in the name of  those “other 
peoples” of the city' (Philo and Kearns, 1993:26, my emphasis). Their assumption is  
that these groups speak for themselves, and are in competition, so that the stories of  
'other peoples' are always silenced. But all of the accounts I have provided here are 
accounts made in the name of 'other peoples' (in Philo and Kearns' terms) by  middle-
class urbanites. Philo and Kearns' model can only really work when histories of the 
working classes, women, ethnic others, sexual minorities, disabled people and other 
marginalised groups are seen as uninteresting, irrelevant or threatening by those with 
greater power to command narratives of place. In the time, place and context where 
my research was conducted, this is  not the case.  Such stories are in fact  the  most 
interesting;  their  appeal  lying  precisely  in  an  association with authenticity  and the 
57 See for example  www.houseofhackney.com,  'the luxe wallpaper,  bed linen and home furnishings 
brand which reworks traditional British homewares for a new generation'. Their 'Hackney Empire' 
design features sloths smoking shishas and raccoons downing bottles of tequila, and adorns teacups 
sold for £68 each and wallpaper at £148 per roll.
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concern of consumers to find meaning in their lives identified by Lury (2004:38) as at 
the heart of branding strategies (see also Chapter Seven).  The people I have quoted 
speak in the name of marginalised others, but also in the name of solidarity with those 
marginalised others. For example, let's remind ourselves of two such claims, the first 
from local politician Joe, the second from Michael Rosen:
Joe: ... you get to live in Albion Square, and the rest of us, and everyone else in 
Hackney, we should just keep it as nasty as possible so you get to feel really 
cool about it and write some edgy articles for the Guardian?...
Michael: ... all you've done, is just facilitate very large private capital to bulldoze 
the centre of Dalston, and create something that nobody has asked for...
Both  of  these  interviewees  make  a  claim  to  be  part  of  Hackney's  (authentic) 
community, and to be defending either this community's future (in the first quote) or 
its  past  (in  the  second).  They  both  position  themselves  as  mounting  this  defence 
against threats from more powerful others (in the first case, artists and writers, in the 
second, property developers) who they position in turn as trying to profit from the 
cultural capital of Hackney (firstly by living in a rich area of Hackney while feeling 'really 
cool'  about the surrounding poverty; secondly by bulldozing Dalston to attract new 
residents who will push out existing ones). The claims to authentic knowledge of and 
solidarity with 'Hackney' which both speakers make are based on their existing stocks 
of cultural capital rooted in local their own local histories and associations. 
As the 'Keep Hackney Crap' badges, the artists who 'can't believe their luck' at 'such 
visible  horror'  of  urban  development,  and  the  people  who  'think  they  discovered 
Hackney in 1975' show, one aspect of the attachment to Hackney is to seek to protect 
the cultural capital it accrues by keeping this capital scarce. That is, something is only 
'edgy' as long as most people still despise it (and the edgy people remain ahead of the 
crowd). Such a logic has been identified in more straightforward analyses of trends and 
marketing (e.g. Thompson et al, 2006), but differs from the more general findings of 
studies such as Butler (1997), Butler and Robson (2003), May (1996) and Reay (2008) 
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which  uncovered  a  more  explicit  desire  to  enjoy  observing  'otherness'  whilst 
maintaining a definite distance from it.58
The difficulty is that so many of these claims to Hackney and its myths are rooted in 
claims of certainty; certainty of being right and of others being wrong. Even complexity 
and flux become reified by appeals to 'diversity', or claims that Hackney has 'always 
been a place of change'. The success of London's bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games 
is widely attributed to its foregrounding of the internationalism and multiculturalism of 
east  London  (Vertovec  2007:1025;  Wetherell,  2008:306-7).  One  of  the  central 
motivations for making the bid was to attract funding to this deprived area of the city  
(Evening Standard, 2008).
The  local  politicians  and  officers  might  benefit  by  'improving'  the  place  –  in  their 
careers and reputation as well as their community-minded goals. And the artists make 
(and recognise that they make) a good deal  out of it  too,  as noted by Iain Sinclair 
above.  Academics (including myself!),  are  of  course no less exempt from this,  with 
Hackney's potency as an area of diversity and change, inequality and political history 
(and often  personal  associations)  drawing  a  variety  of  scholars  to  produce  studies 
embedded in the area (e.g.  Aldred and Jungnickel, 2010/1; Andersson, 2009; Butler, 
1997; Butler and Robson, 2003; Manzi and Jacobs, 2009; Markova and Black, 2007; 
May, 1996; Mumford and Power, 2003; Pratt, 2009; Sinclair, 2009; Rhys-Taylor, 2010; 
Watson, 2009; Wessendorf, 2010; Wright, 2009; Young et al, 1980). The logics of audit 
and associated cultural and eventually economic capital apply to academic outputs as 
much as to those of local authority employees (Back, 2008). There are no easy answers 
about  which narrative  is  'most  progressive';  and this  is  complicated further,  as  the 
narrators themselves recognise – to different extents – their own privileged positions in 
negotiating and using Hackney's brand.
58 Though of course my study differs markedly from that of these earlier researchers, who focused on  
middle class residents in general, rather than policy practitioners and public figures.
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Conclusions
Place branding has received attention within studies of regeneration, geography and 
sociology, but this writing has largely focused on the promotion of places to potential 
investors and tourists (e.g. Aronczyk, 2007; Evans, 2006:197; Kearns and Philo, 1993; 
Urry, 1995; Ward, 1998). While branding and marketing are often criticised as vacuous 
and illusory (Moloney, 2006:1), within the quasi-market of government performance 
measures, having a reputation as an efficient and effective local authority can be a vital 
prerequisite for addressing more material  issues, such as inequalities of power and 
wealth (see Chapters  One and Six).  As  we have seen in this  chapter,  an important 
aspect of a place's brand is not just the reputation of local institutions, but the 'feel' 
and 'experience' of the place as understood by local residents. 
This  chapter  has  explored  different  ways  that  the  meaning  of  Hackney  has  been 
negotiated in policy practice. I have suggested that a useful way of understanding these 
negotiations  is  through  the  logics  of  branding,  and  especially  through  the 
indeterminacy and slippage of meaning which branding evokes. Such a perspective is 
helpful in thinking through how meanings and myths (in this case in relation to place) 
are used (and rebelled against), in policy as elsewhere, as sources of cultural capital. I  
have  also  begun  to  suggest  that  while  there  is  much  recognition  among  policy 
practitioners  that  experiences  and  narratives  of  Hackney  are  multiple,  there  are 
nevertheless attempts to claim an authentic knowledge, with such claims often made 
in relation to imagined futures or pasts anchored within place (and in opposition to 
other  places  and times).  In  these negotiations,  attempts  to  construct  narratives  of 
Hackney as a place of community cohesion face difficulties when it becomes apparent 
that strong claims to love Hackney as a place and a community are multiple, emotive – 
and conflicting. With closer analysis, it becomes clear that the apparently competing 
narratives  are  all  attempts  to  understand  local  power  (or  lack  of  it)  to  determine 
Hackney's future. Much of this narrative is constructed around figures who were often 
spoken  about  but  never  revealed  themselves  to  me  in  my  research  –  either  the 
authentic,  marginalised  Hackney  resident  (with  whom  many  claimed  to  speak  in 
solidarity), or the unreflexive and unsympathetic gentrifier lacking in respect for the 
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more 'authentic' residents.
Where this chapter has explored the understandings of one place negotiated locally, 
the next chapter considers the importance of place-brand (or reputation) within the 
quasi-markets of local governance which I outlined in Chapter One. The navigation of 
cohesion policy with reference to symbolic places which I suggested in Chapter Three is 
considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  policy  practitioners  negotiating  those 
meanings from within, and I consider how the logics of branding and positioning are 
mobilised by different places competing against one another. This is another approach 
again to the competition for private investment or tourists which most place-branding 
literature  addresses;  the  market  in  which  place-brands  compete  in  Chapter  Six  is 
primarily that of competition for government funding and recognition of success within 
auditing regimes.
198
Chapter Six: 'We spent a lot of time trying to be known for other things'
Introduction
In this chapter, I focus less on how meanings of place relate to local residents, and 
more on the relationship to national understandings of how local government copes 
with living together with difference in contemporary Britain. The places I will discuss 
were used repeatedly in my research encounters to stand for differently dysfunctional 
examples of community cohesion problems. I will discuss the differences and parallels 
in how policy practitioners in these 'other places' try to overcome and capitalise on the 
places'  problematic  pasts.  In  developing an element of  my research within  each of 
these  areas,  I  explore  how  local  policy  practitioners  react  to  and  play  with  these 
understandings, with echoes of the branding and re-branding approaches discussed in 
the  previous  chapter.  I  suggest  that  these  approaches  to  managing  narratives  are 
shaped by frameworks of local and national government auditing and competition.
As I argued in Chapter Three, certain places have taken on metonymic significance in 
narratives about community cohesion. In Chapter One, I discussed how technologies of 
governmentality frame policy and decision-making  within common sense narratives 
based around competitive performance measurement. In this chapter, I explore  how 
places  become  imagined  within  policy  structures.  Local  policy  practitioners  are 
concerned  to  present  a  positive  image  of  the  place  they  represent  (politically  or 
professionally) because they perceive that its material conditions, as well as perhaps 
their own careers, are mediated primarily through presentation and reputation. So this 
chapter, like the rest of the thesis, is dedicated to understanding the metaphors which 
policy practitioners use to make sense of, and work within, reality. These metaphors 
are important not because they capture 'reality'; and not because they disguise reality. 
They  are  important  because  they  are  'a  means  through  which  reality  is  rendered 
comprehensible'  (Keith,  2005:70);  they  are  tools  which  policy  practitioners  use  to 
negotiate difficult subjects.
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To remind ourselves of how narratives of 'other places' were used to demonstrate a 
relative lack of urgency of community cohesion policy in Hackney, here is an extract  
from one of the first interviews I conducted, with Mark, an Assistant Director there:
Mark: But it [community cohesion] doesn't... seem to me to be a big issue. Now 
I've no doubt that in the Peterboroughs of this world... they sit in the pubs 
and they worry about all  these East Europeans flooding in,  picking all  our 
tomatoes or carrots or whatever, or in Dagenham, they think that this is the 
final straw, Ford closes down, or nearly closes down, and nobody cares about 
us, and now they're dumping all these foreigners on us, and so on and so 
forth... but I think that that's an atypical perspective for London. Now I've no 
idea  whether  it's  appropriate  for  Oldham,  clearly  where  there's  a  very 
different geographical mix of the ethnic groups kind of thing. And, yeah, you 
go to Bradford,  you think,  oh gosh,  that's  – this  is  –  you know, it's  quite 
different really!
Hannah: Yeah [both laugh]
Mark: [laughs] I can see why the Asians don't wanna live on some of the estates  
there... 
This striking extract sums up 'the Peterboroughs of this world' as places scared by the 
newness of Eastern European migration and fearful for their agricultural jobs; (Barking 
and) Dagenham as a de-industrialised wasteland whose residents feel neglected by the 
state and society and resort to scapegoating 'foreigners'; and Oldham and Bradford, 
whose 'geographical mix of the ethnic groups' does not even need to be elaborated to 
provoke a sardonic laugh of recognition from me about the segregated nature of their 
'parallel lives'. As discussed in Chapter Three, a similar strategy of understanding 'types' 
of community cohesion in relation to place was adopted by the national Commission 
on Integration and Cohesion, which produced a set of archetypal descriptions rather 
than  referring  directly  to  empirical  places  as  representative  of  particular  problems 
(COIC, 2007:58). 
As will become clear throughout the chapter, the three places to which I followed these 
narratives do not map universally onto the imagined geographies of cohesion. That is 
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to say, for example, that Bradford was used as a reference to parallel lives and riots at 
least  as  often  as  Oldham;  indeed,  sometimes  places  which  had  not  had  civil 
disturbances in 2001 but whose name sounded similar (e.g. Blackburn) were referred 
to  in  this  way  by  interviewees.  And as  noted in  Chapter  Three,  the association  of 
Peterborough with community cohesion narratives was not as strong as for Barking and 
Dagenham or  Oldham. Yet,  consistently,  all  of  these places  were used as  reference 
points for  demonstrating shared knowledge of  failures of  cohesion and integration. 
And  as  I  will  show  in  this  chapter,  policy  practitioners  in  each  of  these  places 
recognised that such associations were operating at a national level, and thought it 
important to address the negative associations this entailed.
The chapter considers each of the three 'other places' in turn. For each, I explore how 
'outside' policy practitioners constructed and used the idea of the place to negotiate 
their own understandings of community cohesion policy. I then discuss how local policy 
practitioners  reflected  on  these  outsiders'  views,  made  claims  to  more  authentic 
knowledge, and re-framed the essentials of the broader narrative within more detailed 
narratives of local complexity. Finally, for each place I discuss how policy practitioners  
moved from arguing with what they saw as inaccurate representations of their place, 
to  describing how they had actively  manipulated these meanings  to re-brand their 
locality and their local authority. These attempts to appropriate an existing negative 
meaning and use it to promote a place has a similar logic to the re-branding of Hackney 
which I discussed in Chapter Five. In this chapter, however, policy practitioners were 
looking beyond local affect and belonging and the control of local narratives, and trying 
to establish a positive reputation for community cohesion policy among other policy 
practitioners.
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'Oldham? Riot town!'
Approaching Oldham
Erin: [We said] we need some funding from government to deal with this before 
we have a Oldham and Bradford riot.
Andrew: We would have had another Bradford riot if we hadn't have done this 
community cohesion work.
Siv: Like in Oldham... you know, when they had the riots... people didn't even go 
to school  together,  the kids  in  the different  areas  in  Oldham didn't  even 
know, that it was a no-go area and you start getting that apartheid.
These  interview  extracts  are  examples  of  how  Erin  (speaking  from  Peterborough),  
Andrew (in Barking and Dagenham) and Siv (in Hackney) used Oldham and associated 
places metonymically to stand for riots and parallel lives – and experiences far removed 
from  their  own.  These  examples  arose  within  interviewees'  narratives  without 
prompting, clearly linking Oldham (and Bradford) to 'riots' or 'apartheid'. Once I had 
established my fieldwork sites, I explained the design of my research at the outset of 
each interview, and some of the resulting exchanges shed light on how implicit the 
meaning of Oldham had become:
Hannah:  ...  part of the story of what cohesion means to people, so they were 
Oldham, Peterborough and Barking and Dagenham.
Sally:  [overlapping] Oh right I wonder why! [laughs] 
Hannah:  [overlapping] For different reasons. [laughs] 
Hannah: When people talk about cohesion there's certain places that come up,
Mike: [overlapping] Right. 
Hannah: [overlapping] in the story and Oldham,
Mike: Oldham is obviously, yeah. 
Sally, who works in the voluntary sector in Hackney, and Mike, an interfaith leader in 
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Oldham  were  both  unsurprised that  the  fieldwork  sites  I  had  chosen  were  being 
treated  as  of  particular  significance  to  community  cohesion  policy.  More strikingly, 
neither  I  nor  they  felt  the  need  to  establish  what  this  significance  might  be;  the 
meanings have simply become 'common sense'. As discussed in Chapter Three, these 
associations  stem from the  violent  disturbances  of  2001  in  those  towns,  to  which 
government reports prescribed 'community cohesion' as a cure. Oldham (with other 
'northern towns') has taken on a resonance which fixes it in time as a place of riots and 
ethnic segregation. Interviewees spontaneously referred to the 'problems of Oldham' 
without  feeling the need to elaborate on what  they meant  by this.  Those working 
within Oldham recognised the image they had, were frustrated by it, and suggested 
alternative narratives for understanding the town and its history. 
Jim was a councillor in Oldham, and described his experience:
Jim: People that come from Oldham, after the riots, wouldn't say they come from 
Oldham, they'd shy away, you know... come from near Manchester and things 
like that...  and people used to say... where do you come from, I said Oldham,  
Oldham? Riot town! Well yeah, but – there's been a riot in Birmingham after,  
why don't you ever remember that one?...
Hannah: And why do you think that one's not remembered as much?
Jim: Well, it's the national news, Oldham was great, weren't it, cos Asians were 
setting fire to cars, it made good news, you know... but I think we've got away 
from that now, nobody ever says it to me now... Now and again it creeps up...  
when I go to meetings about cohesion... Where do you come from... Oldham, 
and... half a dozen people said, oh, riot town!
Hannah: [laughs]
Jim: You know, other councillors, I said, No!... Not the riot town! The best borough 
in the country for cohesion!
Jim is clear here that the reputation of Oldham as a 'riot town' has been pervasive, to  
the  extent  that  he  believed  many  Oldhamers  had  become  unwilling  to  identify 
themselves as local because of the negative response they expected this to elicit from 
other people. Jim's view expressed here is that though this has lessened somewhat 
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among the general public, the association of Oldham with telegenic images of riots  
remains strong in local government circles. Jim notes how 'Asians setting fire to cars'  
makes 'good news', and such images of course are not only dramatic in themselves, but 
draw on resonances with the past, such as the urban riots in the 1980s and all of their  
political associations (see Chapter Three). Jim suggests these images made Oldham's 
disturbances  more  resonant  in  imagined geographies  than the  'riot  in  Birmingham 
after'. Jim is referring to disturbances that took place in Birmingham in 2005 and were 
characterised by the media as being clashes between Pakistani and African-Caribbean 
groups arising as a result of revenge attacks for a rumoured gang rape (Muir and Butt, 
2005).59 Though it  can only  be speculation  on  my part,  the difficulty  of  fitting  the 
Birmingham  situation  into  the  existing  narratives  of  migration,  integration  and 
cohesion (or their lack) may have contributed to this story not developing as a policy 
parable in the way that those connected with Oldham have (Bourdieu, 1977[1972]:170; 
Trouillot, 1995:82). 
Inside Oldham
Anne: And I got quite fired up and said do you not think that we know that we had 
disturbances in Oldham in 2001, and do you not think that we've been doing  
something  about  it  since?...  Do  you  not  know  that  we've  had  so  many 
weekends  since  then...  where  we  haven't  actually  had  disturbances  in 
Oldham... and Ted Cantle actually said then, Oldham was unlucky... It was a 
series of events that happened on that afternoon... fuelled by known BNP 
members, and it happened in Oldham, but he said it could have happened in 
any of the northern towns with similar ethnic compositions.
In  this  extract  from  my  conversation  with  Anne  (a  former  Oldham  councillor)  she 
describes an encounter at a national conference where a  colleague had 'wanted it all 
59 Of course, Birmingham is still remembered for riots in the Handsworth area of the city in 1981, but  
Jim is here referring to an incident since 2001.  Newspapers also reported rioting in Birmingham 
following clashes between the far-right  English Defence League and the anti-racist  Unite  Against 
Fascism in August 2009, but my interview with Jim took place the previous June.
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to be about the riots in Oldham, and not progress that had happened since'. In this 
case, she had had the opportunity to disagree with him, and had been supported by 
Ted Cantle (who since he conducted the national  report on community cohesion is 
often presented as a 'community cohesion guru'). Anne's argument here is not just that 
Oldham was unlucky,  but  also that  people in  Oldham have 'been doing something 
about it since'.  Like Jim, she expressed frustration at the association of Oldham with 
riotousness, and linked it to media coverage: 
Anne:  I  think  there's  a  frustration  with  the  national  press  in  that  every  time  
Oldham's on the telly you've got the blazing police car. The blazing police van,  
it  was  just  a  prerequisite  and  it's  just  short  hand  isn't  it,  it's  journalistic  
shorthand,  and  the  number  of  times  where  whenever  people  mention 
Oldham they  talk  about  those  events,  I  think  the  other  thing  that  I  was 
constantly batting off was the question about the BNP.
Anne, like Jim, described being constantly made aware of Oldham's reputation outside 
the borough as a 'riot town', by media reliance on images of Oldham and 'the blazing 
police car'. Anne then notes another way in which Oldham's reputation has spread. She 
is not only expected to talk about problems with community cohesion at conferences, 
but also to dispense advice on how to deal with similar problems. And the expertise 
that is sought is not necessarily in areas that Anne feels are particularly relevant to 
Oldham's circumstances. Though she suggests that the 2001 disturbances were 'fuelled 
by known BNP members', Anne denies that the BNP have been a significant presence 
in Oldham; mainstream parties had confronted them and they had not been elected to  
the council. She seems angry that, nevertheless, there is an 'assumption that we must 
have  had  a  handful  of  BNP  councillors',  leading  representatives  of  Barking  and 
Dagenham to ask Oldham for advice after electing 12 BNP councillors in 2006. Anne is 
adamant that Oldham's reputation for riots should not seep into an assumption that 
the borough has a racist voting record. Thus even where Oldham's association with 
community cohesion is as a source of good practice, Anne has reservations. Claims to 
know how to deal with problems can result in a continued association between the 
area and those problems.
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A number of policy practitioners in Oldham argued that whilst it was true that there 
had been disturbances in 2001, the national narratives that stemmed from these were 
distorted. They provided more nuanced narratives, based on claims to authentic local 
knowledge.  For  example,  Rafiq,  who now worked for  an  inter-faith  organisation  in 
Oldham, described his personal experiences on the night of the disorder:
Rafiq: Riots in Oldham and as serious as they were... were very very localised... I  
know that because I was driving my taxi that night... and I was all around 
Oldham... it was very very localised... this is the physical act of rioting... there  
were bad feelings among people but it was, I feel, localised and whenever a 
news story is put out by news organisations... there's this sense of déjà vu, 
that, we all say, here we go again! [both laugh]
Here,  Rafiq demonstrates his  awareness of  Oldham as  an empirical  place and as a 
metaphor. He acknowledges that the rioting was serious, but states his own physical  
presence in the town (indeed, driving around different parts of the town) as evidence 
of his authority to speak on the subject. Despite this, Rafiq suggests that the narratives 
of the riots, as opposed to the physical acts that took place, are important to the area. 
They have become commonplace in news coverage of Oldham, 'whenever a news story 
is put out...  here we go again!'.  This suggests that what  actually took place on the 
nights of the riots is less important than the aftermath in terms of how Oldham is  
treated by both insiders and outsiders. 
Jim's position, on the other hand, was to state very definitely that the disturbances 
were wholly the result of rivalries between drug dealers. This was an explanation I did 
not hear from anyone else, although there were fleeting references to drugs in all three 
of the Cantle (2001:40), Denham (2001:11) and Ritchie (2001:12-13) reports into the 
disturbances. Jim went much further, however, suggesting that the drug trade in itself 
was the root cause of the violence:
Jim: Everybody says that Glodwick, the Pakistani area, is a no go area and... it's not 
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particularly the Asians, or the BME that are making it a no go area, it's the  
drug [pause] lords, if you like... making it into a no go area, cos they don't 
want the police down there!... What they do want is white people going in  
that use drugs... to buy 'em off 'em, and that's part of what all that rioting 
were about. You know, a lot of it started off with a drugs war. Really. And 
people don't agree with me on that, but... I'm different as a cabinet member, 
I'm a blue collar worker... you start listening to people and that's what's going  
on, a lot of it's drug related.
Though he continued to talk  about 'the Asians,  or  the BME'  and 'white people'  as 
distinct groups throughout the interview, Jim insisted that problems were not linked to 
racialised  inequalities  or  tensions.  His  alternative  explanation  was  that  many  of 
Oldham's  problems  stemmed  from  the  drugs  trade;  'nothing  to  do  with  race  or 
anything else, it's just thuggery'. Jim suggested he had access to privileged knowledge 
as a working class councillor whose day job brought him into contact with many locals 
across  Oldham. Jim's  underlying argument seems to be that  those council  officers, 
national commissions and others who had concluded that tensions in Oldham were 
inflected  by  race  and  racism  and  associated  with  structural  issues  of  social  and 
economic  inequality  had  missed  the  'common-sense'  problem  of  local  criminal 
rivalries.
Steve, who worked for a race equality organisation in Oldham, also challenged the local 
and  national  consensus,  but  from  a  different  position  and  in  a  different,  even 
contradictory way. His view was that Oldham suffered from more long term tensions, 
and that the 'progress' that Anne and most of the other local respondents described 
was more a matter of presentation than substance. He described another violent scene 
which had taken place in Oldham more recently than 2001, in a local school:
Steve: When I talk to young people about what it's like at their schools... what 
came back to me was, in unsupervised times of the day, they're in racially 
defined groups. And one or two will let on to one another, but the rest of the 
time they're in racially defined groups and, and every so often, that breaks 
out  into fighting.  Most notoriously  in  2005 at  St  Augustine's  school  here, 
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which I  found,  in  2007...  THAT,  far  more than the riots  of  2001,  affected 
young people in this town... because it was a horrific experience...  that has 
had an enormous effect on the thinking of young people in this town... but it 
was covered up!
Steve's claim to privileged knowledge, like Jim's, came from conversations with groups 
not usually seen as included in the meaning-making of Oldham – in this case young 
people  rather  than Jim's  case  of  blue-collar  workers  or  council  tenants.  Steve  also 
challenged  the  established  narrative,  but  unlike  Jim  or  any  of  the  other  policy 
practitioners  I  spoke  with  in  Oldham,  he  did  not  do  so  in  a  way  that  emphasised 
positive  changes  or  progress.  Indeed,  Steve's  account  seems  to  suggest  that  the 
national image of Oldham as a place of division, segregation and explosive violence 
may not be so inaccurate. Jim's account of the events at St Augustine's school in 2005 
framed that conflict very differently:
Jim: You do have pockets, and it's little gangs of Asians against little gangs of white  
lads, you know, but, usually sorts itsel' out... within the school... We've had 
one thing that didn't, and... again, the press got hold of it and blew it up to 
summat that it wasn't.
Hannah:  Right. Was that – oh that – was that a big – fight in the school,
Jim:  [overlapping] Yeah 
Hannah:  [overlapping] someone was talking to me about that,
Jim: But it, it really wasn't what it was portrayed to be, when you start talking to  
the  people  that  were  involved,  the  teachers,  and  I  have  done,  and  the 
headmaster,  they  didn't  see  it  as  being  any  more  than  what's  happened 
before, that... never got out, there were one lad hurt, but they've had other  
kids hurt... before and that, and that's happened for donkey's years, before 
there were any community cohesion issues, where you had fights in school...  
that happens, it's part of growing up.
As in his earlier comments, Jim dismisses racialised rivalries as insignificant, and blown 
out of proportion by the press. The fighting at the school which Steve described to me 
in graphic terms, Jim describes as just 'part of growing up'. Like his reference to market 
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logics of drug dealing as at the heart of the problems in 2001, Jim's argument is that 
outbreaks of violence in Oldham are few, and when they do occur are nothing dramatic 
or  different  from  anywhere  else.  For  Steve,  the  treatment  of  such  incidents  as 
mundane  was  a  problem  in  itself,  ignoring  tensions  that  did  exist  in  favour  of 
demonstrating cohesion. Interestingly, both Steve and Jim claimed that their personal 
and professional familiarity with local circumstances had allowed them to know the 
real dynamics of community cohesion in Oldham, the realities which were distorted by 
a  sensationalist  press (from Jim's  perspective)  or  complacent local  politicians (from 
Steve's). Part of their difference in perspective might be explained by the different roles 
and responsibilities the two men had. As a race equality campaigner it was Steve's role 
and instinct to highlight problems and tensions (with a view to their remedy), while 
Jim, as a leading councillor, and others I spoke to were more likely to be professionally 
recognised for their ability either to ease these problems or to suggest that they had 
been eased.
Even  more  prevalent  was  an  attempt  to  turn  the  focus  away  from  those  events 
altogether, and to create narratives about Oldham that presented it instead as a leader 
in  the  field  of  community  cohesion,  or  attempted  to  step  outside  the  cohesion 
framework and to suggest that the town had moved beyond its dominance. 
Rebranding: 'Best borough in the country for cohesion!'
Glen:  If we had a repeat of the disturbances it would be absolutely catastrophic 
for Oldham... we know the damage it did to the reputation, our reputation in 
2001... if you talk to the average person in Britain now, what do you know 
about Oldham, an awful lot of people say oh yeah, didn't they have riots in 
2001... we're not famous for lots of other things, and so we need to re-brand 
ourselves... we want to promote ourselves as a university town, that's our 
new corporate plan, that's one of the things we want to be known for... we 
don't want to be remembered as the place that had riots.
Glen was a senior local authority officer in Oldham. His reference to 're-branding' was 
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not just casual; the local authority had, at the time of my visits, recently undertaken a 
full corporate branding exercise using high resolution images of different positive faces, 
buildings  and  landscapes  of  Oldham  alongside  a  new  logo  and  the  slogan  'One 
Oldham'.60 A  screensaver  on  this  theme  played  on  Glen's  computer  behind  him 
throughout our meeting. This branding played on an interest in local pride and local 
residents' 'sense of place' which has become important in local government policy and 
closely connected to community cohesion. Yet most of the responses to my question 
about how national views of Oldham had affected the interviewees' work did not focus 
directly on the immediate impact or feelings of local residents for the place. Rather 
they were concerned with outsiders' images of the place. 
The corporate policy of both the local authority and its partners attempted to provide 
alternative  narratives  of  the  2001  disturbances  and  to  re-focus  attention  on  other 
aspects of Oldham. This appears to have begun soon after the riots,  when Oldham 
speakers spent a lot of time promoting their work nationally, as Steve rather cynically 
describes it here:
Steve: A lot of paper evidence was accumulated and sent down to London... in 
order to show that Oldham was really doing things, and Oldham speakers 
were  encouraged  to  go  around  the  country...  [the  local  authority]  Chief  
Exec... used to go and speak, he was asked to speak because he came from 
Oldham... He wasn't able to reel off a lot of initiatives that had happened in 
Oldham but he very successfully gave the impression that Oldham was in the 
forefront of dealing with community cohesion.
Steve clearly felt that much of the work to change perceptions of Oldham was carried 
out in the world of image management. The strategy of sending speakers to national  
cohesion events continued at the time of the research; I had initially made contact with 
Oldham interviewees through meeting an Assistant Director of the local authority at a 
local government event in London, where he and another colleague I would eventually 
interview  were  presenting  on  good  practice  for  working  with  faith  groups.  Jim's 
60 Details of the full branding exercise were made available online at http://www.oneoldham.com/ [last 
accessed 24th February 2010].
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comment quoted earlier that Oldham was 'not the riot town' but 'the best borough in 
the country for cohesion!' also highlighted how Oldham had turned national interest in 
their  cohesion  problems  into  a  marketing  virtue:  Oldham  as  a  place  with  more 
experience of thinking about community cohesion than most, and hence a place to 
seek good practice.
Yet several interviewees described a shift in this strategy (linked to a change in chief  
executive) towards promoting aspects of good practice besides work on community 
cohesion,  because  even  talking  about  community  cohesion  continued  to  raise  the 
spectre of the troubled past. For example:
Ron: What I don't think we should be is a one trick pony... because if that's the  
only thing that we can talk about, well bloody hell we can't be doing a very  
good job, can we? That should be just one good component of the stuff that 
we're doing...  and the stuff  that we're talking about. And for a long time 
unfortunately, we were only famous for that... Now we're famous for some 
other stuff, and that's important.
Ron, a senior officer at Oldham Council, puts his emphasis on what Oldham is known 
for, at least as much as what it does. He suggests that promotion of good cohesion 
practice has  run its  course as  an effective strategy for  creating a  positive image of 
Oldham;  Oldham  should  normalise  its  image  by  talking  about  issues  other  than 
cohesion. Though Ron says here that Oldham is now 'famous for some other stuff', it's 
not clear what this is. He does cite positive aspects of Oldham that he suggests could 
be promoted:
Ron: If you're gonna show Oldham, why not show a picture of Robert Winston? 61... 
That's every bit as much Oldham, you know, or our fantastic countryside.
Yet, as Ron says, images of prominent local figures or the surrounding National Park 
61 Robert Winston is a prominent scientist, but has no connection with Oldham that I know or can find.  
Ron may have meant to refer to Winston Churchill, the wartime Prime Minister who was MP for  
Oldham between 1900 and 1906.
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and countryside are  not regularly used in the media when talking about Oldham. His 
comments suggest that while these positive images exist and are 'every bit as much 
Oldham', they are not so in the national imagination. 
I will argue that this concern, and the attempts to change the image of the town, were 
in large part driven by the importance of presentation and reputation in the structures 
of government, particularly the interface between local and national government in 
the UK, and the importance of narratives of place as a tool for local government. I will  
elaborate  on  how this  is  relevant  to  interviewees'  attempts  at  removing  Oldham's 
negative associations and producing different, usually more positive, narratives of the 
town (and local authority) and its 'improvement' in the final section of this chapter. 
First, I want to examine the place that Barking and Dagenham and then Peterborough 
take up in narratives of community cohesion policy, and the ways this is reflected on 
and refracted by local policy practitioners.
Barking and Dagenham: 'the BNP council'
Approaching Barking and Dagenham
Owen: Well, there's obviously racism. And Barking and Dagenham shows that. In a 
way I  think that actually...  in a place like Hackney well  again there will  be 
racism, but it's nowhere near like it is in other communities.
Sam:  Obviously  you  know,  you  just  go  in  Barking  and  Dagenham  and  that 
[housing]'s gonna be THE election issue... come next May, that people are 
moving in and taking... our birthrights to housing... in the local area. I mean 
it's funny that you know they're what ten miles up the road, here in Hackney, 
it just doesn't feature.
Saida:  Far right, it's not an issue so much in Hackney... from intelligence and what  
we can see... [don't] really get a lot of far right kind of issues coming in... so, it 
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might be an issue somewhere like in Barking and Dagenham.
All three of the extracts above come from interviews with policy practitioners based in 
Hackney, and there were many more examples of this use of the contrast with Barking 
and Dagenham to represent Hackney's success at living together with difference. The 
immediate association was between Barking and Dagenham and the BNP,  with the 
association so notorious that it often did not need to be spelt out beyond a reference 
to 'a place like Barking and Dagenham'.  Barking and Dagenham and the BNP were 
synonyms for  an  alienated,  marginalised and therefore  racist  'white  working  class'.  
Sometimes  interviewees  related  this  to  issues  such  as  declining  manufacturing  or 
shortages of public housing. But in most cases it was a simple shorthand for a racist 
place  that  demonstrated  how  people  in  the  speaker's  locality  were  much  more 
comfortable with contemporary difference and complexity.
In the quotation which opened this chapter, Mark referred to 'Dagenham', where 'they 
think that this is the final straw, Ford closes down...  and nobody cares about us, and 
now they're dumping all these foreigners on us'. The story of Barking and Dagenham 
which is most often told is of a 'traditional white working class' community which had 
relied rather heavily on the state and large paternalistic institutions such as the Ford 
car  plant.  Complacency  among  politicians  on  a  traditionally  solidly  Labour  council,  
coupled with industrial decline and new residents moving into the borough as overspill 
from the inner London housing market, are seen as leading to rapid change which has 
overwhelmed long-standing residents. Much resentment for these changes is targeted 
at  growing  numbers  of  ethnic  minority  residents,  with  a  great  deal  of  myths, 
misinformation  and  resentment  circulated  about  'their'  presence  and  the  support 
'they' receive from the state. The connection between this resentment and the election 
of 12 right-wing fascist British National Party councillors to the local authority in 2006 
is the 'perspective' that Mark is referring to in the full quote as 'atypical for London'. It 
is  clear  from many of  my interviews,  and from national  press  coverage and policy 
literature (e.g. Wynne-Jones, 2010; Chappell et al, 2010:3) that the BNP and Barking 
and  Dagenham  have  become  closely  entwined  in  the  popular  imagination.  This 
rhetorical  move  did  not  only  come from Hackney;  as  we saw in  the discussion  of 
213
Oldham above,  both  Anne  and Steve  described an  incident  where  the borough of 
Barking and Dagenham had asked for advice from Oldham on how to deal with BNP 
electoral success. Though Anne and Steve's attitudes to this approach were different, 
both  presented narratives  to me that  emphasised the difference between the two 
authorities in that Oldham, while targeted by the BNP, had never elected one of their 
members to the local authority.62
A different perspective emerged in the following comment from Ed, a national think 
tank researcher:
Ed: But clearly... if the BNP's winning 12 seats on Barking on Dagenham council, 
may win more... may win a seat in the European Parliament... that's not a 
very good... sign about the health of good relations in Britain.
Here, Ed makes a similar move to that discussed above of equating the borough with 
the presence of the BNP. Though Barking and Dagenham had the most elected BNP 
representatives of any local authority in the country, it is by no means the only place 
where they have been elected.63 The association between the place and the party is so 
strong that the place has become a national symbol of disharmony, at least for Ed. The 
locally based policy practitioners I spoke with who associated the place with racism and 
the BNP used it to illustrate the differences from their own locality. Ed, on the other 
hand, suggested this was potentially the future for Britain as a whole. 
Inside Barking and Dagenham
Phil: I'd say one of the issues here is, cos of the speed of change, there's a sense of  
grief... There's definitely a sense of grief. You can see the sort of grief curve 
62 Although between my interviews with Anne and Steve, the BNP did gain the North West of England  
seat for the European Parliament, which includes Oldham in its boundaries.
63 In addition to two seats in the European Parliament and one on the Greater London Authority, the 
BNP has managed to elect councillors including in Blackburn, Bradford, Burnley, Calderdale, Kirklees,  
Sandwell, and Stoke.
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really, denial, anger. Fear and then – all those sorts of things, which people 
have gone through because of the change. And it's happened so quickly. And 
when you talk to people they hanker after this [pause] past which frankly 
didn't  really  exist,  but  all  imagined  with  rose  tinted  spectacles,  everyone 
playing happily in their garden, sticking out there with their doors open and 
all the rest of it... which as I say didn't really exist, but it is very much this 
backward look, something that's been lost.
As  in  Oldham,  the  outsiders'  narrative  is  not  necessarily  disputed  head-on.  Policy 
practitioners in Barking and Dagenham have engaged especially with the explanatory 
elements  of  a  broad  narrative  of  post-industrial  decline  leading  to  exclusion  and 
resentment.  They  try  to  differentiate  Barking  and  Dagenham  from  its  national 
associations by arguing that support for the BNP might be a symptom of this malaise, 
but is not as significant for the borough as it has been made out to be.
In the quote above, Phil,  a senior local  authority officer in Barking and Dagenham, 
engages with this pervasive narrative of loss. He suggests that the local population is 
mourning a golden age – even if this golden age 'didn't really exist'. When Phil refers to  
'change' here, it is in the context of discussing the changing ethnic composition of the 
borough.  He  had  talked  about  nearby  Redbridge  changing  from  'a  very  white 
traditional sort of place, to a predominantly Asian borough' over the course of twenty 
years,  but  suggested  that  the  challenges  in  Barking  and  Dagenham  were  different 
particularly because the change in population there was much faster. Phil related this 
population change to a sense of grief,  of mourning attributed to a long-established 
white  (and  implicitly  working  class)  community.  Phil  describes  local  reactions  in 
therapeutic terms ('the grief curve'), with anger as a natural emotion to be worked 
through, and perhaps associated with the violence of far right politics. Phil takes these 
emotions seriously,  even as he argues that the idyllic  past which is being mourned 
didn't  exist  in  the  terms  it  is  remembered.  This  is  not  to  say  that  changes  in  the 
economy, family structures and local area have not occurred, but Phil's point is that 
these  changes,  and  changes  in  the  ethnic  make-up  of  the  local  population,  have 
become associated  by  some with  the  loss  of  an  idealised  past  which  was  entirely 
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without strife.
June, another senior local authority officer in Barking and Dagenham, continued in a 
similar vein. Her account couples structural and material changes related to housing 
and  employment  with  a  sense  of  mourning  for  the  past  which  she  considers 
'particularly marked' in Barking and Dagenham:
June: As society changed, and as Right to Buy came in which was a very very  
significant factor given the very significant levels of council housing, then that 
change was always going to be more noticeable here, because it was such a 
shift  away  from  the  known,  and  so  you've  got  people  who  are  kind  of 
mourning  the  loss  of  what  was  there  before.  To  an  extent  it's  true  of  
everywhere, but it is particularly marked here.
Hannah: And I mean does that come out – do people express that when they talk  
about the place itself, or that's-
June:  People  certainly  express  regret  that  things  aren't...  the  way  they  were. 
When we said to people how can we improve your area, there was a very 
significant number of people who said, make it the way it was X years ago,  
and X varied from anything from 8 to 80 years ago, but it was always make it  
the way it used to be... So, that is a sign of a community that is mourning its  
past,
Hannah: Sure. And is that young people as well as older people, that came out 
with that?
June: I mean not, certainly, doesn't tend to be young as in terms of school age. 
You will find some sections of the community, sort of twenties and so on, in 
that  they've  heard  it  from  their  parents,  but  obviously  it  is  much  more 
marked in the older age groups and that's because they have that collective 
memory.
June does not here spell  out exactly what 'the past'  entails for the people who are 
characterised as grieving for it. The right of social tenants to buy their properties from 
the  local  authority  was  promoted  by  the  Conservative  government  in  the  1980s, 
reducing the amount of housing stock available for new prospective council  tenants 
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and eventually increasing the number of former council properties which are privately 
let, as their former residents moved to another property. This a factor suggested by a 
number of interviewees as helping to give rise to the myth that new migrants were 
'getting council housing' when they were more likely to be privately renting but in a 
property  otherwise  indistinguishable from the state-run properties  around it.  Aside 
from the housing issue, 'the past' is not specified, and June says that residents wanted 
the area to be 'the way it was anything from 8 to 80 years ago'. This suggests that this  
past  is  somewhat  hazy,  people  having  'heard it  from their  parents'.  The 'collective 
memory' of older age groups evokes this past as something specific, though of course 
collective memory can also be re-imagined. 
June's analysis draws more direct attention to structural changes to life in Barking and 
Dagenham than did Phil's. As such, it might suggest that if there are problems at the 
level of employment and housing, the remedy should be sought at that level. However, 
June also uses the therapeutic language of 'mourning', suggesting policy might engage 
with  issues  in  Barking  and  Dagenham  in  these  terms.  This  differed  from  Ed's 
assessment:
Ed: We've done some focus groups in Barking and Dagenham, where obviously 
the BNP is quite strong on the council... and you just listen to what people 
are  saying  you  think,  we're  not  going  to  solve  any  of  this  by  having  a 
statement of national values or any of this stuff, actually this is about basic 
social and economic issues and it needs a response at that level and... I don't 
think anything that the government says about national identity or any of 
that will actually really cut the mustard at that level. 
Ed here both explicitly states that the election of BNP representatives is a problem, and 
suggests that the subjects to be addressed in Barking and Dagenham are 'basic social 
and  economic  ones',  rejecting  a  response  in  the  register  of  emotion  or  values  as 
inadequate. This is not to say that Ed denies that feelings about place are significant in 
Barking and Dagenham, but his prescription is differently nuanced to those of June and 
Phil. 
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This difference in assessments may be linked to their positions as policy practitioners. 
Ed  is  a  think  tank  commentator  outside  of  the  local  place,  whose  professional 
reputation  is  not  invested  in  its  success;  more  importantly  perhaps,  he  is  not 
responsible for implementing any of the policy prescriptions he makes. This enables 
him to suggest that social and economic issues, which are largely decided nationally, lie 
at the root of Barking and Dagenham's problems. June and Phil, on the other hand, are 
local  government  officers.  Their  positions  are  politically  restricted,  and  they  are 
required to work with councillors of whatever party is elected. More importantly, their 
professional  positions  require  them  to  make  not  only  an  assessment  of  the  local 
situation, but also to intervene. Yet the avenues available for their intervention are 
limited. 
I would suggest that their emphasis on the need to manage a local 'grief curve', rather 
than on addressing underlying economic and political issues they see as contributing to 
this grief, is determined by what interventions seem possible at a local level. I do not 
mean to suggest that the emotional grief response that these interviewees described 
was  not  real  or  significant,  or  that  they  did  not  require  intervention.  Rather,  the 
emphasis on issues of emotion, presentation and narrative arises because political and 
bureaucratic  structures  make  it  easier  for  local  government  to  intervene  in  those 
terms, than to effect large-scale structural and economic change. The perhaps counter-
intuitive result is that in maintaining the guise of 'neutral bureaucrat', June and Phil are 
led to emphasise  emotional techniques and outcomes of governing, in preference to 
more materially-based ones.
Rebranding: 'A positive catalyst'
Phil: A very important part of our approach, and you'll hear... our Chief Exec, say  
this, is that... he didn't want Barking [and] Dagenham to only be known as 
'the BNP council'...  It was only ever mentioned in that context... and so he in 
particular, and us as well, spent a lot of time trying to be known for other 
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things. So being the most improved council last year, going to four stars and 
improving  stronger,  all  that performance stuff,  and getting  I  think  quite  a 
good reputation on the national stage around policy, developing innovation 
and free school meals, and pre-schooling and all this sort of stuff, it's been 
really important to us, obviously, for its own sake as well... But also to say 
that  actually  Barking  and  Dagenham  is  much  more  than  just  12  BNP 
councillors...  and in  fact,  the BNP hardly  figure  really  in  our  thinking...  In 
many ways that's a quite positive catalyst and I think that national attention,  
because we have lots of people come here, ministers, senior civil servants, 
coming all the time now, a lot of them will come and then the first thing in 
their mind is BNP and how does that affect, but, very quickly, hopefully... they 
see all the other stuff we're doing and actually that the BNP's a very little, 
very small, minor part of it and it's the other stuff that's important... so I see 
it as a very positive thing, if it gets us some attention great, and then we can 
use that attention positively to show what we're doing.
Phil acknowledges that the BNP looms large in outsiders' perceptions of the borough, 
and indeed is the reason for a lot of interest. But he insists that not only is the BNP a 
'minor'  part  of  life  in  the  borough,  but  that  the  attention  (which  he  describes  as 
warranting 'monthly' visits from ministers and civil servants concerned about the BNP 
presence)  will  quickly  turn  to  the  achievements  of  the  council  and  partners.  He 
describes this as a 'very positive thing' as it is an opportunity to promote work being 
developed  in  services  which  would  otherwise  not  receive  publicity  or  national 
government visits. In some ways Phil's insistence seems unrealistic, as it is clear that 
the  association  of  the  borough  with  the  BNP  has  not  been  removed  yet  by  this  
approach. Even my presence, as I discussed with him, was part of this process, and Phil  
cited  many  instances  of  innovative  work  to  me,  as  part  of  the  same  strategy  of 
presentation to outsiders. 
This seemed to be part of a corporate strategy, providing a narrative that demonstrated 
a measured response to the election of the BNP. June's account is a good example:
June: The other big angle here that obviously everybody is conscious of was the 
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election results in May 06 which brought the BNP opposition in... now I have 
to say, that hasn't affected council  policy, they're a tiny minority and they 
don't affect the policy of the council. It's brought a lot of extra attention to 
us. But probably what it did do was just make us particularly more conscious 
or refocus our efforts a) to be concerned for how it would feel to be, say, a 
BME member of the public living in the borough... but also to recognise that 
people voted the way that they did because they had legitimate concerns 
and therefore we needed to address those.
June acknowledged that the election of the BNP had brought attention to the borough 
but suggested that the main impact of this had been to 'refocus' existing efforts of the 
council to deal with the feelings of those threatened by the BNP, and the reasons that  
others had chosen to vote for them. 
In  these  narratives,  the  importance  of  the  election  of  these  representatives  was 
minimised (they were only 12 councillors on a local authority of 51 members, which 
remained Labour-led by a large majority) and their impact on policy dismissed. Instead, 
the impact of their election was described as a 'wake-up call' to local organisations to 
pay attention to the reasons these votes may have been cast. These were treated as 
protest  votes  about  socio-economic  issues  and  failures  of  local  institutions  and 
leadership, rather than as expressing support for the policies of the BNP.  Liam, as a 
voluntary sector leader, gave one account of this:
Liam:  A  lot  of  our  staff  are  volunteers,  so  we reflect  local  communities,  both 
negatively  as  well  as  positively...  We are  having  to  deal  with  those  same 
issues within the sector... but are not shying away from it... If anything the 
BNP are helping us to focus on the fact that we can't ignore this.
Liam  argued  that  as  a  group  of  local  organisations,  the  voluntary  sector  used  the 
election result to understand opinions and issues in the borough. They were also made 
up of local residents and so likely to replicate some of the tensions outside, including 
representatives who may have voted for the BNP, or those who felt threatened by their 
presence, and residents experiencing the structural and emotional upheavals others 
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had identified. This sense of  being,  rather than  managing,  'the community' seemed 
less  strong  in  the  other  accounts  I  gathered  from  Barking  and  Dagenham  policy 
practitioners, who talked about the questions of mourning a lost past as something 
that others (the residents of Barking and Dagenham) were doing, and not something in 
which they themselves were involved.  This  is  in  marked contrast  to the way many 
people I interviewed in Oldham, Peterborough and especially Hackney were at pains to 
demonstrate  that  they  were part  of  the  local  community,  slipping  between seeing 
themselves  as  governors  and  part  of  the  population  being  governed.  Perhaps  the 
reason for this tendency to maintain a greater distance in Barking and Dagenham was 
linked to the very difficulty of finding a way to align oneself with a community who 
were  being  constituted  through  the  problem  of  them  having  elected  far  right 
representatives.
One of the striking instances of positive news that Phil  was keen to promote as an 
alternative Barking and Dagenham headline was as 'the most improved council  last 
year'. This referred to the borough's triumph in the category of 'most improved council' 
at  the Local  Government Chronicle  Awards in 2008.  Of  course,  this  is  a  somewhat 
dubious  honour,  as  it  does  tend  to  suggest  starting  from  a  rather  low  base  of 
performance; it is also a title claimed by Hackney in 2009. This turn of phrase, and its  
context, demonstrates how any positive claim to good performance is leapt upon in the 
relationship  between  a  local  authority  and  its  outside  partners.  Phil's  comments 
suggest that the reputation of the place is critical to policy practitioners working there, 
even if (or perhaps because) a 'brand' such as 'the BNP council' seems incredibly hard 
to shift. Before discussing the reasons for this importance, I will consider the place that 
Peterborough takes up in narratives of cohesion.
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Peterborough: 'All these East Europeans flooding in, picking all our tomatoes...'
Approaching Peterborough
Philippa: The growth of the European Community and a lot of migrants coming in, 
they  miscalculated  and  then  suddenly  there  were  all  these...  rural 
communities with migrants, that had never experienced that sort of thing,  
and that's the background to the community and integration commission.
Philippa, who worked for a local  government research organisation, gave a succinct 
account  of  the  relationship  she  saw  between  rurality,  EU  migration,  and  the 
development  of  community  cohesion  policy,  and how it  was  treated as  a  problem 
requiring attention through a national policy commission. Though it is not as resonant 
a metonym as Barking and Dagenham or Oldham, Peterborough or 'places like it' were 
frequently invoked in discussions of cohesion to refer to such a rural or semi-rural place 
and its associations. 
Philippa  refers  to  miscalculations,  by  which  she  means  the  predictions  that  the 
expansion of the EU in 2004 might lead to between 5,000 and 13,000 migrants a year  
to the UK from the A8 accession countries (Dustmann et al, 2003:57). In practice the 
numbers were much larger than that, with a peak of 112,000 A8 migrants arriving in 
the UK in 2007 (though these figures have fallen since, and there is also considerable 
out-migration)  (Vargas-Silva,  2011:4).  Philippa  emphasises  that  the  arrival  of  new 
migrants in rural areas 'that had never experienced that sort of thing' was treated as a 
national  problem to the extent that it  was directly related to the instigation of the 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2006. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, 
other narratives of cohesion policy consider that Commission a response to the London 
bombings  of  2005.  The  point  here,  though,  is  that  the  idea  of  rural  communities 
coming to terms with substantial immigration for the first time is geographically rooted 
in the narratives of policy practitioners. 
The association with Peterborough emerged in Mark's reference in the opening of this 
chapter to 'the Peterboroughs of this world' where people 'worry about all these East 
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Europeans flooding in, picking all our tomatoes'. It appeared again when interviewing 
Michelle, a leading councillor in Hackney:
Hannah:  How  this  discourse  on  cohesion...  [has]  affected  your  work?...  Either 
explicitly or implicitly changed what you do?
Michelle: I think it's something I'm aware of in terms of newspapers and... actually 
I'm from Peterborough...  I  don't know if  you're familiar with the issues in  
Peterborough and everyone is saying that all the Polish are taking their jobs 
and they've had lots of bad press about that so – and I guess as a councillor if  
you  were  in  there  or  maybe  Brad  –  or  somewhere...  you'd  be  asked  to 
comment on it, I've never been asked to talk about it, explicitly.
Though Michelle draws on Peterborough partly because she is familiar  with it  as a 
former resident, she uses it to illustrate a contrast with the Hackney experience in line 
with the narrative of newly arrived Eastern European migrants resented by existing 
local residents who see them as competitors in the labour market. Note that despite 
her familiarity with Peterborough, Michelle emphasises perceptions of the place, rather 
than  discussing  immigration  patterns  or  labour  market  dynamics  themselves 
('everyone is saying', 'they've had lost of bad press'). She suggests that the narrative of 
new immigration, and hostility to it, is part of a landscape of cohesion, when she makes 
(or  almost  makes)  the  link  with  Bradford  as  somewhere  that,  like  Peterborough, 
councillors  would  'be  asked  to  comment  on  it'.  These  allusions  demonstrate  that 
Peterborough and Bradford are part of the narrative of cohesion policy in a way that 
Hackney  is  not.  Others  (perhaps  national  or  local  press  or  local  government 
organisations)  who  might  have  otherwise  asked  her  to  comment  in  terms  of 
community cohesion appear to share this understanding.
Sam, also a senior elected member in Hackney, similarly draws on Peterborough and its  
surrounding area as a contrast, to demonstrate a greater comfort with migration in 
frequently changing inner London:
Hannah: Just to go back to the kind of community cohesion idea itself, I mean do 
you  see  it  linked  to  other  types  of  policies  that  –  say  equalities,  social 
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inclusion, immigration policies even, or is it – I mean you talked about the 
link with the Prevent stuff,
Sam: I can see it  does nationally...  hugely, particularly on Eastern Europeans in 
East Anglia and all that kind of thing... on the farms and stuff, but Hackney [4  
second  pause]  it's  [3  second  pause]  it's  never  really...  come  up  in  those 
terms... Let me qualify that by saying a great deal.
Sam's reference to 'Eastern Europeans in East Anglia',  and to potential conflict over 
labour migration 'on farms and stuff', situates problems with integrating new migrants 
in the countryside. 
Perceptions of migration as a cause of conflict over resources and consequent hostility 
to migrants has 'never really come up in those terms' according to Sam. In this, he also 
made a contrast between Hackney and narratives of Barking and Dagenham, saying 
political arguments in Hackney about 'the white working class not being able to get 
their kids a flat on their estate', which is 'only a few steps away' from it being 'because 
they're all going to somebody else' had never been a significant electoral issue for him;  
he had heard such racialised arguments about immigration and resource competition 
only 'once or twice in ten years, I mean I've probably heard that Elvis is still alive more 
often'.
Inside Peterborough
Hannah: Is that how you, how people in Peterborough think of the place, that it  
was  kind  of  fairly  homogeneous  and  suddenly  had  to  cope  with  new 
migration?
Ahmed: I think to a certain extent that is true... it was not fairly homogeneous, it  
was always a diverse community but that was a much more settled diverse 
community, there was a heavy number of Italians were here, but they were 
fairly well... cohesive or at least getting on with their life... there were a lot of  
Asians, relatively speaking, for a small place but they were still settled and 
getting on with their lives in a way, sometime, frankly, there might be a level 
of  segregation [but]...  it  was kind of not  problematic,  in a  way, but then 
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when with  the Eastern Europeans,  the wave of  it,  first  it  was the asylum 
seekers... and that kind of really injected a kind of bang, what is this?... Then  
this  wave  of  migrations  from  the  Eastern  European  problem,  that  is 
unprecedented for Peterborough in such a short time.
Ahmed worked on community cohesion policy in Peterborough. His narrative is at once 
in keeping with the narrative of a 'much more settled community' confronted with 'this 
wave of migrations that is unprecedented'. However, he complicates this in two ways. 
The first is to suggest that the existing, settled community was not an undifferentiated 
white, British population but included immigrant and immigrant-heritage communities 
from Italy and parts of Asia. In his account of this population (and of this time) he tries 
to  strike  a  balance  between  presenting  an  overly  nostalgic  image  or  an  overly 
problematic one. The second addition to the narrative is the first 'wave' of migration 
from 'asylum seekers' which 'really injected a kind of bang, what is this?' before the 
politicised and publicised arrival  of  Eastern European labour  migrants  (see Chapter 
Three). Despite trying to take this balanced tone, and perhaps despite himself, Ahmed 
consistently used terms like 'Eastern European  problem' (my emphasis)  to  describe 
migration. 
A slightly different inflection was given by Colin, a Peterborough councillor who, when I  
interviewed him, had only days before been given responsibility for the cohesion brief 
with  the  Council's  Cabinet.  His  account  was  extremely  positive,  responding  to  my 
questions about perceptions of Peterborough by saying it was 'just the opposite of the 
national  image,  it's  a  fantastic  place'  –  though  he  did  not  elaborate  on  what  he 
understood 'the national image' of Peterborough to be, beyond my own suggestion 
about the narratives I  had encountered of Peterborough as unused to immigration. 
Colin attempted to disrupt this narrative, like Ahmed describing the establishment of 
an Italian immigrant community following the second world war, and the consequent 
presence  of  'third  generation  Italians'  who  are  'of  course  British  now'.  He  also 
described a 'huge influx' of mainly Pakistani migrants to Peterborough in the late 1980s 
and  early  1990s,  followed  by  a  'huge  influx'  of  economic  migrants  from  the  EU 
accession  countries.  Rather  than  a  town  unused  to  immigration,  Colin  described 
225
Peterborough  as  a  place  enveloping  successive  flows  of  migrants,  and  while  he 
described the descendants of Italian migrants as 'British now', his narrative was one of 
partial  assimilation, claiming that different migrant groups were linked to particular 
industries (Italians largely bricklayers, Asians working in taxis, shops and clothing, and 
Eastern  Europeans  in  agriculture)  and that  there  were  'areas  peculiar  to  particular 
people', that is, some level of voluntary segregation. This differentiation was seen as 
part of a multiculturalist model of living side by side, 'very multinational, almost like 
the UN'.
Whereas  Colin  provided  an  overwhelmingly  positive  narrative  of  cohesion  in 
Peterborough (perhaps sometimes tinged with a rather patronising tone), Amrit, who 
worked in race equality in Peterborough, weighed negative stories about new Eastern 
European migrants  against  positive  personal  encounters  with them. He added that 
regardless of  the good character or  otherwise of  new arrivals,  the rapid change in 
demographics had startled existing residents:
Amrit:  It  is  a  fact  that  Peterborough was a  reception  centre  for  refugees  and 
asylum seekers... It is a fact that we have a large number of Polish, and East 
European countries, the chief constable will say to you that it is a fact that a 
large number of drink drunk offences are from A10 countries, okay? And it is  
also  a  fact  that  the  prison  population  from  A10  countries  is  actually 
increasing. That doesn't mean they're a bunch of criminals... Because some 
of the nicest people I've come across recently are people from Poland and 
the A10 countries... Having said that, it's what I was saying to you earlier, this 
is  the  sheer  scale  of  things  that  have  happened...  which  is  beginning  to 
frighten people. Rightly or wrongly, they are frightened about it.
Though Amrit's caveat about 'some of the nicest people' coming from A10 countries 
may seem to echo a traditionally mocked denial of racism ('some of my best friends are 
black' – see also Van Dijk (1992:89)), I think that here it is really intended to act as a 
'myth-busting' technique. That is, Amrit really does want to insist that there is 'a lot to 
learn from them'. As a long-standing race equality campaigner, and a migrant himself 
(as a refugee from Uganda in the 1970s) Amrit is able to take a relatively sophisticated 
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position  in  his  narrative  of  cohesion  and  immigration  in  Peterborough.  He 
acknowledges  that  there  are  difficulties  with  some  migrants,  but  wants  to  avoid 
stereotyping the whole group. He also offers an explanation of the conflict arising from 
migration as an emotional reaction to process and structure,  rather than rooted in 
individual  faults ('the sheer scale of things,  which is beginning to frighten people'). 
Amrit's account moves away from a simplified characterisation of Peterborough as a 
marker of new immigration, through a more detailed chronology. In his account, Amrit 
attempts shift the debate from a binary idea of  migration and migrants (or  people 
fearful of migration and migrants) being either 'good' or 'bad'. 
Erin, who worked for a community organisation in Peterborough, gave an example of 
the area's contemporary multicuture in practice. She tells of a conflict that escalated in 
the national and local media after two nights of 'what the papers called rioting but the 
police called disturbances'  involving a  group of  newly arrived Kurdish migrants  and 
some members of the established Pakistani community:
Erin: What they [journalists] did was they found the Kurdish café where the young 
lads hang out... and they interviewed the one person there who spoke the 
best English who happened to be a young lad that was a bit cocky... but he  
was actually just a young lad...  interviewed by the media, stuff he said was  
terrible, it was things like, Pakistanis are all bad... And for the media it was 
like, see, these foreign people that are involved in wars can't live like us, don't  
understand British values, Pakistani community have lived here so long now, 
they're like, they are British, you know, it was all that sort of feeling going on 
about new arrivals.
Here, Erin is not describing her own perception of the differences between the two 
groups, but the way they were characterised in the media. Part of her point was that 
without  established community  organisations  or  networks,  newly  arrived groups of 
migrants were still treated as somehow bounded communities, from whom media (and 
government)  sought  spokespersons  (a  tendency  perhaps  reflected  also  in  Colin's 
comments, quoted above, about the city being 'like the United Nations' – if this is read 
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as  people  existing  peacefully,  but  separately,  alongside  one  another  in  a  form  of 
segmented  integration).  While  there  was  an  established  Pakistani  Community 
Association whose head had been given media training and gave a 'really  positive' 
statement about problems being with 'just a few individuals', so both groups should 'sit 
down and sort  out the problems',  the absence of  such a structure for  the Kurdish 
migrants led to a much less temperate account being sourced from 'a young lad' who 
perhaps had thought less about how his statement might be used. Erin described this 
as providing an opportunity for media outlets to not only invoke an idea of a lack of 
'British values' among 'these foreign people', but to underline their point while at the 
same time insulating themselves from accusations of xenophobia by contrasting the 
young  man's  response  with  that  of  the  'Pakistani  community'  who  were  seen  as 
successfully  absorbing  these  'British  values'  (echoing  Colin's  statement  about 
descendants of Italian migrants being 'British now').
Colin,  Ahmed  and  to  some  extent  Erin  all  suggest  that  Peterborough  policy 
practitioners view the town as having been fairly comfortable with a level of relatively 
long-standing ethnic difference. They resist the characterisation of the place as entirely 
untouched by migration in the past and so somehow unsophisticated. Instead, they 
suggest that what residents found hard to deal with was not the fact of migration, but  
the scale  and character  of  more recent  migrations.  But,  as  previous  chapters  have 
shown, there are other aspects to community cohesion policy besides migration. In 
Peterborough, the local authority takes in the city and its surrounding countryside. It 
seemed to me that this might present particular ways of thinking about cohesion, in 
terms of both comfort with change, diversity and migration, and competing priorities 
between rural and urban residents.
At the end of my meeting with Colin, the councillor, he began to describe a 'divide' 
between  urban  and  rural  areas  of  Peterborough.  He  said  that  as  the  elected 
representative for a rural area, he had taken steps to introduce urban and rural people 
to one another, 'and that's community cohesion too'. Stuart, a senior local authority 
officer in Peterborough, provided more detailed comments on the subject:
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Stuart: There's a massive difference between the urban and rural areas around 
our city. You've got one of the most deprived wards right in the centre, where 
you've got some really rich, affluent areas right out here on the outskirts, and 
their  views of life will  be poles apart.  It's  interesting to go to [one of the  
village halls] for a meeting where, as a Peterborian, I'm told there – cos they 
see themselves as a separate and distinct community – we would love to put 
a wall around our village to prevent people from Peterborough coming into 
it!
Hannah: Yeah
Stuart: [laughs] So you really have got people that are massively different in their 
views and opinions, and you've gotta reflect that in the service provision that 
you give. And I think that's right to reflect that. But they can also become 
equally  as  scared  and  have  really  complex  community  cohesion  issues,  I  
mean there is a report around a potential Travellers' site being built in what is 
probably one of the most beautiful areas that we've got on the outskirts of 
our city, surrounded by some of the richest houses that we've got and that 
will cause distinct fears and worries for that community if we don't manage it 
properly.
Here, Stuart characterises an urban-rural divide not only on the basis of location, but 
also in terms of economic difference; of place attachment and belonging; of 'views and 
opinions';  and  of  ethnicity.  Stuart  describes  rural  communities  expressing  a  strong 
sense of local  belonging, which they construct in opposition to 'others', even those 
who might see themselves as fellow 'Peterborians'. The example of controversy over 
the building of a Travellers' site as part of a much larger housing development brings 
together  the  entanglements  between  power  struggles  invoking  class,  ethnicity, 
belonging, nation and access to basic resources. Potentially, thinking about the rights 
of different groups in the countryside and the city to space and particularly to dwelling, 
could be an opening for exploring different inflections of community cohesion policy in 
Peterborough, beyond the narrative of coping with new international immigration in 
which  it  is  usually  understood  This  might  open  up  questions  of  distribution  of 
economic resources locally and nationally. However, as I will discuss in the next section, 
the  tactics  for  regaining  control  of  Peterborough's  community  cohesion  narratives 
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which  I  found  among  local  practitioners  were  not  to  reject  or  complicate  these 
narratives, but to work within their logics.
Rebranding: 'a city that has had massive change and found ways of dealing with it'.
City  MP Stewart  Jackson claims Peterborough should fight back against  recent 
negative national press by highlighting its good points. In recent weeks national 
newspapers  have  highlighted  squalid  migrant  camps  in  the  city  and  alleged 
Peterborough is  'overrun'  with immigrants who are stretching city  schools  and 
services to breaking point... Mr Jackson says: 'Peterborough needs to hit back hard 
with a positive and compelling narrative about the city’s strengths.' (Reville, 2010).
The local press story above highlights the importance that Peterborough's MP, Stewart 
Jackson,  places  upon  the  reputation  the  area  has  nationally.  Jackson  is  quoted  as 
directly addressing the power of 'compelling narrative'. The article refers to a 1980s 
television advertising campaign which used the slogan 'The Peterborough Effect' and 
an actor dressed as a Roman centurion to promote positive messages about 'how the 
city had moved on since the Roman times'.64 Jackson urges that this should be revived, 
'to get our message across in London and beyond, to the opinion formers and decision 
takers who can make things happen' (Jackson, 2010). Once again, the negative stories 
that are to be refuted centre on immigration and link new arrivals to the city with  
pressure on public services and 'squalid' improvised housing. This news story and the 
comment piece to which it refers are not aiming to change the thinking (or practice) on 
'problems with migration', but to put that narrative to one side in favour of associating 
Peterborough with 'strengths' instead. 
Ahmed, as  a  local  authority officer  directly involved in developing local  community 
cohesion policy, voiced a different strategy which might address the issues of housing 
need or stretched public services while contextualising the role of immigration in these 
pressures:
64 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vkga1cGex4E  
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Ahmed: The first top priority now, is socio-economic impact...  on communities,  
particularly  vis  à vis  migration,  economic  downturn,  and  homelessness... 
we're  also trying  to  change it  around [so]  it's  not  looking  at  the migrant 
worker  and  the  issues  they  cost...  it's  as  a  social  impact  on  the  wider 
community.
Ahmed described how the Local Strategic Partnership wanted to move on from simply 
looking at the needs of new migrants, to looking at service needs. The intention was 
not to remove migration from the discussion, but to think about 'social impact on the 
wider  community',  including both migrants  and non-migrants,  of  questions such as 
'economic downturn' and 'homelessness'.  Despite Ahmed's suggestion that this had 
been agreed as the new strategy for local leaders, the examples of how the area had 
been 'rebranded' to change national perceptions of local community cohesion used 
quite different narratives.
I found that policy practitioners did describe ways they had reached 'opinion formers 
and decision takers' with messages that Peterborough was coping with new migration. 
The principal approach was not a traditional marketing campaign using advertisements 
to appeal to residents or investors. Rather, policy practitioners presented their local 
situation to national policy makers within the terms of community cohesion narratives, 
as a place with potential for successful government intervention promoting community 
cohesion. As a result, the local authority was able to promote itself as an example of 
good practice from which others could learn, and  this became the narrative lens for 
understanding  Peterborough's  relationship  to  community  cohesion  policy.  Erin 
described it thus:
Erin: I think we've been seen as a city that has had massive change but has tried to 
find ways of dealing with it... whereas a lot of cities have had massive change 
but haven't really woken up to the fact. 
This reputation of having 'woken up' to massive change and finding 'ways of dealing 
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with  it'  was  one  that  had  been  negotiated  through  specific  appeals  to  central 
government framed in the place-based community cohesion narratives with which we 
have become familiar:
Erin:  So it  all  got  a  bit  tense and resulted in  the different agencies  that  were 
working together... saying look we need to try and get some funding from 
government to deal with this before we have a Oldham and Bradford riot... so 
the police, the council, and health went to the Home Office and said if you 
give  us  some  money  we  will  do  lots  of  work  to  make  things  better  in  
Peterborough... projects that will help new arrivals to integrate... and if we 
stop a riot, it means that we'll save Peterborough five million, because that's 
how much it cost the Bradford and Oldham riots per night... I mean it's a bit –  
weird.
Erin  describes  how  local  agencies  negotiated  with  central  government  to  provide 
funding to Peterborough for services to support the integration of new arrivals. This 
was  initially  to  support  the  use  of  Peterborough  as  a  dispersal  centre  for  asylum 
seekers. Erin suggests that the most effective way to convince central government to 
release  funds  was  to  argue  for  the  need  to  prevent  disorder,  with  the  ability  to 
measure the projected effects of this in monetary terms. The 'Oldham and Bradford 
riot' is invoked not only as a spectre of the worst-case scenario of failed community 
cohesion,  foreshadowed by  previous  outbreaks  of  racialised  violence.  'Oldham and 
Bradford riots' are also important as a yardstick for justifying intervention in terms of 
good accounting, as much as good politics. Though Erin's comment that 'it's a bit – 
weird' suggests she sees some incongruity in deciding to prevent civil disturbances on 
the basis of a financial analysis, she is politically savvy enough to see this as a privileged 
technology  of  persuasion  in  intra-government  negotiations.  From  being  principally 
associated with community  cohesion problems (according to another Peterborough 
practitioner, the city featured in the national  community tension team's monitoring 
report  every  week  because  of  the  potential  for  a  riot),  Erin  suggested  that 
Peterborough was now seen as having a national reputation as a community cohesion 
success story.
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Conclusions
Through this chapter,  I  have shown how three places have been used in anecdotal 
understandings  of  community  cohesion  policy,  by  policy  practitioners  anxious  to 
distinguish their own locality from problem scenarios of community cohesion. I have 
discussed how, within each of these places, policy practitioners recognise the labels 
that  have  been  attached  to  their  area,  and  try  to  complicate  these  narratives  by 
producing  more  nuanced  accounts  drawing  on  their  local  knowledge  (and  how 
resenting their area's associations with community tensions of one sort  or  another 
does not prevent policy practitioners from talking in this way about other places). In 
each  of  the  three  places,  I  have  shown  how  policy  practitioners  have  taken  this 
reputational work further. Rather than devoting all of their energies to negating the 
associations between the place and narratives of community cohesion problems, many 
have tried to lever this notoriety to their locality's advantage.  They have promoted 
Oldham as a community cohesion success story from which others can learn; they have 
tried to use national  attention to showcase social  inclusion projects in Barking and 
Dagenham; and they have secured national funding and support for services to new 
residents in Peterborough by arguing that the place's risky community cohesion status 
required intervention.
In  each  of  these  three  examples,  this  rebranding  has  taken  place  within  policy 
practitioners'  professional  circles.  Their  associations  with  significant  events  in  the 
development of community cohesion policy exist in wider public culture, and to some 
extent the policy practitioners I interviewed described ways they had tried to challenge 
this (for example, the One Oldham local branding campaign for residents, and attempts 
by each of them to attract positive coverage in national media). But their main focus 
was on the perceptions of their colleagues in national government, local government, 
and associated bodies.  This  is,  of  course,  the arena in  which  'community  cohesion 
policy' (in those terms) is a topic of most interest. It is where performance indicators,  
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league tables, inspection reports, beacon status, achievement awards, sharing of good 
practice,  conference  appearances,  case  studies  and  toolkits  are  currencies  of 
reputation  and reward,  both  institutionally  and individually.  These  are  reputational 
tools through which local government negotiates power (on behalf of residents). They 
rely  on persuasive  (and hence affective)  narratives.  In  order  to be persuasive,  and 
easily  understood,  policy  practitioners  often  knowingly  simplify  such  narratives, 
creating  silences  around  difficult  subjects  which  are  hard  to  address  forthrightly 
because  of  the  uncomfortable  positions  they  reveal  about  the  limited  power  local 
government has over decisions about and reputation of its territory.
When it is not possible to disassociate from community cohesion policy, it becomes 
necessary to either fight against, or work within it. In this chapter we have seen how 
policy practitioners conduct such negotiations with regard to place. Chapter Seven will 
address how policy practitioners fit themselves into narratives of community cohesion, 
policy making, and government.
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Chapter Seven: 'You need to be totally objective, but you can't be'
Introduction
Previous chapters have considered how difficult subjects are narrated and negotiated 
in relation to different topics, times, and places. In this chapter, drawing on interviews 
from  all  of  the  local  and  national  research  sites,  I  concentrate  on  how  policy 
practitioners talk about community cohesion policy and the difficult subjects it invokes 
in relation to themselves,  how they locate themselves and are located by others. I 
argue that for the most part, the trope of the situated subject and situated knowledges 
have entered the 'common sense' of policy practice in such a way that all interviewees 
said,  in  one  way  or  another,  that  their  biography  influenced  their  practice.  Some 
interviewees appeared to feel  obliged to describe their  viewpoint as particular,  but 
would then refer to this particular viewpoint as a 'neutral'  one. Other interviewees 
emphasised values and ethics of equality and inclusivity which motivated them in their 
work and life; sometimes this involved resisting identity politics, at other times linking 
personal experiences of marginalisation to political commitments. For many, affiliation 
with  'difference'  and  ideals  of  equality  was  demonstrated  through  living  in 
multicultural  areas  (particularly  when bringing up children)  or  through their  career 
choices. For others, understanding their own viewpoint as particular was not felt as a 
special obligation in work contexts, but experienced as a way of being in the world.  
This  chapter explores the extent to which interviewees'  own social  positioning was 
drawn on as a resource with which to negotiate difficult subjects; and the extent to 
which it became a difficult subject in itself, to be negotiated around.
This is tied up in many interviewees' narratives with moments at which they recognise 
their identification (by other people) as somehow marginal – as 'a problem' (Du Bois,  
1994  [1903]:1;  Fanon,  2008  [1952];  Lorde,  1984).  Whether  or  not  an  epiphanic 
moment (Denzin, 1989) could be identified, many interviewees made claims to a form 
of 'double consciousness' in which a 'sense of always looking at one's self through the 
eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused 
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contempt  and  pity'  (Du  Bois,  1994  [1903]:2)  enabled  them  to  recognise  the 
ambiguities, power struggles and complications of others' lives.
The  types  of  'difference'  or  'problem'  interviewees felt  themselves  to constitute  in 
particular situations varied widely, in terms of the trauma of this experience, the ease 
with which one could avoid this identification (or  'pass')  by changing behaviours or 
contexts, or the persistence or interactions of such identifications. Of most concern in 
this  chapter  are  the  ways  interviewees  used  such  narratives  as  a  resource  in 
negotiating difficult subjects: as claims to authenticity, as claims to authority, as claims 
to understanding or knowledge, or as claims to a lack of any of these.
These questions  go beyond concerns about  complex,  fluid or  multiple  identities  as 
discussed  in  the  literature  on  intersectionality  (e.g.  Anthias  and  Yuval-Davis,  1983; 
Crenshaw, 1994; McCall,  2005; Valentine, 2007). To understand these positionings, I 
draw  on  feminist,  post-colonial  and  queer  writings  about  'passing'  which  build  on 
standpoint theory and elaborate on ways to consider difference without reinforcing 
hierarchical  categories  of  domination  by  considering  the  subject  who  passes  or  is 
'passed' by others (passing between a category in which one feels oneself to belong 
and  a  category  one  claims  or  is  assigned)  (Ahmed,  2000:125-133;  Ali,  2003:12-14; 
Haritaworn et al, 2008; Izakson, 1995; Walker, 1993). Where the difference between 
these  categories  is  embedded  in  status  and  power  differences,  being  assigned  or 
claiming an identity 'up' the social hierarchy can produce ambiguous feelings for those 
who have learnt that they do not 'really' belong to that category. Yet there is also  a 
consideration in some of this literature of what happens when privileged subjects make 
claims to marginality and how or whether this can ever be received, or experienced, as 
authentic (e.g. hooks,  1990; Piper, 2002; Skeggs, 2001; Ware, 2002).  Specifically, the 
parallels with work on 'passing' are the structuring of power relations involved in the 
different forms of passing or critical self-identification; the moral ambiguity that many 
(but not all)  suggested they experienced because of  the risk  of  being perceived as 
inauthentic in some way; and in the disruptive or uncomfortable positions that many 
(but not all) interviewees asserted.
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My analysis of the positions interviewees took builds on debates about the proper role 
of a 'neutral' bureaucrat, demonstrating how policy practitioners often recognised the 
impossibility of  neutrality even whilst  it  remained an ideal,  and found strategies to 
negotiate this difficulty.  Those interviewees who found the least problematically self-
exculpatory position to understand their relationship to their work were those who 
found ways to keep their subject position uncomfortable; to keep questions open and 
unstable, but nevertheless to take a position (Hunter, 2010; Keith, 2008b). This, I would 
argue, is a way of 'choosing the margin' in the sense I understand bell hooks' call, as a 
call to solidarity (hooks, 1990; see Chapter Two).  This is different to 'passing' where 
passing  is  understood as  a  move  between  two theoretically  stable  categories,  and 
choosing the margin means openly disrupting those categories.
Reflexivity as reflex action
The  recognition  that  all  knowledge  is  situated  (Haraway,  1988)  appeared  to  have 
become received wisdom for  my interviewees.  Following the emphasis  the first  six 
participants  gave  to  personal  narratives  in  pilot  interviews,  I  asked  all  remaining 
interviewees, towards the end of the interview, whether (and if so how) they felt their 
own  identity,  background  and  experiences  might  affect  their  understandings  of 
community cohesion policy (see also Hoggett et al, 2006a, 2006b; Hunter, 2003; Mayo 
et  al,  2007).  Initial  reactions  varied;  some were taken aback  and hesitated,  before 
articulating for what they suggested was the first time their personal relationship to 
their work and these subjects. Many of these interviewees would comment on how 
interesting it was to think of their work in this way, and seemed genuinely pleased to 
consider  these  subjects  in  what  appeared  to  be  a  fresh  way,  albeit  that  most 
interviewees  had  already  used  personal  narratives  to  negotiate  our  discussions  of 
community  cohesion  policy  throughout  the  interview.  The  second  broad  type  of 
response  was  an  immediate  assertion,  either  that  everyone's  understandings  are 
always  influenced  by  their  background,  identity  and  experiences;  or  that  this  was 
certainly true of  the interviewee personally.  By far the most common reaction was 
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agreement,  more  or  less  in  one  of  these  two  forms.  And  even  those  who  stated 
categorically that they were entirely unaffected by such influences stated elsewhere in 
the interview that their background had shaped them. 
I will demonstrate how the idea of situated knowledge has become a form of received 
wisdom using extracts from two quite different interview encounters. Alice was a long-
standing colleague of mine who had been aware of and supportive of my research 
project for some time, and a senior officer within Hackney who therefore might well be 
expected  to  be  conversant  with  policy  and  political  debates  about  identity  and 
inequality. Donald, a senior officer in a free market think tank, was less concerned in 
his day-to-day work with issues he classed as related to diversity or equality.  Their  
(party) political persuasions were also divergent, Alice being a member of the Labour 
Party and Donald's work very closely associated with the Conservative Party. Firstly, 
Alice:
Hannah: Do you think that your background or identity or whatever, affects how 
you think about cohesion?
Alice: Yeah I'm sure it does.
Hannah: Mmhm
Alice:  Erm...  [6  second  pause]  Yeah.  I  don't  know  how  though,  cos  I  haven't  
thought about that [laughs]  erm which you obviously  should do...  I  don't 
think  about  my  own  background  and  identity,  I  think  about  what  is 
fundamental to... my beliefs about what is important, which is that you treat 
everyone equally... I'd rather work and live in an environment where there's a 
range of different people from different places, cos that's considerably more 
interesting than living in a place... that is quite monocultural.
Here, Alice immediately agrees that she is 'sure' her background does affect how she 
thinks about cohesion, but is then much more hesitant in finding the words to explore 
how and in what respects this might be the case. Alice seems to feel obliged to exhibit  
an  awareness  of  social  positioning,  yet  not  to  have  articulated  this  to  herself  in  a 
narrative  that  is  readily  drawn on in  the  interview situation.  What  I  want  to  note 
especially here is that Alice does not seem surprised by this question, and indeed she  
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appears  to  have  a  strong  sense  of  what  the  answer  'should'  be.  Throughout  the 
interview, she seemed to feel very self-conscious about trying to anticipate how I might 
later think about her comments; and yet this did not manifest itself as an unwillingness 
to talk around the questions I raised. Rather, the stumbling over how to express what 
she meant, felt, or did in relation to a greater certainty about what she should feel, was 
quite striking. The processes of self-governing, disciplined selves clearly operate within, 
as well as through, the structures of government (see also Rose, 1999a, 1999b).
For Donald, however, the question about whether or how his own positioning informed 
his ideas and practice appeared both startling and troubling, despite his having already 
drawn  attention  to  some  aspects  of  this  earlier  in  the  interview,  in  the  following 
exchange:
Hannah:  The government's  statements on community cohesion often focus on 
race, ethnicity and faith... do you think that will be something that's around 
in a Conservative version of that?
Donald: I think that is an interesting question, I should say here I'm a Catholic and  
I'm a  governor of  a  Catholic  school,  I've  written books on Catholic  social 
teaching,  so  a  thing  such  as  civil  society  and  subsidiarity  I  find  very 
complementary to the general [name of think tank] philosophical beliefs. 
Though Donald did not explore how he was positioned in other ways in relation to 
power, he did feel the need in one sense to 'declare an interest' related to his ethical  
and  personal  commitments  which  might  inform  his  otherwise  supposedly  neutral 
stance. But when I tried to explore this in more depth:
Hannah: When I'm talking about community cohesion policy to people, they often 
talk  about  their  own identity  and  background...  and  you mentioned  your 
Catholicism
Donald: Yeah okay
Hannah: So I just wondered if you feel that your own – background affects how 
you think about this issue?
Donald: Ooh, gosh. Er [pause] Marxist, isn't it? [both laugh] er... [3 second pause]  
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well I suppose Marx would argue that  our background affects how we think 
about an issue even if we don't believe it does, [laughs] no, I mean I don't  
think so, no.
Hannah: mmhm
Donald: No. Erm.... and I must admit it's only relatively recently that I've begun to 
study Catholic social teaching as an academic subject although I've always 
been a Catholic, and my sort of economic and political ideas were sort of 
formed before I started studying those things so no I, er, I er... I don't think so  
particularly.
In  seeming  to  equate  identity  politics  with  Marxism,  Donald  may  be  thinking  of 
'background' as referring to class, or perhaps simply using 'Marxist' to stand in for 'left-
wing' in general. Yet the question as I framed it specifically referred back to his previous 
references to his Catholicism and how it informed his outlook. This was partly because I 
already had some nervousness about asking this question to an interviewee I perceived 
as likely to be unsympathetic to a reading of policy-making as culturally embedded. 
Despite my attempts to link back to earlier in our conversation and demonstrate how 
the question may be relevant and perhaps relatively unthreatening, Donald chooses 
instead to disassociate himself  from his previous comments by saying that Catholic 
social teaching has simply become important to him as he has learnt that it accords 
with his pre-existing beliefs. Yet Donald's sense of needing to declare an interest in 
terms  of  his  religious  commitments  suggests  that  even  those  who  reject  cultural 
politics as having no bearing on the possibility of 'neutrality'  have been reached to 
some extent by critiques of objectivity. For Alice and Donald, the concept of situated 
knowledge  appears  to  have  seeped  through  to  become  received  wisdom  without 
necessarily  being engaged,  theorised or  put  into action  in  the everyday.  But  other 
interviewees re-incorporated this  reflexivity  to re-assert,  paradoxically,  a  view from 
nowhere (see also Skeggs, 2004:131).
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Reinscribing the norm
Hannah: I  just wondered if  you think your own background or experience and 
identity affect how you think about these kind of issues?
Andrew: In terms of my own personal background?
Hannah: Mmm.
Andrew: Right, okay. I think it probably would do, cos... I think that because I'm 
not from any of the visibly recognised equality theme groups... the fact that  
I'm  able  to  come  at  it  from   a  fresh  perspective,  that  I  don't  have  any 
particular, it sounds terrible saying, I don't have any particular axe to grind, 
that I can look at things in different ways.
David: I spose my... life experiences, I don't know... or lack of them
Hannah: [laughs]
David: Means I spose I'm fairly open to - about it.
In the first extract above, Andrew states that not being part of a 'visibly recognised 
equality group' means he has no 'particular axe to grind'. This is a particularly striking 
as Andrew is speaking as an equalities officer. Later in the interview he suggested that 
equality, diversity and community cohesion issues should be addressed as questions of 
customer service and efficiency, and that this would naturally reduce inequalities for 
those otherwise subjected to systematic discrimination and disadvantage. Thus, he is 
aware of the 'visibly recognised equality theme groups' and that he is not part of them; 
but he does not describe this status as being part of an alternative (perhaps white,  
male, professional) 'theme group'. Instead, he becomes immediately neutral, normal 
and invisible again; he has 'no axe to grind'. David, in the second extract, provides a  
similar  account  of  himself.  He is  one  of  the most  senior  local  authority  officers  in 
Hackney and he also agreed that 'whatever your background you'll have a view', and 
gave some examples of backgrounds which, if he had experienced them, he thought 
would give him a different perspective ('if I was Orthodox Jewish... if I was an Asian 
Muslim...').  But  his  own life  was literally  invisible;  his  experiences  as  a  white  male 
professional were a 'lack of' 'experiences'. And he went on to describe this not as a 
barrier to carrying out his role, but enabling him to be 'fairly open', much like Andrew's  
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lack of 'axe to grind'. 
The treatment of white, male, middle class identity as unmarked and unremarked has 
been  widely  noted  (e.g.  Ahmed,  2004a;  Hearn,  2010:175;  Hunter,  2010;  Skeggs, 
2004:133;  Swan,  2010)  and  indeed  this  invisibility  is  part  of  the  privilege  of  such 
identities. But I want to suggest that the persisting ability to think of these identities as 
'standard' requires more work in the context of my research than it may otherwise. 
These interviewees have to re-situate themselves as the norm ('because I'm not from 
any  of  the  visibly  recognised  equality  theme  groups')  rather  than  this  position 
remaining entirely silent. But it does not take much work; and it can be a technique of 
reincorporating reflexivity into the service of existing hierarchies of power as a way of 
demonstrating  knowledge  and  awareness,  and  thereby  reproducing  elite  status 
(Skeggs, 2004:148).
This position is developed further in Thomas's account below. Thomas is a national 
figure, who has been involved in public discussions of community cohesion policy since 
2001, and is widely seen as an expert in this area and often commissioned to produce 
research  and advice  on  the  work  done  by  local  authorities  to  develop  community 
cohesion. He is also a middle-aged, white male professional.
Hannah:  I  just  wondered  if  you  felt  like  your  own  identity,  experiences  or 
background affect how you think about these issues?
Thomas: Er no not really I  mean I suppose... I was committed to anti-racism at 
least by the time I was 16, and I grew up through the sixties... and I only ever 
wanted to work for organisations that were progressive, that wanted change. 
In urban environments, where I felt comfortable, really.
Hannah: yeah
Thomas: I suppose... it's about what you feel comfortable with. I've never had the 
slightest inclination to think about my own identity, I'm not an introspective 
person, some people are very introspective...  if  I  think of  myself  as being 
white, it is only because I know that there are black and Asian people there...  
and that's why of course most black and Asian people think of themselves as  
being black and Asian, it's because they're in a white society... it's not how I 
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see myself, it's how I see myself in relation to others. So I'm a bit anti all of 
that introspection stuff really.
Thomas's  account  shifts  between  theoretical,  personal  and  political  registers  to 
account for his understandings of community cohesion and related subjects. Though he 
begins by saying 'not really', he then says that his values, in particular anti-racism, have 
informed his career since a young age, and that he has always felt more comfortable in 
'urban' and 'progressive' environments. He also talks about identity only being defined 
in  reaction  to  other  categories,  and  went  on  to  discuss  at  greater  length  groups 
identifying  themselves  in  relation  to  a  constitutive  outside  (without  using  that 
terminology). Yet, while 'black and Asian people' might 'think of themselves as being 
black and Asian because they're in a white society', Thomas does not explore how his 
being white in a white society enables him to follow his 'inclination' not to think about 
his identity outside of encounters with 'black and Asian people'. He says dismissively 
that 'some people are very introspective', but in positioning identity as a question of 
introspection, he disregards the power relations which enable him to do so in the first 
place.
The  ways  Andrew,  David  and  Thomas  negotiate  their  own  status  in  relation  to 
community cohesion policy and government in general reveals much about the work 
done by the ambiguities and silences of community cohesion policy in masking power. 
Andrew, David and Thomas have been exposed, through professional discourses of the 
public sector if not elsewhere, to discussions of how gendered, racialised and other 
categorisations have excluded certain groups from access to power and resources. But 
they have not taken these understandings further to imagine either how their own 
inclusion  might  be  part  of  the  process  of  exclusion;  or  what  they  might  have  in  
common with people who have been excluded in this way. Thus, for Thomas, being in 
'urban environments' is what makes him 'feel comfortable';  this reflection does not 
raise any difficulties for him about what enables him to feel comfortable, or how this 
may or may not be shared with others.
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Marginalisation and double consciousness
Hannah: I just wondered if you think that identity, experience, background affect 
how you, personally, think about cohesion issues?
Anthony: Absolutely.
Hannah: Yeah... In what way? [both laugh]
Anthony: Well... I think anyone from, er, a minority ethnic group has had to think 
about these issues. I think someone from a mixed heritage background, has 
probably articulated them more, whether that's shouting, [laughs] or having 
discussions over dinner tables about, and dad are you really a negro, or the 
experience of my sister who was pale and blue eyed and [said], in 1970, yeah 
I do wanna join a black society. Black civil society. But, why, how, no, you! 
Can't! You know.
Hannah: mm
Anthony: My family  has had a long experience of  challenging all  the issues of  
ethnicity  and of  race and questioning  what  they  mean in  different  ways, 
being categorised as absolutely every ethnic group under the sun, so I just 
think that that's how it has shaped my thinking on it... the other probably big  
experience is being in Tower Hamlets and the BNP got elected, and having to 
figure  out  ways  of  articulating  many  of  these  issues  to  friends  and  also 
publicly, and the whole thing around race and people saying yes but there are 
different races... and trying to explain to people... you're wrong. Not true, it  
doesn't exist.
Earlier, Thomas described a lack of inclination to think about his identity, background 
or experiences as formative influences. This is not a choice Anthony, a policy manager  
in Hackney, felt was available to him. Anthony's response is in two parts. Firstly,  he 
describes how ethnic and racial constructions of his and his family's appearance were 
taken to embody difference in ways sometimes expressly at odds with their choosing.65 
In arguing that some people (including him) 'have been thinking about these issues for 
30  years',  particularly  'anyone  from a  minority  ethnic  group  [or]  a  mixed  heritage 
background',  I  don't  think  Anthony  is  suggesting  that  only  people  of  particular 
65 This echoes closely Suki Ali's (2003:13) account and analysis of growing up in a 'mixed-race' family.
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ethnicities have an authentic understanding of the complexities of identity and power. 
Rather, he is pointing out that for some people, such questions are immediate because 
they are constantly made visible (see also Du Bois, 1994 [1903]:1; Haraway, 1988:584).
Though Anthony describes his long-standing 'double consciousness', his awareness of 
the shifting categorisations applied to him and to others throughout his life, he also 
provides a second narrative of an epiphanic moment in which he is moved to another 
relationship to racialising and differentialising processes.  The 'other  big  experience' 
Anthony suggests has formed his understandings is living in east London when a far 
right racist party first gained an elected position on the local council. This mobilised 
him not only to negotiate the constructions of himself by others ('being categorised as 
absolutely  every  ethnic  group  under  the  sun'),  but  to  become  politically  and 
intellectually active in articulating, in various registers, other ways of deconstructing 
and understanding racialised imaginaries.
Saida, like Anthony, worked in Hackney. She also accounted for her understandings as 
related to a situated knowledge and a positioning as a minoritised subject. But rather 
than  Anthony's  narrative  of  always  having  understood  identity  as  challenging,  she 
describes  a  greater  comfort  in  difference  and  change  which  came  from  being 
accustomed to them, growing up in London. She contrasts this with her experience of 
temporarily  moving  to  Northampton,  which  provided  her  with  a  different  type  of 
epiphany when she was made aware of the perception of her own difference by others  
(see Ali, 2003:170): 
Hannah: I just wondered how you think your own background and identity and 
experiences affect how you think about issues around cohesion?
Saida: mm
Hannah: In your work.
Saida: I suppose for anyone I think that would be quite natural, you know you can  
try and separate yourself and put your professional hat on and say the things 
you need to say... but, yeah, evidently, my own experiences form – if I was  
looking at my personal experiences, me being born in this country, parents 
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from Bangladesh, have a Muslim faith, Sunni faith at that, and living in an 
area  which  is  changing...  So  in  that  sense  yeah,  I  suppose  your  own 
experiences do shape how you think of cohesion, for me because I've been 
brought  up  in  my  own  background  and  then  had  friends  from  different 
communities you sort of think oh it's kind of normal to be getting along with 
someone that is black or white or Chinese, cos in my school everyone was so  
mixed... and university was mixed and... where I work is quite mixed so it was 
quite normal but trying to get work in Northampton was a very different 
experience... cos I was seen different. So... you think, why is it, I mean I'm 
same person, nothing's changed, so why's it so difficult for me to get work in  
Northampton?
Hannah: mm
Saida: So, yeah. There is that and, in that sense you can start viewing and thinking,  
you start looking for justifications as to why things are the way they are, and 
you try and put things together. I suppose in [my work] that's quite important  
as well... so yeah, that's one of the things I think about.
Saida's account of her experience of growing up in multicultural  London places her 
both as particular ('born in this country, parents from Bangladesh, Muslim faith, Sunni 
faith at that') and comfortable in a shared sense of difference ('it's kind of normal'). But 
when she tried to find work in a different city, the identities she was already aware of  
living became visible in a different way; she was differently marked. From Saida's other 
brief comments on this in the interview, she felt that the problem was not necessarily 
that  there  were  no  Muslim/Sunni/Bangladeshi  heritage  people  in  Northampton 
(making her the first to present her visible difference in this way) but that attitudes to 
'difference' there were much more hostile than she was used to. It seemed she had 
experienced so much discrimination in seeking employment that she had returned to 
London to work, at some cost to her household and family arrangements. Yet the way 
Saida described this impacting on her work was not as a claim to an authentic identity 
politics, or explicitly as a commitment to oppositional anti-racism. Rather, she related 
her experience and her reactions to contexts in which others (her service users) might 
have had similar experiences and how she might empathise with them. She used her 
double consciousness – her awareness of  others'  perceptions  of  her and how they 
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differed to her own – as a tool for governing others through her professional role.
Nadia, a London councillor, described how she perceived that her role as an elected 
member  had  been  influenced  by  her  structural  positioning.  Nadia  focused  more 
directly on how she felt her marked identity had had a direct influence on her career  
path than did Anthony and Saida, whose accounts were more focused on how their 
everyday lives and understandings had been formed.
Nadia: From 2002 onwards I think the role of a councillor changed dramatically.  
But I think it also pushed me into a role where... you know, there's not that  
many young Asian women that were coming into politics... for me personally, 
I think it's put me into a position where I don't think my - the work that I've 
had to take on as a local councillor
Hannah: Yeah
Nadia: is very different to, you know, other... you know, anyone else that may have 
come in at the same time as me, elsewhere. You know I don't think they 
would have been thrown in, in the same way.
Nadia suggests that her experience of being a councillor has been shaped by national 
changes to the role. I think here she is referring to the reforms to local government 
following the Local Government Act 2000, in particular the establishment of executive 
leaders and elected mayor and cabinet governance. Nadia herself had been appointed 
to  a  cabinet  role  relatively  soon  after  being  elected  to  the  council,  a  role  with  a 
particular responsibility for community cohesion issues. The implication of her words 
here is that her status as one of the relatively few 'young Asian women' in politics had 
meant she was more visible, not only for promotion but potentially also as a voice seen 
to  speak  with  'authenticity'  about  community  cohesion  and  related  issues.  The 
structures of power and visibility are such that Nadia recognised not only how she was 
positioned by others as specifically  young,  Asian and female.  She also felt  she was 
required to embody that identity as a form of authenticity, not only for herself, but for  
her political colleagues, to give residents and voters confidence in the local authority's 
representation and understanding of local residents. Her embodiment of this identity 
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was made visible to her in connection with her professional position in a way that it 
was not visible to many of the white interviewees I spoke with (see also Ahmed, 2007a; 
Hunter,  2010;  Puwar,  2001,  2004;  Swan,  2010).  Even  though  very  many  white 
interviewees commented on their privileged status in terms of their ability or perceived 
ability to speak for diverse communities, not one suggested that their whiteness had 
any bearing on why or how they came to be in their current professional position.
Moving margins
Hannah: ... whether you think your own kind of background and identity affect 
how you think about those issues?
Emma: Yeah. I think being Irish and coming over here in the late eighties... Yeah, I  
think  [both  laugh]  absolutely!  And  sitting  on  the  number  36  bus  outside 
Victoria station when a bomb went off, yes, there's a lot in your background 
makes you think about that...  So yes definitely, definitely.  And in terms of 
working  for  local  government...  that's  actually  very  difficult,  because  the 
whole culture of the organisation is that you need to repress that view and 
you need to be totally objective but you can't be. You can't be, you've gotta 
temper the worst of your instincts and my instincts sometimes are just to 
completely  rant  at  people,  but  you  modify  your  behaviour.  But  no,  your 
background is definitely, definitely a strong influence.
Emma, a senior local  authority officer in Hackney, felt that in some ways a marked 
identity she might have once shared with Nadia had now been erased; yet she still 
retained the double consciousness of one who has been marked out as different by the 
gaze of others. She is aware of her privileged position as a policy practitioner expressly 
because of her previously (more) marked identity as an outsider, and perhaps has a 
feeling  that  her  now more  secure  position within  'the establishment'  presents  the 
opportunity, whether she takes it or not, to pass as an insider.
The moves Emma can make are determined by how she is positioned in social space.  
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Emma explains that her history as a migrant from Ireland to London at the time of 
sectarian  and  nationalistic  violence  has  influenced  her  understanding  of  being 
minoritised, demonised and vulnerable. Elsewhere in the interview she gave a specific 
example of this influencing her work, when she explained 'to this ex-intelligence officer 
from you know, MI whatever, who was working in the Home Office' that she would 
have  been the target  of  their  work  twenty years  ago,  'you  know,  demonising Irish 
people whereas now it's Muslim. Who's next?'. Describing how the 'demonisation' has 
moved on from Irish people to another group, Emma suggests she could now pass as 
no longer a threat; but she still feels a responsibility to speak up as an othered subject 
(Nickels et al, 2009).
Yet this speaking out is the 'rant' which she feels the need to 'monitor', in order to be 
'objective'. Feeling completely embedded in her own histories, believing that 'you need 
to be totally objective  but you can't be'  for Emma means doing work on herself  to 
'repress' her instincts to recognise resonances with her own life. In the same sentence 
in which she asserts the need for objectivity, Emma recognises its impossibility. Her 
professional  commitment  to  strive  towards  an  (impossible)  impartiality  comes  into 
conflict with her knowledge of this impossibility, and is held in tension as she tries to 
understand  this  as  a  question  of  working  on  herself  ('temper  the  worst  of  your 
instincts').  This  is  the  work  of  being  a  public  servant,  balancing  public  goods  and 
individual need, balancing one's own personal, political and ethical commitments with 
organisational  and  democratically  agreed  priorities.  Being  able  to  manage  these 
balancing  acts  is  an  essential  skill  for  working  in  such environments,  but  is  under-
acknowledged  and  under-explored,  perhaps  because  of  some  of  the  unsettled 
positions  which  might  emerge  (see  Bonnett,  1993:79;  Hunter,  2005;  Keith,  2008b; 
Mayo et al, 2007).
Evan,  another  senior  manager  in  Hackney,  also  describes  his  understanding  of 
community cohesion as tied up with his own subjectivity, which he narrates as at once 
giving him insights into the experience of difference and discrimination, and in other 
ways  apparently  disqualifying  him  from  authoritative  insights.  Evan  drew  on 
biographical elements throughout our conversation, well before I asked him directly 
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about his background, identity and experiences:
Evan: I think it's also difficult because a lot of the people involved particularly for 
example in Muslim communities, younger people born here, the values are  
potentially very different from kind of general, liberal values that the society 
in Britain supposedly has. And I think it's because these haven't really been 
clearly set out, I think the assumption is that everybody has the same values,  
just rub  along.  From a Hackney point  of  view,  I've lived in Hackney thirty 
years. And I think it is an amazing place, culturally speaking. I mean I'm a gay  
man. So I have that perspective on it. And I just think it's incredible that you 
go to Springfield Park on a Sunday afternoon, and you see all these different 
communities using cultural space and as I say, rubbing along, it is impressive.
Here (in a much longer response to my question 'what [do] you think about when you 
think about cohesion policy? How would you describe it?') Evan has moved on to the 
subject  of  'values',  and  how  to  manage  perceived  differences  in  values  between 
'communities'.  In  this  context,  he  gives  the  example  of  Muslim  communities  as  a 
potential threat to 'general, liberal values that Britain supposedly has'. Evan seems to 
sense that this is a potentially  contentious subject,  and immediately reasserts both 
Hackney's exceptionalism as a place where people do 'rub along' easily, and also his 
own minoritised status as 'a gay man'. By emphasising both his sexual identity and his  
personal commitment to and knowledge of Hackney a multicultural space ('I've lived in 
Hackney 30 years'),  Andrew attempts  to negotiate a safe space from which to talk 
about difficult aspects of diversity. 
This  position  is  not  unproblematic,  not  least  because  it  hints  at  what  has  been 
described  as  'homonationalism'  (Puar,  2007:39)  or   'gay  imperialism'  where  an 
'artificially constructed gay v. Muslim divide, to contest sexual oppression in Muslim 
communities' means that 'homophobia is constructed as belonging to Islam', and that 
non-Muslim (implicitly white, Western Christian or secular)  society is by implication 
exempt  from  confronting  its  own  homophobia  (Haritaworn  et  al,  2008:83).  This 
resonates  with  a  trend  identified  in  narratives  throughout  this  thesis,  where 
understanding  of  local  complexity  (in  this  case,  experiences  of  homophobia)  are 
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positioned  against  assumptions  of  simplified  elsewheres  or  others  (in  this  case, 
religious mores). Yet Evan appeared to be aware of the risk of projecting one form of 
prejudice onto another out-group, firstly by noting that 'Britain' only 'supposedly' has 
'general,  liberal  values'  of  tolerance;  and  secondly,  by  emphasising  later  that  his 
wariness was more directed at the potential of all religion to discriminate against gay 
men and lesbians:
Hannah: My last question to everyone is whether you think that your particular  
background or identity affects how you think about cohesion?
Evan: Yes it does. It does. I mean the bit that, being gay, obviously, one is aware of  
if  you  like  homophobic  tendencies  in  other  communities,  particularly 
religious communities, and I'm not just talking about Judaism and Islam, I'm 
talking about Christianity as well... community leaders need to not just take 
the  easy  option,  talk  about  communities  that  are  visible...  the  lesbian 
community  in  Hackney,  and  the  gay  community  has  had  a  really  strong 
influence in the way Hackney's developed over the last thirty years. And has 
helped to contribute to that openness and tolerance if you like, and what I'd  
hate to see, is that aspect of diversity being shut down to pacify certain other 
communities or parts of other communities, now it's not a blanket thing for 
me, I don't make assumptions that people are gonna be homophobic, but 
one  is  aware  that  certain  fundamentalists  do  have  particular  views  in  all  
religious communities, and that makes me a bit nervous.
Again,  it  is  'being  gay'  which  Evan  identifies  as  making  him  most  aware  of 
discrimination, and which he identifies as emanating from elements of potentially all  
religious  groups.  Evan  earlier  mobilised  his  sexual  identity  (alongside  his  personal 
commitment  to  the  locality)  as  a  resource  to  demonstrate  a  particular  form  of 
sameness in difference from which it was possible to speak about conflict and diversity.  
In the second extract, 'being gay' is addressed more directly as a position in which he 
can  be  the  victim  of  discrimination,  and  which  informs  his  work  on  community 
cohesion  by  making  him aware  of  the  potential  conflicts  between  the  interests  of 
different groups, but also of the subtleties of such conflict, which make assumptions on 
the basis of group membership unreliable.
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This complexity is illustrated further in a final extract from the interview with Evan, in 
which he considers how other aspects of his  identity and positioning – as a 'white 
middle class, pretty well off person' – mean he has a particular vantage point from 
which to value the experience of living in Hackney:
Evan: I'm aware of the irony of me as a white middle class, pretty well off person 
saying that, it's almost like saying you shouldn't encourage everybody to live 
well, but I do think one of the things about Hackney is that... it's provided an  
environment for people to experiment and to mix and to develop different 
ways of relating, which I think is quite difficult to do in a society that's more 
solid. More fixed, in a way. So it's the fluidity. It is tiring, and it is difficult, and 
there are times I think as one gets older, I think that probably one wants that  
kind of fixedness, but certainly for younger people in Hackney I think it's a  
fantastic environment, because you've got all those different influences.
Evan ends this extract by suggesting that his own relationship to the challenges and 
delights of living in Hackney might have changed with age. In this part of the interview,  
Evan was reflecting on his privileged position in terms of race and class which enabled 
him  to  opt  in  and  out  of  being  part  of  Hackney.  His  awareness  of  'the  irony'  of 
celebrating the difficulties of life in Hackney as the grounds on which tolerance and 
mixing are built is that he does not have to confront many of these difficulties in his  
daily life, or can choose not to (particularly as he gets older) where others cannot (Bell 
and Binnie, 2000:105; Reay et al, 2007). This does not negate the fact that in other 
contexts  and  moments,  other  aspects  of  Evan's  identity  can  lead  to  him  being 
threatened and marginalised him in ways that are harder to avoid.
Choosing the margins?
Some interviewees  were  even more explicit  about  how they  moved in  and out  of 
'marginality', selecting parts of their identity or biography to represent an association 
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with difference (Lury, 1998:1). Glen, a senior officer in Oldham, laughed when I asked 
him how he thought  his  own identity  or  background might  affect how he thought 
about community cohesion issues, and said 'a week ago I would have answered that a 
bit  differently'.  In  the past  week he had discovered ancestors  who had been 'very 
active on interethnic and interfaith issues' in previous centuries, 'a strong tradition of 
serving the community and work in public service' in his family, which he now thought 
was 'part of the reason why I've ended up in this job' because of 'values that have  
come down through my parents and my family'. I asked what he thought his answer 
might have been before he knew this history, and he said 'the bit about values would 
have been the same' but now he had 'the feeling that what I'm doing fit[s] so well with  
what some of my forebears did'. Unlike Donald, who (earlier in this chapter) explained 
the connections between his religious inheritance and political beliefs as coincidence, 
Glen chose to present his ancestry as a back-dated explanation of his values.
Phil,  who had a very similar  senior  local  authority  role to Glen but in Barking and 
Dagenham, was also in the process of researching his family tree, and related this to 
the way he thought about community cohesion. The question I actually asked Phil was 
'how you felt your own life experience affects how you think about these issues?' and 
he replied that 'it affects me totally' and explained that he grew up in London. But this 
was only mentioned very briefly before he began to discuss his current research into 
his family, which included migration histories on both his mother and father's sides, 
taking in India, Poland and Russia and intertwined with histories of British colonialism 
and European anti-semitism: 'so it's those experiences of being displaced, being in a a  
place where you're not necessarily  part of the accepted community has very much 
shaped my identity and upbringing'. Phil had known about his diasporic family history 
already, but was trying to find more information about the details and to trace earlier 
generations. 
Both Glen and Phil  suggested that  their  genealogies  had formed their  attitudes  to 
cohesion  and  related  issues  through  the  perspectives  imparted  to  them  by  their 
parents – in Glen's case, values of serving the community; in Phil's a sense of being out 
of place and sensitive to difference and inequality. Yet they both reinforced their claims 
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to  these  perspectives  by  reference  to  their  ancestry.  They  present  their  bonds  of 
inherited identity as if these will be more authentic claims to understanding questions 
of marginality than their own observations or embodied experiences. Yet drawing on 
their genealogies is a choice; neither Glen nor Phil's historic identifications are marked 
as visible to others. Their family trees are drawn on as a tool to negotiate entry to the 
ranks of the authentically marginal. 
Ellen,  a  local  authority  officer  in  Hackney,  described a different relationship to her 
family history in answer to this question:
Hannah: My final question to everyone was whether you think that how you think 
about cohesion is affected by your background? In particular.
Ellen: Oh – hoo! [laughs]
Hannah: [laughs] and it could be -
Ellen: Ooh. How I think about cohesion is affected by my, erm. No. I don't think 
so... Other than that maybe I've taken a direct path away from perhaps the 
values of my parents and grandparents. I think it is a generational thing and I 
think if you spoke to my parents they might talk about people using different 
words than I would certainly use... that's how it was then... But one of the 
reasons I left Essex was... I had a 360 degree feedback and the only criticism 
of my performance was about a lack of understanding of other communities. 
And that's because I lived, worked in a white middle class area, you never 
saw somebody that wasn't white, you didn't see many people who were poor 
people,  quite  frankly.  And  that  was  one  of  the  reasons  I  took  a  definite 
decision to come to somewhere like Hackney where I knew it would be very 
different, and that's one of the reasons I really like Hackney. 
Ellen suggests that in contrast to Glen, Phil and other interviewees discussed in this 
chapter, her family's values contrasted with her own attitudes to difference, inequality 
and belonging. If anything, she suggests her values were formed in direct opposition to 
those  of  her  parents  and  grandparents.  She  then  describes  explicitly  making  a 
commitment to choosing difference, in the sense that she moved to work in Hackney 
precisely  because it  contrasted with her  existing  understanding  and experiences  of 
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work and personal life – and she reinforces that this is a personal alignment with her  
statement 'that's one of the reasons I really like Hackney'. An important contrast here 
with the work being done by Phil and Glen to situate themselves as marginal in their  
accounts is that they suggest this positioning is secure and authentic because of its 
inheritance from their families; they do not express it as a choice. Ellen, on the other  
hand, makes a claim to an affinity with marginality precisely because she has made an 
active choice.
A  joint  interview with  Karen  and Angela  in  Hackney  brings  into  sharper  focus  the 
questions of choosing, who gets to choose, and what the consequences of choosing 
'the margin' are. Both worked for the local authority; Angela was Karen's manager.
Karen: I think Hackney schools are a fantastic example of cohesion.
Hannah: Mmhm.
Karen: When it works well,  you have got a classroom of thirty pupils from real 
diverse backgrounds and certainly my own children having been brought up 
in Hackney, had just such great experiences of primary education, they met 
children  from  a  vast  range  of  cultures,  and  there  were  tensions  and 
differences, but things were worked through.
Angela: But I think with that, having [been] someone who's been kind of born and 
brought up here, and been in school what is quite telling is that within the 
school environment those relationships tend to be good, I think the measure 
is if  you were doing a longitudinal study, if you go back ten, twenty years  
after people have gone through the schooling system are they still in close 
relationships with people from other communities?
Hannah: Yeah
Karen: Mm.
Angela: And very often... they're not [all laugh] erm.
Karen: Yeah... I  think it would be really interesting to do the sort of thing that 
Angela talks about, taking the temperature now, and then looking forward, 
because I remember reading an interview with Doreen Lawrence, and she 
was saying the boys who attacked and killed Stephen were brought up in this 
multicultural area, so what's going wrong? And I remember that really struck 
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me, that my own experience is a really positive one, and you like to think that  
other people have the same openness, but we know there are both extreme 
groups but also extreme opinions.
Karen first of all establishes her commitment to both the borough of Hackney, and to 
being part of its diversity by living there and educating her children at local schools. But 
Angela draws attention to the limits of the claims that Karen can make, by suggesting 
that as someone who attended local schools herself (rather than making the choice to 
send her children there, as Karen has) the more long-term experience of diversity and 
equality may not be so rosy – that many people do lose the friends who are from 'other 
communities'  as  they  get  older.  This  interchange is  inflected not  just  by   the class 
privilege involved in Karen's choice to send her children to local schools as a middle 
class mother able to provide cultural capital to support their educational success while 
providing them with the 'multicultural capital' of familiarity with diversity (see Crozier 
et  al,  2008;  Haylett,  2001:365; Reay,  2008;  Skeggs,  2005a:971).  Karen is  white  and 
Angela is black, and their speaking positions are also refracted through this aspect of 
their  structural  positioning.  This  is  highlighted  when  Karen  reacts  to  Angela's 
comments about different experiences of schooling by talking about an instance where 
it 'really struck' her that her own positive experience might be particular, relating her 
thoughts about the history of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence.66 Thus Karen 
acknowledges, after the indirect prompting from Angela, that both her whiteness and 
her class position67 are particular, and perhaps do not give her the authentically and 
authoritatively marginal position she first claimed.
66 See Chapter Three.
67 'What went so wrong' for the (white) boys who killed Stephen might be something to do with their  
class position, meaning that they experienced growing up in inner London less as a cultural resource  
and  more  as  a  process  of  marginalisation  and  demonisation  (see  Haylett,  2001:365;  Hewitt,  
2005:121-30).
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'Cohesion's for everybody'
Angela: And so I think what the cohesion agenda does is allow people to park their 
differences for however long they want  to  park  them with a view to the 
common good, cos this  is  about the value benefit  for everybody whereas 
when you talk about social inclusion you can opt out of that, you can say well  
actually they're the ones who need to be included and I'm fine...  so it's not  
about me, it's about them. And when you talk about multiculturalism again 
it's another issue, it's about 'them', whereas the benefit around community 
cohesion is that of all of the agendas it's the most inclusive cos everybody 
has a personal stake in it.
For some practitioners, community cohesion policy offered the possibility of at once 
acknowledging  difference  and  inequality,  and  removing  the  need  to  talk  about  it 
altogether. Angela, who I also quoted above in the joint interview with Karen, argued 
that the opportunity to put differences (or difficult subjects) to one side and instead 
focus on commonality was an advantage of the concept of community cohesion policy. 
She suggests that discussions of community around social inclusion or multiculturalism 
have become too associated with 'otherness',  and that she sees an opportunity for 
community cohesion policy to be interpreted as being about 'the common good'. There 
have of course been attempts to promote both social inclusion and multiculturalism as 
universally inclusive as well as critiques of them for reverting to a focus on a reified 
'other'  –  a  critique  which  has  equally  been  made  elsewhere  to  applications  of 
community cohesion (Alexander, 2007:124-5; Levitas, 2005; Robinson, 2008; see also 
Chapter Three).  Angela says  that  community  cohesion does not  let  anyone off  the 
hook, because it is about inclusive community, about everyone – including those who 
might otherwise be seen as unproblematic. But it is not clear from Angela's statement 
what she then imagines 'the cohesion agenda' to be, what it aims to achieve. If it is to 
'allow  people  to  park  their  differences'  to  come  together  (temporarily)  for  the 
'common good',  what  becomes of  the 'common good'  when those  differences  are 
picked up again?
Ruth, who worked on policy issues in Hackney, presented a congruent analysis of the 
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workings  of  community  cohesion  rhetoric  –  but  she  was  more  sceptical  about  its 
progressive potential.  Considering the extent to which the language of  'community 
cohesion' might be a way of avoiding talking directly about questions of class or of 
race, Ruth said:
Ruth: It's more comfortable, if you're a white middle class person, talking about 
cohesion... because it's about people getting on, whereas if you're that same 
person, talking about race equality and race justice, it's much more obvious 
that you're not on the receiving end of injustice and race hate and all those 
sorts of things,
Hannah: yeah
Ruth:  so  your  position,  your  ability  to  talk  about  those  issues,  is  [pause] 
questionable...  I  used  to  think  that  also  with  human  rights,  a  little  bit... 
human  rights  [representation  at  meetings]  was  often  white  middle  class 
people.  And  it's  cos  it's  an  arbitrating  concept  about  reconciling  the 
competing interests... there's something about it which is a little bit neutral, 
it's not about a struggle, or it should be, but it's not... whereas I think issues  
around specific equality, and injustice, is much more toothy and political...  
these kind of cross cutting discourses... everybody together, all citizens, they 
kind of neutralise that, they kind of slightly cover up the kind of real injustice  
that people face. Every day.
Hannah: Yeah. And you think that's also easy for some people to talk about?
Ruth: Yeah, it's easier for me to talk about,
Hannah: Yeah [both laugh]
Ruth: people don't say who are you to talk about cohesion, cos cohesion's for 
everybody, you know...  whereas if  I  was to stand up and start  saying, I'm 
doing strategy on race equality...  I  don't think that would be quite such a 
comfortable position to be in.
Ruth describes how the apparent neutrality of concepts like community cohesion and 
human rights, which are about 'everybody together' 'cover up the kind of real injustice 
that people face'. She, personally, finds it 'easier to talk about' community cohesion 
because this vocabulary does not require her to expose her own privilege as a 'white 
middle class person'. Unlike Angela, Ruth doesn't seem to be saying that this neutrality 
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or comfort is a good thing; she is expressing concern that 'injustice that people face 
every day' might be neglected. Ruth also suggests that not being 'on the receiving end 
of injustice' might make one's ability to talk about those things 'questionable'. Here she 
reverts to an idea of the politics of authenticity which suggests that for her to challenge 
injustice as a privileged subject would be not only uncomfortable, but impossible. Yet 
in this conversation,  Ruth is putting herself  back into an uncomfortable position by 
acknowledging not only her race and class privilege, but that even her professional 
work  intended  to  address  this  privilege  is  embedded  in,  and  reinforces,  existing 
structures. It is possible to experience a disjuncture of belonging even when objectively 
privileged (Christie, 2006; Hoggett et al, 2006; Puwar, 2004:131).
Rachel, who we met in the thesis introduction and who worked as a senior service 
manager in Hackney, took a position that was almost a mirror image of Ruth's. Ruth 
sees herself as embedded in structures of inequality and in that respect part of the 
problem, and yet (and therefore) able to hide behind structures of invisibility. Rachel, 
on the other hand,  described her home and family life  as embedded in an almost 
'picture perfect' narrative of urban multiculture – and yet instinctively separated this 
from her work within the paradigms of community cohesion and social care.68
Hannah: Do you think your background or identity affects how you think about  
cohesion?
Rachel: God it must do. It must do! I suppose I think that it's not really about me, 
you know that it's something other… we talk about communities... I probably 
think about ethnic minority communities, and people who are poor... And it's 
something  other,  to  me...  something  that  I  watch  rather  than  partake. 
Although actually, that's just so not true, I mean for me personally.
Even when she surprised herself by reflecting on how her own life – in a religiously and 
ethnically mixed area, with her mixed race children with her female partner, where 
neighbours  respected  one  another's  difference  and  looked  out  for  one  another's 
welfare – could fit into narratives of community cohesion as a subject of policy, Rachel 
68 We met Rachel initially in the Introduction to the thesis.
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insisted that not just her class but her specific professional status marked her out (or 
rather, made her invisible) as not a subject but a practitioner of policy:
Rachel:  And I  suppose it's  different  for  people  that  are  in  professional  worlds 
because so much of my work is about... very very vulnerable, very poor, high  
risk group of people... not that it's an attractive attribute, but it's seeing them 
as something other.
Rachel  did,  on  reflection,  point  to  ways  in  which  her  home  life  became  visible  in 
relation to policy and issues of difference, belonging and inequality (see also Hunter, 
2003, 2005). She felt uncomfortable acknowledging this privilege (and with it facing up 
to her role in actively governing the selves of others). But she also said that in everyday  
practice, her home life seemed like a completely different – or invisible – realm. This is 
different to saying that her personal identity and experiences did not influence her 
practice,  of  course.  The point is  that the technology of  community  cohesion policy 
suggests  it  is  relevant  to  everybody,  but  does  not  actually  undermine  the  power 
relations of governing which lead Rachel to see herself instinctively as set apart from 
populations to be governed.
'Think about it on a human level'
Yet it was not only interviewees relating experiences of direct discrimination against 
themselves who expressed personal and emotional commitments to an understanding 
of context-laden complexity and power-struggle (see Nayak, 2007:70; Sayer, 2005:40). 
My final two examples here are Erin, a service manager in Peterborough, and Sally, a 
voluntary sector manager in Hackney.  Both talked about experiences that informed 
their commitments and ethics, drawn from their observations in both their work and 
their personal lives, which became intertwined:
Hannah: ... whether you think your own identity and background affect how you 
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think about cohesion?
Erin: [dramatic intake of breath] That's a good one! Yeah, my father was a big  
trade unionist and... you know that famous poem, first they came for the  
Jews [coughs] he used to carry that everywhere on him, if you don't look out 
for  your neighbour,  how can you  expect  them to  look  out  for  you  when 
you're in trouble, and ultimately when, trouble is there's nobody there... But  
he always said you question everything that you read and everything that you 
hear and everything that you see... So yes, my background, I've been very 
fortunate. Very fortunate to have been brought up with that... and when I  
was very young, well a teenager, I saw a black guy being beat up in the street 
by two white guys. And he was a friend of mine. You know you see that as a 
youngster, you don't forget it really. For no reason.
Erin here describes formative political influences of growing up in a household with a 
commitment to an ethic of social solidarity, which she credits with forming her political 
attitudes and providing her with an instinct to question received wisdom. When she 
says she has been 'very fortunate' with regard to her background, she seems to be 
referring to  this  political  outlook.  This  differs  from the more common tendency to 
relate my question directly to identity politics or class privilege. Erin then described 
witnessing a racist attack on her friend. Her account suggests that this was a formative 
moment  in  her  understanding  of  power  relations  in  society,  though  she  did  not 
elaborate on this as we were interrupted at that point by a phone call. The attack on 
Erin's friend was inexplicable – 'for no reason' – yet it happened, and she could see it  
was motivated by racism. Though Erin was not the subject of the attack, and she does 
not assume the position of victim or target of racism, she clearly felt the shock of this 
event strongly ('you see that as a youngster, you don't forget it really').
Erin  went  on  to describe other  incidents,  this  time in  her  working  life,  which  had 
brought  into  focus  for  her  the  discrimination  and  violence  faced  by  marginalised 
people, and which she herself felt as emotional, if not physical, pain. When she was 
working with asylum seekers:
Erin: I just was amazed about how badly they were treated, and the services that 
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were turning them away, without even asking them, cos they didn't speak 
English, telling them that they couldn't help them when they were entitled to  
things, and I'd sit and they'd lift up their shirts some of them and show me 
their  torture... One of them had a diary that they'd drawn the pictures of 
their journey here and they all had photos of their families in their wallet and  
it was just heartbreak- and then you'd phone up somebody and they'd say 
well I'm not prepared to talk to them unless they bring somebody that speaks 
Eng- you know, it was just like, do you realise, this person's been, you know...
This extract captures Erin's shock and outrage, as well as her 'heartbreak' and disbelief 
at the lack of empathy of service providers who would not see her clients. Similarly, at 
another point when she had been working with unemployed young people, Erin had 
been struck by the racism they faced when unable to get a job interview simply as a 
result of their 'foreign-sounding' names, and she had resorted to arranging interviews 
for them using falsely 'English' names: 'I'm sat with people who didn't stand a chance. 
Just by nature of their name'. Given Erin's description of her upbringing which taught 
her to 'look out for your neighbour', it seems that these attacks on and humiliations of  
people she cared for were also felt as attacks on herself. Yet she does not make an 
identity claim to the margin, to belong to an essentialised category herself. Nor does 
she claim to know what  these experiences felt  like for  those directly under attack. 
Rather, having 'sat with people who didn't stand a chance', Erin joins them in solidarity.
Sally, similarly, described an upbringing with politically involved parents, her 'dad had a  
kind of burning commitment to socialism – democratic socialism of course!' and both 
parents  were  very  committed  to  education,  which  she  connected  to  the  'left-ish' 
political commitments she and her siblings had in adult life. But again, like Erin, Sally 
explained this ethical and political commitment as a background which she connected 
with concrete experiences in her life, though they might not have been experiences 
that impacted directly on her:
Sally:  This  goes  for  my  husband as  well,  most  of  the  rest  of  our  families  are 
working class. And so we're still in touch with working class roots that a lot of 
people in our position – Labour Party people – are not in touch with, and I  
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think gives me a totally different perspective... The fact that three members 
of [our] family, when the minimum wage was introduced, received increases 
of 50% in what they earned. And so people say oh, the minimum wage, what  
does that mean, that's what it means. The money that's gone into schools  
and health service, what has that meant? Because I think if you're middle  
class and London based, you get a very different picture... it also means that 
when I talk to family members who are openly racist I'm able to say, You may 
say, people come over here from Africa and they get everything but there are 
people living across from where I work, N families to a flat, women who've 
been deserted by the fathers of their children, who've brought them over 
here, who find themselves in a very difficult situation cos they don't have any 
legal status here any more and, etc.,  etc.  Just think about that.  Just think 
about what you'd be like in those circumstances...  Think about it on a human 
level.
Sally describes two instances in which witnessing the struggles and triumphs of others 
(who are less privileged than her) gives her a perspective from which she speaks, not  
necessarily  on  their  behalf,  but  with  a  knowledge  that  challenges  people  who  are 
otherwise close to her position – whether 'middle class and London based' or 'family 
members'. Though it is a difficult and uncomfortable line to walk, I don't think that  
either Erin or Sally are here taking the role of  'the institutional interlocutor who frames 
the self of the subaltern' (Skeggs, 2004:126). Rather, they use as a resource not the 
experiences of others, but their own experiences of coming into contact with others' 
experiences. In this they recognise implicitly their (race and class) privilege but also 
choose to ally themselves with others who are under direct attack from this privilege.  
Indeed, as Skeggs points out, 'narrativization of one's experience is a resource; some 
are unable to present themselves as the subject of narrative' (2004:126) – yet this does 
not necessarily mean that the most progressive course of action for those who do have 
this resource is to relinquish it. Rather, like Erin and Sally seem to be (giving an account 
of) doing here, they can also try to find ways of putting this reflexivity to use in the  
service of addressing power inequalities (Skeggs, 2002:369).
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Conclusions
Interviewees whose accounts showed the most potential for developing an approach 
to  difference which neither  reified nor  ignored constructed identity  categories  and 
power differentials were those whose accounts suggested a sociological imagination; 
that is to say, 'the capacity to shift from one perspective to another... to range from the 
most  impersonal  and  remote  transformation  to  the  most  intimate  features  of  the 
human self – and to see the relations between the two' (Mills, 1999 [1959]:7).
Hunter argues that 'failure to reach resolution can be read as a strength, rather than a 
weakness' (2010:469) when contemplating such encounters. There is a parallel here 
with Sara Ahmed's celebration of the 'killjoy feminist' as the rupturer of consensus, the 
voice  which  draws  attention  to  the  oppressive  or  objectionable  contents  of  a 
conversation or practice and thereby is seen as a negative presence herself (2010:582).  
Ahmed also  argues  that  opening  up,  and keeping  open,  areas  of  vulnerability  and 
difficulty is a progressive move:
Struggling against racism means being willing to labor over sore points. Not only 
do we need to labor our points, as a laboring over sore points, but we also might 
even need to stay as sore as our points (Ahmed, 2010:591).
What Ahmed does not address in her discussion of the killjoy feminist is the ongoing 
argument  over  the privilege of  being  able  to  speak,  and to  be  heard  (though she 
considers this at length elsewhere – see Ahmed, 2000:55-74). For the other discussions 
cited here though, and for many of my research participants, the awareness of their 
own privileged  status is present, but can have a paralysing effect – the risk of being 
'destined to suffer because she feels deeply about the injustice of a political system 
which  she  is  powerless  to  change'  (Ware,  1992:232).  Similarly,  Srivastava,  in  her 
examination of  the possibilities for  anti-racist  feminism, argues that a predominant 
strain of anti-racist feminism has become focused on the production of a virtuous anti-
racist self. This results in dilemmas about how to present oneself as a white anti-racist  
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feminist:
If she were to say with complete ease 'I am racist'... she risks criticisms that she is  
complacent or glib about racism. If she were to outright deny being racist, she 
knows she would be stuck in an unacceptable ethical position (2005:53).
Srivastava  argues  that  this  dilemma,  and  the  preoccupation  with  the  creation  and 
presentation of an ethical self, becomes an obstacle to institutional progress towards 
anti-racist goals. She suggests that a more productive approach would be to upset the 
apparent  certainties  of  a  dichotomous  choice  of  'innocence versus  evil,  knowledge 
versus ignorance' (58) and instead recognise the possibility of a less settled position,  
'more interested in why antiracist change is not happening and less interested in her 
own moral acceptability' – whilst still acknowledging that 'individual preoccupations... 
may  impede  that  work'  (57).  This  potentially  uncomfortable  position,  between 
acknowledging a situated, limited and compromised standpoint, and trying to move 
beyond  this  acknowledgement  to  intervention,  is  one  I  found  many  research 
participants to be experiencing (see also Keith, 2008b; Mayo et al, 2007). Processes of  
governmentality  encourage  policy  practitioners  to  behave  (and  feel)  in  appropriate 
ways in their professional, as well as personal, lives. The continual pull to be 'neutral' or 
to have a fixed, correct position mitigates against attempts to retain ambiguity and 
'sore points' or uncomfortable positions, which might involve stepping into the margins 
or challenging the power inequalities that underlie marginalisation.
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Chapter Eight: Thinking Inside the Box
Introduction
This  chapter  brings  together  the  major  themes  developed  throughout  the  thesis, 
demonstrating  how  policy  practitioners  negotiate  difficult  subjects,  by  taking  up 
uncomfortable  positions.  Sometimes  they  attempt  to  make  these  positions  more 
comfortable, but often this results in new discomforts.  My research has considered 
policy practitioners working in and with local  government. The questions I  asked of 
them, and the responses they gave, ranged across a wide variety of subjects but they 
all  led away from, or back to, community cohesion policy and its negotiations; and 
ideas  of  belonging,  identity,  and  inequality.  These  are  subjects  that  research 
participants  encountered  and  lived  in  other  aspects  of  their  lives,  not  just 
professionally.  This  was  reflected  in  the  way  that  many  of  them  talked  about 
community cohesion policy in research interviews. In this chapter I will emphasise four 
broad findings  from my research,  partly  by  considering  new artefacts;  in  analysing 
them, I draw together observations, analysis and original contributions to knowledge 
from throughout the thesis.
Firstly,  the  practice  of  policy  in  the  government  worlds  I  investigated  consisted  of 
ongoing  ethical  negotiations  between  individual  and  collective  responsibility,  and 
between individual choice and collective norms. Community cohesion policy, as I have 
demonstrated,  is  concerned  with  enabling  citizens  to  behave  in  appropriate  ways  
(which  of  course  entails  the  unspoken  question  of  who  determines  what  is 
appropriate).  It  is  about  government  finding  ways  for  'difficult  subjects'  to  make 
themselves less difficult. I have used the framework of governmentality, but my original 
contribution has been to emphasise that the policy practitioners I am researching are 
both governing others through techniques of governmentality (that is, finding ways to 
encourage  populations  to  regulate  themselves)  and are  subject  to  regimes  of 
governmentality  (that  is,  they  also  seek  to regulate  themselves  in  line  with norms 
outside  of  themselves).  Importantly  for  the  perspective  of  this  study,  governing 
266
through  governmentality  (conducting  the  conduct  of  conduct)  is  a  practice  and  a 
process  itself.  It  involves  individuals  taking  decisions  within  regimes  of  power  and 
truth.  Those  regimes help  to form individual  selves;  individuals  are  able  to amend 
regimes  through  their  actions  to  differing  extents;  and,  importantly,  they  are  also 
(made to feel) responsible for these regimes of truth and what changes they make do 
not make within them. 
The second point I want to make is that community cohesion policy easily slips into a 
language of 'celebrating diversity' without necessarily considering  why some types of 
difference are seen as important while others are not, and what power relations lie 
behind (and result from) that. This can have the effect of assuming that 'diversity' is 
banal, unproblematic and shared – without addressing inequalities and discrimination. 
This research was conducted in a period of structural, political, economic and social 
change and multiple, unpredictable shifts in the ways that government and individuals 
considered 'community', 'cohesion', 'belonging', 'identity' and 'inequality'. Discussions 
of  these  subjects  at  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first  century  often  cite  changing 
technology and the consequent ease of global travel, communication and commerce as 
challenging long-standing (senses of) locally-rooted communities (e.g. see MacKinnon 
et  al,  2011).  As  we  have  seen,  such  developments,  most  especially  international 
migration,  were  very  relevant  to  the  ways  that  policy  practitioners  I  interviewed 
constructed narratives about the need for and achievement of community cohesion. 
Yet  there  is  a  more  specific  question,  I  think,  about  the  development  of  'super-
diversity' in populations. This is pertinent to, but goes beyond migration status, racial  
or ethnic categories, and associated inequalities. It is a question about what types of  
'difference'  are  made  visible  –  most  often,  as  we  have  seen,  connected  to  race,  
ethnicity and religion – and what types of 'difference' remain invisible or are silenced.  
My  focus  has  been  on  the  processes  whereby  forms  of  difference  are  created  or 
silences  in  the  narratives  of  policy  practitioners.  When  difference  or  diversity  is 
identified (whether to be regarded with suspicion or celebration) without attention to 
power  relations  this  creates  new  uncomfortable  positions  which  complicate 
'community  cohesion'  further.  Equally,  recognising  that  differential  power  relations 
exist and that one is implicated in them can be uncomfortable for policy practitioners – 
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particularly where, despite their professional positions, they lack the means to address 
underlying structural inequalities. A variety of techniques were used to negotiate these 
discomforts  by  silencing  inequalities;  recognising  but  reincorporating  power 
differences;  or  recognising  them  and  trying  to  work  within  the  discomforts  they 
produced.
The third point I want to develop in this conclusion is how the role of local government 
is imagined by those narratives and voices that we have encountered throughout the 
thesis. Here I open the discussion further to consider how this is seen as both changing 
and staying the same through a variety of  successive 'policy agendas'  from shifting 
national government administrations. At the time of writing this conclusion, it seems 
the 'community cohesion' era may be coming to an end – perhaps to be replaced by 
David Cameron's 'Big Society' as a goal. The concepts are similarly slippery and capable 
of being recast in different moulds. Rather than trying to speculate too far on what 
might become of 'community cohesion' in the Big Society, I will consider instead how 
the policy practitioners I interviewed (before the election of the coalition government 
in 2010) anticipated change as a result of the global financial crisis and an expected 
new government (and how they reflected on change as a perennial process even with 
the same party in power). The question that concerned them was how, situated in their 
local area and in their professional roles, they would find ways to deliver the goals that  
they connected to community cohesion (or opposed to it) within whatever might come 
next.  I  will  link  these  reflections  to  the  way  my  findings  throughout  the  thesis  
contribute to an understanding of the debates and practices that distance and question 
the 'proper' role of local government.
Finally, I want to conclude the chapter and the thesis by considering briefly where we 
might be taken by using Mills' lens of the sociological imagination and accepting that 
changing  the  world  might  involve  some uncomfortable  positions  –  positions  which 
might depart from imagining academia as separate from 'the real world'. And I build on 
Mills'  treatment  of  the  sociological  imagination  by  paying  greater  attention  to  the 
emotional and affective elements of imagination and the links that an emotional lens 
can  either  enable  or  obscure between the intimate and the global  (see also Back, 
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2007b). The role of participant observer that I have taken in approaching this research 
has drawn out narratives which rely on emotional commitments to ideas, ideals, places 
and processes of governing. Recognising the role of emotion in governing belonging, 
identity and inequality is essential because power relations are experienced through 
emotional, embodied registers. That I have conducted this research as at once a social 
researcher  and a  policy  practitioner  has  helped me to analyse  the  similarities  and 
discontinuities between the two roles. It has also produced a precarious line for me to 
negotiate,  as  does  any  experience  of  participant  observation,  maintaining  both 
intimacy with the research field and enough detachment to produce informed analysis.  
Including an analysis of the role of emotion in governing could be subjected to parallel  
criticisms, that emotional responses risk obscuring material inequalities. I agree that 
this is a risk and through this chapter (and the thesis) I reflect on a number of moments 
when this elision can be seen within negotiations of community cohesion policy. But I  
conclude that such risks, while serious, should not prevent us from attempting to find 
ways of practising public  sociology that intervene in society – and in doing so it  is 
important  to  recognise  how  affective  commitments  interact  with  structural  power 
relations, sometimes in unexpected or contradictory ways. 
'Building people'
A research participant and former colleague who works on cohesion policy tells me she has 
something for me that I might find interesting, something she picked up at a recent practitioner 
training event about community cohesion. She hands me a small tin, 6 cm by 6 cm by 2 cm. It  
doesn't weigh very much, and it has a hinged lid, like something that might contain mints, or an 
old-fashioned cigarette tin. But the lid shows a government crest and the words Government  
Office for London. Underneath that, in block capitals, it asks  'What is Community Cohesion?'. 
Perhaps the answer is inside the box.
I open the box and am presented, not with cigarettes or mints, but with a USB stick displaying 
the same logo and the same question. It is held within protective foam like a piece of jewellery  
might be. It invites me to discover the answer to its question, by plugging it into my computer  
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to see what happens. Will I find out the answer to this question?
What I find is a film lasting 6 and a half minutes. It begins with a statement from Hazel Blears  
MP, then Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, with responsibility for 
community cohesion. She stands in a computer generated landscape with a silhouette of the 
London skyline in the background. Between Blears and the horizon there is a screen-within-a-
screen, on which play images of (I suppose) community cohesion. Blears explains what she  
thinks community cohesion means and why she thinks it is important:
Community  cohesion's  really  important  to  me  in  the  work  that  I  do  in  the  
Department,  because it's  really about bringing people together,  whatever their  
age, their race, their religion, and trying to really build on the shared values that  
people  have,  rather  than  concentrating  on  the  differences  between  people.  
Everybody knows, if they live in a place where they feel comfortable, they feel at  
home, they know their neighbours, they feel that they share very much the same  
values as the people around them, but at the same time being able to celebrate  
the  things  that  make  them unique  and different,  and  I  think  that  community  
cohesion, particularly in a time of great change, is something that's really precious  
to us, and absolutely essential to building the kind of communities that we all  
want to see.
We then hear what seem to be extracts from interviews with local authority workers, talking 
about what community cohesion means to them. Unlike Blears, who appeared as herself, the 
visual accompaniments to these voices are two-dimensional cartoon figures (see Figures 8.1 
and 8.3). There are six of these avatars in the film (though there appear to be at least ten  
different  voices),  and  they  seem  to  represent  'diversity'  in  cartoon  form.  In  order  of  
appearance, there's an 'Asian man' in smart-casual shirt and trousers; a 'white woman' in a 
business suit and glasses with her hair pulled back severely; a 'young (Asian?) Muslim woman'  
in a hijab and jeans; another 'white woman' in jeans and t-shirt; an 'African-Caribbean woman'  
wearing  sandals  and  carrying  a  shopping  bag;  and  a  stocky  'white  man'  in  shorts,  t-shirt, 
sunglasses, a hat and a high visibility jacket. They hold up cards with various words extracted 
from the voice-over,  in  the style  of  the  Bob Dylan video  to  Subterranean Homesick  Blues  
(Figure 8.1). The cards say:
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Building people; Relationships; Shared Understanding; Shared Belonging; YOUNG  
OLD (and then a line is drawn between 'YOUNG' and 'OLD' saying 'understanding  
and dialogue'); Get to know each other; Three Major Stakeholders; Your ethnicity  
and my ethnicity living in harmony; We; Are; ALL; Stake Holders; Police; Health;  
Housing;  Perception  of  Services;  Your  Community;  Different  Understanding;  
Appropriate  Language;  that's  the  language  they  talk;  Services;  No  One  
Understands Me; Community Cohesion is...; Love; Respect; Understanding.
Figure 8.1
In between the sign saying 'No One Understands Me' and the one saying 'Community Cohesion 
is...', the woman in a suit holds a card with a schematic female figure who in turn holds a  
placard reading 'I am responsible'; then in the rest of the placard four more stick figures (two 
male and two female) appear, holding a sign saying 'So are we' (see Figure 8.2).
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Figure 8.2
Over these visuals, a woman's voice explains: 'it's not the responsibility of someone sitting in  
the centre, it's the responsibility of everybody who delivers services and also all residents as  
well'. The last thing we hear is a man saying: 'if we spend time trying to understand people and  
deliver the services that they want, then what we will find is that we will get the cohesion that 
we're looking for. Because it's about relationships'. Then the music plays out to an image of t he 
six avatars standing together holding blank pieces of paper (see Figure 8.3). Perhaps now it is 
over to you, the viewer to fill them in? Or is this the answer to what is community cohesion?69
69 The video is available online at http://vimeo.com/2981426 [last accessed 28th May 2011].
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Figure 8.3
If we treat this film as a text in itself, there is ample material to analyse its construction 
of community cohesion as a 'thing' which can be defined (without actually providing 
any clear definition anywhere in the text). As I explored in Chapter Three, there are 
multiple  narratives,  meanings  and resonances  of  community  cohesion.  This  applies 
whether conceptualising 'community cohesion' as an observable state of populations; 
as  a  goal  to  be  achieved  or  worked towards;  or  as  a  set  of  policy  proposals  and 
techniques.  The  voices  in  the  film  seem  to  be  discussing  techniques  designed  to 
achieve community cohesion, and the observable state of community cohesion; these 
two senses of the term overlap as they do in many such discussions. However, very few 
of  the  narratives  which  I  drew  out  in  Chapter  Three  from  more  traditional  policy 
documents  and  discourses  appear  explicitly  in  this  film.  There  is  no  reference  to 
'tension',  'riots',  'violence';  there  is  no  discussion  of  'discrimination',  'equality'  or 
'extremism'; there is no mention of the specificity of local place. There is very limited 
reference to migration – the only specific example of what cohesion might mean at the 
level of interaction is a statement that 'for some people community cohesion is about 
different ethnicities and how they get on together. A group that people often look at is 
refugees,  and  they  see  the  need  for  refugees  to  integrate  into  life  with  other 
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Londoners',  but  what  this  might  mean  is  not  explored.  Another  speaker  says  that 
refugees are  her clients,  and one set of  'stakeholders'  in  community  cohesion;  the 
other two groups of stakeholders she cites are people working in service delivery, and 
'the general public'. 
Economic inequality is only mentioned in the film very fleetingly – there is a statement 
that 'there are examples of very successful areas which have high levels of deprivation 
but  also  have  high  levels  of  cohesion'.  The  only  connection  between  community 
cohesion and questions of inequality or discrimination in this presentation is when a 
voice accompanying the woman in the suit suggests that 'your perceptions of who's 
getting what' from local housing services could impact on community cohesion. The 
implication is that the group seen to be getting more (or the group feeling hard done 
by) is defined on ethnic or racial lines. This example also demonstrates an unspoken 
class bias in who is made a concern for community cohesion policy: principally people 
who live in social housing. 'Services' are mentioned but only in relation to people's  
perceptions about how services are delivered, and whether they  feel they are being 
treated  fairly.  This  is  a  narrative  of  community  cohesion  as  a  policy  to  manage 
residents' feelings about how they are treated, not about whether they actually  are 
being treated differently. The overwhelming answer this video gives to the question 
'what  is  community  cohesion?',  is  encapsulated  by  Hazel  Blears'  statement  at  the 
beginning:  it's  about  'trying to really  build  on the shared values that  people  have,  
rather than concentrating on the differences between people'. This is reflected in the 
voice-overs and the way they are summarised in the captions I listed above; all of these 
focus on affective relationships. 
The video presents a narrative that can be understood in relation to those in Chapter 
Three, but which does not directly refer to the histories or relationships implicated in 
those narratives.  The concept  of  community  cohesion is  presented as  free-floating, 
unattached  to  particular  events  or  places.  Tensions,  conflicts,  and  the  inequalities 
which provoked them are absorbed into a discussion of diversity and acceptance or 
celebration  of  difference.  What  is  more,  this  diversity  is  literally  embodied  in  the 
narrators of this film. The six cartoon figures each represent an archetype of diversity 
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based on a set of  simplified visual  clues that place them as  having specific  ethnic, 
gender, religious and professional statuses. Most interesting, perhaps, is the figure of 
the white man in outdoor clothing including shorts and a high visibility jacket. Although 
there is no explanation in the video of who the speakers are, their comments suggest 
that they are practitioners who work in community cohesion policy in various guises.  
This man in his outdoor work-wear seems to represent an 'identity group' which is not  
included in the other visual representations of the video (the white working class male) 
while it is unclear what role his outfit suggests as a community cohesion worker. That 
at least ten different voices accompany the six avatars suggests that they are not simply 
representations of the speakers, but that the voices we hear have been amalgamated 
into this collage of professional diversity. The personal backgrounds, identity or status 
of the voices or their visual avatars are not mentioned at all in the script of the film. Yet 
the way the figures have been differentiated and physical clues to status have been 
distributed  suggests  that  there  is  a  level  at  which  their  personal  identities  are 
important. 
The  first  sign  saying  'Building  people'  makes  an  analysis  of  the  film  as  a  tool  of  
governmentality  via  affect  almost  too  obvious.  The  end  of  the  film,  where  the 
principles of cohesion are described as 'love', 'trust' (which doesn't receive a caption), 
'respect' and 'understanding', drives home this presentation of community cohesion as 
a policy which aims to manage populations through their emotional responses. But it 
also suggests that the role of the policy practitioner (the neutral bureaucrat?) is not 
just to find ways to manage the emotions of populations. The practitioner must engage 
in  these  emotional  relationships with  those  populations;  love,  trust,  respect  and 
understanding all  carry the implication of a two-way relationship and commitment. 
This  resonates  with  Emma's  comments  about  the  impossibility  of  the  role  of  the 
neutral  yet  reflective  policy  practitioner  in  Chapter  Seven:  'you  need  to  be  totally 
objective, but you can't be'. 
Thus the practitioner must embody difference, and perform love and relationships. The 
sign  in  Figure  8.2  makes  it  clear  that  not  only  is  community  cohesion  a  form  of 
governmentality  in  which  individuals  must  take  responsibility  for  themselves  and 
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behave  in  ways  which  embrace  'shared  values'  and  'celebrate  difference';  it  is  a 
framework of governmentality in which the governors themselves are expressly subject 
to these same requirements of self-monitoring and performance of personal attributes. 
This  is  not  quite  the  'evacuation  of  subjectivity  through the  policy  construction  of 
cardboard  cut-out  characterizations...  that  runs  across  the struggle  over  citizenship 
between those who govern and those who are governed' that Gail  Lewis describes 
(2005:538) since here the 'cardboard cut-outs' are at once those who govern and those 
being governed.
Yet it remains a contradictory relationship. It is clear that some individuals and groups 
are expected to perform community cohesion more ardently,  because they are the 
(often unspoken) examples of potentially problematic difference which supposedly we 
all  embody.  A  very  clear  example  of  this  was  the  demand  that  Muslim  people 
demonstrate  antipathy  to  terrorism  and  commitment  to  'the  wider  community' 
through the Preventing Violent Extremism programme, discussed in Chapter Four. The 
'everybody'  whose  values  are  shared  echoes  Jacqui  Smith's  comment  (quoted  in 
Chapter Five) that to walk down the street alone in Hackney after midnight was 'just  
not  something  people  do'.  In  Chapter  Seven,  Thomas's  reference  to  'urban 
environments where I feel comfortable' and Alice's preference for living in cities which 
are 'more interesting' than elsewhere, echo this treatment of a white, middle class self 
as a norm, even when this normative habitus is being described as 'comfortable' with 
difference. 'People' and 'everybody' are imagined in these statements as 'people like' 
the  speaker;  and  indeed  if  the  values  and  experiences  which  they  refer  to  were 
universal, there would presumably be no need for community cohesion policy to be 
addressed at all. The places experienced by this 'everybody' are in turn 'comfortable' or 
to be avoided, in relation to a normative white middle class self.
The production of the film itself is an act of governmentality, as through its design and 
performance those involved present themselves as embodiments of good practice in 
administering and engaging in cohesion. The film is both made by and aimed at policy 
practitioners,  and  it  features  policy  practitioners,  both  promoting  themselves  as 
performing appropriate normative behaviours, and helping to regulate the behaviour 
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of colleagues – who will in turn use these lessons in the management of populations. 
As I considered in Chapter Two, 'Good Practice' can be critiqued as a technique for 
reincorporating reflexivity into practice in a way that reinforces normative behaviours 
and  shuts  down  critique  (e.g.  Strathern,  2006:200).  This  may  indeed  be  what  is 
happening  in  the  production  and  dissemination  of  this  video.  However,  the 
methodological  approach  I  have  taken,  and  much  of  the  practice  which  I  have 
discussed, have aimed to find ways of understanding 'good practice' as an opportunity 
to keep open critical inquiry; to continue to negotiate uncomfortable positions and find 
new  ways  to  approach  difficult  subjects.  Though  this  more  open  approach  is  not 
presented in the film, it is a central question for how to negotiate ethical policy practice 
(in the sense of unstable, ongoing negotiation and questioning – see Back, 2007b:114). 
In the next section, I consider a specific example of how the uncomfortable overlaps 
between professional and personal roles can be experienced, and the different ways 
this  can  be  understood  when  thinking  through  a  sociological  imagination  which 
recognises the links between personal actions and experiences, and structural power 
dynamics.
'My existence is under threat'
Hannah: So I just wondered if your own background and identity and experience 
affect how you approach these issues?
Jack:  Totally,  one  hundred  and  ten  per  cent...  Every  day,  when  I  think  about 
community cohesion, I can honestly say I challenge myself... people tell you 
all the time, that they're not racists... now I've just got one question for those 
people and that's how do you know? How do you know you're not a racist 
cos how the hell do you tell that? When you talk about communities so, I live 
in Barking. I've always lived in Barking except for when I was at [university]... I  
am a Barking boy.  My whole town has completely and utterly  and totally 
changed.  Doesn't  look  the  same,  smell  the  same,  feel  the  same...  This 
afternoon, I will put my house on the market to sell  it to move... So then 
when you think about that in terms of your own personal experience well, 
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what's that all about? Why do I wanna do that, why do I wanna move?... And  
I  suppose  it's  about  [pause]  for  me  [pause]  and  my  experiences  of 
community cohesion [pause]  my community  no longer exists...  They're  all 
part of the white flight, bang, they've all gone... So all my friends have gone, 
I'm the last man standing, that's what they say... and something, when I've 
been dealing with [my work]  that I've  thought about  a lot  is  [pause]  cos 
essentially  where  I  am,  what's  happened  is...  my  children  are  now  a 
significant minority in their schools. I think my little boy is one of four white 
kids in his class that he's going into... We talk about understanding of and 
engagement with Muslim communities. Well, I'm a minority aren't I, where is 
the understanding and engagement with my community?
Jack asked for these comments to be anonymised further than others he made. I have 
removed some of the identifying features, and should point out simply that he was 
working on cohesion-related policy but not in Barking and Dagenham; that was simply 
where  he  lived.  I  did  not  include  this  material  in  the  discussion  of  Barking  and 
Dagenham because it  is  about a different relationship to the place from that I  was 
discussing in the main – Jack is speaking as a local resident, about how his experiences 
as a policy practitioner have affected how he thinks about aspects of his home life. 
Though  I  asked  Jack,  as  I  asked  others,  whether  he  thought  his  own  background 
affected how he thought about related issues, he seemed to be talking here about how 
his work affected the way he thought about issues troubling him in his life outside 
work. He described an unsettling feeling, that the area he had lived in all his life had 
changed, principally describing a change in the ethnic mix of the local population as 
new residents moved in and previous (white) residents took flight into towns further 
outside London, into Essex. He described a sense of isolation – he was 'the last man 
standing'  –  the place he had grown up in,  and 'the community',  'doesn't  exist  any 
more'.  Having described feeling left  behind by his  friends and his  community,  Jack 
described how his children, as white children, were in a minority in their school. Adding 
emphasis to this, he told me of his shock when his son came hope from school one say 
to tell him what he had learnt about Christmas:
Jack: What he said was, he said CHRISTIANS believe...  And for me that's like – 
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that's a real check up... That is really hard for me to accept that. Not because 
[pause]  I  don't  understand  the  fact  that  there  are  different  faiths  and 
different religions, but I kind of – expected, unconsciously, that my kids would 
be brought up in the same tradition that I was brought up in, collective acts 
of worship, this, that,  and then when my son comes home, well Christians 
believe, so oh my god, don't say that when your nan's here because that will  
be it, that will be uproar over that... And I keep asking myself the same time, 
are you racist, is that what this is, are you actually a racist? And you think  
well, hang on a minute, I suppose the Asian community are coming together 
cos they wanna be together, why should it be any different for me?...
Hannah: And does that make you feel [pause] does that kind of make – help you 
understand how other communities are w- or is it making you feel-
Jack: No I think it makes me feel how communities may feel under threat... And 
attacked. And it's  a terrible way to say it  isn't  it...  but actually  my way of  
living, my existence, is under threat, is under attack, it has been threatened.
Jack  describes how his  certainties about  life  and his  place in  the world have been 
shaken by changing circumstances in Barking and Dagenham. He has tried to think 
about this using the framework of community cohesion policy, as he understands it. In 
his account, the problem for him is not that his children have learnt about a range of  
different religions and cultures, or even that their school is ethnically mixed; it is that 
within this mix, his 'tradition' is no longer the norm. Nowhere in our conversation did 
he suggest that he had a strong religious faith (indeed if he had, one might suppose his 
son would already have some knowledge of Christian traditions including Christmas). 
What  he described was  identifying  with Christianity  as  a  default  background faith. 
When he expected that his children would be brought up in 'the same tradition' as him, 
he  meant  'collective  acts  of  worship'  at  school  –  that  is,  a  background  of  white 
(Protestant) Christian normativity within which they were unremarkable and 'normal'.
Jack's  narrative  has  some  similarities  with  the  narratives  of  a  dispossessed  'white 
working class' disturbed by rapid demographic and social change who turn to far-right 
voting patterns as a defence against economic and social upheaval they are not ready 
for,  as  a  protest  vote  against  their  neglect  by  a  liberal  middle  class  elite,  or  as  a 
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demonstration of their fundamentally xenophobic core. I  discussed these narratives 
and the work they do in Chapter Three, and the work that policy practitioners do to 
understand,  negotiate  and  reposition  them  (from  within  Barking  and  Dagenham 
specifically)  in  Chapter  Six.  Jack's  narrative  is  not  the  same  as  those  ideal  types,  
however. 
Firstly, he stated several times in the interview his strong antipathy towards the BNP ('I 
hate those bastards as much as anyone'), and he began the comments quoted here by 
referring to an ongoing struggle with himself over whether his feelings stemmed from 
unconscious or deep-seated racism – and reiterated this struggle later in the interview. 
Secondly, Jack is not 'white working class' at least in a material sense; while we did not  
discuss  his  class  identification,  he  certainly  cited  aspects  of  his  life  (his  university 
education and home ownership, as well as his professional position) which meant that 
the  situation  of  powerlessness  and  marginalisation  usually  associated  with  the 
discourse of 'white working class' disillusionment was less pronounced. 
Finally, and of course connected to these other two factors, Jack is speaking in relation 
to a professional  role in which he had become accustomed to a particular form of 
'diversity talk' and practice. That is, he is expressing feelings of isolation and discomfort 
with (ethnic demographic) change more usually understood within the narrative of a 
'white  working  class'  turning  to  the far  right  for  refuge,  but  using  his  professional 
habitus  he  attempts  to  make  sense  of  his  experience  in  a  version  of  community 
cohesion discourse which emphasises affect and bounded identities in lieu of power 
relations – a  discourse bearing a strong relationship to that  in the video discussed 
above. Here, the 'difficult subjects' of structural power relations and discrimination are 
rejected  as  subjects  for  community  cohesion  policy,  and  instead  the  elements  of 
affective group belonging are emphasised as determining factors – which are shared by 
'everybody'.
Jack's  description  of  his  experience  emerged  when I  asked  if  his  own  background 
informed how he thought about community cohesion policy. His reply is eventually 
that, feeling 'under attack' by changes in the 'feel', 'look' and 'smell' of the area where 
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he has lived all his life, he is able to empathise with 'other communities' who may feel 
attacked. The 'threat' to Jack is not a physical attack. It is not clear what 'understanding 
and engagement' Jack feels is lacking for 'his' community. Nor is anyone removing his 
children's ability to learn about the traditions in which he grew up, in their schools. The 
threat is that this is no longer learnt about as necessarily the dominant tradition, but 
one among many. 'His'  community no longer feels like his,  'doesn't  exist any more' 
because he is  not  the one agreeing to 'tolerate'  others  (Lewis,  2005:540;  Wemyss, 
2006), but one of many being 'tolerated' by one another. He describes a loss of his  
'community' but the population of Barking has not disappeared; it has changed. 
An alternative way for him to view the situation might have been to find ways to adapt  
his own sense of what constituted 'his' community. What he has lost is a feeling of  
superiority and security that he didn't even realise he had, and which many people 
never  have  had.  This  resonates  with  analyses  of  post-colonial  melancholia  (Gilroy, 
2001, 2004; see also Hewitt, 2005:131) which suggest that feelings of alienation such 
as those described by Jack arise from an unmet expectation of entitlement to power 
and privilege which Britain as a whole has suffered with the loss of Empire and the 
demise  of  British  international  influence,  and  which  those  subjects  who  identify 
themselves as  embodying Britishness  (or  more specifically  Englishness),  most  often 
white men, are most likely to experience.
By imagining this  within a  narrative of  community  cohesion policy which privileges 
affect, identity and belonging to bounded communities linked by 'tradition', Jack seems 
to be setting himself an impossible task. As his reflections demonstrate, he has not 
resolved  his  feelings  within  this  or  any  other  explanatory  framework  to  his  own 
satisfaction. Indeed, he has decided to exit the site of his immediate discomfort by 
moving his family out of Barking, but this decision makes him uncomfortable when he 
tries to understand it in the terms of his professional practice. His resolution appears to 
be that 'the Asian community are coming together' as are his (white English) Barking 
community (albeit in new locations outside of Barking) and that therefore a population 
living in ethnically differentiated 'communities' is acceptable. But as we have seen, the 
genesis  of  community  cohesion  policy  was  premised  on  such  arrangements  being 
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problematic,  sometimes  because  of  a  recognition  that  they  may  be  linked  to  or 
exacerbate structural inequalities, more often because such separation was seen to be 
caused by or increase discrimination and mistrust between communities so defined 
(see Chapter Three). Jack's narrative demonstrates some of the contradictions at the 
heart  of  community  cohesion policy.  By 'celebrating difference'  without  recognising 
that  some  differences  are  treated  differently  to  others,  one  can  simply  reinforce 
difference and ignore inequalities of power. 
Jack feels that he has become marginal,  an outsider or  at  least  less dominant;  but 
thinking through community cohesion policy as a celebration of difference does not 
allow him to translate this feeling into solidarity with others who are marginalised in  
different  ways  and  to  different  extents,  but  similar  to  him because  they  have  felt 
excluded  by  power.  In  Chapter  Seven,  we  saw  how  other  policy  practitioners' 
negotiations  of  these overlaps  between personal  and professional  experiences  and 
commitments  could  vary  along  with  their  understandings  of  their  position  within 
structural power relations. Thinking about one's role within the ethical negotiations of 
power as a policy practitioner does not necessarily make positions more comfortable; 
indeed, it  can increase discomfort as one is forced to confront one's own privilege.  
Though some practitioners dealt with this by re-silencing such questions, others tried 
to practice a kind of public sociology by incorporating a sociological understanding of 
difference and power into the way they understood their work within government. 
Doing  so  might  entail  a  recognition  that  there  may not  be  a  comfortable,  neutral  
position  from  which  to  speak  or  act;  but  that  words  and  action  were  necessary 
nonetheless. 
This thesis contributes to an understanding of these positions, building on a developing 
literature  that  uses  an  affective  lens  to  understand  the  practices  in  which  policy 
practitioners  engage  when  negotiating  power,  responsibility  and  personal 
commitments (e.g. Ahmed, 2007a; Hunter, 2003; Keith, 2008b; Mayo et al, 2007). My 
research  contributes  to  this  literature  by  engaging  with  the  narratives  and 
understandings  of  policy  practitioners  as  they  reflect  on  these  negotiations  and 
confront (or  try to escape) the uncomfortable positions this can entail.  In the next 
282
section  I  will  consider  how  the  practice  of  attempting  to  reconcile  these  difficult 
subjects goes to the heart of questions about the role of government, and UK local 
government in particular.
What is local government for (in the Big Society)?
Hannah: Do you think cohesion's going to stay around as a big policy issue in the 
next few years?
Beverley: I think a great deal will depend on the change of government... if it's the 
same administration [laughing] then I'd expect it to continue. But if we had a 
change of administration, I think it would qualify in some way, partly because 
I think that Conservatives would have their commitment to reducing funding,  
and this is the kind of discretionary thing that could go. And of course some 
of the authorities that are doing excellent work in this field are Conservative 
authorities,  but  that  doesn't  mean  quite  the  same  thing  as  national  
government policy.
Hannah: And do you think that [community cohesion policy] will have a future,  
can you see where that might go?
Alison: Depends who gets elected of course. It's gonna be such a mysterious [both 
laugh] I don't know whether the Tories will  hang on to the concept. They 
have a shadow communities minister, so that's - I think the terminology will  
inevitably will evolve, and change, and we'll talk about different things, but I 
think it will be a gradual shift if there is a shift, and I think we will continue to  
talk  about  the  kinds  of  issues  that  are  currently  encapsulated  under  the 
umbrella  term  of  community  cohesion  because  I  don't  think  local 
government can do its job in the current political,  geopolitical,  ideological 
environment, without having some way of talking about the diversity of their 
communities,  and the widening class divide and the impact of  the 'credit 
crunch'.
My  fieldwork  ended  before  the  Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  national  coalition 
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government took power in May 2010, and the thesis covers the way that community 
cohesion was understood in the years before that. But in many of the interviews and 
observations  of  policy  events  and discussions  that  I  conducted,  there  was growing 
discussion about how an expected new government might have a different approach to 
issues connected to community cohesion policy. Impacts of the international financial 
crisis and the likely effect on public spending in Britain were anticipated, both for how 
communities lived, and how policies for promoting cohesion would be prioritised. 
The two quotes above are from separate interviews with Beverley and Alison, who 
worked  in  similar  roles  in  two  different  national-level  local  government  lobbying 
organisations.  They  gave  very  similar  answers  to  my  question  about  what  might 
happen to community cohesion as a policy agenda in the coming years. Indeed, both 
laughed wryly at the idea that there was any doubt that there would be change of 
national government at the forthcoming general election (I interviewed Alison in June 
2008  and  Beverley  in  April  2009).  They  both  suggested  that  a  new  (Conservative) 
government was likely to 'qualify', 'evolve', 'change' or 'shift' the policy programme. 
Beverley suggests that a Conservative government might reduce community cohesion 
work because of a commitment to reduce public spending, a commitment which was 
becoming  increasingly  vocalised  as  global  economic  recession  developed.  Alison 
highlights the effects of  recession as potentially  a concern for  community cohesion 
policy,  when  she  suggests  that  growing  economic  inequality  is  one  of  the  issues 
'encapsulated' in the term.
Both suggest that despite their expectations of a change in terminology and focus, the 
issues that community cohesion connects to will continue to be political concerns. And 
both suggest that this is because the issues dealt with through community cohesion 
policy  are  central  to  the  role  of  local  government.  Alison  doesn't  think  local 
government 'can do its job... without having some way of talking about the diversity of 
their  communities,  and  the  widening  class  divide'  and  the  impact  of  recession. 
Beverley points to a distinct role for local government, 'that doesn't mean quite the 
same thing as national  government policy',  when she discusses how in many cases 
Conservative-led authorities have pursued community cohesion as an agenda, while 
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their  national  party  very  rarely  uses  this  language  in  publications,  speeches  or 
debates.70 All main political parties champion 'localism' in various forms, arguing that 
decisions about places should be made by people who live in them (e.g.  Cameron, 
2010; Clegg, 2011; Miliband, 2006). Yet, as we saw in the negotiations between local  
and  central  government  in  Chapter  Four,  this  does  not  necessarily  translate  into 
practice;  local  decisions  are  made  within  parameters  set  by  central  government. 
Indeed,  as  Beverley and Alison indicate,  the predominant  influence of  the national 
political  situation  over  what  happens  locally  is  not  even  up  for  discussion  –  even 
though  they  both  lobby  on  behalf  of  local  government,  both  suggest  that  local  
authorities are likely to alter their approaches to community cohesion policy with a 
change in national government, whether or not existing local approaches are seen as 
successful.
The close association between the purpose of local government and the practice of 
community cohesion policy which Beverley and Alison express has echoes elsewhere in 
my research. There are numerous examples throughout the thesis of how meanings 
and practices of community cohesion have been contradictory and contested. Perhaps 
less overtly, the meaning, purpose and practices of local government have also been 
put in question by the practitioners I interviewed and observed. This is most clearly 
exemplified in Chapter Four, where the extremely controversial language and design of 
the Preventing Violent Extremism programme provoked a clear division between many 
local government practitioners and their national government colleagues. That is not to 
say that there was a clear consensus from either group about what the role of (local) 
government should be – some, like the comments I quoted in Chapter Four from a 
television interview with the Leader of Bradford Council, emphasised service delivery, 
whilst  some  practitioners  I  interviewed  argued  there  was  a  duty  to  'bring  people 
together';  some  national  narratives  emphasised  security  whilst  others  suggested 
70 Indeed, in attempting to interview right-leaning think tanks for my fieldwork, I contacted one of the 
Directors (who was also an elected councillor) of a think tank which framed itself as 'dedicated to  
issues related to local government and localism', and it became apparent that he was not rejecting  
the concept, as I had anticipated, but was not aware of the term at all. The organisation declined to 
take part in the research as they did not 'have sufficient expertise... on this subject, so may not be of 
any real value' (email dated 16 June 2009).
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structural inequality should be a greater concern. The point is that the disagreements 
and negotiations were not simply about what community cohesion policy is, was, or 
should be, or whether it was a relevant or appropriate activity for local government. 
Within  these  arguments  lay  a  deeper  question  of  the  purpose  of  democratic 
institutions, public services and administration; and of their local dimension in terms of 
responding to the needs of specific places and populations and the levers of power 
available  to  them.  Community  cohesion  policy  is  one  lens  through  which  to 
contemplate these issues. As Beverley and Alison anticipated, the question of how to 
deliver community cohesion (whatever that might mean) has become less central to 
policy discussions in those terms. Yet questions of belonging, identity and inequality – 
and of the role and aims of government in asking and negotiating these questions –  
have by no means disappeared from the work of policy practitioners since the 2010 
general election:
For a long time the way government has worked... has turned many motivated 
public sector workers into disillusioned, weary puppets of government targets... It  
has turned lively communities into dull, soulless clones of one another... So we 
need to turn government completely on its head... these are the three big strands 
of the Big Society agenda. First, social action... [G]overnment... must foster and 
support a new culture of voluntarism, philanthropy, social action. Second, public 
service reform... we’ve got [to] give professionals much more freedom, and open 
up public services to new providers like charities, social enterprises and private 
companies...  And  third,  community  empowerment.  We  need  to  create 
communities  with  oomph  –  neighbourhoods  who  are  in  charge  of  their  own 
destiny, who feel if they club together and get involved they can shape the world 
around them (Cameron, 2010).
Though the term 'Big Society' has been much lampooned (e.g. Bell, 2011; Guru-Murthy, 
2011;  Stephens,  2011;  Wheeler,  2011)  as  without  substance,  the  extract  from 
Cameron's  speech,  given two months  after  he became Prime Minister,  lays  out  its  
assumptions rather clearly.  It  begins from a premise that 'the way government has 
worked' has been damaging to both practitioners and citizens; that this is a result of  
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regulation,  'targets'  and  centralisation.  The  prescription  is  to  ask  –  and  require  – 
individual  (non-professionals)  to  take  responsibility  for  their  own and  others'  well-
being. That this will be promoted through a 'new culture of voluntarism' suggests some 
element  of  'obliging  people  to  be  free'  in  the  mode  of  practices  and  policies  of 
governmentality  within  which  community  cohesion  policy  exists,  as  discussed  in 
Chapter One. The second element of the Big Society project is that the idea of public 
services  as  projects  of  the  state,  that  is,  of  government  with  a  link  to democratic 
institutions,  will  be weakened.  Again this  is  framed in  the language of  'freedom' – 
freedom for 'professionals' to meet needs they define (presumably with communities) 
rather than assessing these against national frameworks – but such 'freedom' to decide 
will  again  be  obligatory,  and  will  come  with  the  responsibility  to  deliver.  The 
responsibility (and potential culpability) associated with freedom is also evident in the 
third element of the Big Society; that 'communities' will be 'empowered'.
That  local  government  is  adept  at  adapting  to  the  changing  national  policy 
environment is a theme which has been important throughout the thesis, around the 
presentation  of  purpose  –  language,  narrative,  myth-making  or  branding.  This  was 
especially apparent in Chapter Six in the discussion of how local authorities presented 
themselves to one another and within policy worlds, in relation to their reputations as 
marker points in discussions of community cohesion. In Chapter Five, we saw how the 
role of local government was envisioned as deeply connected to questions of shared 
belonging embedded in a desire to control narratives of place. 
The questions raised in Chapters Four, Five and Six about the proper and actual roles of  
local government were not always framed by research participants directly in terms of 
community cohesion policy. But as we examined the subjects being debated, they were 
clearly about how to handle and distribute power; about the right to belong; about 
how to constitute communities; about how to imagine places where communities are 
constituted.  Likewise,  in  Cameron's  Big  Society  discourse,  the  language  is  not 
necessarily that of community cohesion policy, but the concerns are closely related. 
There is  no mention here of  many of  the keywords  which have become central  to 
community  cohesion  (though  'communities',  or  more  often  'neighbourhoods'  are 
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central).  There  is  very little  mention of  diversity,  except  around 'diverse  models  of 
service provision' (i.e. reducing direct government provision of public services). 'Power' 
is, in fact, mentioned here – but in relation to a supposed redistribution of power of 
decision-making  to  more  local  levels,  and  not  in  relation  to  distribution  of  social,  
cultural  or  economic  resources  within  and  across  populations.  Nonetheless,  it  is 
arguable that 'The Big Society' is the narrative framework that practitioners who had 
learnt to use and adapt the vocabulary of community cohesion must now adopt. Like 
community  cohesion  policy,  it  has  linguistic  lacunae  that  can  leave  silences  to  be 
ignored, mobilised, or over-written. 
I  have  included  this  speculation  about  new  developments  here  because  it 
demonstrates  how  the  practice  of  policy  continues  to  evolve.  The  dominance  of 
'community cohesion policy' may be over as a central term used by government, but 
the  term  itself  has  stuck  in  places  –  statutory  duties  for  schools,  some job  titles,  
institutions and publications, at least for the time being. More importantly, the issues 
that  people  tried  to  address  through  'community  cohesion  policy'  have  not 
disappeared (any more than they appeared when the term did). Populations may be 
problematised differently using the language of The Big Society, but equally, as with 
community cohesion policy, the language and programmes themselves may be bent to 
address  re-imagined problems and solutions  through the negotiation  of  policy.  My 
research  shows  how,  far  from  Cameron's  vision  of  'public  sector  workers  [as] 
disillusioned, weary puppets of government targets', many negotiate difficult subjects 
(including the subject of the appropriate role and functioning of local  government) 
with  skilled  manoeuvres  around,  within  and  through  government  targets  and 
narratives. In doing so, they often make use of what might be called a 'sociological 
imagination' – an idea of how personal narratives connect to structural power relations 
(see particularly Chapters One and Seven).
This  research  also  provides  findings  which  contradict  Cameron's  sense  that  'lively 
communities'  have  been  turned  into  'dull,  soulless  clones  of  one  another'.  I  have 
shown at length in Chapters Five and Six  how narratives of place are manoeuvred, 
negotiated and re-incorporated by policy practitioners. In Chapter Five, we saw how 
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multiple narratives of Hackney were intertwined in negotiations over the meaning of 
the place. Notably, each of these narratives were dependent on a sense that Hackney 
was  special;  that its internal diversity and changeability was connected to a kind of 
'sameness in difference', if  not solidarity in diversity. In Chapter Six, I  discussed the 
negotiations  of  policy  practitioners  firstly  projecting  and  using  images  of  Oldham, 
Barking and Dagenham and Peterborough as metaphors in narratives of community 
cohesion policy, and secondly reincorporating these images into new narratives with 
more  positive  connotations.  Neither  of  these  chapters  suggest  that  the  places 
considered in the thesis or their populations are 'dull, soulless clones'. 
Cameron does not describe what he means by 'the way government has worked' but 
implies this has been about central control of local activities. Throughout this thesis, I  
have shown how national policy narratives and techniques shape local understandings 
of priorities, needs and populations. But importantly, I have also shown that this is far 
from a direct  relationship of  command-and-control.  Rather,  narratives  within  policy 
and government incorporate existing meanings and resonances while individuals and 
groups of policy practitioners reflexively interpret, and sometimes deliberately subvert, 
the meanings of national  policy narratives in the context of their own professional, 
personal, political and ethical experiences, knowledge and priorities.
This  is  not  to say that  nationally-mandated government priorities have not  had an 
effect  on  how  local  government  operates  –  as  I  have  discussed,  they  are  deeply 
entangled. But local authorities,  or more accurately,  the practitioners who make up 
local  governance,  do  not  have  their  practices  or  interpretations  fixed  in  place  by 
national governing techniques. Rather, they operate within regimes of governmentality. 
Governmentality  has  most  usually  been  used  as  a  way of  understanding  the 
management of populations by 'obliging them to be free' i.e. requiring self-government 
where  individuals  choose how  to  behave,  but  where  behaviour  within  normative 
frameworks  and  parameters  is  the  only  thinkable  'choice'  (Rose,  1999).  Such 
techniques usually do not require forcible coercion, because populations, in the main, 
choose to behave in normative ways of their own accord in order to avoid expected 
penalties for moving outside of the norm; but because the rules are often unspoken, 
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there remains room for incremental change and manoeuvre. The thesis builds on the 
considerable work on governmentality as a technique for  managing  populations,  to 
demonstrate how such dynamics also operate  within practices of government – my 
research develops the study of the conduct of conduct to engage with the conduct of  
the conduct of conduct. The policy practitioners in this study were engaged in finding 
ways to get populations to behave as cohesive communities; but they were doing so 
because this  was part  of the normative expectations of  them within the regime of 
governmentality of their professional statuses.
Throughout the thesis I have considered numerous examples of research participants 
describing their location and practices in terms that reveal the contradictions of being 
at once free to make decisions, and obliged to make those decisions in specified ways. 
On  a  broader  scale,  the  relationship  between  national  and  local  institutions  of 
government  in  England  and  Wales  (and  beyond)  is  an  excellent  example  of  this 
apparent contradiction. Through successive governments there has been a pervasive 
rhetoric of 'localism' or 'devolution' which suggests that a priority is to allow decision-
making  at  the  smallest  unit  of  governance.  Yet,  as  measures  (such  as  Local  Area 
Agreements  – see Chapter  Four)  have increased local  accountability,  they have  set 
frameworks for the types of decisions that can be made and the ways in which they 
should be made. If the speech on The Big Society quoted above is any indication, it 
seems that this dynamic will continue to determine the role of local government (and 
practitioners within it),  as government 'fosters' designated 'cultures of voluntarism'; 
professionals  are  given  'freedom'  (and  responsibility)  for  delivering  services  and 
encouraged to do this through 'new providers'; communities must have 'oomph' to be 
'in  charge  of  their  own  destiny'  and  organise  themselves  accordingly.  This  thesis 
explores what it  means to negotiate the shifting terms and contradictions of policy 
process  and  government,  and  to  find  ways  of  recognising  these  difficulties  whilst 
working  within  and  against  them.  Finally,  I  want  to  argue  that  conducting  such 
negotiations should be thought of as a form of applied sociological imagination, and as 
a potential arena in which to practice public sociology.
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Imagining sociologically, thinking emotionally, and staying uncomfortable
Far  from  'weary  puppets',  I  have  found  policy  practitioners  testing  boundaries,  if 
usually remaining within them. The thesis opened with a chapter setting my research 
in the context of early twenty-first century policies of governmentality. I suggested that 
to a great extent, to develop such techniques of governing, policy practitioners must 
have a sense of the relationships between individual choice and structural constraint; 
that is, they must have a sociological imagination (Mills, 1999 [1959]). As we saw at 
many  points  in  the  thesis,  but  especially  in  Chapter  Seven,  using  a  sociological 
imagination within practices of government does not necessarily mean always coming 
to the same conclusion. It seems to create a variety of uncomfortable positions for 
those involved in practices of governing, if only because looking at society and one's  
place in it this way can reveal contradictions which may be impossible to resolve. Jack's  
narrative of dislocation in this chapter is just one example.
We might  also think of  Emma's reflection in Chapter Seven that,  as  a theoretically 
neutral arbiter of government she felt the need 'to be totally objective, but you can't 
be'. Or perhaps the way that many research participants in Chapter Six discussed their  
local areas as obviously linked to community cohesion narratives at the same time that 
they tried to establish new narratives with which locals and others could associate 
them. The negotiations of policy practitioners and others in Hackney in Chapter Five, as 
they tried to find ways to address power inequalities (while recognising their ability to 
do so relied on their own relative power and privilege) are another example. The ways 
that research participants (including myself) reflected on the compromises required 
and made around the implementation of the Preventing Violent Extremism programme 
in Chapter Four (and the moments when limits of compromise were reached) showed 
practitioners working within the limits of governance regimes whilst simultaneously 
able to reflect on these limits, and using their understandings of the limits to attempts 
some changes within the rules of the game. And Chapter Three, which describes the 
sets  of  narratives  and  resonances  that  slip  past  and  through  one  another  in 
practitioners' and others' understandings of community cohesion policy, demonstrates 
291
how the sociological imagination (the ability to make links between historic resonances 
and current problematisations, specific crises and longer-term trends) is both relied on 
and confounded by the languages and techniques of policy which use silences and 
implication  to  create  links  that  can  still  be  denied.  The  ongoing  tension  about  a 
definition of community cohesion, the repetition that this 'goes beyond race and faith', 
at that very moment indicating the expectation that race and faith are at the heart of 
its  concerns,  is  an  excellent  example  of  this  reliance  on  implicit  meanings  to 
communicate the unspoken.
I  have  written  about  branding  as  a  way  of  organising  narratives  and  resonances, 
particularly in Chapters Five and Six. I have found this a useful way to think about links 
between governmentality and sociological  imagination for three reasons. Firstly,  the 
language  of  branding  appeared  in  several  places  in  my  research  data,  where 
participants used it to talk about their work in relation to developing understandings of 
place,  of  organisations,  of  services,  of  policy  concepts.  Secondly,  the  commercial 
overtones of  'brand'  (the context  in which it  is  usually practised and in which it  is  
usually  analysed  in  the  sociological  literature)  are  important  for  a  period  in  which 
government has tried to emulate many of the processes and logics of private capital (as 
discussed in Chapter One). But the organisation, ethos, purpose and expectation of 
public service or government is very different to that of most private enterprise. My 
work extends the theorisation of brand into the sphere of government, and thereby 
provides new insights into the importance of narrative-building and presentation, and 
government through emotion. Finally, the apparent intangibility of many techniques of 
branding,  and  the  importance  of  the  slipperiness  and  unruliness  of  brands,  their 
unpredictability,  potential  for  reincorporation  and  subversion  of  meaning  –  their 
retention of the 'margins of  indeterminacy'  (Lury,  2004:162) – is a characteristic  of 
branding  but  also  of  policy  practice.  As  discussed in  Chapter  One,  the  concept  of 
'community'  in  itself  is  attractive  precisely  because  of  its  'ambiguous  potential' 
(Schofield, 2002:680). It can connote both nostalgia for a lost past and excitement for  
building an alternative future. It can suggest innate similarity or commonality across 
difference. It  can be a tool  of self-organisation or of oppressive control.  This thesis 
provides  new evidence of  how such ambiguities constitute  both the meanings  and 
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practices of community cohesion policy.
I  have  demonstrated  how  the  ambiguities  of  community  cohesion  policy  and  of 
processes  of  governing through governmentality  (of  the conduct  of  the conduct  of 
conduct)  are  experienced  and  understood  through  their  emotional,  or  affective, 
dimensions. I have argued that my research demonstrates a need to take seriously the 
narratives – and feelings – of policy practitioners because these are the tools they use 
to  conduct  government,  with  consequences  for  the  populations  they  govern.  This 
should  not  be  confused  with  the  growing  trend  to  'measuring  happiness',  largely 
associated with behavioural economics, which tends to treat emotional responses (of 
populations) as more important than material measures of well-being or inequalities of 
power – which might fit more neatly into Burawoy's typology of policy sociology, as 
opposed to public sociology (Burawoy, 2004:1607). Rather, my research builds on what 
is  sometimes known as 'the affective turn'  in the sociological  literature which pays 
attention to the importance of embodied emotions in social processes (see Ahmed, 
2004b; Berlant, 2004; Calhoun, 2001; Fineman, 2000; Gould, 2010; Greco and Stenner, 
2008; Hoggett, 2000). My contribution to this literature is to extend existing insights on 
the role of affect in management of self (Coffey, 1999; Rose, 1999a, 1999b; Hunter, 
2005, 2010; Skeggs, 2002, 2004; Stenner et al, 2008); to understand the centrality of 
emotional  techniques  to  the  very  rational  processes  of  government;  and  to  pay 
attention both to how individuals operating within governance structures are subject 
to  difficult  negotiations  of  affect  and  power,  and  that  they  often  recognise  these 
complications and incommensurabilities of their work, but find ways to do it anyway. 
The relative 'silence' on these issues in the sociological literature (Barnes, 2008:477; 
though  see  Hunter,  2003  and  2005;  Lewis,  2000;  Lipsky,  1980;  Mayo  et  al,  2007) 
suggests that there is room to extend my research in this area further. In particular, my 
direct access to policy practitioners, beyond reliance on textual analysis, is a relatively 
unusual approach in governmentality studies (McKee, 2009:479). My extension of the 
attention  to  narratives  into  my  methodological  approach,  following  governing 
narratives to the 'elsewheres' they are built around, has demonstrated some of the 
contrapuntal, recursive elements of policy practice, and a new model for this type of 
exploration  and for  narrative  analysis.  It  has  also  provided new knowledge  on  the 
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processes  of  governing  the  specific  empirical  sites  which I  researched,  which have 
more  often  been  discussed  in  community  cohesion  literature  in  relation  to  the 
implementation, rather than the practice or making of, community cohesion policy.
Recognising  these  ambiguities  and  indeterminacies  means  recognising  the  difficult, 
unstable balances that many policy practitioners (and sociologists) attempt to make 
when interpreting and intervening in social worlds. Through the application and honing 
of  skill  and  technique  they  might  aim  to  deliver  ever  more  definite  and  precise 
definitions and solutions to social problems and questions of government. Yet context 
and interpretation is shifting, and therefore it can be important to remain open (and 
vulnerable to) the unknown (Gunaratnam, 2009:59). This vulnerability can be lived as 
an  emotional  reaction,  but  this  does  not  necessarily  mean it  is  against  reason,  or 
reactionary. As discussed in Chapter Two, if we treat emotion and affect as embodied 
commitments or reactions to ideas and situations, we may see how their power can 
also be harnessed to resist dominant norms (Sayer, 2005:100). Recognising emotion 
within practices of both (public) sociology and policy practice is important not for the 
sake of sentimentalism or even sympathy, but because structural and political power 
dynamics  are  experienced  through  emotional  filters  within  the  everyday.  Taking 
seriously  emotional  or  affective  commitments  within  government  does  of  course 
produce  yet  another  precarious  line  to  walk.  It  can  slip  into  a  masking  of  power 
relations, as in the video discussed earlier in this chapter, or more significantly in some 
of the manoeuvres around discourses of community and social capital associated with 
Third Way communitarianism, discussed in Chapter One.
Negotiating such precarious lines is part of the role of a reflective policy practitioner. It  
is  also  a  negotiation  central  to  critical  sociology.  As  both  researcher  and  policy 
practitioner  I  have  addressed,  particularly  in  Chapters  Two  and  Four,  some of  the 
overlaps and differences between these two roles. They are of course distinguished 
from one  another  by  their  different  aims;  as  a  social  researcher,  to  delineate  and 
investigate  theoretical  and empirical  questions  and seek  their  answers;  as  a  policy 
practitioner,  to  effect  changes  which  address  empirical  social  problems,  within  the 
parameters of government that are available. I am certainly not the only person who 
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moves between these roles,  and indeed my research uncovered many practitioners 
speaking in the language of, or using models of, sociological theory and research. Yet 
the  conclusions  to  which  this  led  them  to  might  not  necessarily  be  possible  or 
thinkable in the context of governing. For some, this was approached by silencing the 
difficulties  of  the  space  between ethical  commitments  as  felt  and  as  practised,  or 
developing other languages to talk  about  and bypass such uncomfortable positions 
(see  especially  Chapter  Four).  For  others,  it  meant  creating  new  narratives  which 
attempted  to  bring  these  two  imaginaries  together  (see  Chapters  Five  and  Six 
especially). And yet others attempted to live on a precarious line they felt might not be 
achievable,  but  which  was  worth  striving  towards,  by  keeping  in  mind  both  the 
contradictions  of  their  position  and  attempts  to  intervene  in  the  world  and 
distributions  of  power  and  meaning  despite  these  contradictions.  Perhaps  this 
attention  to  working  within  contradiction,  of  staying  uncomfortable,  is  essential  to 
living according to a sociological imagination, and to practising public sociology.
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Appendix One: Primary documentary sources
As is the nature of the relationship between the academy and policy-making, there is 
not  always  an  unambiguous  line  between those  sources  used as  'data',  and  those 
which form part of the academic debate. Thus this appendix is intended to give an idea 
of the amount of 'grey literature' accessed, used and analysed in the production of the  
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Dagenham
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Total number 
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43 (with 45 
people, plus 
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meeting)
20 (with 22 
people)
5 6 7
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interviewed 
(NB for 
Barking and 
Dagenham, 
Oldham and 
Peterborough 
this has been 
combined to 
preserve 
anonymity. For 
national 
interviews, I 
have referred 
to the 
interviewee's 
organisation 
only)
Mayor
Chief Exec
4 Directors
6 Cabinet 
Members
17 Assistant 
Directors 
3 Heads of 
Service
6 Policy 
Officers 
(various 
directorates)
2 Service 
managers 
(various 
directorates)
1 Police 
officer
1 voluntary 
sector 
representativ
e,
2 cultural 
commentato
rs (see 
Chapter 
Five), plus 
one large 
meeting of 
voluntary 
and 
community 
sector 
representativ
es.
2 x 
Communities 
and Local 
Government 
Department; 2x 
Improvement 
and 
Development 
Agency; Local 
Government 
Association; 
Commission on 
Integration and 
Cohesion; UK 
Borders Agency; 
Department of 
Industry, 
Universities and 
Skills; Institute 
for Public Policy 
Research; Young 
Foundation; 
New Local 
Government 
Network; 2 x 
Equalities and 
Human Rights 
Commission; 2 x 
Institute for 
Community 
Cohesion; 
Institute for 
Economic 
Affairs; Centre 
Forum; 
Department for 
2 x Community Cohesion Lead 
Officer, 2x Directors, 2 x Cabinet 
Member, Former Cabinet Member, 
Assistant Director, 2x Race Equality 
Council Head, Head of Equalities, 
Head of Strategy, 2x Interfaith 
workers, 2 x community and 
voluntary sector leaders, 
Neighbourhood and Community 
Engagement Manager, Chair of 
Cohesion Board
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Children, 
Schools and 
Families; 2 x 
Local 
Government 
Information 
Unit; Social 
Market 
Foundation.
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Appendix Three: Glossary of interviewees
Ahmed local authority officer in Peterborough
Alice senior local authority officer in Hackney
Alison worked for an organisation that represents local  government 
interest to national government and vice versa
Amrit worked in race equality in Peterborough
Andrew local government equalities officer
Angela senior local government officer in Hackney
Anne former Oldham councillor
Anthony policy manager in Hackney
Beverley worked  in  a  national-level  local  government  lobbying 
organisation
Brian a senior  local  police  officer  involved  in  community  cohesion 
work in Hackney
Colin councillor in Peterborough
Craig a police officer who had worked with community cohesion and 
PVE issues
David one of the most senior local government officers in Hackney
Donald senior officer in a free market think tank
Ed a national think tank researcher
Ellen local authority officer in Hackney
Emma a senior officer in Hackney
Erin worked for a community organisation in Peterborough
Evan senior manager in Hackney
Glen senior local authority officer in Oldham
Jack worked on community cohesion policy
Jim councillor in Oldham
Joe senior politician in Hackney
June senior local authority officer in Barking and Dagenham
Karen local authority officer in Hackney
Laura senior  officer  whose  work  was  partly  related  to  publicity  in 
Hackney
Liam voluntary sector leader in Barking and Dagenham
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Marie worked in equality policy
Mark an Assistant Director in Hackney
Michelle a leading councillor in Hackney
Mike interfaith leader in Oldham
Nadia a London councillor
Owen a policy practitioner in Hackney
Phil senior local authority officer in Barking and Dagenham
Philippa worked for a local government research organisation
Rachel social care manager in Hackney
Rafiq worked for an interfaith organisation in Oldham
Rob senior local government officer in Hackney
Ron senior officer at Oldham Council
Ruth local authority officer
Saida was directly engaged with implementing PVE in Hackney
Sally works in the voluntary sector in Hackney
Sam senior politician in Hackney
Siv senior local government officer in Hackney
Steve worked for a race equality organisation in Oldham
Stuart senior local authority officer in Peterborough
Thomas national community cohesion expert
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Appendix Four: Glossary of Abbreviations
ASBO Anti-Social Behaviour Order
BME Black and minority ethnic
BNP British National Party
CASE Collaborative studentship
CLG Communities  and  Local  Government  Department  (also  known  as 
DCLG)
COIC Commission on Integration and Cohesion
DCLG Department of Communities and Local Government (also known as 
CLG)
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
GOL Government Office for London
ICoCo Institute of Community Cohesion
LAA Local Area Agreement
LBH London Borough of Hackney
LGA Local Government Association
LSP Local Strategic Partnership
MPA Metropolitan Police Authority
PVE Preventing Violent Extremism
RAT Race Awareness Training
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